

# Andreia

STUDIES IN  
MANLINESS AND COURAGE  
IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY

EDITED BY

RALPH M. ROSEN

& INEKE SLUITER



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RALPH M. ROSEN AND INEKE SLUITER

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## CONTENTS

Chapter 1	Ineke Sluiter and Ralph M. Rosen, General Introduction .....	1
Chapter 2	Karen Bassi, The Semantics of Manliness in Ancient Greece .....	25
Chapter 3	G. I. C. Robertson, The <i>Andreia</i> of Xenocles: <i>Kouros</i> , <i>Kallos</i> and <i>Kleos</i> .....	59
Chapter 4	Sarah E. Harrell, Marvelous <i>Andreia</i> : Politics, Geography, and Ethnicity in Herodotus' <i>Histories</i> .....	77
Chapter 5	Ralph M. Rosen and Manfred Horstmanshoff, The <i>Andreia</i> of the Hippocratic Physician and the Problem of Incurables .....	95
Chapter 6	Adriaan Rademaker, "Most Citizens are <i>Europrôktoi</i> Now": (Un)manliness in Aristophanes .....	115
Chapter 7	Joseph Roisman, The Rhetoric of Courage in the Athenian Orators .....	127
Chapter 8	Edward E. Cohen, The High Cost of <i>Andreia</i> at Athens .....	145
Chapter 9	Peter T. Struck, The Ordeal of the Divine Sign: Divination and Manliness in Archaic and Classical Greece .....	167
Chapter 10	Marguerite Deslauriers, Aristotle on <i>Andreia</i> , Divine and Sub-human Virtues .....	187
Chapter 11	Helen Cullyer, Paradoxical <i>Andreia</i> : Socratic Echoes in Stoic 'Manly Courage' .....	213
Chapter 12	Myles McDonnell, Roman Men and Greek Virtue .....	235
Chapter 13	Onno van Nijf, Athletics, <i>Andreia</i> and the <i>Askêsis</i> -Culture in the Roman East .....	263
Chapter 14	Joy Connolly, Like the Labors of Heracles: <i>Andreia</i> and <i>Paideia</i> in Greek Culture under Rome .....	287
Chapter 15	Jeremy McInerney, Plutarch's Manly Women ....	319
Indices	.....	345

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## CHAPTER ONE

### GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Ineke Sluiter and Ralph M. Rosen

#### 1. *Introduction*

On September 11, 2001, four American planes were hijacked and turned into flying bombs, two of which were flown straight into the two towers of New York's World Trade Center. The Twin Towers collapsed, killing and burying thousands of people in tons of debris. In the mondial outrage over these attacks, they were condemned time and again as 'cowardly' and 'terrorist' attacks. When celebrities like Susan Sontag and Bill Maher, the host of the talk-show 'Politically Incorrect', went public with their view that whatever one could say about these attacks, they could hardly be called cowardly since the hijackers were in no way trying to get off scot-free but knew that their actions would cost them their lives,<sup>1</sup> the reactions were visceral: people were appalled at the thought of justifying the terrorists by giving them credit for courage. A spokesperson for the White House stated that "people have to watch what they say and watch what they do"—a statement quickly relieved of its dangerous implications for the First Amendment by the White House dropping its first half.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Of course, the action could be called 'cowardly' with equal justification and remaining within the same general descriptive framework: it is generally accepted that not giving people a chance to defend themselves (as in hitting someone from behind) may be called 'cowardly', and certainly neither the passengers on board the planes nor the people in the WTC were given a fair chance that way. However, it is true that embracing personal danger would certainly disqualify someone from being called 'cowardly'. This just goes to show that the same action may be called cowardly or courageous depending on one's point of view, and one therefore has to look for other explanations of their use, in this case the performative force of the utterance. Incidentally, Susan Sontag considers 'courage' a morally neutral value.

<sup>2</sup> Susan Sontag's comments appeared in *The New Yorker* of Sept. 24, 2001. The information in this paragraph is based in large part on an article in *The New York Times* of Sept. 29, 2001 by Celestine Bohlen.



What this incident shows among other things is how deeply political and rhetorical language can be, and to what extent it is colored by our perception of reality and in turn shapes that perception. If the only criterion for courage is ‘assumption of risk’, the attacks would be courageous—but if one looks at the actual *use* of such terms, one finds that the situation is far more complex. Calling someone or something ‘courageous’ is to commend that person or action, and thus has a performative force that far outstrips the merely descriptive—in that sense the visceral reaction of the general public, although unreflected, is very defensible. Conversely, calling an action ‘cowardly’ as part of its blanket condemnation may hide certain aspects of it which from a different ideological perspective could have led to a very different description—this may have been what Susan Sontag wanted to point out, although she picked a particularly bad moment for making an (incomplete) philosophical point about semantics. It turns out understanding what courage *means* is not necessarily enough to understand how the concept is *used*.

The United States chose to describe the actions as an ‘act of war’, and this made the discourse of courage and cowardice all the more poignant. In fact, warfare may always have been the outstanding opportunity for proving one’s manliness and courage. In Theodore Roosevelt’s eyes, for example, the ideals of nationalism and national unity were bound up with the opportunities offered by warfare.<sup>3</sup> War and the stress and dangers of combat formed an opportunity for men to recover a sense of manliness that had been impaired by the new industrial and bureaucratic order of the 1890s. “True men, he believed, proved themselves on the battlefield, not in bureaucracies”.<sup>4</sup> TR believed that the American nation should be grounded in racial hybridity, and accordingly, he consciously created his famous regiment of the Rough Riders as a melting pot of different ethnic backgrounds, again to be unified by the pressures of war. There were limits to his inclusiveness, however: no African or Asian Americans were selected to form part of the Rough Riders. However, when the Rough Riders engaged in their most famous exploit, the mad rush on and conquest of San Juan Hill in Cuba in 1898, the victorious commander found himself the leader of both white and black troops:

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<sup>3</sup> The next two paragraphs are based on Gerstle 2001, chapter 1.

<sup>4</sup> Gerstle 2001, 27.

without the help of the black Ninth and Tenth regiments, fighting side by side with the Rough Riders, the battle would probably have ended differently.

Gary Gerstle points out that this state of affairs could have led TR to extend his melting pot theories to include African Americans, but instead something else happened. Although happy to acknowledge the achievements of the black soldiers immediately after the event, TR proceeded systematically to diminish or eliminate the African American contribution to the victory in later accounts of the battle.<sup>5</sup> The black troops might have been excellent fighters, TR claimed, but “they were peculiarly dependent on their white officers”; and they failed to stay in their assigned positions and even ran, when, due to the high casualty rate among their officers, they were left on their own.<sup>6</sup> In other words, they did not behave as real men should have, but were cowardly. Note how TR chooses to frame his disparagement of the African American soldiers in terms of a discourse of courage and cowardice—the point is again a political one: the exclusion of the black population from the all-American melting pot. Incidentally, the doubts cast on the fighting abilities of black soldiers, even when commanded by white officers, would lead, e.g., to their virtual exclusion from combat in World War I (Gerstle 2001, 38).

The study of the nature and use of value terms in any community quickly leads the researcher to core issues of cultural identity and construction of self and society, including the behavioral norms by which one judges the social value of others and is in turn judged oneself. This goes for our own age as well as for earlier stages of history. As so often, the Graeco-Roman world offers us both a recognizable set of issues and the clinical distance to appreciate its singularity, in this case in the context of studying the social function of the discourse of manliness and courage and their opposites. It is this route into the heart of the classical world that the Classics Departments of the Universities of Leiden and Pennsylvania chose in organizing the first of what will hopefully be a series of Penn–Leiden Colloquia on Ancient Values. For this first installment, which took

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<sup>5</sup> Gerstle 2001, 35f.

<sup>6</sup> Gerstle 2001, 36f., pointing out the tendentiousness of these statements. Notice the emphasis on “staying in one’s assigned place” as a sign of manliness and courage—see below on Plato’s *Laches*.

place at the University of Leiden in June 2000, the organizers focused on the concept of ‘manly courage’, primarily represented by the Greek term ἀνδρεία. ‘Manliness’ or ‘manly courage’ seemed a particularly good starting point for our series, since the mainstreaming of feminist studies in the guise of gender studies offered new perspectives on and invited a fresh look at what it meant ‘to be a man’ in the ancient world.<sup>7</sup> At the same time, the Penn-Leiden venture intended to distinguish itself from existing publications in the field by firmly anchoring itself in the ancient lexicon, and exploring an ancient concept and its semantic field. This is not to say that we intended to restrict ourselves to a positivistic account of actual attestations of the terms. That such would be a mistake was pointed out already by Hugh Lloyd-Jones in 1971:<sup>8</sup> rather, the assumption underlying this project is that a sound philological exploration of the ancient conceptual framework should be supplemented by the study of actual behavior, and form the basis for extrapolation and further theorizing. Thus, this volume will comprise not only papers that concentrate on explicit ancient definitions of, and observations on, the concept of *andreia* and its Latin counterparts, and papers that study the semantic field of *andreia*, its synonyms, antonyms and its interactions with other ideas,<sup>9</sup> but also papers that investigate the ideological, rhetorical, and behavioral consequences of the ideas of manliness found through such philological study. We want to know what the word *andreios* means, what it *means* to be *andreios* to an ancient Greek, and what it means to deploy the rhetoric of *andreia*, in other words the way the concept is being *used*. We are interested in the discourse of manliness and its role in the construction of social order. Two ideas are therefore particularly relevant in this context. The first is the question of concept formation (section 2), the second is the ineluctably rhetorical and performative nature of the use

<sup>7</sup> See e.g. Foxhall and Salmon 1998a and 1998b, and on a more restricted issue Gleason 1995.

<sup>8</sup> Lloyd-Jones 1971, 2: “One of the most damaging sources of error about early Greek morality has been the assumption that in order to study the moral notions found in a work of art or in a society it is enough to list and analyze the words indicating moral concepts which occur in it”—this approach is legitimate in itself but should be supplemented by a “study of the actions performed . . . and the attitudes shown towards them” (ibid. p. 3).

<sup>9</sup> See also e.g. Collins 1998; Schmid 1985; Fränkel 1975, 87f.; 134ff.; 420f.; Cairns 1993; Wissmann 1997.

of such concepts in discourse, and in the construction of societal ideology (section 3). By way of example, we will take a closer look (section 4) at one area where the concept is used almost contra-intuitively, to denote the stance of the comic poet, before announcing and introducing the contents of this volume at greater length (section 5).

## 2. *Prototypical courage*

When one takes a specific item from the lexicon as one's point of departure in setting up a research project, questions of semantics and concept formation are of obvious methodological importance. Many classicists are still used to working with the framework of semantics as laid down by Plato, and particularly by Aristotle: a category has a definition, items in the world either fall under a concept or they do not, and all members of a category are equally representative of it, because the properties defining the category are shared by all members. This is something Socrates' interlocutors in Plato's dialogues seem to fail to grasp time and again: every time a 'what is x'-question is set up, they will begin their attempts to answer Socrates with an example of x, rather than with a definition, and Socrates usually has to spend some time in explaining the difference between the two by pointing out that the same example could also conceivably be called not-x, and that other examples that are also x have not been subsumed under the initial answer. And he persists in looking for the essential nature, as represented in a definition, of values and virtues, sharing the hope of so many people that there *is* such a thing as a fixed and stable value, even though they are always just behind the horizon, and performing the Socratic, or rather Platonic task of trying to stabilize what may be inherently unstable and flexible.

*Laches* is no exception: Socrates is drawn into a conversation between two fathers looking for advice on the best educational way to instill *andreia* in their sons, and the two generals whom the fathers had initially sought out for this purpose. Everyone agrees that *andreia*, manly courage, should be the goal of education: if the boys have that, they will have turned into real men. But Socrates points out that they will need an answer to two preliminary questions first, namely whether *andreia* can be taught at all, and even prior to that, what exactly *andreia* is. The general Laches has not a second's hesitation about

the answer (*Laches* 190e4): “if someone is willing to stay at his post, to fend off the enemy, and not flee, well, you can be sure that he’s got *andreia*”. A simple question, “what is *andreia* anyway?” gets the simplest of answers: “not running away in the middle of a battle, of course”.<sup>10</sup> Laches derives his example from his own experience, it is the martial context of *andreia* that seems to him to be most representative for the concept. Nevertheless, Socrates wants a more general answer from him.<sup>11</sup> As we said, the same process may be observed in other dialogues.<sup>12</sup>

In the light of more recent developments in the theory of concept-formation and categorization, however, it is possible that Socrates’ interlocutors deserve more credit than they usually get. Following pioneering work by Eleanor Rosch, many researchers in cognitive psychology and linguistics especially have come to a very different view of categorization. Experiments have shown that it is not the case that categories have no internal structure; in fact, some members of a category have a special cognitive status, they are judged to be ‘best examples’ of their category, and to be more representative of that category than are other examples. These ‘best examples’ are called ‘prototypes’, and people make judgments about degrees of prototypicality. This means that categories do have some internal structuring (even though these ‘prototype effects’ may be superficial only), and that membership is not a simple matter of sharing the properties expressed by a definition. Moreover, some categories may have fuzzy boundaries, which means that there could actually be degrees of membership, and furthermore, rather than adherence to a strict definition, what characterizes members of a category may be a family resemblance that can be schematized in a network-like structure. This principle can be transferred to semantic description.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. TR’s rhetorical strategy, discussed in section 1 above.

<sup>11</sup> Pl. *Lach.* 191c7ff. Τοῦτο τοίνυν, ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὅτι ἐγὼ αἴτιος μὴ καλῶς σε ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς ἡρόμην· βουλόμενος γάρ σου πυθέσθαι μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὀπλιτικῷ ἀνδρείους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἵππικῷ καὶ ἐν σύμπαντι τῷ πολεμικῷ εἶδει, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κινδύνους ἀνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους καὶ ὅσοι πρὸς πενίας ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικά ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσιν, καὶ ἔτι αὐτὸ μὴ μόνον ὅσοι πρὸς λύπας ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσιν ἢ φόβους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἡδονὰς δεινοὶ μάχεσθαι, καὶ μένοντας καὶ ἀναστρέφοντας.

<sup>12</sup> E.g. Pl. *Euth.* 5d8ff. (Euthyphro speaking): “I say that the pious is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer, be it about murder or temple robbery or anything else, whether the wrongdoer is your father or your mother or anyone else; not to prosecute is impious” (tr. Grube) (a salient example from his own immediate experience); Pl. *Charm.* 159b2ff.

The identity of the ‘best examples’ may vary from culture to culture. Heracles is a prototypical hero to the Greeks, and so is Achilles; the robin is the prototypical bird in the Anglo-American world, as can be shown by experiments: when one asks a group of Americans to name a bird, this is the one they will most frequently come up with, and they will rate a robin higher than a chicken on a scale of ‘goodness of example’ for the category ‘birds’. Similarly, apples are more central in the category of ‘fruit’ than are dates or olives. It is likely that when asked to think about ‘fruit’, people do not concentrate on an abstract definition, but rather revert to the basic-level entities, invoking the mental picture of a concrete piece of fruit—in modern America, again most likely an apple. Prototype effects even occur when strict logic should not allow them. For instance, there is no good reason why one odd number should be more ‘odd’ than another odd number: if ever there was one, this is a category which does not seem to allow degrees of membership, and indeed it does not. However, once again, it turns out that such judgments are being made, with some members having a privileged, more central status within their category.<sup>13</sup> So far, research has mainly concentrated on categories of ‘things in the world’ and grammatical/linguistic categories. But if we provisionally extend the results to structure of ‘meaning’ and to the language of evaluation, this would mean we have to give up on the notion (if anyone still cherished it) that there is a pigeonhole called ‘manly courage’, in which every example of such behavior is equally recognizable and central. Rather, the category of *andreios* behavior is constructed in language, and may be internally structured by centrality judgments.

So it would seem that what Socrates’ interlocutors offer as their preliminary answers corresponds to their understanding of prototypical occurrences of the value they are being asked to define—and

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<sup>13</sup> The cognitive-psychological theory on prototypes is well expounded in Lakoff 1987, 39ff.; Kleiber 1990; see also Rosch 1999 (1978), who emphasizes that category-formation is a culturally determined process: it is not arbitrary, in that it is related to the “things out there” in a “perceived world structure”, but it does maximize cognitive economy. Lakoff 1987, 79ff. also points out prototype effects of ways of reasoning that involve metonymy, typical examples, ideal cases, paragons, salient examples. Lakoff 1999 (heavily dependent on Lakoff 1987) insists on the superficial nature of prototype effects, which show nothing direct about the nature of categorization. Lakoff 1987, 150–1 discusses prototype effects in judging (odd) numbers. Verkuyl 2000 translates psychological theory into a linguistic/semantic approach to prototypes and stereotypes.

this is actually an intelligent and reasonable way to come to an understanding of how a concept works in a society, if one does not insist on essentializing ethical values (as Plato's Socrates does). Plato and the characters in his dialogues engage in the search for something many human beings crave: firm and unchangeable values to serve as a beacon for human conduct. But in fact, values like 'courage' turn out to be dependent to an important degree on what people will *say* about them. They are societal constructs that form part of a specific, often political, discourse. 'Manly courage' is not a value easily claimed for oneself: it has to be attributed to you by others. And the rationale behind such attributions may change with the context.

So, ask a general for his views on courage, and the likelihood is that he will come up with martial examples, and what is more: when one studies other ancient Greek sources, one cannot avoid the impression that war is the prototypical scene for manifestations of courage and manliness.<sup>14</sup> It offers the most immediate danger a man can be made to face, and the notion of 'danger', faced willingly and knowingly, is critical to the applicability of the label 'courage' / *andreia* (see Pl. *Laches* 191d3f. quoted in note 11). *Andreia* prototypically needs an agonistic context. Laches is therefore a reliable representative of Greek society, and someone the reader of the dialogue would have been able to identify with easily.<sup>15</sup>

### 3. *Rhetoric and construction*

We have already alluded to the fact that the way a concept functions in society is not just a matter of semantics, but also of the performative uses to which it is being put. And again, manliness and courage seem to constitute particularly pregnant examples of how this works, not just in Antiquity, but throughout Western society. Time and again, it turns out that the description of almost any given situation cast in military terms will allow for the behavior deployed

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<sup>14</sup> See Hobbs 2000, 86f.; Schmid 1992, 107 notes that while Socrates wants to extend the applicability of the notion of *andreia* to dealing with "the fear of drowning, or the pain of disease, or the travail of poverty, or political dishonour", he still accepts the test of battle as the premier or essential test and context for the manifestation of courage.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. also Gould 1987 and Tessitore 1994 for recent interpretations of courage in the *Laches*.

in it to be described in terms of courage or cowardice, manliness or its reverse. And such qualifications in turn serve the purpose of a strongly rhetorically colored condemnation or approval,<sup>16</sup> of warnings or protreptic. Notice that certain core characteristics of the terms are being preserved throughout this process: for one thing, one needs something that can be described as a ‘danger’ for the semantic field of *andreia* to be activated; for another, ‘courage’ is a good thing, so is ‘manliness’—if one wants to argue it is not, one will explain that in some cases ‘courage’ turns into e.g. ‘rashness’.

Ancient intellectuals were fully aware of this rhetorical flexibility of evaluative language. For instance, when Socrates in the *Republic* describes how the oligarchic character is corrupted into the democratic one, he paints a scene of internal conflict in the soul of the oligarchic young man: his soul is beleaguered by his relatives, who are trying to save him. But the fortress has already been seized by an occupying force of ἀλαζόνες λόγοι,<sup>17</sup> who refuse to accept any mediation by ambassadors, but support their rule by taking the following measures (*Rep.* 560c9ff.):

Once they’ve won the war, they denounce inhibition as simple-mindedness, deprive it of rights, and send it out into exile; they call self-control “cowardice”, drag its name in the gutter, and then expel it; they perpetuate the view that moderation shows lack of style and that frugality is stinginess, and then, with the help of a horde of futile desires, they banish them beyond their borders. (tr. Waterfield)

Αὐτοί τε κρατοῦσι μαχόμενοι, καὶ τὴν μὲν αἰδῶ ἡλιθιότητα ὀνομάζοντες ὠθοῦσιν ἔξω ἀτίμως φυγάδα, σωφροσύνην δὲ ἀνανδρίαν καλοῦντές τε καὶ προπηλακίζοντες ἐκβάλλουσι, μετριότητα δὲ καὶ κοσμίαν δαπάνην ὡς ἀγροικίαν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν οὖσαν πείθοντες ὑπερορίζουσι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν

In this context of outright battle, it is easy for the victorious party to denounce what everyone in normal circumstances knows is an instance of *sôphrosunê* as ‘unmanliness’ or ‘cowardice’ (*anandria*). The label serves a rhetorical and persuasive purpose: it becomes the ground for the expulsion of the quality. When the young man has thus been deprived, under false pretexts, of a number of virtues, vices are brought into his soul in a perversion of the stately procession-ritual of the Mysteries (560d8ff.):

<sup>16</sup> Hence Susan Sontag’s quandary, see section 1 above.

<sup>17</sup> Pl. *Rep.* 560c7–8, cf. 560c2 ψευδεῖς . . . καὶ ἀλαζόνες . . . λόγοι τε καὶ δόξαι.



Once they've taken over the mind of the neophyte, and purged and purified it for the great mysteries, they next waste no time before recalling from exile insubordination, disorder, extravagance, and uninhibitedness. They parade them in glory, with chaplets on their heads and with a full complement of attendants. They *sing the praises* of these qualities and *gloss over* their true nature: they call insubordination 'erudition', disorder 'freedom', extravagance 'magnificence', and *uninhibitedness* 'courage'. (tr. Waterfield)

Τούτων δέ γέ που κενώσαντες καὶ καθήραντες τὴν τοῦ κατεχομένου τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ τελουμένου ψυχὴν μέγαλοισι τέλεσι, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἥδη ὕβριν καὶ ἀναρχίαν καὶ ἀσωτίαν καὶ ἀναίδειαν λαμπρὰς μετὰ πολλοῦ χοροῦ κατὰγουσιν ἐστεφανωμένας, ἐγκωμιάζοντες καὶ ὑποκοριζόμενοι, ὕβριν μὲν εὐπαιδευσίαν καλοῦντες, ἀναρχίαν δὲ ἐλευθερίαν, ἀσωτίαν δὲ μεγαλοπρέπειαν, ἀναίδειαν δὲ ἀνδρείαν.

Socrates, of course, never doubts that the real and undisguised virtues exist, but he points out the power of language to perform feats of praise on deserving or undeserving objects, or to mask the true nature of things. There are things, and there are the performative speech-acts about those things. This analysis in the *Republic* is strongly reminiscent of Thucydides' famous analysis of the evaluative distortions of language occurring under stasis (Thuc. 3.82.4).<sup>18</sup>

In the fifth book of the *Republic* we find another example of Socrates showing a distinct awareness of the power of language to represent things in a certain light for persuasive purposes. Socrates is defending his proposal that the philosophers should rule in the cities, or that the present kings should become philosophers, and puts forward the view that the true philosopher will be concerned with each and every form of *sophia*. As a parallel for this, he points out that the true *erōtikos* (and Glaucon is supposed to be one) will deem everything in full bloom worthy of attention: this in itself is an act of judgment and evaluation (*Rep.* 474d6 δοκοῦντες ἄξιοι εἶναι ἐπιμελείας τε καὶ τοῦ ἀσπάζεσθαι).<sup>19</sup> This evaluation is then manifested in the choice of descriptive vocabulary (474d7ff.):

Isn't this how you and others like you behave towards good-looking young men? Don't you *compliment* a snub nose *by calling it* 'pert', *describe* a hooked nose as 'regal', and *call* one which falls between these two

<sup>18</sup> See Bassi in this volume; again *andrea* is one of the examples. Incidentally, note that the Platonic passage also describes a situation of stasis.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Thuc. 3.82.4 τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἄξιωσιν . . . τῇ δικαίῳσει.

extremes ‘perfectly proportioned’? Don’t you call swarthy young men ‘virile’ and pallid ones ‘children of the gods’? And who do you think invented the term ‘honey-colored’? It could only have been some lover *glossing over* and making light of a sallow complexion, because its possessor was in the alluring period of adolescence. In short, *you come up with every conceivable excuse and all kinds of terms* to ensure that you can give your approval to every alluring lad. (tr. Waterfield)

ἢ οὐχ οὕτω ποιεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς; ὁ μὲν, ὅτι σιμός, ἐπίχαρις κληθεὶς ἐπαινεθήσεται ὑφ’ ὑμῶν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ γρυπὸν βασιλικόν φατε εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δὴ διὰ μέσου τούτων ἐμμετρώτατα ἔχειν, μέλανας δὲ ἀνδρικοὺς ἰδεῖν, λευκοὺς δὲ θεῶν παῖδας εἶναι· μελιχλῶρους δὲ καὶ τοῦνομα οἶει τινὸς ἄλλου ποίημα εἶναι ἢ ἐραστοῦ ὑποκορίζομένου τε καὶ εὐχερῶς φέροντος τὴν ὠχρότητα, ἐὰν ἐπὶ ὥρᾳ ᾗ; καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ πάσας προφάσεις προφασίζεσθῆτε καὶ πάσας φωνὰς ἀφίετε, ὥστε μηδὲνα ἀποβάλλειν τῶν ἀνθούντων ἐν ὥρᾳ.

Again, the purpose is expressing approval and praise (*epainethêsetai*) through language for what in reality shows traits that are not automatically grounds for approval. As in the previous passage, the term ὑποκορίζεσθαι ‘call by an endearing or soft name’, is used for this process. This behavior under the influence of love becomes a literary topos.<sup>20</sup>

As our last example, we take a more dangerous version of the same phenomenon. In *Rep.* VI, Socrates is discussing the corruption of even the best souls. Such corruption takes place under the influence of the masses, in ecclesia, court of law or theater. Sophists only make themselves into the mouthpiece of the uneducated masses. It is in this context that Socrates brings up the metaphor of the Wild Beast, representing democracy, and the speech habits it provokes in its keeper (*Rep.* 493a9ff.):

Imagine that the keeper of a huge, strong beast notices what makes it angry, what it desires, how it has to be approached and handled, the circumstances and conditions under which it becomes particularly fierce or calm, what provokes its typical cries, and what tones of voice make it gentle or wild. Once he’s spent enough time in the creature’s company to acquire all this information, he calls it knowledge, forms it into a systematic branch of expertise, and starts to teach it, despite total ignorance, in fact, about which of the creature’s attitudes and desires is commendable or deplorable, good or bad, moral or immoral. *His usage of all these terms simply conforms to the great beast’s attitudes, and he describes as right and good things which are merely indispensable, since he*

<sup>20</sup> To give just one example, see Hor. *Sat.* 1.3.40ff., with Freudenburg 1993, 49f.

hasn't realized and can't explain to anyone else how vast a gulf there is between necessity and goodness. (tr. Waterfield)

Οἷόνπερ ἂν εἰ θρέμματος μεγάλου καὶ ἰσχυροῦ τρεφομένου τὰς ὀργὰς τις καὶ ἐπιθυμίας κατεμάνθανεν, ὅπη τε προσελθεῖν χρή καὶ ὅπη ἄψασθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁπότε χαλεπώτατον ἢ πραότατον καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίγνεται, καὶ φωνὰς δὴ ἐφ' οἷς ἐκάστας εἶωθεν φθέγγεσθαι, καὶ οἷας αὖ ἄλλου φθεγγομένου ἡμεροῦταί τε καὶ ἀγριαίνει, καταμαθὼν δὲ τὰντα πάντα συνουσίᾳ τε καὶ χρόνου τριβῇ σοφίαν τε καλέσειεν καὶ ὡς τέχνην συστησάμενος ἐπὶ διδασκαλίαν τρέποιτο, μηδὲν εἰδὼς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τούτων τῶν δογμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὅτι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ὀνομάζοι δὲ πάντα τὰντα ἐπὶ ταῖς τοῦ μεγάλου ζῴου δόξαις, οἷς μὲν χαίροι ἐκεῖνο ἀγαθὰ καλῶν, οἷς δὲ ἄχθοιτο κακά, ἄλλον δὲ μηδὲνα ἔχει λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοὶ καὶ καλά, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἑωρακὼς εἴη μήτε ἄλλω δυνατός δεῖξαι.

The language of the animal itself hardly seems to amount to articulate speech, but the important thing is that the 'political' speech of its keeper is supremely rhetorical and functional. His discourse has divorced itself completely from any role language might play in the transmission of knowledge, or the representation of truth and reality (τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, τῷ ὄντι), but the evaluations conveyed through it (calling something 'good' or 'moral') are dictated by the subjective emotions of the creature it wants to placate. 'Good' still *means* GOOD, but it may be applied to something that *is* bad.

In fact, we have encountered only one example where a word with pejorative meaning—again from the semantic field of 'courage' and cognates—was turned through persistent rhetoric into a positive evaluation: in his seminal study of the language of the Third Reich, Victor Klemperer draws attention to the amazing shift that was brought about in the usage of the words "fanatisch" and "Fanatismus" by the Nazis (1957, 16): "Wenn einer lange genug für heldisch und tugendhaft: fanatisch sagt, glaubt er schliesslich wirklich, ein Fanatiker sei ein tugendhafter Held, und ohne Fanatismus könne man kein Held sein. Die Worte fanatisch und Fanatismus sind nicht vom Dritten Reich erfunden, es hat sie nur in ihrem Wert verändert und hat sie an einem Tage häufiger gebraucht als andere Zeiten in Jahren".<sup>21</sup> More typically however, the discourse of evaluative lan-

<sup>21</sup> Cf. 1957, 24; 60 "Niemals vor dem Dritten Reich wäre es jemandem eingefallen fanatisch als ein positives Wertwort zu gebrauchen . . . (61) [fanatisch] bedeutete die Übersteigerung der Begriffe tapfer, hingebungsvoll, beharrlich, genauer: eine glorios verschmelzende Gesamtaussage all dieser Tugenden".

guage will be a way to spin-doctor events in the public opinion by using positive terms for what one wishes to be evaluated positively, and vice versa. Under the Third Reich, this also happened, of course, even if only in jest, as when the inhabitants of Berlin, who were suffering under the intense allied bombings, countered the claim that deaths caused by bombs were less honorific than falling in battle. The joke went: “what is cowardly?”, and the answer would be: “Wenn sich einer von Berlin weg zur Front meldet!”.<sup>22</sup> It is such rhetorical, persuasive and performative use of evaluative language that will turn out to be especially important in coming to grips with the ancient concept of *andreia*. In this volume we will therefore take both the approach of more conventional semantics, and that of rhetorical analysis. In some cases, we will try to get a view of *andreia* through lenses that distort or invert. In the next section we will illustrate how such processes of inversion can help us in the study of *andreia*.

#### 4. *Comic andreia*

One of the ways to get to the heart of any cultural value in Antiquity is to go right for the places where these values are parodied, inverted, or otherwise transgressed. A whole play of Sophocles, for example, tells us less about audience *reception* of tragedy—their attitudes, expectations, and literary standards—than does the *paratragedy* of Aristophanes’ plays. Throughout classical literature, or so we claim, there existed a trope of comic *andreia* (surviving today as well) with certain recurrent themes that allow us to delineate clearly—albeit in a slightly inverted way—the most fundamental aspects underlying so many of the other ancient treatments of the concept.

In this section, we will focus on a few key passages in Aristophanes in which the figure of the comic poet is constructed as an embodiment of *andreia*. Indeed, we would go so far as to say that *andreia* is the most essential, defining characteristic claimed or projected by any comic poet whose literary thrust is satire and mockery. Aristophanes

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<sup>22</sup> Klemperer 1957, 129; cf. the persuasive use of the accusation of *anandria/kakia* leveled against Socrates by Crito because he chooses to stay in prison rather than to protect his children (Pl. *Crito* 44b–46b).

would certainly fall into this category, Menander much less so, but there are also a number of other, non-dramatic poets: the iambographers, Horace and Catullus at the right moments, Juvenal, Martial and others. All these poets at one point or another portray themselves in their work as *obsessed* with *andreia*, or at least with a notion to which they sometimes give the name of *andreia* or its Latin equivalents. The interaction of two factors sets this kind of poetry apart from others: first, the centrality of the poet's subjective voice, his 'ego', as principal narrator; second, the stance of external beleaguerment or oppression (however feigned) that allows the poet to register his indignation and establish himself in a perennially antagonistic relationship with an outside world. A fictionalized space emerges in which the poet remains in pitched battle against an enemy who may be as specific as a named target, or as abstract and impersonal as a lifestyle or a mode of behavior that he finds particularly irksome. Real-life battlefields, of course, are commonly invoked as ideal sites of *andreia*, as we saw above, since here is where feats of bravery and courage, so often hailed as peculiarly 'manly' virtues, are played out. So it makes perfect sense that polemical poets would claim for themselves some measure of *andreia* in their own metaphorical military campaigns. On the surface, this might even appear to be a noble stance, and certainly such poets try with tongue in cheek to convince their audiences that it is. But in fact, their claims to *andreia* are continually ironized by the fact that their version of it clashes with its standard formulation.

We have already seen that the rhetoric of courage is well served by its prototypical context of the battlefield—this is true in all periods. However, its prototypical representatives or embodiments change over time. In the *Iliad*, it is still the aristocratic hero, who single-handedly and furiously engages with the enemy. But fifth-century Athens is no suitable context for this kind of *andreia*, which clearly has its dangerous and anti-social side. In this period, the martial valor and bravery so often a part of the rhetoric of *andreia* functions ideally as a delicate balance between personal and social concerns: in war the hoplite who displays *andreia* will still achieve a conspicuous level of personal *kleos*, what Athenians would further specify as *axiôma*; but this *kleos* comes into being because his acts of *andreia* were part of a common goal, directed towards a common, external enemy. *Kleos* arises from *andreia*, that is, because the community values the

kind of behavior that leads to military victory, and hence, the stability of the state.<sup>23</sup>

The battles that the comic poets take on, on the other hand, most often involve segments of the domestic community itself, and invariably originate in allegations of personal indignation. Only he, after all, has the power to see what others are too blind to see, to perceive the world's wrongs, describe them, and register his anger. We can see now how subtle the comic poet's assimilation of the rhetoric of *andreia* is, and how amusing as well: for he can end up implying that his *andreia* is far more meaningful than any conventional *andreia*, since he is a *solitary* individual taking on an enemy that most people cannot even see! In this way he reverts to archaic codes of honor. His goal, like that of the conventionally *andreios* man, is to preserve the health and stability of the community, but there is a difference between the two: our poet is all alone in the world, a whistleblower whose poetic success, within the fiction of his work, depends in a sense upon him never being heard. The humor arises ultimately, therefore, from the clash between the poet's grandiose claims to a conventionally social virtue and his persistent self-portrait as a dyspeptic, narcissistic, somewhat marginalized underdog with a Cassandra-complex.

In Aristophanes, of course, the voice claiming to be the poet's surfaces mostly in the parabases. One of his most elaborate parabases occurs in *Wasps*, 1015ff., where all the hallmarks of the comic poet's stance are brilliantly laid out. The chorus leader begins by noting the poet's indignation at the audience: "The poet wants today to find fault with the audience; for he says that they have wronged him, even though he has in the past done so many good things for them . . ." (1016–17). It becomes clear later in the passage that the poet is annoyed specifically at the fact that he was defeated in the previous year's competition with *Clouds*, and the rest of the parabasis tries to show how undeserved this fate was. The coryphaeus predictably proceeds to lay out all the poet's previous services to the state, and the list culminates with an over-the-top claim about his 'extraordinary' attacks on Cleon (1029–35):

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<sup>23</sup> Cf. Smoes 1993.

And when he first began to produce his plays, he says that he did not attack just anyone, but working up the spirit of Heracles, he went after the greatest targets, boldly (θρασεώς) and unflinchingly confronting (ξυστάς εὐθύς) from the start the jagged-toothed one himself. . .

Οὐδ' ὅτε πρῶτόν γ' ἦρξε διδάσκειν, ἀνθρώποις φησ' ἐπιθέσθαι ἀλλ' Ἡρακλέους  
ὀργήν τιν' ἔχων τοῖσι μεγίστοις ἐπιχείρειν, θρασεώς ξυστάς εὐθύς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς  
αὐτῷ τῷ καρχαρόδοντι,

After more comic hyperbole, the coryphaeus continues at 1036:

. . . seeing a monster such as this, the poet says he was not afraid and took no bribes, but fought, and indeed continues to fight (πολεμεῖ) even now, on your behalf.

τοιούτων ἰδὼν τέρας οὐ φησιν δείσας καταδωροδοκῆσαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἔτι  
καὶ νυνὶ πολεμεῖ.

In the climax to the passage, the poet is referred to (1043) as ἀλεξίκακος, “protector from evil”, and τῆς χώρας τῆσδε καθαρτήν, “cleanser of this land”. And so, the coryphaeus concludes (1047), it is unconscionable that the audience refused to recognize that the poet’s production of *Clouds* was better comic drama than anyone had ever heard. As we would say in English, “they owed ‘im one” for his audacity, his fearlessness, and his self-sacrifice. The following year (421), Aristophanes returned to these same themes in the parabasis of *Peace*, repeating *verbatim* from *Wasps* some of the lines about his attacks on Cleon, and stating the *quid pro quo* even more plainly (759–61):

Seeing a monster such as this, I was not afraid, but I kept my ground, fighting on your behalf and also on behalf of the islands. On this account, then, it is appropriate for you to repay the favor and not to forget all I’ve done.

Τοιούτων ἰδὼν τέρας οὐ κατέδεισ', ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν πολεμίζων ἀντείχον ἀεὶ  
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων νήσων. ὦν εἵνεκα νυνὶ ἀποδοῦναι μοι τὴν χάριν ὑμᾶς εἰκὸς  
καὶ μνήμονας εἶναι.

These battles, of course, are strictly metaphorical, but they evoke the prototypical context for manliness and bravery, even though the bravery and courage the poet claims for himself refer to literary efforts. He feigns a solemnity worthy of a Homeric warrior or an Athenian war hero, but his eye is really on little more than the victory at the festival. The climax of the *Peace* parabasis suggests the

appropriate spirit in which the poet's claim of self-sacrifice and bravery should be taken (767–74):

And we advise that bald men should work on getting me a victory. For if I win, everyone will say at the dinner-table and at parties: “To Baldy, Baldy, give some dessert, and don’t hold it back from the man whose forehead is that of the noblest of poets!”

Καὶ τοῖς φαλακροῖσι παραινοῦμεν ξυσπυδάζειν περὶ τῆς νίκης· πᾶς γάρ τις ἐρεῖ νικῶντος ἐμοῦ κατὰ τραπέζῃ καὶ ξυμποσίοις· φέρε τῷ φαλακρῷ, δὸς τῷ φαλακρῷ τῶν τρωγαλίων, καὶ μὴ φαίρει γενναιοτάτου τῶν ποιητῶν ἀνδρὸς τὸ μέτωπον ἔχοντος

These parabolic passages all highlight the poet's active ‘military’ service on behalf of the city, and the bravery this warfare entails. Is this *andreia*? In these passages, at least, the word *andreia* itself does not actually appear, so one might wonder whether we are in fact justified in seeing this stance as a stance of *andreia*.

The rhetoric of *andreia* in other Aristophanic passages, however, combined with the activation of the prototypical context for *andreia* in our passages, clinches the connection. To begin with, any time a poet would presume to take on the character of Heracles *alexikakos*, we can be sure that he has *andreia* in mind as a central attribute. The entire conceit in *Frogs* in which Dionysus tries to impersonate Heracles for his descent into Hades is predicated explicitly on Heracles’ reputation for *andreia*. After Dionysus (dressed as Heracles) collapses in fear at the sight of Aeacus, the conversation with his servant Xanthias turns on the question which of the two has more *andreia*. Dionysus claims at 489–90 that the simple fact that he stood up as soon as he collapsed, and had the decency to clean up the odiferous mess he made was a mark of *andreia*. Xanthias responds sarcastically (491ff):

XA: Wow, those are *andreia* feats all right, by Poseidon!

DI: Well, I’d say so.

Weren’t you afraid of the din of his words  
And his threats?

XA: No way! I didn’t give it a second thought.

DI: Alright, then: since you’re so spirited and *andreios*,  
You take this club and lion skin and become me,  
Mr. Fearless-Guts!

XA ἀνδρεῖά γ’, ὦ Πόσειδον.

DI

οἶμαι νῆ Δία.



Σὺ δ' οὐκ ἔδεισας τὸν ψόφον τῶν ρημάτων  
Καὶ τὰς ἀπειλάς;

XA οὐ μὰ Δι οὐδ' ἐφρόντισα.

ΔΙ ἴθι νυν, ἐπειδὴ ληματιῶς κἀνδρείος εἶ,  
Σὺ μὲν γενοῦ ἦ γὰρ τὸ ῥόπαλον τουτὶ λαβὼν  
Καὶ τὴν λεοντὴν, εἴπερ ἀφοβόσπλαγχνος εἶ

Clearly, when Aristophanes claims to have taken on the role of a latter-day Heracles in his poetic attacks on politicians like Cleon, he is assuming for himself the virtue that Heracles is the 'best example'-embodiment of, *andreia*. If the parabases of *Wasps* and *Peace*, with their foregrounding of fearlessness and bravery and their invocation of Heracles were all we had, we could still comfortably maintain that Aristophanes (and indeed all comic poets engaged in satire and mockery) claim a form of *andreia* for their poetic enterprises, even if other terminology and metaphors are used to convey it. Such is the imaginary environment they have constructed through their rhetoric, a battlefield in which the comic poet willingly and knowingly confronts equally self-construed dangers.

In the parodos of *Frogs*, the chorus of mystic initiates casually, yet convincingly, makes an explicit connection between *andreia* and the very practice of comic mockery. Much has been written about this passage, with its apparent syncretism of Eleusinian and Dionysiac ritual, but it is hardly controversial to characterize it as programmatic: the heart of the section features an almost parabolic speech in anapaestic tetrameters—a meter unique for a parodos, though common in parabases—in which the chorus commands the uninitiated to stay clear of their rites. In this case, however, the 'rites' they have in mind are not the rites of conventional religion, but rather those of comic poetry, specifically the poetry of mockery and invective. At line 372, the chorus, having warned off the undeserving and unfit, begins a strophic song of exhortation to those who understand satirical poetry:

Proceed now, all of you, with *andreia*  
To the flowery folds  
Of the meadows, stamping out the dance,  
Mocking  
And joking and insulting  
For lunch has been most fortifying.

Χώρει νυν πᾶς ἀνδρείως  
Εἰς τοὺς εὐανθεῖς κόλπους

Λειμώνων ἐγκρούων  
 Κάπισκώπτων  
 Καὶ παίζων καὶ γλευάζων.  
 Ἡρίσθηται δ' ἐξαρκούντως.

The passage proceeds with a series of famous examples of mockery, some lightheartedly picaresque, others graphically obscene and *ad hominem*. The effect of the parodos as a whole is in keeping with the stance of the comic poet discussed earlier: we see a defensiveness about the activity of comedy itself and a soupçon of indignation that, within the conventional fabric of society, the comic poet is an oppressed, misunderstood individual. It is as if the poet himself asks: Who in his right mind would take up such a genre, except the man endowed with vast amounts of what we might call *andreia*? It seems at first to sound like a noble cause (“Proceed now, all of you, with *andreia* to the flowery folds . . .”) until bathetically deflated with the mention of jesting, insult, and even lunch.

Roman satirists, too, frequently conceptualized their poetic enterprise much as the poets of Athenian Old Comedy did: like them, the Roman satirists are self-righteously indignant at their contemporary society and their poetry becomes a kind of warfare that requires bravery, daring, strength and a host of other qualities frequently subsumed under the term *andreia* and its Latin cognates. To give just one example: Juvenal’s first satire is a brilliantly funny diatribe about how the excesses of Roman society compel one to write satire, to take up the pen as a metaphorical weapon in the battle for a putative moral corrective. Juvenal makes it clear that he works in a time-honored ‘military’ tradition:

Ense velut stricto quotiens Lucilius ardens  
 Infremuit, rubet auditor cui frigida mens est  
 Criminibus, tacita sudant praecordia culpa. (165–7)

As often as burning Lucilius raged on as if with drawn sword  
 The listener who has a cold mind grows red with shame  
 At his crimes, and his body sweats with silent guilt.

It is a nasty business, for as Juvenal continues, the decision to attack people will make them angry (*inde ira et lacrimae*), and you must be well prepared for the battle that will ensue: *tecum prius ergo voluta//haec animo ante tubas; galeatum sero duelli//paenitet* (“and so think it over first in your mind, before the trumpet sounds; once your helmet is on, it is too late to decide you are not up for the fight”).

Like the Greek poets of Old Comedy, the Roman satirists too wanted to portray themselves as brave and aggressive in their poetic warfare and so claimed for themselves qualities appropriate to their task. These poets make consistent, functionally analogous claims to a virtue that is, or could be, articulated by their respective cultures as *andreia* or equivalents. In order to do so they construct rhetorically a situation in which an adequate resemblance can be perceived to the prototypical environment for manly courage: the dangers of the battlefield.

### 5. *In this volume . . .*

The body of this volume begins with a contribution by Karen Bassi focusing on the archaeology of the semantics of *andreia* in an attempt to understand and contextualize Thucydides' views of language and meaning (chapter 2). She provides the setting for the following studies of archaic and classical Greek conceptions of *andreia*, which each take their own particular approach: George Robertson discusses the intriguing and ambivalent connection between visual appearance and manliness in archaic Greek poetry (chapter 3). Sarah Harrell looks at those instances in Herodotus where *andreia* is cause for wonder because it is attributed to an unexpected type of subject: a woman or a barbarian (chapter 4). Ralph Rosen and Manfred Horstmanshoff investigate the conceptual connections between Plato's *Laches* and the Corpus Hippocraticum with regard to the relation between courage and knowledge in a case study of ancient medical approaches to incurable disease. In their contribution, it is the doctor, not the patient, who is cast in the role of the warrior against disease (chapter 5). Adriaan Rademaker demonstrates in an *a negativo* approach how comic inversions of manliness fit into fourth-century popular morality on this issue (chapter 6), while Joseph Roisman tackles the fourth-century orators to show the extreme rhetorical malleability of the concept of manly courage. The concept turns out to be flexible to the point where it can equally be applied in recommending war (its prototypical environment) as in the 'manly-courageous' abstention from rash action (chapter 7). Edward Cohen's paper extrapolates the picture of manliness emerging from the more philologically oriented papers to demonstrate the again paradoxical economical consequences of the ancient Greek concept of manliness: the ideology of manli-

ness left an important part of the economic arena free to be managed by women and slaves (chapter 8).

Moving from popular morality and economics to the relations between human beings and gods, Peter Struck examines four case-studies of the literary representation of divination, construing them as the ultimate crucible of manliness: the divine sign creates an arena in which men can compete to prove their mettle (chapter 9). From these literary texts, we then move to philosophy, and hence to texts that explicitly concern themselves with *defining* and *pinpointing andreia*: Marguerite Deslauriers' paper (chapter 10) shows connections to those of Sarah Harrell and Peter Struck: in explaining why according to Aristotle neither women and slaves nor gods can properly be called *andreios*, she demonstrates that in Aristotle's view neither beings with imperfect or non-functional rationality (like women and slaves) nor gods can ultimately act "for the sake of the noble", and that is the defining characteristic of *andreios* behavior. Helen Cullyer tackles the Stoic interpretation of Plato's *Laches* and shows how Chrysippus tries to resolve its final *aporia* (chapter 11).

The last part of the book is taken up by four papers dealing with conceptions of virtue and manliness under the Roman republic and during the Second Sophistic, and it again starts with a semantic study with cultural implications: Myles McDonnell follows the transformations of the concept of *virtus* in the Roman republic in the context of a socio-linguistic theory of semantic borrowing. The late Republic shows two models of *virtus* existing side-by-side, one based on the Hellenistic model where ethical values come into play, the other on traditional Roman values where 'manliness' is judged in behavioral terms only as the occurrence of actual instances of martial prowess (chapter 12). Onno van Nijf defends the continuing importance of athletics in Second Sophistic ideals of manliness against the modern trend to emphasize the power of rhetoric and education in 'making men' (chapter 13). On the other hand, Joy Connolly demonstrates the lengths sophists had to go to in order to defend themselves against charges of effeminacy, and to recast their oratorical performances in terms of the rhetoric of manly courage. Once again, through their rhetorical framing of their behavior and actions, these actors created their own battlefields, a rhetorical arena where honor was to be won (chapter 14). Finally, Jeremy McInerney looks into Plutarch's work *Mulierum Virtutes* and compares Plutarch's claims that male and female virtues are identical to the more conservative

picture emerging from the vignettes in that work. Female bravery turns out to be confined to quite specific categories of behavior, is provoked whenever social order is threatened, and functions to spur the men into the actual actions that will set the situation straight. Such a view of the relation between men and women in a sense reflects the relationship between Rome and Greece (chapter 15).

## 6. *Outlook*

The papers in this volume take a variety of approaches, some lexical and semantic, some conceptual and extrapolating, to the study of a central issue in the self-definition of any Greek speaking man: in some cases the focus seems to be on ‘what it is to be a man?’ or ‘what it is to be courageous?’, but in fact, the central question is ‘what is it to deserve the predicate of *andreios*?’ in concrete instantiations of the concept.

The concept of *andreia* is so malleable that any number of characters can be qualified by it provided the speaker creates the right kind of rhetorical framing: heroes, Heracles, *kouroi aikhmêtai*, tyrannicides, hoplites, philosophers,<sup>24</sup> comic poets, recipients of the right kind of education, however comically distorted, athletes, Spartans, no! Athenians, and even those characters that seemed excluded from it, like women, slaves and barbarians—even though this remains cause for wonder. And *andreia* functions not only on the horizontal axis, but also plays a role in segmenting the vertical axis from animals to human beings to gods. Many papers deal with all possible ways of expressing one’s *andreia*? By looking the right way, or sporting a beard? By one’s words? By one’s deeds? And does only active behavior count? Or is the patient submission to what is inevitable also a form of courage? These issues, it turns out, appear in any number of genres: epic, historiography, ethnography, tragedy and comedy, rhetoric, philosophy, lyric, and even absent statues. To all these questions we tried to find answers, and a number of those answers can be found in this volume. However, we cannot end this

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<sup>24</sup> See Smoes 1993 and 1995 for the way different actors can become salient examples of *andreia* in different periods, from Achilles in the *Iliad*, to the hoplite fighter, to the philosopher (Socrates in particular). For the heroic and *andreios* philosopher, see also Hobbs 2000, 240ff.

introduction without sharing with you how our colleague from Leiden, the now emeritus Professor of Ancient History Henk Versnel, (un?)wittingly revealed his vision on this material. It was the last day of the conference and we were all standing outside the School of Arts of the University of Leiden, waiting for the session to start. From our position, we had a great view of the unbelievably big and gleaming motorcycle on which the janitor of the building had just made his loud and impressive arrival. Henk threw a wistful glance at the huge metal monster and sighed: "If only I had one of those: then I would be a real man!"

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## CHAPTER TWO

### THE SEMANTICS OF MANLINESS IN ANCIENT GREECE

Karen Bassi

#### 1. *Introduction*

The history of manliness in the West takes shape in the works of Greek authors and visual artists who represent and valorize the activities, dispositions, and virtues that are normative for males. The challenge is to identify the salient features that constitute this history in the ancient Greek sources and, by extension, in the western imaginary. My aim in this paper is to show how the development of manliness as an abstract concept, distinguished from masculinity as a physical or biological attribute, is a significant and complex feature of Athenian political self-representation. The account of this development includes a consideration of *anêr* compounds in epic, of *andreia* and related terms in fifth-century Athenian drama and historiography, and finally of Plato and Aristotle's discussions of 'political manliness' (*andreia politikê*) in the fourth century BCE. In restricting the lexicon of 'manliness' to *anêr*- or 'man'-specific words, I omit numerous others which, like *andreia*, are routinely translated as 'bravery' or 'courage' in English (i.e. θάρσος, ἀλκή, μένος, etc.).<sup>1</sup> This restriction is purposeful since conclusions that take these English (or French or German) equivalents as their starting point often elide the specificity of the Greek lexicon. 'Courage' may be a suitable translation of these various terms as they refer to similar qualities, but the distinctiveness of being a man is specified in the semantic extension from the concrete entity to the abstract ethical quality, i.e. from *anêr* to *andreia*.<sup>2</sup> The semantic history of manliness is one in which what it means to

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<sup>1</sup> For a general comprehensive study of 'courage' as a Greek virtue, see Smoes 1995.

<sup>2</sup> On this aspect of semantic change, see Hock 1986, 290.



be a man begins as an observable act of facing death on the battlefield in epic poetry and becomes a defining ethical characteristic of the citizen in the fifth-century *polis*. In tracing the development of this ethical vocabulary we are also tracing the transition from an individual martial ethos to a collective political one.<sup>3</sup>

This transition can be mapped in a variety of ways in the ancient sources; a lexical or semantic map is obviously partial and selective. Still, culturally significant words like *andreia* have histories, not simply in the sense that they have etymologies or because they stay in circulation (or do not) over a significant period of time. While these aspects of the history of lexical meaning are important, more pertinent to the present discussion is the process by which a particular word becomes the subject of definition. With the advent of the modern dictionary, all words in a given language are the potential subjects of systematic categorization and definition, based on 'historical principles'.<sup>4</sup> The idea of a monumental compilation of words and their equivalencies prompts two questions with respect to ancient practices: What principles generate the activity of defining words and their meanings, and Why do the meanings of certain words or classes of words require discussion and definition? More generally: What is the role of semantics in establishing and maintaining ideological formations?

A detailed study of ancient Greek theories and practices of definition is beyond the scope of this paper, but I would like to begin with two general propositions.<sup>5</sup> First, that abstract ethical terms necessarily have a more sustained history of definition, including debates over

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<sup>3</sup> See Winter 1995, 259–60, who argues that evidence for this transition is discernible as early as the 8th century BCE in Greece, i.e. in the Homeric poems.

<sup>4</sup> See Murray on the *OED* 1977, 135–6: "In planning the work Trench adopted the historical principle in lexicography, first stated by a German, Franz-Passow, in 1812, which had already been followed in England by H. G. Liddell and R. Scott in their Greek-English Lexicon (1843). The aim was to show the life history of every word, its origin and any changes of form and meaning. As an historian of language, not a critic, the lexicographer's task was to collect *all* words, rather than to select *good* words, and whereas quotations were used by Johnson and his successors to define words, now their chief use would be to show historical changes in sense".

<sup>5</sup> Etymology, exemplified by Plato's *Cratylus* and including debates over whether the relationship between words and their referents is natural or conventional, comprises the most systematic approach to lexical meaning in the ancient Greek sources. But the search for the origins of words, especially when those origins are ascribed to nature or *physis*, has the effect of neutralizing the contemporary historical, social,

their meaning, than words for objects whose existence in the world is verifiable by empirical observation and demonstrated by ostension. Thus, one of the essential characteristics of ethics as an object of study is the need to define the virtues it encompasses, especially insofar as these can never be exhausted in the observable and discrete activities of individual human agents.<sup>6</sup> Second, that an interest in defining a given abstract quality or virtue (like manliness) implies that the quality is a significant and contested feature of cultural identity. This last proposition may seem obvious or, conversely, it may be objected that our sources are too few to give it any statistical weight. What seems obvious, however, must be explained even as we understand that any conclusions about language-use in a finite number of texts are necessarily provisional. I should add that the activity of defining words is itself broadly defined here to include any instance where a Greek author discusses what a word means and is not limited to the formal practice commonly attributed to Prodicus of Ceos.<sup>7</sup>

In *Word and Concept in Thucydides*, June W. Allison concludes that, “[Thucydides’] History must be reckoned as the earliest extant text from which one can isolate a definition of a concept by means of metalinguistic vocabulary”.<sup>8</sup> Our discussion of the semantic history of *andreia* begins *in medias res* with a passage that illustrates Allison’s conclusion, namely, Thucydides’ famous description of the malleability of language, negatively figured in the dissociation of words and the activities they customarily describe in the time of *stasis* or civil war. The passage is a good starting place for two related reasons. First,

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and political significance of the word in question. On ancient etymology and etymology, see Sluiter 1997, 159–63. Of particular interest is her attention to the ethical aspect of etymology (161–2). See also, her discussion of Plato’s *Cratylus*, 177–88. The fragmentary and variously titled *Glosses* of Philitas of Cos (4th c. BC), the *Lexeis* or *Glossai* of Aristophanes of Byzantium (3rd and 2nd c. BCE), and the *Alphabetical Collection of all Words* compiled by Hesychius of Alexandria (5th c. CE?)—among other similar works that are known to have existed—attest to the ancient interest in lexicography. The tenth-century *Suda* has been called a “cross between a dictionary and an encyclopedia” (N. G. Wilson 1983, 145). On the *Suda* see also Lemerle 1986, 143–6. For a brief but informative essay on the history of the dictionary, see Crystal 1987, 108–11.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Allison 1997, xiii on abstractions as terms that by definition do not have “concrete objects of reference”.

<sup>7</sup> For an overview of the history of Greek semantics, see Sluiter 1997, 149–224. See also, Allison 1997, 1–18.

<sup>8</sup> Allison 1997, xi; cf. 7. See also, Sluiter 1997, 177.

it demonstrates how the relationship between abstract terms and their referents is an important feature of Athenian political rhetoric. And second, it points to the recognition value of *andreia* (among other terms) as a virtue or ethical term whose meaning is contested in the fifth century. In discussing the sophists, Ineke Sluiter notes a correspondence between theories of language and ethical views, namely, that the rejection of “an accurate correspondence between names and things” is coincident with a “relativist view of ethics”.<sup>9</sup> This coincidence neatly summarizes Thucydides’ discussion of language-use in the time of civil war where the ‘things’ under discussion are ‘deeds’ (*History* 3.82.4):

In making a judgment, they [the partisans in *stasis*] changed the values that words customarily gave to deeds. Rash daring was considered manliness for the sake of the party (*ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος*), cautious hesitation was considered specious cowardice, moderation was considered a disguise for a lack of manliness (*τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα*), and comprehensive intelligence was considered a complete inability to act.

καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ. τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, μέλλησις δὲ προμηθὴς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνητὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἄργον.

In his discussion of this passage, John Wilson argues that the customary meanings of words did not change; in fact, an accurate understanding of what is at stake depends on words *retaining* their usual meanings.<sup>10</sup> Thus, ‘deeds’ (*τὰ ἔργα*) that traditionally had been described in pejorative terms were, during the time of *stasis*, described in positive terms, and vice versa. Wilson argues that the subject of *ἐνομίσθη* “must here be some act or non-linguistic phenomenon, not a name or term or description” (19). But this seems too restrictive, since the examples Thucydides gives can conceivably apply to what men did, thought, and said (i.e. to a ‘linguistic phenomenon’).<sup>11</sup> And, of course,

<sup>9</sup> Sluiter 1997, 176–7; cf. 183.

<sup>10</sup> Wilson 1982, 18–20, followed by Loraux 1986, 102–3. See also Allison 1997, 169 and Hogan 1980, 146.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Hogan 1980, 145: “*ἐνομίσθη* invokes not what men said but what they thought. During *stasis* citizens confounded in thought previously distinguishable concepts”. This seems unnecessarily vague. Thucydides is clearly concerned with the linguistic expression of what men thought and the actions that followed from this. Cf. Allison 1997, 171: “It is imperative to reiterate that the object of attention in

the practice of referring to activities by uncustomary words and phrases—the general rubric under which all the examples fall—is itself a linguistic phenomenon. According to Thucydides, the equivalent relationship between words and their referents (including other words) is conventional and therefore subject to change by virtue of the temporal and situational context in which they are used. As a feature of Thucydides' description of past events, this lexical instability or flexibility has a double focus. The specific examples he gives are projected onto the earlier dramatic date of the outbreak of *staseis* in the Greek cities, but their effect continues into the time when Thucydides is composing his *History*.<sup>12</sup> Whether or not words meaning 'manliness' and its opposite were actually part of a revolutionary rhetoric, Thucydides attests to their currency in the political and ethical lexicon of the fifth century. At the same time, it is important to stress that Thucydides is considering only a particular set of equivalencies here and is not offering a general theory of semantics.

Although Thucydides implies that the willful confusion of customary equivalencies is a natural and universal feature of *stasis*, the words and phrases he gives as examples are necessarily specific to political events in Greece (πάν ὥς εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη, 3.82.1).<sup>13</sup> In summing up Thucydides' appropriation of what he terms the Hesiodic tradition of "ethical inversion" in this passage, Lowell Edmunds concludes:<sup>14</sup>

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3.82.4f. is not actions or even characteristics; Thucydides is writing about language and expression". Without even considering the overall meaning of the passage, the contrast between τὰ ἔργα and πάν ἀργόν (contr. from ἀεργός) shows that Thucydides is interested in 'linguistic phenomena'. Cf. Loraux 1986, 118–19, 123–4, mentioned by Allison 1997, 171, n. 19. See also Allison 1997, 175 on Thucydides' use of *nomizein*.

<sup>12</sup> I am not referring to any strict relationship between the date of the *History*'s composition and that of the Corcyrean Revolution in 427 BCE. The more general point is that the lexicon described at 3.82–3 necessarily reflects usage at the time Thucydides was writing the *History*. Whether or not the lexicon reflects usage at the time of the events he describes, Thucydides assumes readers who will think it is appropriate to those events. In Wilson's terms, the fact that customary words retained their meanings is due to their recognition value to Thucydides' readers. Cf. Loraux 1986, 109 who argues that Thucydides' intended audience was a 'general' reader and not the aristocratic *hetairoi*.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Gomme 1959 on *History* 3.82.3: "Note the order of thought in this chapter: from *stasis* in Kerkyra to *stasis* in the Greek world generally . . .; to universal conditions of *stasis* and war as its stimulus . . ."

<sup>14</sup> Edmunds 1975, 91. Edmunds argues that the pre-*stasis* virtues are associated with the general "conservative outlook" of the Spartans, while the pre-*stasis* vices are "Athenian traits" (82–3).

Thus the pattern of inversion is seen in exclusively historical and political terms, in the strife of factions within the polis. Human nature is mentioned, but Thucydides describes only a human nature expressed in political action.

Why are 'manliness' (*andreia*) and its opposite (*anandros*) significant terms in this history of 'ethical inversion'?<sup>15</sup> As mentioned above, Thucydides' list of terms is not arbitrary and each term is to be understood not only in the context of the present passage but also in the context of the *History* at large. While commentators principally talk about individual words (*onomata*) when discussing this passage, it is more accurate to say that Thucydides' examples consist of combinations of nouns and adjectives that may in themselves (i.e. the combinations) be new or unconventional. The adjective φιλέταιρος occurs only here in the *History* and appears to be rare in the fifth century in general.<sup>16</sup> J. T. Hogan argues that "there is no reason to suppose that in Thucydides φιλέταιρος should have an obviously bad connotation" but this conclusion seems to be based on an effort to preserve a positive meaning for *hetaireia*.<sup>17</sup> In a discussion of *stasis* fueled by party strife, however, the combination of the *phil*-prefix (which can refer to what is excessive) and the term for party affiliation (*hetairos*), suggests that *philetairos* has an ambiguous, if not an overtly negative connotation. Loraux, in fact, argues for the latter: "dans

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Loraux 1986, 101: "Or *andreia*—le mot, la chose—est précisément, de toutes les valeurs, celle que la *stasis* menace le plus directement: le mot apparaît en bonne place au premier rang des noms employés au rebours de leur valeur par les factieux et le 'courage' authentique risque fort de n'avoir plus cours dans les cités que bouleverse la guerre civile". (Now *andreia*—the word and the thing—of all the values, is precisely the one *stasis* threatens most directly: the word is given pride of place in the front rank of the names that are used contrary to their value by the factions, and authentic 'courage' is at great risk of losing currency in the cities that civil war overthrows.)

<sup>16</sup> As possible sources for comparison, there are two citations of *philetairos* in works attributed to Xenophon. In *Cyropaedia* 8.3.49.1, the term describes Pheraulas as someone who is devoted to his friends; in *Agesilaus* 2.21.7, the term is also used positively in an assessment of actions taken by the Spartan king.

<sup>17</sup> Hogan 1980, 146, n. 21. He goes on to say that "At [3.]82.5 the implication is not that ἡ ἔταιρεία is bad, but that men value it too highly; the same is true of ἑταιρικόν at 3.82.6". Cf. Loraux 1986, 108, who argues that, for Thucydides, *hetairia* (like *hetairikon*) "n'est qu'une pratique factieuse, donc condamnable" (is only a seditious practice, subject to condemnation). She contrasts this usage with *hetairos* and *philos* in 'traditional' Greek poetry, i.e. in Homer and Hesiod. See Nagy 1979, 103–8 and 241 on *philoî* and *hetairoî*, cited by Loraux 1986, 108, n. 49. Also, Benveniste 1973, 273–88 on *philos*, with examples from Homer.

l'adjectif *philetairos* . . . le fidèle lecteur de Thucydide ne doit rien entendre que de sinistre" (in the adjective *philetairos*, the accurate reader of Thucydides should hear nothing but a negative connotation).<sup>18</sup>

Given the singularity of *philetairos* in Thucydides' narrative—and its rare appearance elsewhere in fifth-century texts—the argument that *andreia philetairos* retained its usual meaning is problematic at best, even if we break the phrase down into its constituent parts. And given the likely negative connotation of the adjective, how is it possible to read *andreia* as a positive attribute? On the other side of the equation, *tolma alogistos* represents a similar uneasy pairing since *tolma* is very often a positive quality in Thucydides' text while *alogistos* is not. Thus, the oxymoronic equivalence between the two phrases does not simply mean that a positive term is now used to describe a negative activity or disposition. The overall and 'unusual' effect of the sentence τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη is that the positive meanings customarily ascribed to both 'manliness' (*andreia*) and 'daring' (*tolma*) are attracted into the negative semantic fields of their adjectives (*philetairos* and *alogistos*).<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Loraux 1986, 108: On φιλέταιρος, see also Gomme 1959, ad loc. We might compare the negative force of the *phil-* prefix in φιλέταιρος with Thucydides' use of φιλοτιμία to explain the causes of *stasis* at 3.82.8: πάντων δ' αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν (The cause of it all was power pursued for the sake of greed and personal ambition). The translation is Gomme's. See also, Hunter 1982, 153, n. 45, who notes that at 3.82.8 *pleonexia* and *philotimia* lead to *to philonikein* or 'fanatical strife'. Here the *phil-* prefix connotes a negative because excessive form of the desire for victory.

<sup>19</sup> Positive connotations of both *andreia* and *tolma* are found in Pericles' Funeral Oration, 2.35–46. See 2.39.1 and 4 (*andreia*); 2.40.3; 2.41.4; 2.43.1 (*tolma*). What might be called the negative discourse of *tolma* or daring in 3.82 and 83 reveals a military virtue turned into a political vice. For example, at 3.82.6 the partisans are said to be willing to dare (τολμᾶν) any action on behalf of the party; at 3.84.1 the Corcyreans are said to be the first to dare (προυτολμήθη) commit the crimes connected with *stasis*. Cf. 3.82.8 ἐτόλμησαν; and 3.83.3 τολμηρῶς. At the same time a lack of *tolma* (ἀτολμία) can be a negative trait in Thucydides (1.17.1; 2.39.4; 2.43.1; 2.89.7). Cf. *antitolmao* (7.21.3) and *atolmos* (8.96.5). See Huat 1968, 432–6 for a general discussion of forms of *tolman* in Thucydides. I agree with Huat that in the phrase *tolma alogistos*, the adjective is responsible for giving *tolma* "une nuance péjorative" (434). See also Allison 1997, 182–5 who discusses the use of *tolma alogistos* to describe the action taken by Harmodius and Aristogeiton against Hipparchus at *History* 6.59.1. She suggests that, looking back to the phrase in 3.82, the action of the tyrannicides can be more accurately described as *andreia philetairos* because "it is precisely the phrase into which one could, with raw sarcasm perhaps, translate the erotic relationships motivating the characters: these men were *hetairoi* and lovers". She goes on to note that in Thucydides' account of the tyrannicide, it is "no blow struck for political freedom or release from an overbearing tyrant . . ."

Consequently, the lexicon of civic and martial virtue, represented here by *andreia* and *tolma*, is compromised even before the equivalence is made and ‘manliness for the sake of the party’ is not simply a euphemism for ‘rash daring’. Moreover, this situation reflects on *all* the equivalent phrases in the passage so that what Thucydides represents is a complete semantic crisis; all positive references are compromised because in civil war no deeds (*erga*) are good.

I have dwelt on this passage at some length not because I believe Thucydides is commenting on everyday or common language use but—on the contrary—because he is commenting on lexical meaning in a significant situational context (civil war).<sup>20</sup> In the time of *stasis* when, as Thucydides says, “every kind of death”—including fathers murdering their sons—took place in the cities (3.81.5) *andreia philetairos* signifies the absence of an unambiguous manliness predicated of actions performed in *polemos* or war proper (i.e. war against an external enemy).<sup>21</sup> In general, the unstable equivalencies to which Thucydides’ draws our attention in 3.82 demonstrate how debates over the meaning of key ethical terms signify the destabilization of social and political institutions. In doing so, he points to a concept of manliness (among other traits) that is essential but unstable in fifth-century political discourse. But if this is the case, what constitutes the essential or stable concept of manliness that makes Thucydides’ critique possible?

## 2. *An archaeology of manliness*

Étienne Smoes notes that *andreia* is a post-Homeric word, and that it appears for the first time in Herodotus.<sup>22</sup> It is impossible, of course,

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(183). Allison’s analysis of the intertextual resonances between 6.59 and 3.82 complicates a strict positive or negative reading of both phrases in question.

<sup>20</sup> On the ‘contextual theory of meaning’, see Lyons 1977, 607–13.

<sup>21</sup> Of the sixteen citations of *andreia* or *andreios* in Thucydides, ten are in direct speeches and two are in indirect speeches, beginning with Pericles’ Funeral Oration (2.39.1 and 4). In the fifteen examples excluding *andreia philetairos* at 3.82.4 and the Funeral Oration (discussed below) the words are used in martial contexts in which they have positive connotations (2.64.2; 2.87.3 (twice); 2.87.4; 2.89.2; 3.82.4; 4.120.3; 4.126.5; 4.126.6; 5.9.9; 5.72.2; 6.69.1; 6.72.2; 6.72.4). Further study is needed to see if there are significant differences between their semantic value in the speeches and in the narrative at large. See Cox 1998, 161–7 for a discussion of what it means for men to leave home to fight foreign wars.

<sup>22</sup> Smoes 1995, 33. On *andreia* in Herodotus, see Harrell in this volume.

to know when the word first came into everyday speech and, given the limited number of extant sources, when Greek authors first began to use it. But even given the uncertainty surrounding Herodotus' dates and the composition of the *Histories*, it seems likely that the first extant citation is in Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*, produced in 467. I discuss the use of *andreia* in the works of Aeschylus below; the main point here is that—given our extant sources—the word is post-Homeric. Of course, the concept of 'courage' is manifested in a number of Homeric terms used to describe heroic feats in martial combat. But as stated above, this diverse lexicon is to be distinguished from 'masculinity' as expressed in *anêr*-specific terms in the epics. The following observations about the use of *anêr* and *anêr* compounds in Homer do not constitute an exhaustive study but can contribute to an understanding of *andreia* as a post-Homeric concept distinguished from its *anêr*-specific antecedents.

In the *Iliad*, the troops are frequently admonished by their leaders to "Be men" (ἀνέρες ἔσθε). Most often found in the line ἀνέρες ἔσθε, φίλοι, μνήσασθε δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς ("Be men, friends, and remember your furious strength"), this exhortation expresses a close relationship between being a man and possessing bodily strength (*alkê*).<sup>23</sup> Of the ten occurrences of the phrase ἀνέρες ἔσθε in Homer, all of which occur in the *Iliad*, eight make reference to *alkê*.<sup>24</sup> The remaining two examples (*Iliad* 15.561 and 15.661) occur in lines in which Ajax and Nestor, respectively, enjoin the fighters to stand their ground: ὦ φίλοι, ἀνέρες ἔσθε, καὶ αἰδῶ θέσθ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ ("O friends, be men, and put a feeling of shame in your heart"). Although *aidôs* may be considered an internal and perhaps even an ethical attribute, the metaphorical force of *thesthe* together with the implicit physical localization of the *thumos* makes the admonition a call to physical or bodily action. More generally, the admonition to "Be men" is uttered in preparation for armed combat where being a man is proven by physical action, by standing one's ground, and refusing to retreat (i.e. at *Iliad* 15.665–6). As a collective fighting force, men prove they *are* men by putting their bodies to the test at the behest and in view of their leaders. In other words, being a man is the effect of a disciplinary

<sup>23</sup> Smoes 1995, 33–5 compares this admonition with passages in which men are rebuked for acting like weak women. In other words, it means in effect, "Be men, not women!" Smoes refers to this as "l'aspect 'sexiste' du courage" (33).

<sup>24</sup> *Iliad* 5.529; 6.112; 8.174; 11.287; 15.487; 15.734; 16.270; 17.185.



regime in which the collective actions of the troops are modeled on the individual actions of the hero or 'best man' (*aristos anêr*). As such, being men is both an ontological and an ideological category; it functions in the service of maintaining dominant social structures even, or perhaps especially, in the face of death in battle. This collective masculinity may be said to anticipate manliness or *andreia* as an abstract ethical quality.<sup>25</sup> But Homer's *aneres*—even as a collective entity—are not abstracted from the bodily activities that define them as such and, as I've suggested, their manliness is modeled on the visible physical and martial feats of the heroic *anêr*.

When we turn to *anêr* compounds in Homer, we find the same semantic adherence to notions of physical or bodily activity. The largest class refers to men as the agents or victims of physical action—usually violent action. This class includes ἀνδράγρια ("the spoils of a slain enemy", *Il.* 14.509), ἀνδράποδον ("captive or war slave", *Il.* 6.475), the epithets ἀνδρειφόντης and ἀνδροφόνος ("man-slaying", *Il.* 2.651; 24.724; 18.317), ῥήξιγῶρ ("breaking men apart", i.e. those in armed ranks, *Il.* 7.228), and φθισίγῶρ ("man-killing", *Il.* 2.833).<sup>26</sup> The well-known epithet of Polyphemus is ἀνδροφάγος the "eater of men" (*Od.* 9.200). In these compounds, *anêr* refers to a man's external and physical body and not to an internal or ethical disposition.

Similarly, the noun *androtês* names what is "left behind" by Patroclus' soul when he dies (*Iliad* 16.857 and 24.6). Correlate with Patroclus' youth (*hêbê*) and strength (*menos*), however, *androtês* denotes masculine vigor as a physical attribute. Chantraine defines it as "the strength of the body that the soul of the dying soldier leaves behind" (force du corps que quitte l'âme du guerrier mourant).<sup>27</sup> The adjective ἄγῆγῶρ is predicated of Achilles (*Iliad* 9.699), of Thersites' θυμός (*Iliad* 2.276), of the θυμός of a ferocious lion (in a simile, *Iliad* 24.42), and of Penelope's suitors (*Od.* 1.106). This surfeit of masculine force is a negative condition connected with the physical seat of passion (the *thumos*) and by virtue of which a fierce animal has human attributes. Its applicability to Penelope's suitors, defined by their gluttony and offensive physical presence, demonstrates the extent of its negative

<sup>25</sup> There seem to be no admonitions to "Be a man" in the singular in Homer.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. ἀντιάνεϊρα, an epithet of the Amazons (*Il.* 3.189 and 6.186); and εὐήγῶρ as a modifier of bronze (*Od.* 13.19) and wine (*Od.* 4.622).

<sup>27</sup> Chantraine 1968–80, 88. See Lloyd 1983, 14 on the 'physical' nature of the ψυχή.

semantic range. This negative masculine aspect is also exemplified in the substantive ὑπερηνορέων which is reserved for Penelope's suitors in the *Odyssey*, with one notable exception.<sup>28</sup> The exception is *Odyssey* 6.5, where it is predicated of the monstrous Cyclopes whose surfeit of masculine (if not human) might is exemplified by the fact that they "used to plunder" the Phaeacians (σινέσκοντο) and by their superior physical strength (βίηφι δὲ φέρτεροι ἦσαν).<sup>29</sup> The shared usage points to an implicit similarity between the suitors and the Cyclopes, based on their unrestrained violence and bodily appetites.<sup>30</sup>

The opposite of this surfeit of masculinity is represented by the adjective *anênôr*, used to describe the threat posed to Odysseus by Circe; Hermes warns that she may make him "weak and not a man" (κακὸν καὶ ἀνήνορα θήη, *Od.* 10.301 and 341). But here too, the threat is not that Odysseus will be less of a man in an ethical sense. Rather, as Hermes explains, the threat is one of physical enervation that comes from being transformed into an animal under the influence of Circe's *pharmakon* (*Od.* 10.284–91). Circe's ability to make Odysseus 'not a man' is also contingent upon his being made naked (*apogumnôthenta*, 10.301), another indication that to be *anênôr* is a physical condition rather than an ethical one.

Finally, ἡνορέη has a rather wide semantic range in Homer but still fits the pattern suggested so far.<sup>31</sup> Glaucon says that the gods gave Bellerophon "bodily beauty and desirable masculinity" (κάλλος τε καὶ ἡνορέην ἐρατεινήν, *Il.* 6.156). The phrase ἡνορέη ἐρατεινή is unique in Homer and is used here to describe Bellerophon's singular physical attractiveness in anticipation of telling the story of Anteia's sexual desire for the hero.<sup>32</sup> The noun is also used to describe Ajax and Achilles who, "trusting in their masculinity and the strength of their hands" (ἡνορέη πίσυνοι καὶ κάρτεϊ χειρῶν, *Il.* 8.226) have sta-

<sup>28</sup> *Odyssey* 2.266; 2.324; 2.331; 4.766; 4.769; 17.482; 17.581; 20.375; 21.361; 21.401; 23.31. Somewhat surprisingly, there are only two occurrences of ὑπερηνορέων in the *Iliad*, 4.176 and 13.258.

<sup>29</sup> *Sineomai* is not used of the suitors whose rapaciousness is expressed by τρύχω and φθινύθω, i.e. at *Odyssey* 1.250.

<sup>30</sup> Hesiod uses *agênôr* to describe the *thumos* of the Titans at *Theogony* 641.

<sup>31</sup> LSJ gives ἡνορέη as a "poet. word for ἀνδρεία, manhood, prowess" and then cites examples from epic and Pindar. This anachronistic definition elides the semantic and historical specificity of each term while it also implies that *andreia* is not found in poetic texts. See below on the use of *andreia* in comedy and tragedy.

<sup>32</sup> See Kirk 1990, ad loc.

tioned themselves at either end of the assembled ships.<sup>33</sup> In a similar passage, Apollo enjoins Aeneas to fight with the following words (*Il.* 17.328–30):

I have seen other men  
Who trust in their might, strength, and masculinity  
And in their superior number, holding their *dêmos* even against all  
odds.<sup>34</sup>

ὥς δὴ ἴδον ἀνέρας ἄλλους  
κάρτεϊ τε σθένει τε πεποιθότας ἡνωρέῃ τε  
πλήθει τε σφετέρῳ, καὶ ὑπερδέα δῆμον ἔχοντας·

In a final example, Odysseus explains the fighting prowess of his *genos* to Telemachus: “for always before we have excelled in strength and masculinity over all the earth” (οἷ τὸ πάρος περ/ἀλκῇ τ’ ἡνωρέῃ τε κεκάσμεθα πᾶσαν ἐπ’ αἴαν, *Od.* 24.508–9). Translated loosely as ‘masculinity’ in these examples, ἡνωρέῃ manifests itself as an externally recognized attribute or action that shares the semantic field of *alkê*, *sthenos*, and *kartos*. It refers to the visible evidence of looking and acting like a man and doing what a man should do. We can summarize the meaning of manliness or masculinity in the epics then as the privilege of a conservative and aristocratic ideology based on external appearance, success in individual combat against foreign enemies, and hereditary (i.e. patriarchal) succession.

In an article on the representation of Phoenicians in Greek epic, Irene J. Winter summarizes the social and cultural developments that take place between the commonly accepted date of the Homeric poems (mid-eighth century) and the consolidation of the *polis*. Noting a “shift in organized warfare from an emphasis on individual combat to greater dependence on the strategic deployment of the phalanx” during this period, she suggests that the failure to recognize this shift in the epics, evident in the continued emphasis on the individual hero, is a form of ‘vicarious nostalgia’.<sup>35</sup> Thus, the epic may

<sup>33</sup> This verse is omitted in a majority of the manuscripts, but also occurs at *Iliad* 11.9 where Ajax and Achilles are again described. See Kirk 1990, on 8.226.

<sup>34</sup> See Edwards 1991 on this passage, esp. ὑπερδέα (or ὑπὲρ θεόν) with which he compares ὑπὲρ Διὸς αἴσαν at 17.321.

<sup>35</sup> Winter 1995, 259–61 with reference to E. Vance, ‘Signs of the City: Medieval Poetry as Detour’, *New Literary History* 4 (1973) 557–74, and M. L. West, ‘The Rise of the Greek Epic’, *JHS* 108 (1988) 166.

be understood as “the product of cultural processes congruent with early state-formation, in which heroic action and archaizing values are at once glorified and displaced onto a rhetorical plane, in order to make way for institutions and values more appropriate to new forms of sociocultural organization” (261). Winter’s conclusions help contextualize the semantic history of manliness in terms of this displacement. As a rhetorical feature, epic manliness functions both to preserve and contain “former cultural values, thereby permitting the development of a new code of values and behavior more appropriate to contemporary social and political developments” (260). What distinguishes this rhetorical strategy is an absence of ambiguity about those ‘former’ values.<sup>36</sup> In this context, Thucydides’ use of *andreia* at *History* 3.82 indicates a weakening in the strategy of containment for which Winter argues. A more flexible or expedient form of manliness is expressed in a new (post-Homeric) and abstract lexicon (*andreia*), one that recognizes the political utility of ‘former cultural values’ while it redefines and renames those values. If Thucydides’ text comments directly on this process, can we find its traces in other fifth-century sources?

### 3. Contextualizing Thucydides: Attic drama

Before attempting to answer this question, it must be noted that *andreia* is not a commonly occurring word in fifth-century literary texts. Of course, this only raises the question: common relative to what? Given the limited number of sources and the fact that there is no reliable gauge for measuring common usage, I note only that a contemporary (i.e. post-Homeric) word for manliness appears infrequently in a culture that privileges male attributes and behaviors. The Homeric lexicon is still the preferred means to nostalgically refer to those ‘former values’ in the context of a changing political scene.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Winter’s 1995 analysis of what the epics do *not* say is also pertinent: “[I]f we understand nationalism, or state-ism, as a social process maintained at least in part by *not* articulating all of its political ideologies, but rather through allying itself with (an often fabricated) ‘tradition’ that preceded it, then the casting of a national text into a heroic past can be seen as part of the very process of state-formation” (263).

<sup>37</sup> See Whitehead 1993, 45–6 with the sources cited in n. 29 on the notion of ‘pillaging’ aristocratic values in the fifth century.

As a result, we have a temporally hybrid lexicon of manliness in the fifth century, i.e. one that combines Homeric *anêr* words with post-Homeric *andreia* and *andreios*. The semantic effect of this phenomenon can be analyzed in the corpus of extant Attic tragedy and comedy. With one exception, the tragic plots take place in the legendary or Homeric past so we might expect them to reveal a preference for Homeric terms.<sup>38</sup> But this expectation gives us all the more reason to wonder about tragedy's use of post-Homeric terminology. As mentioned above, the earliest extant use of *andreia* may be in Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*, where the messenger describes the collective fighting spirit of the seven Argive warriors (52–3):<sup>39</sup>

Their *thumos*, iron-hearted and burning with *andreia*,  
Breathes war like lions with blazing eyes.

σιδηρόφρων γὰρ θυμὸς ἀνδρείαι φλέγων  
ἔπνει λεόντων ὥς Ἄρη δεδορκότων.

In this passage, the language surrounding *andreia* is clearly Homeric, including the metaphorical use of πνέω and the lion simile.<sup>40</sup> It may seem natural that Aeschylus describes the *andreia* of the Argives within a lexical field appropriate to the heroic *aneres* of Homer.<sup>41</sup> But because

<sup>38</sup> There are eleven occurrences of *andreia* or *andreios* in tragedy, eight of which are in six of Euripides' plays. This statistical spread is obviously related to the greater number of extant plays by Euripides and cannot be interpreted as an increase in usage over the course of the fifth century or attributed to any particular aspect of Euripides' art. In at least one of Euripides' plays, *Iphigenia in Aulis* 373, *andreia* is probably not the correct reading.

<sup>39</sup> In addition to this single extant citation of *andreia*, there are two in the fragments of Aeschylus: 106 and 124 (Radt 1985). The latter, from the *Lycurgus*, seems to refer to Lycurgus who, drinking beer from human skulls (?), boasts and "credits this [deed] to his manliness" (τοῦτ' ἐν ἀνδρείᾳ τιθεῖς). The reading is highly conjectural, but if *andreia* is correct, it is here associated by the speaker with barbarian behavior.

<sup>40</sup> This is not to suggest that anachronism is unknown in the dramatic texts. Jonathan Hall 1997, 69 points out, for example, that in Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, Polynices "describes Argos as 'Dorian' in spite of the fact that the play is supposed to be set in an era prior to the Dorian conquest of the Peloponnese". The phrase μένεα πνέοντες is a common epithet of warriors in epic (*Il.* 2.536; 3.8; 11.508, etc.). Cf. Aeschylus' statement in *Frogs* 1016–17 that he bequeathed to Athens spectators who "breathed (πνέοντες) spears and javelins and white-plumed helmets, etc." In other words, he made them into Homeric-style heroes. For lion similes, see *Odyssey* 6.130–2 where Odysseus is compared to a lion with shining eyes (ἐν δέ οἱ ὄσσε δαίεται); and *Odyssey* 23.46–8 where Odysseus is compared to a lion as he stands over the dead bodies of the suitors.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Smoes 1995, 73–7 who contrasts two forms of courage in Sophocles' *Ajax*

the epic lexicon of masculine attributes is still current and in use by the dramatic poets, two questions present themselves:<sup>42</sup> Does the use of *andreia* in *Seven* indicate that the word was in everyday use at the time the play was produced (467 BCE)? Does the fact that this is the only occurrence of *andreia* in the extant tragedies of Aeschylus indicate that it was novel in the early tragic lexicon or that it was not previously considered a 'poetic' word?<sup>43</sup> It is impossible to answer these questions with any certainty, of course, but they prompt us to think about the circumstances under which a lexical item gains currency at a particular time and in a particular genre.

In these terms, the appropriate question is: what is the effect of this post-Homeric abstract noun when Aeschylus could have described the martial strength of the Argives using the traditional vocabulary of Homer? *Iliad* 24.41–2, for example, provides a suitable Homeric model for Aeschylus' purposes; there Achilles is compared to a lion with "great strength and a masculine *thumos*" (μεγάλη τε βίη καὶ ἀγήνορι θυμῷ) and *agênôr* is a Homeric equivalent for the Aeschylean *andreia*.<sup>44</sup> In fact, later in the play the chorus use *agênôr* (the only use in the Aeschylean corpus) to describe the Argives (*Seven* 124–6):

The seven masculine warriors, conspicuous in the army,  
with their lance brandishing harnesses, stand before  
each of the seven gates they have obtained by lot.

ἐπὶ δ' ἀγήνορες πρέποντες στρατοῦ  
δορυσσοῖς σαγαῖς πύλαις ἐβδόμαις  
προσίστανται πάλῳ λαχόντες.

As we have seen, *agênôr* in Homer signifies an excess of masculine strength. Here it retains its negative connotation, especially since it

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and Euripides' *Heracles*. Ajax exemplifies the Homeric concept of courage in battle; Heracles' courage is "moral et intérieur" (77). These are the only dramatic texts Smoes discusses in any detail; *andreia* does not occur in either.

<sup>42</sup> In *Septem*, for example, we find *tharsos* (184, 270), and *alkê* (76, 215, 498, 569, 878).

<sup>43</sup> The *TLG* lists no occurrences of *andreia* in Pindar, for example. Pindar uses ἀνορέα (for Homeric ἡγορή) at *Olympian* 8.67 to refer to the fighting prowess of the victor. See also *Nemean* 3.20. Hutchinson 1985 on *Seven* ll. 49–51 notes that *andreia* "occurs only once before in verse (Simon. fr. 579.7)." In the Simonides poem, the sight of Aretê is reserved for one who "comes to the peak of manliness" (ἵκη τ' ἐς ἄκρον ἀνδρείας).

<sup>44</sup> I am not arguing for a metrical equivalence of course, but only that the imagery of the two passages is very similar.

is spoken by the chorus made up of Theban women under siege by the Argive army. From the point of view of the Thebans, the masculinity of the Argives is clearly a negative attribute whether it is called *agênôr* or *andreaia*.<sup>45</sup> The mixed lexicon of manliness (*andreaia* and *agênôr*) in the play can be explained as a simple case of *variatio* or it may indicate that the Homeric lexicon is being superseded by a post-Homeric one. In both cases, however, it suggests that the *concept* of masculinity is undergoing a change in the fifth century. It is impossible, of course, to know how a fifth-century Athenian would hear this mixed lexicon, but we may compare its effect to finding the obsolete English adjective 'wight' in a text that also includes the contemporary term 'manly'.<sup>46</sup> This example is not exactly right, of course, since the Homeric lexicon is not obsolete in the fifth century. But it helps illustrate how the very perseverance of the Homeric lexicon may have foregrounded the emerging lexicon.

In Sophocles' *Electra*, produced some time in the last quarter of the fifth century, Electra wants to convince Chrysothemis to help her take revenge on Aegisthus and imagines the public honors that will come to both of them as a result. The argument that they deserve such honors is put in the mouth of 'a citizen or stranger' (Sophocles, *Electra* 975–85):

What citizen or stranger who sees us  
Will not greet us with the following words of praise,  
"Look at these two sisters, friends,  
who preserved their paternal household;  
who, when their enemies were fully entrenched,  
risked their very life and did not back away from slaughter.  
We must all love and pay our due respect to these two girls.  
Both in festivals and before the entire citizen body  
everyone must honor them on account of their *andreaia*."

<sup>45</sup> In its contemporary context, this negative form of manliness may refer (ironically?) to "the weakness of the Argive élite at the beginning of the fifth century," in Jonathan Hall's words. Hall 1997, 71–2 is discussing the function of stories in Herodotus and Plutarch about the defeat of the Argives and the resulting dominance of a slave class in Argos. He suggests that the "conflict between two groups at Argos [was] probably still being waged in the middle of the fifth century when Herodotus was gathering information". Aeschylus' play, produced in 467, falls within the period Hall is discussing, i.e. between the beginning and middle of the fifth century.

<sup>46</sup> The *OED* gives the first meaning of 'wight' as "strong and courageous, esp. in warfare". Cf. the noun 'wight' meaning "a living being in general; a creature;" also "man".

These are the sorts of things that everyone will say,  
so that our fame will not leave us while we live or after we are dead.

τίς γάρ ποτ' ἀστῶν ἢ ξένων ἡμᾶς ἰδὼν  
τοίοισδ' ἐπαίνους οὐχὶ δεξιόσεται,  
ἴδεσθε τῶδε τῷ κασιγνήτῳ, φίλοι,  
ὦ τὸν πατρῶον οἶκον ἐξεσώσατην,  
ὦ τοῖσιν ἐχθροῖς εὖ βεβηκόσιν ποτὲ  
ψυχῆς ἀφειδήσαντε προυνστήτην φόνου.  
τούτῳ φιλεῖν χρή, τῶδε χρὴ πάντας σέβειν·  
τῶδ' ἐν θ' ἐορταῖς ἐν τε πανδήμῳ πόλει  
τιμᾶν ἅπαντας οὐνεκ' ἀνδρείας χρεῶν.  
τοιαῦτά τοι νῶ πᾶς τις ἐξερεῖ βροτῶν,  
ζῶσαιν θανούσαιν θ' ὥστε μὴ κλιπεῖν κλέος.

In the only occurrence of *andreia* in the plays of Sophocles, Electra uses it to describe her own man-like virtue and yet ventriloquizes that description through the voice of an anonymous speaker who, we may assume, is male.<sup>47</sup> This invocation may add authority to her argument, but it also suggests an ambivalence about the meaning of *andreia* in context since Electra does not claim it for herself outright.<sup>48</sup> That claim is based on the public recognition of an act of physical violence that is conventionally masculine and epic; the epic model is Achilles' revenge against Hector for the death of Patroclus. The poetic fame or *kleos* that Electra does claim in her own voice recalls the *Iliad* not only in the lexicon employed but also in the overall structure and content of the passage.<sup>49</sup> In the *Iliad*, Hector challenges an Achaean to face him in single combat and boasts, like Electra, that his victim will be the source of his *kleos* (7.87–91):

<sup>47</sup> This is the only occurrence of *andreia* in Sophocles. The adjective is used in the *Trachiniae* where Deianeira describes the river Achelous with the face of an ox and the body of a man (ἀνδρείῳ κύτει βούπρωρος, 12–13).

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Munson 1988 on the 'manliness' of Artemisia in Herodotus. She compares Artemisia with Themistocles as exemplars of ethical and political expediency in the *Histories*. During the Battle of Salamis, Artemisia rams and sinks the ship of an ally. Munson concludes that Artemisia's 'manliness' (*andrêiê*, 7.99.1) is "a morally neutral trait and therefore entails a relative deficiency of *aretê* in the traditional sense of straightforward valor based on a firm ethical stance . . . In the case of Artemisia at Salamis, the intelligence and skill she displays even blatantly deny heroic valor" (103). I would say that Artemisia's *andrêiê* is not 'morally neutral' but that the word itself conveys ethical and political expediency and an absence of 'heroic valor'. Cf. Smoes 1995, 91–5 on the notion of intellectual courage in Thucydides. On the *andreia* of Artemisia, see also Harrell in this volume.

<sup>49</sup> On *kleos* as 'glory' conferred by epic poetry, see Nagy 1979, 16–18 and *passim*.



And some day, someone from future generations will say,  
as he is sailing on a many-benched ship over the wine-dark sea:  
“This is the tomb of a man who died a long time ago,  
who was performing his *aristeia* when illustrious Hector killed him.”  
That is what someone will say, and my *kleos* will never perish.<sup>50</sup>

καὶ ποτέ τις εἴπησι καὶ ὀπιγόνων ἀνθρώπων  
νηὶ πολυκλήϊδι πλέων ἐπὶ οἴνοπα πόντον·  
ἀνδρὸς μὲν τόδε σῆμα πάλαι κατατεθνηῶτος,  
ὅν ποτ' ἀριστεύοντα κατέκτανε φαίδιμος Ἴκτωρ.  
ὥς ποτέ τις ἐρέει· τὸ δ' ἐμὸν κλέος οὐ ποτ' ὀλεῖται.

The reference to an anonymous speaker, the praise for killing an enemy, the combination of indirect and direct speech, the similar transitional phrase (τις ἐρέει, cf. πᾶς τις ἐξερεῖ), and the final claim to undying *kleos* suggest a model (if not a direct borrowing) for the passage in *Electra*. And yet, the murder of Aegisthus and Clytaemnestra cannot easily be equated with Hector's call for a champion to face him in battle or with the ensuing fight between him and Ajax. Acts of revenge for domestic crimes are not the same as killing an enemy on a foreign battleground. My point is that the implied but impossible similarity of these acts is marked by the use of *andreia* in the *Electra* where it points to the absence of masculinity in its traditional or normative form and the emergence of a manliness that is no longer *anēr* specific.<sup>51</sup>

This emerging concept of manliness is perhaps most evident in the plays of Euripides. In his *Electra* (423 BCE), for example, Electra addresses the corpse of Aegisthus, whom she compares to her future husband (Euripides, *Electra* 947–51):

You were arrogant because you lived in a king's palace  
and were fitted out with beauty. I want a husband  
who does not have a girl's face, but a manly disposition (ἀνδρείου  
τρόπου).

For the children of these sorts of men are descended from Ares;  
while your looks are only good for dressing up dances.

ὑβρίζεις, ὥς δὴ βασιλικούς ἔχων δόμους  
κάλλει τ' ἀραρώς. ἀλλ' ἔμοιγ' εἴη πόσις

<sup>50</sup> The translation is that of Nagy 1979, 28.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 351 where the chorus famously comment that Clytaemnestra speaks like a man: γύναι, κατ' ἄνδρα σόφρον' εὐφρόνως λέγεις.

μη παρθενωπός, ἀλλὰ τάνδρείου τρόπου.  
 τὰ γὰρ τέκν' αὐτῶν Ἄρεος ἐκκρεμάννυται,  
 τὰ δ' εὐπρεπῇ δὴ κόσμος ἐν χοροῖς μόνον.

The ironies of this gruesome scene are obvious: the address to a corpse that focuses on his physical beauty, the comparison of a future husband with a mother's lover, etc. At the same time, Electra implicitly compares herself and Orestes with the children of men "descended from Ares" and by extension, she compares their acts of murder and revenge with the traditional deeds of war.<sup>52</sup> But here *andreiōs* conflates martial and sexual acts and a 'manly disposition' is no more than a kind of mirror image for Aegisthus' girlish good looks. Electra's half-hidden desire for a father who resembles the god of war and a husband who resembles her father is, in both cases, the desire for an absent and god-like *anēr*. In this sense, *andreia* signifies the absence of the (dead) hero of epic in the fictional universe of the play and, by extension, in the genre of tragedy; the heroes of the tragic stage are only citizens playing the parts of epic heroes.

It is in light of this desire that we can read the *andreia* attributed to Orestes and Pylades in the messenger's speech. The messenger reports that after Aegisthus was struck down, the household servants came to his defense (Euripides, *Electra* 844–7):

The servants immediately rushed to seize a spear,  
 many to fight against two; but by virtue of their *andreia*  
 Pylades and Orestes stood up to them,  
 shaking their javelins.

δμῶες δ' ἰδόντες εὐθὺς ῥῖξαν ἐς δόρυ,  
 πολλοὶ μάχεσθαι πρὸς δύο· ἀνδρείας δ' ὑπο  
 ἔστησαν ἀντίπρωρα σείοντες βέλη  
 Πυλάδης Ὀρέστης τ'.

Coming immediately after the messenger's description of the manner in which Aegisthus was killed, the *andreia* of Pylades and Orestes only emphasizes their less than heroic attack (*Electra*, 839–43). Their stand against this 'army' (*polloi*) of *dmôes* or household slaves who put up no resistance once Orestes has announced himself, is hardly an act of heroic valor. In a play in which there are no heroes and no

<sup>52</sup> LSJ translates ἐκκρεμάννυμι in this passage as "to be devoted to". But the metaphor of genealogical descent seems to me to fit the context.

acts of heroism traditionally defined, *andreia* signifies once again the irrevocable absence of a ‘true’ or unambiguous manliness.

As might be expected, the comic texts provide vivid commentary on this absence, especially in their use of *andreia* and its cognates to connote emasculation.<sup>53</sup> The words occur with greater frequency in comedy than in tragedy; the Aristophanic corpus includes twenty citations in nine plays. Strictly speaking we can’t say that *andreia* is a ‘comic’ word but it is clearly available for parody in the fifth century. Here I limit myself to a few examples that illustrate the way in which the terms refer to the absence of ‘real men’ in the comic texts. In *Lysistrata*, the superlative of *andreios* is predicated twice of Lysistrata who is called the “most manly of all grandmothers and maternal stinging nettles” (ὦ τηθῶν ἀνδρειοτάτη καὶ μητριδίων ἀκαληφῶν, 549) and more simply “the most manly of all women” (ὦ πασῶν ἀνδρειοτάτη, 1108). In the one other occurrence in this play, men who go food-shopping in armor are called *andreioi* but only to emphasize how their external appearance (wearing armor) is not in conformity with their deeds; they are the objects of laughter (*geloion*, 559). Produced in 411, following the failure of the Sicilian Expedition, and during the complicated political machinations surrounding the recall of Alcibiades, *Lysistrata* presents a dream of peace in which both sides can claim victory (1293), but only when *andreia* in its superlative form can be predicated of a woman.

By the time of *Frogs* (405 BC), *andreia* (both noun and adjective) is the stuff of slapstick and parody. The word occurs five times in the play, three of which are in the episodes. In the first, Xanthias calls Dionysus’ frightened response to Aeacus’ threats (the god soils himself) an act of *andreia* (491). In the same scene, Dionysus tells Xanthias to put on the Heracles costume, since he is *andreios* (494–6):

Come on, since you are high-spirited and manly  
Take this club and lion skin  
And be me, if you really have the guts.

ἴθι νυν, ἐπειδὴ λημματιᾶς κἀνδρείος εἶ,  
σὺ μὲν γενοῦ ἄγω, τὸ ρόπαλον τοῦτ᾽ λαβὼν  
καὶ τὴν λεοντῆν, εἴπερ ἀφοβόσπλαγχνος εἶ.

<sup>53</sup> On *Frogs*, see General Introduction, section 4.

Here *andreios* and ἀφοβόσπλαγχνος have the same grammatical construction and occupy essentially the same position in the line. The implied equivalence that results emphasizes the bodily nature of manliness in comedy, both because it depends on an act of bodily display (putting on the Heracles costume) and because ἀφοβόσπλαγχνος—while metaphorical—does not lose its visceral meaning.<sup>54</sup> And, of course, Dionysus' act of *andreia*—mentioned earlier—is to call for the application of a sponge. Later in the play, when Aeschylus speaks about the effect of his *Seven Against Thebes*, Dionysus responds that the playwright indeed made the Thebans (Athens' enemies during the Peloponnesian War) 'more manly' in the pursuit of war proper (ἀνδρείοτερους εἰς τὸν πόλεμον, 1024) and for this he deserves to be hit (τύπτου).<sup>55</sup> One of the play's recurring themes is the effect of tragedy on 'real life'; Euripides' tragedies take their toll on the everyday affairs of Athenians (*Frogs* 1064ff.) while Aeschylus' plays influence 'current affairs' by making Athens' enemies more formidable. And it is partly because the *andreia* attributed to the Thebans in *Frogs* is a function of mimesis that its value is open to suspicion, not to mention the fact that Aeschylus is said to have made Athens' enemies more manly. As we might expect, comic *andreia* is part of the discourse of bodily functions (both literally and figuratively) in a quasi- or mock-heroic context. Comedy appropriates the figure of the epic *anēr* as warrior, only to make it the stuff of mimesis and ridicule. We should begin to wonder at this point if there ever was such a

<sup>54</sup> See Dover 1993, ad loc. σπλάγχνα are referred to three times in *Frogs* (473, 844, and 1006) in addition to the passage under consideration here. The primary visceral meaning of the term is established in the first occurrence where Aeacus tells Dionysus that Echidna will "rend your innards" (ἢ τὰ σπλάγχνα σου διασπαράξει, 473). The other two refer to the anger of Aeschylus, which—given his martial disposition in the play—may erupt into physical violence. Dionysus' challenge to Xanthias at 494–6 helps to contextualize the two later references to the σπλάγχνα of Aeschylus; having 'guts' is no guarantee of 'real' martial prowess.

<sup>55</sup> See Dover, ad loc.: "[T]he confederation of Boeotian city-states, dominated by Thebes, was an ally of Sparta in the Peloponnesian War and a formidable enemy of Athens on land. The Boeotian victory at Delion in 424 made a lasting impression; cf. Xen. *M.* iii.5.4." We recall that the only occurrence of *andreia* in Aeschylus is in *Seven* (52) where it describes the martial prowess of the Argives. Aristophanes' use in *Frogs* may be an intertextual reference insofar as he describes the Thebans (Athens' 'real' enemies) with the same term Aeschylus had used to describe the Argives (Thebes' 'legendary' enemies). It is difficult to say if the shared usage includes a political allusion in addition to being one of those textual borrowings that constitute so much of the script of *Frogs*.

thing as ‘authentic’ *andreia*, to use Loraux’s adjective. Rather, it seems more accurate to say that *andreia* refers to the *absence* of manliness as an ‘authentic’ virtue embodied in the physical, i.e. martial, deeds of ‘real’ men.

The use of *andreia* in the dramatic texts illustrates a none too subtle uncertainty about the word’s referentiality, especially and predictably in *Frogs*, where the emphasis on wordplay makes us suspicious about the stable meaning of anything. At the same time, and even when *andreia* is predicated of females in both tragedy and comedy, it owes its effect to the dominant discourse of masculine behavior in Homer. Of course, the distinction between being a man and seeming to be one is literally in play in the dramatic genres, and is especially marked when manliness is attributed to women characters who are played by men.<sup>56</sup> Drama, in other words, is the genre in which the Homeric exhortation to “be men” is most problematic.<sup>57</sup> More specifically, the contested nature of *andreia* as an ethical and political quality in the dramatic texts—spanning the period from 467 to 405—helps contextualize its use in Thucydides’ *History* (3.82) with which I began. We can now better appreciate its suitability as a *stasis*-specific quality, i.e. as a word whose meaning—in contrast to Homeric terms for masculinity—conveys the semantic flexibility characteristic of political rhetoric in general and civil war in particular.

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<sup>56</sup> See Zeitlin 1995, chapter 8, pp. 341–74. Also, Bassi 1998, chapter 5. Cf. Aristotle’s discussion of the nature of tragic *ἥθη* in the *Poetics*, where *andreia* is an *ethos* that is not fitting for a woman (ἔστιν γὰρ ἀνδρεῖον μὲν τι ἥθος, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἀρμόδιον γυναικὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἢ δεινὴν εἶναι, *Poetics* 1454a22–4). Because *andreia* in the *Poetics* is a quality revealed in bodily acts and more pointedly, in dramatic mimesis, Aristotle’s statement seems to be an act of recuperation whose aim is to put the ‘man’ back in ‘manliness’. Cf. Lucas 1968, ad loc., who reads ἀνδρεῖαν for ἀνδρεῖον (in the vulgate) in the first clause and translates, “It is possible for a woman to be brave”. He interprets the sentence to mean that “what would be brave for a woman would be cowardly for a man”, and makes reference to *Politics* 1277b21. On *ethos* as a quality expressed in physical activity in the *Poetics*, as opposed to *dianoia*, see Blundell 1992.

<sup>57</sup> The use of *andreia* in the medical writers is also pertinent to the contested nature of the term. According to the author of *Airs, Waters, Places* (dated to the fifth century) men may be *andreioi* by nature but can become cowardly by *nomoi*, and vice versa (16.18–20). These observations are incorporated into political and ecological arguments about differences between peoples, principally Asians and Europeans. But they also contribute to the idea that *andreia* is not an essential or innate attribute but one that changes according to context. See Rosen and Horstmannshoff in this volume.

4. *Andreia in the Funeral Oration*

In light of the fifth-century discourse of manliness outlined thus far, I want to turn now to the first use of *andreia* in Thucydides' *History* where—in contrast to exemplifying the negative effects of *stasis* in the Greek *poleis* in Book 3—it refers to a uniquely Athenian political virtue. The question here is how to account for this usage in the Funeral Oration where Pericles implicitly compares Athenian *andreia* with that of the Spartans. Here we can recall its use to describe the Argives in Aeschylus' *Seven* and the Thebans in Aristophanes' *Frogs*. In spite of their differences, these examples testify to the development of *andreia* as a political virtue attached to *poleis* as collective entities. Spartan manliness, says Pericles, is the effect of external discipline (*nomos*), while Athenian manliness is the effect of an internal disposition instilled by custom or habit (*tropos*, 2.39.4).<sup>58</sup>

Since we wish to run risks with ease of mind rather than with physical exertion, and with a form of manliness that is less the effect of external compulsion than of a customary disposition, we succeed in not worrying about future hardships. When we do face them, we do not appear less daring than those who are always worn out with toil; both for these reasons and for others as well, [I say that] our city is worthy of wonder.<sup>59</sup>

καίτοι εἰ ῥαθυμία μᾶλλον ἢ πόνων μελέτη καὶ μὴ μετὰ νόμων τὸ πλεόν ἢ τρόπων ἀνδρείας ἐθέλομεν κινδυνεύειν, περιγίγνεται ἡμῖν τοῖς τε μέλλουσιν ἀλγεινοῖς μὴ προκάμνειν, καὶ ἐς αὐτὰ ἐλθοῦσι μὴ ἀτολμοτέρους τῶν αἰεὶ μοχλοῦντων φαίνεσθαι, καὶ ἔν τε τούτοις τὴν πόλιν ἀξίαν εἶναι θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἄλλοις.

In this speech, *andreia* is *polis* specific and part of a competitive discourse between rival cities and rival political systems. The implication is clear that Spartan manliness (although not explicitly referred to in the text) is inferior to Athenian *andreia* because the former is manifested as an effect of external compulsion while the latter is an innate disposition.<sup>60</sup> The Spartans are thus characterized by an outmoded form of manliness that, in the context of Athenian political

<sup>58</sup> Cf. the phrase ἀνδρείου τρόπου at Euripides' *Electra* 949, discussed above.

<sup>59</sup> I agree with Gomme 1966, ad loc., that θαυμάζεσθαι depends on an implied φημί.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Vlastos 1971, 18–19 on the restricted, and therefore perverted, meaning of *isonomia* and *dēmokratia* as applied to the Spartans by Isocrates, *Panathenaicus* 178.

rhetoric, has been supplanted by the political manliness for which the city of Athens is recognized as an object of ‘wonder’. In this view, the Spartans can be said to adhere to a conservative—even Homeric—kind of manly action. Conversely, Pericles’ appeal to an innate and collective Athenian manliness augments a vision of Athens as a transcendent city inhabited by autochthonous and idealized citizens.<sup>61</sup> The rhetorical effect of Pericles’ promotion of an Athenian-style *andreia* is to create an image of the *polis* as a triumphant collective entity in the face of its military losses (the war dead).

Pericles dispenses rather quickly with the city’s anonymous ancestors (οἱ προγόνοι, 2.36.1) who are characterized by the τιμή they earned in previous unnamed wars: μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν οὐ βουλόμενος ἐάσω (“not wishing to speak at length among those who know these things already, I will let them go”, 2.36.4). This rather half-hearted example of *praeteritio*—half-hearted because Pericles says very little about what he says he leaves unsaid—contributes to his praise of the city as a collection of anonymous citizens. As a feature of this praise, the old-style Homeric *timē* is superseded by a new-style Athenian *andreia*.<sup>62</sup> This semantic shift is extended to Pericles’ performance as the speaker of the (prose) oration. Implicitly professing his own superiority to the epic poet, he states that there is no need for Homer to sing the praises of the Athenians (2.41.4); this, in fact, has become the general’s prerogative (τὴν πόλιν ὕμνησα, 2.42.2). Gomme notes that ὕμνησα is a word “normally used of poets, later of eulogists in prose”.<sup>63</sup> In exemplifying this later usage, Thucydides makes the *city* the object of this ‘poetic’ verb. The Oration is not a vehicle for praising old (Homeric) war horses, but for praising the city’s current *politeia* and *tropoi* (36.4; 37.1; 39.4; 40.2; 41.3). The *aretai* of the dead soldiers, says Pericles, ‘adorn’ these distinguishing aspects of the city

<sup>61</sup> On Athenian autochthony, see Loraux 1986b, 148–53 and *passim*. See also her discussion of the city and the hoplite as abstract entities in the Funeral Oration, 1986b, esp. 270–87. Insofar as Pericles does not praise the exertions of exemplary or singular males but the city at large, this appeal may also attest to the displacement of individual elite leaders by the *dēmos* in Athenian democratic rhetoric; Pericles makes specific reference to δημοκρατία (2.37.1) as the Athenian form of *politeia*. On the role of the *dēmos* in the advent of democracy, see Ober 1996, esp. 32–52. See also, Ostwald 1986, chapter 5 on the power of ‘demagogues’ or *prostatai tou dēmoi* after Pericles’ death.

<sup>62</sup> On *timē* as a ‘central theme’ of the *Iliad*, see Nagy 1979, 72.

<sup>63</sup> Gomme 1966, on 2.42.2. Cf. Thucydides’ censure of the epic poets in his methodological statement in Book 1 (*History* 1.21).

(ἀ γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ὕμνησα, αἱ τῶνδε καὶ τῶν τοιῶνδε ἀρεταὶ ἐκόσμησαν, 42.2). As a state-sponsored speech in the context of a full-scale foreign war (*polemos*), Pericles' Funeral Oration is a compensatory gesture; it must both acknowledge and justify the loss of citizens on the city's behalf. It does this in part by appealing to a notion of manliness that Athenians possess by virtue of their *politeia*, not by virtue of birth or training, i.e. not by virtue of a corporeal existence which, in the context of the speech, is exemplified in the bodies of the dead soldiers. Rather, as a political virtue, *andreia* is an abstract concept and a defining characteristic of the city for which they died.

Scholars debate the point of view from which Thucydides composed the Funeral Oration: does it reflect the historian's disillusionment after the fall of Athens in 404 or is it a "remarkable projection back to the spirit of the earlier generation," i.e. to the dramatic date of the speech?<sup>64</sup> It may be both. Without relying on a chronological order of composition, we can read the *andreia* of the Funeral Oration—put in the mouth of Pericles—together with the historian's *in propria persona* description of *andreia* in the time of *stasis*. In doing so, we see in effect two sides of the same coin. On one side, manliness is a contested virtue within cities (between party factions); on the other, it is a contested virtue among cities (between Sparta and Athens). So although the passages are clearly very different in terms of narrative level and context they share a concept of manliness that is both abstract and politicized. Moreover, if we read back from Book 3 to Book 2, Pericles' discussion of Athenian manliness is subject to intertextual scrutiny even without appeals to the historian's 'disillusionment' or 'projection'.<sup>65</sup> As a political term in the context of the Funeral Oration, *andreia* does not refer to an unambiguous virtue, i.e. to 'courage' in a strictly positive sense. Rather, it refers to an expedient kind of manliness that suits this rhetorical set piece. I therefore take the use (or abuse) of *andreia* in 3.82—spoken by the narrating *ego* (even though attributed to the participants in civil war)—to be decisive in the sense that it colors all other occurrences of the word in the *History*.

<sup>64</sup> See Gomme's brief summary of this argument 1966, 129–30. The quote is from p. 130.

<sup>65</sup> See Allison 1997, 182–5, who discusses the intertextual connections between *History* 3.82 and 6.59.



5. *Philosophical andreia*

Given the semantic range of *andreia* in fifth-century texts, it does not seem surprising that philosophical discussions of *andreia* in the fourth are primarily concerned with its true or definitive meaning as a political virtue. In Plato's *Republic*, *andreia* is essential to the guardians' education and to the preservation of the city (*Republic* 429a–430c). When Plato takes up the definition of *andreia* in this context he does so not in terms of the *andreios* individual but of the *andreia* polis: "But it is not difficult to see in what part of the city *andreia* itself lies and on account of which the city is considered to be manly" (Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀνδρεία γε αὐτή τε καὶ ἐν ᾧ κεῖται τῆς πόλεως, δι' ὃ τοιαύτη κλητέα ἡ πόλις, οὐ πᾶνν χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν, *Rep.* 429a 8; cf. ἀνδρείαν πόλιν, 429b2). This manly part of the city is the one that does battle and takes the field on the city's behalf (τὸ μέρος ὃ προπολεμεῖ τε καὶ στρατεύεται ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς, *Rep.* 429b2–3). In the analogy with wool dying that follows, *andreia* is an innate and immutable disposition (φύσιν, 430a4): by virtue of education and obeying the laws, the city's στρατιῶται will know what is appropriate to fear and what is not and, as a consequence, will take on *andreia* like a dye. Socrates will later refer to this manliness as a *politikê andreia* (*Rep.* 430c2–3). Here we can see the protocols of the funeral oration in play, that is, the appeal to a collective and innate manliness in the context of a *polis* at war.

In *Laches*, Plato offers a sustained discussion of the definition of manliness in a heavily marked historical context. Socrates' two interlocutors are the generals Laches and Nicias who together concluded the Peace of Nicias in 421. The likely dramatic date of the dialogue is 423, i.e. during the height of Athenian power. In his monograph on *andreia* in *Laches*, Walter Schmid suggests that the dialogue asks in retrospect why the glory days of Athens came to an end and how democracy played a role in that end.<sup>66</sup> Lysimachus and Melesias, two sons of two famous fathers (Aristides and Thucydides) consult Laches, Nicias and Socrates about how to teach their own sons to be *aristoi*, which includes the imparting of *andreia*. These fathers have not accomplished the great deeds that *their* fathers had; *andreia*, in other words, is not a trait passed from father to son. In fact, the very accomplishments of the two boys' grandfathers caused them

<sup>66</sup> Schmid 1992, 5.

(the grandfathers) to neglect the education of their own sons (Lysimachus and Melesias) since they were attending to the affairs of the allies and the city (διοικούντες τὰ τε τῶν συμμάχων καὶ τὰ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως, 179c–d). These men, it seems, have been parents for the city to the neglect of their own children.<sup>67</sup>

It is in this context that Socrates asks, “What is *andreia*?” and, secondarily, “Can it be taught?” (190e). In answer, the generals predictably want to talk about martial exploits but Socrates wants to know what *andreia* is in every circumstance, not only in combat (191c–d). In other words, he moves the discussion away from battle as the vehicle of *andreia* and toward a more generic, abstract, notion, one that does not depend on knowledge and in fact is best demonstrated in the absence of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη, 193b). Having reached the conclusion that *andreia* is neither a particular kind of knowledge nor a disposition passed down from father to son—in fact something that manly fathers seem especially incapable of passing on to their biological offspring—Socrates and Laches come to an impasse. For they are led to the impossible conclusion—reminiscent of Thucydides’ τόλμα ἀλόγιστος (*History* 3.82.4)—that “foolish daring” (ἡ ἄφρων τόλμα, 193d) is manliness.<sup>68</sup> Socrates then remarks on the lack of *andreia* that he and Laches share as interlocutors (193e):

For our deeds are not in harmony with our words. For it seems likely that someone might say we have a share of *andreia* in deed, but not in word, I think, if he should hear us in conversation now.

τὰ γὰρ ἔργα οὐ συμφωνεῖ ἡμῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἔργῳ μὲν γὰρ, ὥς ἔοικε, φαίη ἂν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνδρείας μετέχειν, λόγῳ δ’ ὥς ἐγῶμαι, οὐκ ἂν, εἰ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀκούσειε διαλεγομένων.

The distinction between deeds and words is a commonplace in Greek cultural discourse, beginning with the Homeric epics. The implication here is that both can ‘have a share’ of *andreia* and, more specifically, that the present conversation has this potential. At the same time, the more difficult task is to have a share of manliness in words, i.e. to come to a common understanding of its meaning.

<sup>67</sup> The role of citizens as parents of the state is mirrored in the metaphor of the state as the parent of its citizens. On Athens as parent, see Golden 1990, 40; Bassi 1999, 429–31.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 560e.

In fact, Socrates goes on to suggest that *andreia* is the virtue of those who search for its meaning (194a):

If you wish, let us too persist and persevere in our inquiry, so that *andreia* itself does not laugh at us because we do not search it out in an *andreia*-like way, for maybe this endurance is itself *andreia*.

εἰ οὖν βούλει, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τῇ ζητήσει ἐπιμείνωμέν τε καὶ καρτερήσωμεν, ἵνα καὶ μὴ ἡμῶν αὐτῇ ἡ ἀνδρεία καταγελάσῃ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνδρείως αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις αὐτὴ ἡ καρτέρησις ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία.

Perhaps we are meant to laugh at the possibility that the dialogue is itself an act of *andreia*; the repeated use of *andreia* (noun and adverb) in this tautological diversion only suggests that the inquiry itself is laughable. But the notion that dialogue (i.e. a contest of words) can be a manly activity is taken seriously by Laches. To Socrates' exhortation that they persist in their inquiry, Laches responds: "I seem to know in my own mind what *andreia* is, but it has fled me (διέφυγεν) somehow so that I cannot take hold of it in speech (τῷ λόγῳ) and say what it is" (194b). As a form of speech, *andreia* 'flees' the general like an enemy since under Socrates' tutelage it has become detached from martial deeds. As a retrospective event in the presence of two famous Athenian generals, the final failure to answer the question, "What is *andreia*?"—and even the need to ask it—reveals how the search for a 'true' *andreia* is simultaneously the recognition of its irrevocable absence. The general's lament that *andreia* is hard to capture in words anticipates the aporetic ending of the dialogue.

Aristotle's conception of *andreia* is often talked about as a corrective to the Platonic conception and as a means of comparing the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. The chronological and compositional relationship between the *EE* and *NE* is not my concern, however, although this relationship is the focus of a valuable article by M. J. Mills on the meaning of *andreia* in the two treatises.<sup>69</sup> Together with the focus on *andreia* in the *Laches*, the fact that *andreia* may be a key to the relationship between these two treatises suggests the central place of this particular virtue in philosophical discourse in the fourth century. In the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle defines *andreia* as the attribute

<sup>69</sup> Mills 1980.

of a man whose actions demonstrate a reasoned and moderate negotiation between ‘boldness’ (*thrasos*) and ‘fear’ (*phobos*). The *andreios* man neither fears too much nor too little and it is this moderation that makes *andreia* a virtue or *aretê* (*EE* 1228a26–30a37; 1230a26–33). The principal aims of inquiry in the *EE* are the pursuit of ‘happiness’ (εὐδαιμονία) and the art of ‘living well’ (εὖ ζῆν) of which true *andreia* (ἡ ἀληθής, *EE* 1230a22) is an attribute. Five forms of *andreia* (εἶδη) can be identified by analogy with this true form (*EE* 1229a13–15; cf. *Rhet.* 1366b11):

There are five kinds of *andreia* so called by analogy, because [really *andreioi* men] endure the same things, but not for the same reasons. One is political *andreia*. This is the one that is due to a sense of shame.

ἔστι δ’ εἶδη ἀνδρείας πέντε λεγόμενα καθ’ ὁμοιότητα· τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ διὰ τὰ αὐτά. μία μὲν πολιτική· αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ δι’ αἰδῶ οὖσα.

This taxonomy of *eidê* is an expression of the abstract nature of the treatise’s inquiry and the extent to which manliness has become an object of semantic refinement or narrowing. Aristotle illustrates *andreia politikê* by citing two passages from Homer (*EE* 1230a20–1). The first citation, not attested in the extant Homeric corpus, describes an encounter between Hector and Achilles: Ἑκτορα δ’ αἰδῶς εἶλε (“Shame took hold of Hector”). In the second, Hector broods on the fact that Polydamas will be the first to reproach him if he does not go out and face Achilles on the battlefield: Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει (“Polydamas will be the first to lay a reproach on me”, *Iliad* 22.100). The first of these examples recalls *Iliad* 15.561 and 15.661 (discussed above) in which having *aidôs* is a feature of being men: ὦ φίλοι, ἀνέρες ἔστε, καὶ αἰδῶ θέσθ’ ἐνὶ θυμῷ (“O friends, be men, and put a feeling of shame in your heart”). In defining political *andreia* by means of Homeric exemplars and the Homeric lexicon of *aidôs*, Aristotle both universalizes and de-historicizes the concept while he also implies that there is no contemporary manliness that can match the martial valor of the epic heroes.<sup>70</sup> ‘True’ manliness, in other words, is part of a nostalgic discourse even, or perhaps

<sup>70</sup> We might ask why Hector is the heroic exemplum in both of these examples. Perhaps it is because, as the hero who fights a war to save his city, his manliness is *politikê*.

especially, if we take the Homeric examples to be ineffectual in the dialogue.

As M. J. Mills points out, the *NE* offers a more sustained analysis of the similarity between what Aristotle calls *andreia* that is noble (*andreia kalon*, *NE* 1115b22) and political *andreia*, based on the fact that both are manifested in the pursuit of excellence or *aretê* and motivated by the avoidance of shame or τὸ αἰσχρὸν (*NE* 1116a 20–9).<sup>71</sup> This sort of *andreia* is best exemplified in battle which affords the most noble or *kallistos* form of death (*NE* 1115a27–33; cf. *EE* 1229b 3–14). As in the *EE*, *politikê andreia* is listed in the *NE* as the first of five kinds of *andreia*, for “citizens appear to endure dangers on account of the penalties of the laws, the avoidance of reproaches, and the awards of bravery” (δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνειδέη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμὰς, *NE* 1116a18–20; cf. Plato, *Rep.* 430c). Homeric heroes, here Diomedes and Hector, are again the exemplars of this type of *andreia* (*NE* 1116a24–6) while mercenaries or professional soldiers (στρατιῶται) don’t qualify as *andreioi* because, insofar as they rely on their skill in battle, they become cowards (δειλοί) when that skill fails them (*NE* 1116b3–23). Aristotle offers an example from history in which mercenaries ran away from a battle at “the temple of Hermes” in Coronea in 353 BCE (*NE* 1116b19).<sup>72</sup> We should note that cowardice is exemplified by a historical example while manliness is again exemplified by the heroes of epic.<sup>73</sup> As in the *EE*, Aristotle’s search for the meaning of political *andreia* in the *NE* reveals the nostalgic register of the concept (manliness) and the uncertain referentiality of the term (*andreia*); indeed, these are mutually productive. The more extreme claim—and one I subscribe to—is that the problem has to do in part with the word itself, i.e. that *andreia* is simply incapable of naming the virtue the philosophers seek to define. Or, to put the matter differently, insofar as *andreia* refers to a political quality its meaning as ‘true’ manliness is compromised.

<sup>71</sup> Mills 1980, 209.

<sup>72</sup> Scholiast to *NE* 1116b19.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. the historical example of the Spartans at *Laches* 191b–c.

6. *Conclusion*

In an article on epigraphical evidence for the language of approbation in democratic Athens, David Whitehead notes “a significant change in approbatory practice, [namely] the adoption of abstract noun attributes [that] occurs precisely in the last decade or so of the fifth century.”<sup>74</sup> *Andreia* does not figure in his discussion of what he calls the ‘cardinal virtues’ in Athenian public inscriptions. He argues that it is a Platonic virtue, one that is hardly referred to at all in the fifth century, presumably including the epigraphic sources. But even though *andreia* may be uncommon in the ethical lexicon of the fifth century, its use in dramatic and historical texts anticipates its transformation into a ‘Platonic’ virtue, as I have tried to show.<sup>75</sup> In other words, the philosophical aim of defining the term can be read as a response to its ambiguous meaning in fifth-century texts. Whitehead notes that the preferred term of praise found in fifth-century inscriptions is the post-Homeric *andragathia*, an abstraction that develops out of the earlier concept of the *agathos anêr* and he concludes that this “move into abstraction” signifies a transformation of the individual *anêr* into the collective *dêmos*, for “virtues, whether cardinal or not, are desirable aspects of human conduct conceptualized independently of any specific persons or concrete circumstances” (p. 51).<sup>76</sup> Whitehead explains this transformation in terms of the self-fashioning of the *dêmos*. I am suggesting that the semantic history of *andreia* is similar to that of *andragathia*, but with the proviso that the “move into abstraction” is not simply a direct reflection of democratic consciousness or, in Whitehead’s words, of

<sup>74</sup> Whitehead 1993, 40.

<sup>75</sup> On the grounds that Plato’s thought is peripheral “to the real-life world of classical Athens and its democratic morality” Whitehead 1993, 38 argues that Plato is irrelevant to an investigation of the ‘cardinal virtues’ in the fifth century. Our access to the ‘real-life world’ of fifth-century Athens is debatable as is Whitehead’s assumption that public inscriptions provide direct access to that world. In any event, while discussions of *andreia* in the dialogues may not provide direct access to democratic morality, they do illustrate the semantic afterlife of the term and provide a commentary on its earlier usage.

<sup>76</sup> Whitehead 1993, 59–61 refers to *andragathia* as a “trail-blazing abstract virtue” that supplants *aretê* in the fifth century. It is significant that *andragathia* retains its connection to the Homeric *anêr agathos*. Whitehead explains the preference for the abstract term as a means of honoring the living since *aretê* is associated with heroic death and argues for the “need to find and adopt an *agathos*-abstract free from the elitist and necrological baggage of the past that *aretê* brought with it . . .”

“an egalitarian society.”<sup>77</sup> This ‘move’, which culminates in the desire to pin down the defining characteristics of *andreia* in fourth-century philosophical treatises, signifies a destabilization of dominant ethical categories over time. In the fifth century, this destabilization is part of a process of supplanting noble *aneres*—defined as such by their physical deeds in war—with *andreioi* (men defined by their *andreia*).

But this transformation is not a simple matter of lexical equivalencies or of substituting one positive term for another; nor does it happen overnight. As Thucydides’ description of *stasis* demonstrates, an ethical vocabulary is situational and political, even at the level of individual lexical items. While we cannot call *andreia* an honorific ‘democratic virtue’, as Whitehead does *andragathia*, we can say that it is part of an emerging political lexicon that includes more commonly discussed abstractions like *isonomia*. I am not suggesting that *andreia* has the same weight as *isonomia* in Athenian democratic discourse, only that it inaugurates a new concept of manliness whose connotation—like that of *isonomia*—is overtly *political*.<sup>78</sup> Epitomized in Thucydides’ phrase *andreia philetairos*, this political manliness is not proven in the performance of traditional masculine deeds (*erga*) but in the manipulation of words. Thucydides implies that both democratic and oligarchic sympathizers abused the term during the civil wars (διαφορῶν οὐσῶν ἑκασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν δῆμων προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, “grievances in different places prompted the democratic leaders to call in the Athenians and the oligarchs to call in the Spartans,” 3.82.1), but his own usage here and in the Funeral Oration suggests that *andreia* is recognizable to his audience as a particular feature of Athenian democratic discourse. It suggests, in other words, that political manliness is—for better or worse—a matter of what Athenians say.

<sup>77</sup> Whitehead 1993, 62.

<sup>78</sup> *Isonomia*—like *andreia*—figures in Thucydides’ discussion of *stasis* at *History* 3.82.8: “The leading men in the cities used respectable-seeming names on each side, claiming to value the political equality of democracy (πλήθους τε ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς) or the discipline of aristocracy, and while nominally cherishing public interests they in fact set them up as prizes”. The translation is Rhode’s, 1995. The only other instance of *isonomia* in Thucydides occurs at 4.78.3. Cf. Herodotus, *Histories* 3.80.26 and 83.3 (the speech of Otanes); 3.142.15; 5.37.8. Vlastos 1971, discusses the meaning of *isonomia* (“the equality of political power”) and its relationship to *dēmokratia* in these and other passages.

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### CHAPTER THREE

## THE *ANDREIA* OF XENOCLES: *KOUROS*, *KALLOS* AND *KLEOS*

G. I. C. Robertson

This paper will be concerned with the ‘visibility’ of virility in early Greek poetry, and its focus will be the epitaph of the Athenian spearman Xenocles, a couplet inscribed on the base of a *kouros* (the statue has not been preserved) which appears to declare that this warrior’s *andreia* can be recognized by looking at his grave monument. Although there are many references in poetry to an ideal unity of virtue (whether *andreia* in particular or virtue in general) and physical beauty, the relationship between these qualities is not straightforward; the combination of the two is praised, but the failure of most people to live up to this ideal is a constant theme. I would like to examine the relationship between physical appearance and *andreia* in early Greek poetry (both literary and inscriptional), and to situate the epitaph of Xenocles within this poetic tradition. This inscription is both exceptional and conventional in its collocation of the visible and the virtuous; its invitation to the viewer to ‘know’ the deceased’s *andreia* from ‘seeing’ the monument, though unique among verse epitaphs of its era, can be understood in terms of the *kleos* (‘fame’) bestowed by poetry upon its subjects in the literary tradition from Homer to Pindar. This discussion of Xenocles’ epitaph falls into three parts: the first is concerned with the inscription and the *kouros* within their traditions; the second with the relationships between beauty (*kallos*) and virtue, particularly martial virtue, stated or implied in literary verse; and the third with the role of poetic commemoration and *kleos* in the construction of an ideal unity of appearance and *andreia*.

### 1. Kouros

The epitaph of Xenocles (no. 19 in Hansen 1983, henceforth *CEG*) is inscribed on a stepped base for a *kouros*; the base was built into the north bastion of the Sacred Gate in the Kerameikos during

Themistocles' rebuilding of the Athenian defences in 479, and so the *kouros* itself has been lost, but the lettering and punctuation suggest that the epitaph dates from 550–530 BC. The text of this badly damaged inscription is printed by Hansen as follows:

[ — — ]ξ αἰχμετῶ, Χσενόκλεες, ἀνδρὸς [ἐπισ]τάς  
σεῖμα τὸ σὸν προσιδὼν γνό[σεται]αι ἐν[ορέαν?].

On the basis of meter and sense, the final word has been restored here as the accusative case of *ênorea*, a poetic form of the noun *andreia*; this word appears in its Ionic form (*ênoreê*)<sup>1</sup> in Homer and in its Doric form (*anorea*) in Pindar. The sense of the surviving words may be roughly given as follows: “having looked (*prosidôn*) at your *sêma*, Xenocles, one will know (*gnôsetai*) a spearman's *andreia*”. By looking at the monument, the viewer will know that the deceased possessed this warlike excellence; this is the only surviving verse epitaph for a soldier in the archaic period which makes such a claim—and for that reason it may seem particularly disappointing that this *kouros*, of all possible *kouroi*, has been lost. The epitaph, however, remains; although the statue at which it invites us to look and recognize *andreia* is no longer there for us to see, the verses can still be interpreted in their poetic context.

Although it is not uncommon in early verse epitaphs to draw the viewer's attention to the monument itself in order to inspire pity (e.g. *CEG* 28 and 51) or admiration for the sculptor's art (e.g. *CEG* 18, 150, 161), it is rare for the beauty of the dead person to be emphasized in the inscription. Even where the beauty of the monument is mentioned, it is just that: a beautiful monument (e.g. *CEG* 161 *kalon mnêma*), not a monument of a beautiful person.<sup>2</sup> The epitaph of Xenocles is remarkable in that it not only directs the reader to look at the image, but also links the appearance of this image to a specific virtue possessed by the dead man, in this case the *andreia*

<sup>1</sup> Wilhelm proposed that the full Ionic form ἐν[ορέαν] should be supplemented here, but Hansen argues in his notes ad loc. that the form of Xenocles' name in the inscription does not support this. Other supplements are given in Hansen's notes; one suggestion is that a plural form of the noun ought to be restored (the plural appears, for example, at Pindar, *Isthmian* 4.11), but in any case there is little reason to doubt that the epitaph is concerned with the virtue of *andreia*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Ducat 1976, 241, who comments that these epigrams draw attention both to the absence of the person being commemorated and to the presence of the image which is an unsatisfactory substitute for the life that has been lost.

of a spear-fighter; no other surviving verse inscription of the period up to the end of the fifth century does this.

There is one epitaph which links the beauty of the monument to the beauty of the youth whom it commemorates; this is *CEG* 68, from the base of an Attic *stêlē* slightly later than Xenocles' tomb ('Looking [*esorôn*] at the *mnēma* of the dead Cleoetes, son of Mene-saechmus, mourn how fair [*kalos*] he was when he died'). This inscription emphasizes the loss of Cleoetes' life and its attendant beauty; elsewhere in the surviving early verse epitaphs this concern is clearly illustrated by the use of the *topos* of the 'flower of youth', and its particular application to fallen soldiers. Tyrtaeus refers (10.28) to the "splendid flower of lovely youth" (*eratês hêbês aglaon anthos*) which the ideal warrior possesses during his life, and this phrase (with variations) is common in literary poetry in a variety of contexts, particularly laments for the onset of old age or death;<sup>3</sup> it also appears in more general descriptions of heroic excellence (e.g. Aeneas at *Iliad* 12.484; Jason at Pindar, *Pythian* 4.158). But in the early verse epitaphs this *topos*, when it is used of men,<sup>4</sup> is *always* used of men who died in battle,<sup>5</sup> perhaps as a strategy to make the loss of these young lives especially evocative of grief; as the Lydian king Croesus says at Herodotus 1.87, part of the horror of war is that it requires fathers to bury, rather than be buried by, their sons. The 'flower of youth' is very much a quality of the living, as the poetic theme of its 'passing away' indicates; it would be natural enough to find the phrase in an epitaph for a young man who died in any circumstances, but in the epitaphs the emotional weight of this graphic image is reserved for fallen soldiers.<sup>6</sup> This is as close as the epitaphs usually get to praise of a fighter's beauty: they remember something that has now passed. The epitaph of Xenocles, on the other hand,

<sup>3</sup> See Campbell 1982, 370–1 for some examples from Homer, Mimnermus, Solon, and Theognis; to his list may be added Simonides 20.5.

<sup>4</sup> It is used twice of women: *CEG* 175 (Sinope, c. 475–450) and 119 (Thessaly, c. 450?).

<sup>5</sup> *CEG* 4 (Athens, 458 or 457), 6 (Attica, 447?), 13 (Attica, c. 575–550?), 82 (Attica, c. 450–425?), 136 (Argolis, c. 525–500?).

<sup>6</sup> If a person died young but not in battle, there were other ways to express this; forms of the word *a(n)ôros* 'untimely', for example, occur in *CEG* 43 (Athens, c. 525?), 45 (Athens, c. 525–500?), 117 (Thessaly, c. 475–450?), 154 (Amorgos, c. 450–425?), 163 (Thera, c. 500?), and 171 (Egypt, c. 475–400?). Some of these, of course, are too badly damaged to give any indication of the manner of death, and even the less damaged epitaphs do not always specify this. *CEG* 171, for example,

does not follow this pattern of lament for the loss of youth; contrary to other verse epitaphs, it insists on something which is still there, in fact still visible (*prosidôn*), through which the warrior's *ênorea* can be known (*gnôsetai*) by the passer-by.<sup>7</sup> Unlike those which mention the 'flower of youth' motif, Xenocles' epitaph says nothing about the manner of his death, and it is entirely possible that he did not die in battle; indeed, this circumstance may have prompted a more forceful expression of his warlike *ênorea* than is found elsewhere in the epitaphs. In any case, the fact remains that the inscription is unique in its claim that Xenocles' manly virtue can be recognized from viewing the monument.

Vocabulary similar to that used in the epitaph of Xenocles appears in the opening of the pseudo-Simonidean inscription on the statue of the wrestler Theognetus ('Simonides' 30 Page), where the observer is invited to "Look and know (*gnôthi . . . prosidôn*) the boy Theognetus, Olympic victor . . .", but the strategy is slightly different. In Theognetus' case the following three verses elaborate on the boy's virtues; we are told, for example, that he was "a skilled charioteer of wrestling" (*palaimosunês dexion hêniochon*, v. 2) who "crowned his city of noble fathers" (v. 4). In this epigram—which is probably not genuine<sup>8</sup>—the text is intended to work with a statue in enabling its audience to 'know' its subject: the viewer knows from seeing the image that Theognetus was beautiful, and he knows from reading the words that the boy was an Olympic victor, no less skilled in athletics than

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may be the epitaph of a mercenary, as suggested by Wagner 1973, 174. But it remains true that the motif of 'loss of (the flower of) youth' motif in the epitaphs, when used of men, is always used of fallen soldiers.

<sup>7</sup> Sourvinou-Inwood 1995, 280 notes that the direct address to the deceased is rare in archaic epitaphs, and that such addresses "create a discursive time and space, a now in which absent objects or beings are present subjects in the discourse".

<sup>8</sup> Theognetus was probably the winner of the boys' wrestling at Olympia in 476. The victory is mentioned by Pindar at *Pyth.* 8.36; see Giannini's commentary on this passage (Gentili et al. 1995, 572) for the evidence. Scholars from Wilamowitz 1922, 440 n. 1 to Giannini have been sceptical about the attribution of this epigram to Simonides; Page 1981, 244 comments that in these verses "the style is florid, and the absence of the name of the home-land would be surprising in a contemporary epigram . . .; these lines may well be the work of a learned Alexandrian". Ebert 1972, 58 suggests that the epigram may indeed be genuine, if the victor's homeland was recorded in an accompanying prose inscription, or if these verses were inscribed on a statue at home rather than on the Olympic monument seen by Pausanias (6.9.1).

he was handsome (*kalliston men idein, athlein d' ou kheirona morphês*, v. 3).<sup>9</sup> The recognition and identification of virtue involved in this 'knowing' are the result of more than simply looking at the statue; the inscription provides a condensed account of the actions which allow its subject to lay claim to an ideal combination of beauty and excellence. This is a poetic substitute for the kind of recognition that is normally made on the basis of experience; the Megarian poet Theognis, for example, exhorts his young friend Cyrnus to 'know' (the same verb is used) the characters of men by associating with them, so that he will befriend the 'good' men (*agathoi*) and avoid the 'bad' ones (*kakoi*).<sup>10</sup> And in Homer, one comes to 'know' a character by actions<sup>11</sup> rather than appearances, as for example when Hector taunts Paris at *Iliad* 3.53–5:<sup>12</sup>

You won't stand up to war-loving Menelaus?  
Then you would know (*gnoiês*) the man whose wife you now have.  
Your lyre wouldn't help you, nor the gifts of Aphrodite,  
nor your hair, nor your appearance (*eidos*), when you rolled in the  
dust.

The poet of *CEG* 19, on the other hand, suggests that a similar judgment about Xenocles' *andreia* can be made simply by looking at the *sêma*, without experience of this virtue either directly through personal contact (as in the case of Theognis' advice to Cyrnus) or indirectly through report (as in the case of Theognetus).

It should be remembered here that a funerary *kouros* offers no opportunity for visual 'individualizing' markers; the conventional

<sup>9</sup> Kurke 1993, 144, accepting the authenticity of this epigram on the grounds given by Ebert (see previous note), discusses the ritual associations of victory inscriptions such as this one: just as the statue "immortalizes its model, preserving him precisely as he was in his moment of glory and even assimilating him to the divine", the inscription "captures the moment when Theognetus was the object of all eyes—the moment he stood before the Olympic herald" for the proclamation of his victory.

<sup>10</sup> E.g. Theognis 98, 117, 124, 312.

<sup>11</sup> Or words: it is only after Odysseus has "recognized the infallible temper" (*noon nêmerete' anegnô*) of Philoetius and Eumaeus through questioning them that he reveals himself. Chantraine 1950, 115 suggests that the prefix *ana-* indicates the effort involved in testing the servants' reactions to their master's homecoming, and that this effort is reflected in the later use of *anagignôskein* meaning 'to read', i.e. to recognize letters and decipher their sense.

<sup>12</sup> For this and some other Homeric examples of 'knowing' a man (or, in one case, a god) by his deeds, see Ecker 1990, 158–9, with n. 498. The scene between Paris and Hector will be discussed further below.

statue of the naked youth by itself (as opposed to a *stêlê*, for example) presents an ideal type which tells the viewer nothing about what the particular virtues of the dead man may have been.<sup>13</sup> Osborne contrasts two examples of funerary art from sixth-century Attica: the famous *stêlê* of Aristion, which represents the dead man as a warrior with spear and armor,<sup>14</sup> and the *kouros* representing a certain Croesus "whom furious Ares once destroyed as he fought in the front rank" (as we are told in the accompanying epigram, *CEG* 27).<sup>15</sup> Aristion and Croesus were both warriors; the *stêlê* allows Aristion to be represented as such in an image, but the *kouros* is unable to convey such a 'narrative' without the aid of an inscription. "Text and sculpture both complement and undermine each other here", remarks Osborne; the former concentrates on an act that made Croesus particularly worthy of commemoration, while the latter implicitly assimilates him to his fellow men, "asserting that for all an individual's particular achievements all a man can in the end lay claim to is humanity".<sup>16</sup> It is striking in the case of Xenocles, then, that a funerary epigram which explicitly (and unusually) links the act of looking at the *sêma* to recognition of the dead man's particular virtue should be attached to a type of image where this is, strictly speaking, not possible. If, as Osborne writes elsewhere, "the absence of any definitive action on the part of the *kouros* removes the possibility of masculinity being shown in action",<sup>17</sup> how is the viewer to 'know' the warlike *ênorea* of Xenocles, as the inscription suggests, from looking at the *kouros*?

<sup>13</sup> Jeffery 1962, 150. Some dedicatory *kouroi* were given attributes, but the funerary monuments were not; see Stewart 1986, 56–7, 60.

<sup>14</sup> Richter 1961, no. 67. *Stélai* were not, of course, restricted to warriors' graves, and other surviving monuments give indications of other activities: Richter's nos. 25 and 31, for example, represent a discus-thrower and a boxer.

<sup>15</sup> Stewart 1997, 66 remarks that the couplet on Croesus' monument "proves, if proof were needed, that the youthfulness of this and other *kouroi* is not 'realistic', for to fight in the vanguard, Croesus must have been a heavy-armed infantryman or *hoplites* . . . and thus over twenty and bearded". Sourvinou-Inwood 1995, 262 suggests that the same is likely true of Xenocles, who is described in his epitaph as an *aikhmêtês anêr*.

<sup>16</sup> Osborne 1988, 7 and 8.

<sup>17</sup> Osborne 1998, 25.

## 2. Kallos

In the scene between Hector and Paris in the third book of the *Iliad*, which has been mentioned briefly above, Hector reproaches his brother Paris for being good looking (39 *eidōs aristē*, 44–5 *kalon eidōs ep'*) without having the valor (*alkē*) to match his looks. At lines 43–5 his words are as follows:

Surely the long-haired Achaeans laugh at us,  
saying that a chieftain is [chosen as] our champion because  
his appearance is handsome, but there is no strength or valor in his  
heart.

ἦ που καγαλῶσι κάρη κομόωντες Ἀχαιοί,  
φάντες ἀριστήα πρόμον ἔμμεναι, οὔνεκα καλὸν  
εἶδος ἔπ', ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι βίη φρεσὶν οὐδέ τις ἀλκή.

The translation of the middle line above is adapted from Kirk 1985, 272; the conjunction οὔνεκα ('because') is taken closely with the immediately preceding ἔμμεναι (infinitive of the verb 'to be'), and the implication is that the Greeks are laughing because the Trojans appear to have made the assumption that Paris must be brave simply because he is beautiful. They are laughing at Trojan naïveté (and the criticism is the stronger because it comes from the Trojan Hector), not because they honestly believed that such a handsome champion must be a good fighter and their expectations have not been fulfilled.<sup>18</sup> This is clear from Menelaus' reaction to Paris' appearance earlier in the book: when the Trojan prince, clad in a panther-skin and carrying a bow and throwing-spears (3.17–18), challenged the Greeks to fight, Menelaus immediately realized that Paris would be an easy opponent and 'rejoiced' (*ekharē*, 23 and 27) as a lion rejoices upon encountering its prey. The Greeks are not deceived by appearances, and they now laugh at the Trojans for equating

<sup>18</sup> As might be the case if οὔνεκα were understood as following more closely after φάντες 'saying' at the beginning of line 44: the Greeks are laughing (now) because they (previously) believed that the Trojan champion (*promos*, "fighter in the forefront") was a great warrior (*aristeus*) on the basis of his appearance. Part of the ambiguity in translation of the phrase resides in the word *aristeus* itself; although it literally means an 'excellent' man (and particularly an excellent fighter), it is also used in Homer in a somewhat diluted honorific sense to mean simply 'chieftain', as for example at *Iliad* 9.334, *aristēssi . . . kai basileusi*: "virtually synonymous" terms, as noted by Hainsworth 1993, 106.



beauty with bravery and making a handsome but obviously inexperienced fighter their champion.<sup>19</sup>

Hector's rebuke, then, refers to an ideal of a handsome warrior, but does so in such a way as to undermine it immediately: familiarity with the ideal of excellence *accompanied by* beauty does not permit excellence to be *inferred from* beauty; this is the simple mistake for which Hector now imagines the Greeks to be mocking the Trojans. There are indeed some heroes of the *Iliad* who are blessed with both qualities, including not only Hector himself (22.369ff.: the Greek heroes marvel at the wondrous appearance [*eidōs agēton*] of Hector's corpse), but also Ajax (17.279–80 = *Od.* 11.550–1: he was second only to Achilles in appearance [*eidōs*] and deeds [*erga*]) and Bellerophon, who had both beauty (*kallos*) and "lovely *ênoreê*" (6.156). This may be what men *should* be like, and in an ideal world it would be possible to infer *andreia* from appearance, but many men do not attain this ideal; Odysseus makes this point in a different context (*Odyssey* 8.159ff.) when he replies to Euryalus' criticism that he does not look like an athlete by pointing out that appearance is not a fair indicator of excellence: some men are blessed with good looks, others with intelligence or skill in speaking.<sup>20</sup> In the *Iliad*, Paris has beauty without bravery, and Tydeus, for example, has bravery without beauty (5.801 "he was small in stature, but a fighter").<sup>21</sup> Obviously courage is the deciding virtue—it can excuse the lack of good looks, but possession of the latter cannot excuse a lack of the former.

This is also the case in Archilochus' iambic fragment 114, where the poet declares that he has no use for a swaggering, well-coifed military commander, but prefers a short, bandy-legged one who stands firm and has 'heart'. The sentiment in this fragment has been described as "unhomeric",<sup>22</sup> "anti-heroic realism, even iconoclasm",<sup>23</sup>

<sup>19</sup> The Greeks themselves are represented as having more sense: Nireus of Syme, though he was *kallistos*, was weak (*alapaunos*) and led only a small contingent of fighters (*Iliad* 2.671–5). Donlan 1997, 43 writes that Nireus held 'patriarchal' authority by virtue of his birth, but lacked the 'charismatic' authority necessary for military leadership. Nireus' situation is very like that of Paris; the good looks of these heroes do not convince their followers.

<sup>20</sup> Odysseus himself has both strength and beauty: when preparing to box with Irus, Odysseus "showed his thighs, beautiful (*kalous*) and large, and his broad shoulders, his chest, and his powerful arms" (*Odyssey* 18.67–9).

<sup>21</sup> Similar language is used of Heracles by Pindar, *Isthmian* 4.53 (see below, n. 33).

<sup>22</sup> Campbell 1982, 152.

<sup>23</sup> Podlecki 1984, 41.

but in fact it is no more or less 'Homeric' or 'heroic' than the attitudes expressed in the *Iliad*; in his dismissal of beauty as a sure marker of bravery, Archilochus recalls Hector in Book 3, as well as the contemptuous phrase *eidos agêtoi* ("wonderful in appearance") used to describe the Greeks when Hera and Agamemnon reproach them for cowardice (5.787 = 8.228). Of course Archilochus is praising not ugliness in itself but the 'heart' behind it;<sup>24</sup> the ugliness of his preferred commander is introduced simply as a contrast to the vain and self-indulgent *stratêgos* whom he rejects in his opening lines to make the same observation that Hector and other epic heroes make: the ideally handsome warrior is just that—an ideal.

This ideal is given further refinement by Tyrtaeus, whose portrayal of a handsome warrior who dies in battle shows us beauty and bravery in combination. "It is *kalon* for an *anêr agathos* to die fighting in the front rank for his country", says Tyrtaeus (10.1–2), and later in the poem it becomes clear that *kalon* means not only *figuratively* 'fine' or 'noble' but *literally* 'beautiful'—in lines 27–30, the poet claims that the brave and good-looking fighter retains his beauty even in death. The correspondences between this passage and Priam's plea to Hector at *Iliad* 22.71–6 are revealing: whereas Homer treats the young man's death first and then focuses on the disgrace of the dying old man, Tyrtaeus moves from the old man (10.21–7) to the young one (10.27–30), emphasizing the visual and erotic aspects of the latter scene (29 *thêêtos* "marvellous to see" . . . *eratos* "lovely") and finishing with the phrase *kalos d' en promakhoisi pesôn* ("and he is beautiful when he has fallen in the front rank"), which echoes the opening of the poem; now, however, the adjective *kalos* is shifted from the act of dying (expressed in the infinitive *tethnamenai* in line 1) to the man himself (this does not occur in the Homeric version of the scene).<sup>25</sup> If it is *kalon* to fight and die bravely, it seems that bravery

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Burnett 1983, 44: the poet "refuses to admire the soldier who is outwardly splendid, but this does not mean automatic praise for his homely opposite, for even short legs are no good unless a man is brave".

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Garner 1990, 11: Tyrtaeus "slide[s] magically from the general declaration of the beauty of dying—which is hard to accept—to the beauty of the young—which is practically impossible to deny". Garner accepts the standard view that Tyrtaeus was writing after Homer; but since the passage seems to be intended as an exhortation to fight (as in Tyrtaeus), not as an appeal to stay out of the battle (as in Homer), West 1995 (with references to his earlier arguments) believes that the passage from Tyrtaeus has been adapted to a less appropriate context in the

can in fact *make* one beautiful—the sentiment of Sappho’s fragment 50 (“The one who is *kalos* is *kalos* as far as looks go; the one who is also *agathos* will immediately be *kalos*”) is here applied to the martial sphere. But for Tyrtaeus (as, of course, for Sappho, Archilochus, and Homer), the converse is not the case: beauty does not necessarily imply bravery, or any other excellence. Tyrtaeus writes (10.9–10) that the deserter who leaves his *polis* and is condemned to wander with his wife and children, hated by all whom he encounters, ‘shames’ (*aiskhunei*) his family and “belies his splendid appearance” (*kata d’ aglaon eidos elenkhei*). The good soldier may gain beauty in the act of dying, according to Tyrtaeus, but once again it is recognized that the ideal of a fighter who is both brave and handsome does not allow an observer simply to look at a warrior and infer his excellence from his appearance.

The relationship between the two qualities becomes more complicated in Ibycus’ ode to the Samian tyrant Polycrates (*S* 151 in Davies 1991). An interpreter of this poem is not helped by the fact that much of it has been lost, but some idea of its progression may be discerned from what does remain. The preserved text begins with a description of the Greek army capturing Troy “because of fair Helen’s beauty” (5 *xanthas Helenas peri eidei*), and then the poet suddenly declares that he has no interest in singing of the Trojans, the capture of Troy, or the magnificent *areta* of the excellent heroes (*hêrôes esthloi*) of Greece (14–18). But this last item does in fact form part of his program; after saying that such a project would be fit only for the Muses to undertake, Ibycus mentions the two foremost Greek heroes, Achilles and Ajax, with their conventional Homeric epithets (33–4 *podas ôkus Akhilleus kai megas Telamônios Aias*) before shifting the audience’s attention to heroes distinguished for beauty (36–45): Cyanippus (probably described as *kalli]stos*, 36), Zeuxippus (son of Apollo and the Naiad Hyllis), and the even more beautiful Troilus, whose appearance (45 *morpha*) the Trojans and Greeks alike compared to that of Zeuxippus as thrice-refined gold to the base metal orichalc. Nothing is said specifically about the valor of these last figures; the poet concentrates on their beauty, just as he mentions

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*Iliad*. But it is perhaps best to follow Powell 1991, 247 and Richardson 1993, 113: the scene is probably an example of a traditional motif which both Homer and Tyrtaeus adapt to their own purposes (whatever their relative chronology might have been, and however successful their adaptations may appear to us).

only the martial prowess of Achilles and Ajax in vv. 32–4 without saying much about their appearance.<sup>26</sup> The poet places the two concepts side by side, marking the division; and by thus ‘articulating’ their disjunction, Ibycus does exactly that—he places a ‘joint’ between them, and thus suggests their combination. (Perhaps this is why the beautiful but cowardly Paris was first in his list of rejections at line 10.)

This last section of the poem, where we return to the theme of beauty which we encountered earlier,<sup>27</sup> moves swiftly and slyly to the concluding address to Polycrates. Achilles and Ajax were brave; Cyanippus and the others were beautiful, but are listed with the Aeacids and therefore presumably also possessed bravery—what, then, about Polycrates himself? The last three verses of the ode are as follows (46–8):

Among these [heroes] you too, Polycrates,  
will forever have undying fame (*kleos aphthiton*) for beauty (*kalleos*)  
just as my own fame (*kleos*) [is undying] in song.

τοῖς μὲν πέδα κάλλεος αἰὲν  
καὶ σύ, Πολύκρατες, κλέος ἄφθιτον ἐξεῖς  
ὥς κατ’ αἰοῖδ’ αὖ καὶ ἐμὸν κλέος.

These lines have been much discussed, including the notorious problem of whether *πέδα* should be understood as the preposition ‘with’/‘among’ (as translated above) or as a syncopated form of the verb ‘have a share in’ (“These have a share in beauty forever; you too will have undying fame, just as . . .”), and the related question of whether the punctuation given in the papyrus at the end of line 46 should be retained or removed.<sup>28</sup> Whatever decisions may be

<sup>26</sup> He does mention that Ajax was *megas* (like the good-looking general criticized in Archilochus fr. 114), and size can be taken as an indication of beauty; see, for example, Verdenius 1949. But the point is that Ibycus here repeats the Homeric formula *megas Telamōnios Aias* (which occurs twelve times in the *Iliad*), and Ajax’s *megethos* is associated specifically with his strength by Hector at *Iliad* 7.288.

<sup>27</sup> Certainly in v. 5 of the preserved text (the mention of Helen), and probably before then: Fränkel 1975, 288–90 suggests that the poem started with a declaration of the power of beauty, and that Helen is given as an example thereof.

<sup>28</sup> Woodbury 1985 notes that translating *peda* as the verb means that Polycrates is promised fame for nothing in particular (at least explicitly); it seems, therefore, better to remove the stop (as in Davies’ text, given above), and the poem thus ends with both a specification of the praise for Polycrates and a link with the poet’s fame (cf. the end of Pindar’s first *Olympian* ode). See also Goldhill 1991, 116–19

made by the reader, the movement of thought is the same: from bravery to beauty, to Polycrates, and finally to the *kleos* bestowed by poetry. Polycrates, through the poet's skill in crafting the song, will (like the last-mentioned heroes) have *kallos*<sup>29</sup> and *kleos*; and it is to the 'bodily' implications, so to speak, of this *kleos* that I would now like to turn, beginning with the epinician poetry of Pindar and Bacchylides.

### 3. Kleos

It is not surprising that epinician poetry refers to the physical beauty of the victors whom it celebrates—Bacchylides, for example, tells us that the pentathlete Automedes displayed his "marvellous body" (*thaumaston demas*) at the Nemean games and outshone the other competitors as the moon outshines the stars (9.27–31). The same poet uses similar language of the virtue of *Areta*, 'excellence', itself: after a description of the fighting at Troy, he describes *Areta* as "shining" and "undimmed by the dark veil of night" (13.175–7)—Automedes in the ninth ode, then, is a visual embodiment of the abstraction towards which he strives.<sup>30</sup> But Bacchylides elaborates further on the image of "shining *Areta*": he tells us (13.178–81) that she roams over land and sea, flourishing with undying repute or fame (*doxa*). Outstanding appearance and outstanding excellence are thus linked by the idea of 'fame'; and Pindar will show us more clearly how the preservation of manly virtue and its transmission through poetry can in fact bestow beauty upon the *laudandus*.

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for a discussion of the complexities of *kleos* in this passage, including a further ambiguity in the translation of the final verse.

<sup>29</sup> MacLachlan 1997, 194 suggests that the ode includes "the warning that beauty has its dangerous underside" and turns out to have been "prophetic": "Polycrates, beautiful and powerful, would ultimately deliver Samos into the hands of the Persians by the sensuous living he cultivated" (Athenaeus 12.540f–541a).

<sup>30</sup> Bacchylides refers to the physical beauty of victors less often than Pindar does (cf. Instone 1996, 10). Note also Bacchylides 5: Heracles (who is *thaumastos*, 71) is struck (84 *thambēsen*) by Meleager's beauty, and begs him to let him marry Deianeira, rather than Meleager begging Heracles to marry his sister (as in Pindar, fr. 249a = scholion to *Iliad* 21.194, referring to *Dithyramb* 2 'Katabasis of Heracles' or 'Cerberus'). The greatest hero of Greece is struck by overwhelming admiration for a lesser figure; cf. Gentili's comment on Bacchylides' tendency to 'humanize' the hero (Gentili et al. 1995, xix). The myth of Meleager illustrates his "courage tranquille" (Croiset 1970, 406)—he dies in the act of killing his enemy Clymenus (who

Many of Pindar's epinician odes contain references to the physical beauty of heroes and athletes, particularly victors in combat sports such as wrestling and the pancration<sup>31</sup>—the 'Simonidean' epigram for Theognetus mentioned earlier, too, is for a wrestler—and Pindar is careful to note the role played by poetry in constructing this beauty. This poetic mechanism is operative at *Olympian* 10.93–4, where a combative athlete (Hagesidamus of Epizephyrian Locris, victor in the boys' boxing) is told that the lyre and *aulos* will "sprinkle *kharis*" on him, and the Muses will nurture his *kleos*. *Kharis* is used here, as elsewhere in Pindar, to denote the pleasure of epinician song and its benefits for the victor and his reputation;<sup>32</sup> in this case, Pindar immediately goes on to demonstrate the action of this *kharis* in the poem's final epode (vv. 97–105), where he briefly mentions the victor's homeland and parentage and the "strength of his hand" (100 *kheros alkai*), and concludes the poem by focusing particularly on Hagesidamus' beauty, describing the victor as 'lovely' (99 *eraton*) and "beautiful in form, imbued with youthfulness" (103–4 *ideai te kalon, hôrai te kekramenon*), and comparing him to Ganymede. The poet's progression from the power of the *kharis* of song to the concluding emphasis on the victor's beauty implies that the commemoration of the victory preserves and indeed enhances the athlete's appearance, and this is in fact exactly what Pindar states in other poems: in the sixth *Olympian* ode, we are told that the personified Charis "sheds (*potistaxêi*) a glorious form (*euklea morphan*)" on those who win the mule-car race

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happens to be "blameless in body", *amômêton demas*, 147), but it is his beauty that captures the attention of Heracles.

<sup>31</sup> Also noted by Pfeijffer 1999, 284. E.g. the Aeginetan wrestler Alcimedon was "beautiful to look at (*esoran kalos*), and did not belie his appearance (*eidos*) in action (*ergôi*)", *Ol.* 8.19; the eponymous hero Opous was "a man indescribable in form (*morphai*) and deeds (*ergoisi*)", and the wrestler Epharmostus "young and fair (*kalos*), having performed the fairest deeds (*kallista*)", *Ol.* 9.65–6 and 94; the Aeginetan pancratiast Aristocleidas was "fair (*kalos*), and performed deeds appropriate to his form (*eoikota morphai*)", *Nem.* 3.19; and the Theban pancratiast Strepsiadas was "astounding in strength, shapely to behold (*idein te morphaeis*)", and achieved "success no worse than his appearance (*aretan ouk aiskhion phuas*)", *Isthm.* 7.22. Cf. the poet's words to Telesicrates of Cyrene, victor in the race in armour, at *Pyth.* 9.97–100: "when you were so often the victor in the seasonal festivals for Pallas, each maiden prayed silently that you might be her dearest husband or son".

<sup>32</sup> See, for example, Verdenius 1987, 103–6. MacLachlan 1993, ch. 6 offers a detailed discussion of *kharis* in epinician poetry, particularly as *kharis* pertains to "favor and reciprocity, and civilized behavior" (123). The charm of beautiful poetry can, of course, work both ways: as Pindar notes elsewhere, deceptive *kharis* can cause a false story to gain currency (*Olympian* 1.30ff.).

(*Ol.* 6.76).<sup>33</sup> Likewise, the poet claims elsewhere (*Pythian* 10.54–9) that by means of his songs (*sun aoidais*) he will make the Thessalian Hippocleas, victor in the boys' *diaulos* race, "even more marvellous to look at (*eti kai mallon . . . thaêton*) on account of his crowns". This redoubled splendor will inspire admiration among his peers and elders, and will, in particular, make Hippocleas desirable to unmarried girls—in effect, he will reap the benefits of Tyrtaeus' ideal war-like *anêr agathos*, who appears beautiful to men and desirable to women (10.29–30), and is honored by all his fellow citizens, young and old (12.37–42).

Appearance ideally reflects *andreia* (whether martial or athletic), and the scholiast on *Olympian* 6.76 comments that "victors appear to be good looking", but this misses the point. It is not simply *victory* which gives the victors this *eukleês morpha*, but *victory honored in song*—as Ibycus' encomiastic conclusion implied, it is *kleos* which bestows *kallos* on a man, thus making 'visible' other virtues such as *andreia*. The physical body is in effect augmented by a 'poetic body', in which *andreia* can be recognized by the audience.

#### 4. Conclusion

We can now return to the epitaph of Xenocles, and see how it both stands out from and intersects with other poetic 'visualizations' of *andreia*. As was mentioned in the first section of this discussion, the

<sup>33</sup> This 'shedding' or 'dripping' of *kharis* to enhance beauty has a Homeric precedent: at *Odyssey* 6.235 (= 23.162), Athene pours *kharis* on to Odysseus' head and shoulders, resulting in an increase of *kallos*, which causes Nausicaa to 'gaze' at him (6.237 *thêito*). At the end of *Isthmian* 4, Pindar promises to celebrate the victorious pancratiast Melissus of Thebes and his trainer Orseas, "shedding delightful *kharis*" (72 *terpnan epistazôn kharin*) upon them. Melissus, scion of a family renowned for "unsurpassed manly deeds" (11 *ênoreais . . . eskhataisin*) is described earlier in the ode as "not much to look at" (50 *onotos idesthai*) despite his great strength, and Pindar follows this description with an account of some great deeds of Heracles, who was "short in stature, but unbending in spirit" (53 *morphan brakhus, psukhên d' akamptos*); Pfeijffer 1999, 284 remarks that the poet "breaches the conventions and paradoxically makes a derogatory remark about the victor's appearance in order to draw a highly complimentary parallel between the victor and Heracles". In view of the Homeric scene and Pindaric statements cited here to the effect that his songs will enhance the beauty of the victor, perhaps it is not too fanciful to see a hint in the final verse of *Isthmian* 4 that the *kharis* of epinician song, shed upon the victor, will provide a kind of remedy (Thummer 1969, 2:80 sees a reference in this image to medical treatment) for Melissus' unimpressive appearance, and for Pindar's "breach of convention" in mentioning it.

surviving early Greek verse epitaphs are concerned primarily with the loss of life and beauty, they very rarely mention the physical appearance of the person being commemorated, and in particular they avoid making a direct connection between appearance and virtue ('manly courage' or otherwise).<sup>34</sup> Now that we have seen how poets from Homer to Pindar dealt with this question, it is perhaps surprising that there are not more inscriptions like the epitaph of Xenocles which draw attention to such a relationship. But although *CEG* 19 is an exceptional epitaph, it intersects with conventions seen in the literary poetic tradition: the act of commemoration, of asserting that the subject was manly and beautiful, ensures that he will remain so for posterity. The idealized *kouros* is an *eukleês morphê* like the 'poetic bodies' constructed by Pindar, and by Tyrtaeus and Ibycus before him; it makes Xenocles' beauty as eternal as that promised to Polycrates by Ibycus, and his *ênorea* as *erateinê* 'lovely' as that of Homer's Bellerophontes (*Iliad* 6.156). Hurwit writes that the aristocratic *kouros*, "the embodiment of heroic *aretê* . . . affirms a belief as old as Homer: that immortal *kleos* (fame) is the only compensation for death and that fame can be conferred only by poetry or art",<sup>35</sup> to which it may be added that the *kleos* of poetry and art is one place—perhaps the only place—where the rarely attained ideal unity of manly *aretê* and manly beauty can be said to reside.<sup>36</sup>

The epitaph of Xenocles constructs this unity even when the *kouros* to which it draws attention has been lost; it takes an ideal associated with the heroic past (as was the case with Bellerophontes, whose *kallos te kai ênoreên erateinên* [*Iliad* 6.156] is preserved in Homer's report of Glaucus' account) and projects it into the present and future. We cannot literally perform the act which the inscription invites us to perform, but the absence of the *kouros* encourages closer attention to the poetry which remains and to the *kleos* which it implies, incidentally providing literal confirmation of Pindar's claim that poetry can

<sup>34</sup> Pace Race 1990, 188. Referring to "this *topos*, as old as the *Iliad* and frequently encountered in inscriptions, which expresses the relationship between an individual's physical appearance . . . and his performance", Race quotes *Odyssey* 11.550f. of Ajax, 'Simonides' 30 Page, a Latin inscription, *Aeneid* 5.344, and cites Young 1971, 19 n. 61.

<sup>35</sup> Hurwit 1985, 202.

<sup>36</sup> Bassi 1998, 245 explores, in a different context, the Greek 'nostalgia' for *andreia*: "the desire to resurrect an idealized and ever receding past and the masculine subject who occupies and sanctions that past".



carry fame to places that stationary statues cannot reach (*Nemean* 5.1ff.; cf. *Nemean* 4.79ff. for song as preferable to monuments). By considering the place of this epitaph in a poetic conversation on the relationship between beauty, virtue, and celebration in song, perhaps we can, after all, 'know' something of the nature of Xenocles' *andreia*.

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## CHAPTER FOUR

# MARVELOUS *ANDREIA*: POLITICS, GEOGRAPHY, AND ETHNICITY IN HERODOTUS' *HISTORIES*

Sarah E. Harrell

### 1. *Herodotean andreia*

Twice in the *Histories*, Herodotus in his own voice expresses wonder (*thôma*) that particular individuals display *andreia*. In both cases, his amazement arises from the fact that figures who apparently lack masculine traits perform acts characteristic of *andreia*. Through his surprise, Herodotus reveals the implicit expectation that men are the ones who exhibit *andreia*, and 'manly' men in particular. In narrating the tales that defy this expectation, Herodotus draws attention to the conditions that effect *andreia*.<sup>1</sup> The marvelous stories of Artemisia and Telines suggest that, for Herodotus, politics, geography, and ethnicity, in addition to sex and gender—not some single, essential element—all inform his conception of *andreia*.<sup>2</sup> This paper argues that marvelous *andreia* emerges where boundaries are blurred and categories confused. It arises out of the ambiguity that characterizes the margins, real and symbolic, of the Greek world. Before turning to these marvelous examples, however, let us review the less exceptional cases of *andreia* within the *Histories*.

For Herodotus, *andreia* is a gendered concept that can be opposed to femininity.<sup>3</sup> It suggests the performance of an action rather than

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<sup>1</sup> It is the deviations from the norms of masculinity that most often receive comment in antiquity and that permit examination of its components (Gleason 1995, 60). See Hartog 1988, 230–7 on Herodotus' use of *thômata* in the *Histories* to draw attention to norms by highlighting exceptional cases. Cf. Munson 2001, 232–65.

<sup>2</sup> The difficulty in reducing Herodotean *andreia* to one cause stems from Herodotus' own world-view as well as from the general Greek concept of 'manly courage'. Cf. Gould 1989, 63–6 on the multiplicity and variety of Herodotus' explanations for the causes of events.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the one instance in which Herodotus applies the term to objects rather than people. He describes two types of flute as "womanly and manly" (γυναικίους τε καὶ ἀνδρηίους, Hdt. 1.17.1).

simply an innate quality.<sup>4</sup> It tends to be associated with martial prowess, and does not belong exclusively to any one ethnic group. The most explicit demonstration of the performative aspect of *andreia* involves Hegesistratus, an Eleian seer who served the Persian Mardonius at Plataea. According to Herodotus, Hegesistratus once had been imprisoned by the Spartans. He cut off part of his own foot in order to slip out of his chains and escape. Herodotus first describes this deed (*ergon*) as μέζον λόγου, ‘beyond speech’, and then terms it ‘the most manly’ (ἀνδρηιότατον) of all those that he knows (9.37.2). Hegesistratus mutilates his own body, and produces a tangible sign of his *andreia*: the piece of his foot. This *ergon* appears to be ‘most manly’ in Herodotus’ eyes because of the extreme nature of the risk and pain that it entails.<sup>5</sup> The story implies that *andreia* is likely to be enacted at times of physical danger, when the stakes are life and death.

The most obvious setting for the performance of *andreia*, then, would be war. In Book 1 of the *Histories*, Herodotus recounts the strength and bravery of the Lydian nation before its defeat by the Persians:

At this time, there was no other race in Asia more manly or strong than the Lydians. They fought on horseback, carried great spears, and were themselves good at horsemanship.

Ἦν δὲ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἔθνος οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ οὔτε ἀνδρηιότερον οὔτε ἀλκιμώτερον τοῦ Λυδίου. Ἦ δὲ μάχη σφέων ἦν ἀπ’ ἵππων, δόρατά τε ἐφόρεον μεγάλα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἦσαν ἱππεύεσθαι ἀγαθοί. (Hdt. 1.79.3)

After identifying the Lydians as formerly more ‘manly’ than any other Asian race, Herodotus enumerates their skills in warfare. While he does not narrate a particular instance of Lydian *andreia*, he links this quality to martial prowess. Later in the same book, Croesus tells Cyrus that the Lydians will no longer be a threat to the Persians once they have been induced to lay down their weapons and take up luxurious pursuits:

<sup>4</sup> See Gleason 1995, esp. 159–67 on masculinity as a performance enacted by rhetoricians of the Second Sophistic.

<sup>5</sup> The Spartans are held in amazement (*thōma*) at the daring (*tolma*) revealed by the sight of Hegesistratus’ foot (9.37.3). Immerwahr 1960, 261–75 examines the double connotations of *ergon* within Herodotus’ *Histories*. For Herodotus, an *ergon* can be either an abstract accomplishment or a concrete object. The episode of Hegesistratus combines both aspects in a gruesome manner. See Munson 2001, 66–8.

Sending them this message, forbid them from possessing weapons of war. Order them instead to put on tunics under their clothes and to wear high boots; enjoin them to play the cithara and the lyre and to teach their children to be shopkeepers. And soon, king, you will see that they have become women instead of men . . .

ἄπειπε μὲν σφι πέμψας ὅπλα ἀρήια μὴ ἐκτῆσθαι, κέλευε δὲ σφεας κιθῶνάς τε ὑποδύνειν τοῖσι εἵμασι καὶ κοθόρνους ὑποδέεσθαι, πρόειπε δ' αὐτοῖσι κιθαρίζειν τε καὶ ψάλλειν καὶ καπηλεύειν παιδεύειν τοὺς παῖδας· καὶ ταχέως σφέας, ὃ βασιλεὺς, γυναῖκας ἀντ' ἀνδρῶν ὅψει γεγονότας . . . (Hdt. 1.155.4)

Croesus describes the Lydian loss of martial prowess in gender terms. His people will become “women instead of men”. The renunciation of weapons both contributes to and visibly demonstrates this change. The Lydians no longer will possess the tools with which one displays *andreia*. Similarly, King Sesostris divides into two groups the peoples whom he has conquered in Egypt: those who put up a fight and those who submitted without resistance. Those who fought for their freedom are called ‘strong’ (*alkimos*) and ‘manly’ (*andreios*). Those who do not attempt warfare against the king reveal their lack of strength (*analkis*) (Hdt. 2.102.4–5). Herodotus again associates *andreia* with strength in war. Furthermore, he emphasizes the gendered aspect of the concept. Sesostris forever marks those peoples who were not *andreioi* by setting up in their land pillars displaying images of female genitalia (αἰδοῖα γυναικός, 2.102.5).<sup>6</sup>

Herodotus makes clear that the Lydians embody the stereotype of effeminate, eastern barbarians only after their military defeat.<sup>7</sup> In other words, their lack of *andreia* is not the direct and natural result of their ethnicity. Nor is *andreia* the exclusive possession of any one ethnic group, Greek or non-Greek.<sup>8</sup> In addition to the Lydians of the past and the anonymous tribes whom Sesostris defeats, Herodotus associates the Getae with *andreia*.<sup>9</sup> They are the most ‘manly’ (ἀνδρηότατοι) and just of the Thracian peoples (Hdt. 4.93). The young Cyrus, son of a Mede and a Persian, is the most ‘manly’ of his agemates (ἀνδρηϊοτάτω, Hdt. 1.123.1). Herodotus does not articulate

<sup>6</sup> On this passage see Steiner 1994, 128–9.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Kurke 1992, 102; Munson 2001, 102–3.

<sup>8</sup> See Tuplin 1999, on the limits to racial prejudice among Greek authors. Barbarians can possess positive qualities, and their lack of such qualities is not posed necessarily as proof of their racial or genetic inferiority. Cf. Thomas 2000, 110–17; 134.

<sup>9</sup> Hartog 1988, 91 discusses the *andreia* of the Getae.

how or why the Getae and Cyrus possess *andreia*, but his reference to the quality at least implies prowess in war.<sup>10</sup>

When we turn to the instances of *andreia* at which Herodotus expresses wonder, we gain a fuller understanding of the various factors that allow an individual to perform an act of 'manly courage'. The two accounts of marvelous *andreia* occur in Book Seven in relative proximity to one another. They form part of the larger narrative of the Greek and Persian preparations preceding Xerxes' invasion of the Greek mainland. Thus we must view these stories in the context of this central contest over Greek identity and freedom.

## 2. *Artemisia*

Artemisia, who like Herodotus comes from Halicarnassus, provides the first example of marvelous *andreia*.

But I especially marvel that Artemisia, a woman, waged war against Greece. After her husband died and she herself held the tyranny even though her son was a youth, she waged war with spirit and manly courage, being under no compulsion.

... 'Αρτεμισίης δέ, τῆς μάλιστα θῶμα ποιεῦμαι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα στρα-  
τευσαμένης γυναικός, ἥτις, ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνδρὸς αὐτὴ τε ἔχουσα τὴν  
τυραννίδα καὶ παιδὸς ὑπάρχοντος νενίεω, ὑπὸ λήματός τε καὶ ἀνδρηίης  
ἐστρατεύετο, οὐδεμιῆς οἱ εἰσῆς ἀναγκαίης. (Hdt. 7.99.1)

We see here that biological sex, like ethnicity, is not a prerequisite for 'manly courage'.<sup>11</sup> While not impossible, however, it is still unusual for a woman to perform *andreia*. The immediate cause of Herodotus' surprise at Artemisia's actions is her sex, as he makes clear by placing γυναικός ('woman') and ἀνδρηίης ('manliness') in close proximity to θῶμα ('wonder'). It is a marvel to Herodotus that the female Artemisia displays *andreia* in the traditional arena of war (cf. στρα-τευσαμένης, ἐστρατεύετο).

<sup>10</sup> Perhaps in Cyrus' case, this is also a sly allusion to the fact that as king of the Persians he will be defeated in battle and killed by a woman, Queen Tomyris (cf. Hdt. 1.214).

<sup>11</sup> See Weil 1976, 223 on how Artemisia brings into question the importance of nature (*phusis*) in forming a woman's character. He believes that Artemisia's portrayal in the *Histories* was influenced by contemporary Sophistic debates.

If we expect a man to reveal *andreia*, what makes it possible for Artemisia to overturn these expectations? There is not one simple answer, as I suggested above. Instead, a variety of political, ethnic, and geographical factors contribute to this woman's enactment of *andreia*. First, Herodotus connects Artemisia's political status with her display of 'manly courage'. Artemisia is more than a warrior who acts with distinction among the troops in battle. She is in fact a leader. Herodotus classes Artemisia among the other taxiarchs, or squadron leaders, who make up Xerxes' forces (7.99.1). She herself 'commanded' (ἡγεμόνευε) troops from Halicarnassus, as well as those from the nearby islands of Kos, Nisyrus, and Kalydnos (7.99.2). Her military leadership is only one reflection of her political standing. She also holds the tyranny of Halicarnassus, a position she took over from her dead husband (7.99.1). Artemisia did not achieve the position of tyrant because of her *andreia*, but her tyranny provides her with the political autonomy to take on military leadership and reveal her *andreia*.

Herodotus concludes the sentence about Artemisia's *andreia* with the additional information that no 'necessity' (ἀναγκαίης) was upon her. On one level Artemisia serves the great Persian king Xerxes. But Herodotus presents that service as freely given, rather than the result of compulsion. A few chapters later, the Spartan Demaratus says to Xerxes that the Greeks will display great courage in battle because they are free men, recognizing only *nomos* as their master (7.102). Xerxes replies that men who are subject to the rule of one man, in the Persian manner, fight better. He says that, being fearful and under compulsion (ἀναγκαζόμενοι) to the whip, soldiers would demonstrate great valor (7.103.4). The entirety of Herodotus' narrative of the Persian Wars disproves Xerxes' argument. Herodotus suggests instead that freedom is a major determinant of martial success. Thus, the absence of compulsion is an important factor of Artemisia's ability to display *andreia* in the realm of war.

Munson has drawn attention to the significance of Artemisia's autonomy to her portrayal in the *Histories*. She relates this to Herodotus' desire to present Artemisia as a Greek, and particularly Athenian, element within Xerxes' Persian forces: "Autonomy with regard to political choices is generally a prerogative of the Greek side, and especially of the Athenians".<sup>12</sup> Munson correctly links Artemisia's

<sup>12</sup> Munson 1988, 95; see now Munson 2001, 255–9.



political and ethnic status. As she points out, a central theme of the *Histories* is the contrast between Greek freedom and the slavery of the Persian forces to their leader Xerxes.<sup>13</sup> But the question of Artemisia's ethnicity deserves a closer look. Munson states that in the *Histories* Artemisia's "Hellenic and 'male' side predominates" and that Artemisia in the end resembles a "cultured Athenian".<sup>14</sup> I would argue instead that Artemisia remains ethnically ambiguous in Herodotus' text and that this ambiguity permits her unusual display of *andreia*. Artemisia is both Greek and non-Greek, and her marginal status is never fully resolved. On the contrary, it is a central feature of her identity.

Herodotus displays an interest in Artemisia's origins, employing the terms *genos* and *ethnos* in his brief description of her.<sup>15</sup> Artemisia's *genos* (or her relations by blood descent) is "from Halicarnassus" on her father's side, but "Cretan" on her mother's (7.99.2). Herodotus names her father, Lygdamis, but does not record the name of her mother. He identifies neither explicitly as Greek or non-Greek, but instead tells us where they are from. As a Cretan, Artemisia's mother seems to be a Dorian Greek, although one from a place with a history of barbarian presence (cf. Hdt. 1.173). But what ethnic connotations does the term Halicarnassian carry? We must keep in mind that Herodotus himself was from Halicarnassus, and therefore would have had a particular interest in this question. In his description of Artemisia, Herodotus identifies the cities that Artemisia commands, including Halicarnassus, as Dorian:

Of those cities which I said she led, I declare that the race of all of them was Doric. The Halicarnassians were Troezenians, while the rest were Epidaurians.

τῶν δὲ κατέλεξα πολίων ἡγεμονεύειν αὐτὴν τὸ ἔθνος ἀποφαίνω πᾶν ἐν Δωρικόν, Ἀλικαρνησσέας μὲν Τροιζηνίους, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους Ἐπιδανρίους. (Hdt. 7.99.3)

Just after he has described Artemisia's father as "from Halicarnassus", Herodotus claims that Halicarnassians are part of the Doric *ethnos*. He thus gives the distinct impression that Artemisia is a Dorian

<sup>13</sup> See especially Munson 1988, 94–7. On this general theme in the *Histories*, see Redfield 1985, 116, Hartog 1988, 322–34.

<sup>14</sup> Munson 1988, 93, 94.

<sup>15</sup> See J. Hall 1997, 35–6 for a discussion of the meaning of the terms *ethnos* and *genos*.

Greek, on both sides of her family. He perhaps draws attention to Artemisia's Dorian connections in order to account for her martial prowess. At least by the time of the Peloponnesian wars, Dorians were considered superior in the manly arena of war.<sup>16</sup> In addition, Herodotus may have felt it necessary to reinforce his city's, and his own, Dorian roots. Halicarnassus had adopted the Ionic script and dialect in the fifth century, and of course Herodotus composed the *Histories* in Ionic Greek.<sup>17</sup>

These references to the Dorianism of Halicarnassus do not resolve fully the question of Artemisia's ethnicity. Masculine qualities, while expected in Greek men, take on different connotations when displayed by Greek women. In a woman, these qualities cease to be Hellenic. Artemisia's anomalous position as a 'manly' female ruler for the Persian king therefore forces Herodotus' audience to question her Greek ethnicity. As a woman who is tyrant and taxiarch, Artemisia evokes a class of 'manly women' familiar from Greek myth, tragedy, and ethnography. Often these women are rulers. A few, like Clytaemnestra, might be Greek. But such women often belong to, or are associated with, barbarian races.<sup>18</sup> In Greek thought, barbarian races can invert the norms of Greek culture.<sup>19</sup> One aspect of this inversion is the role that barbarian women play in their societies: they are in control while the men they rule are effeminate. Artemisia thus resembles a barbarian queen, and, as we have seen, she serves the great barbarian king.<sup>20</sup>

Herodotus leaves Artemisia's ethnicity ambiguous, but given Artemisia's association with Herodotus' city of birth, he implies that Halicarnassus is particularly conducive to the unusual display of

<sup>16</sup> See Alty 1982, esp. 7–14.

<sup>17</sup> See J. Hall 1997, 169–70 on Halicarnassus' Dorian ethnic identity and adoption of the Ionic dialect.

<sup>18</sup> On this class of women, see Pembroke 1967, Rosellini and Säid 1978, Zeitlin 1978, Dewald 1981, E. Hall 1989, 205–9, Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1993.

<sup>19</sup> See Redfield 1985, and Hartog 1988 on the complex inversions of Greek norms within Herodotus' representation of non-Greeks.

<sup>20</sup> Dewald 1981, 109–10 compares Artemisia with Tomyris, queen of the Massagetae whom Herodotus describes in Book 1 (Hdt. 1.205). Munson 1988, 93 comments: "Artemisia, the woman whom Herodotus calls masculine, is both analogous and antithetical to the Persians, and this ambiguity affects her relation to the opposite side, the Greeks". She concludes, however, that Artemisia's Hellenic side predominates. For a different perspective on Herodotus' portrayal of the relationship between women and political power, see Tourraix 1976 who examines women as guarantors of power for male rulers within the *Histories*.

*andreia*. Several modern scholars assert that the historical Artemisia indeed was Carian on her father's side.<sup>21</sup> Their conclusions derive primarily from onomastics. Carian origins have been suggested for her father's name, Lygdamis, as well as for the names of her brother and son, Pigres and Pisindelis, mentioned in the *Suda*.<sup>22</sup> This evidence is far from conclusive. Masson has observed that it is often difficult to determine linguistically whether names found on fifth-century inscriptions in Caria are Greek, Carian, or a hybrid of the two.<sup>23</sup> His caution warns us that names alone should not be used to prove the ethnicity of the individuals who possess them. With no other ancient evidence beyond the seemingly Carian names of her male relatives, we cannot determine definitively whether the real ruling dynasty of Artemisia was Carian.<sup>24</sup>

The evidence of names at Halicarnassus, however, does allow for another sort of conclusion about the city that produced both Herodotus and Artemisia. Individual families at Halicarnassus exhibit Greek and non-Greek names in successive generations. Herodotus himself was related to the Halicarnassian poet Panyassis, whose name appears to be Carian.<sup>25</sup> In a well-known Halicarnassian inscription from the late-fifth or early-fourth century, several men with Greek names have fathers with Carian names, as Masson has pointed out. Conversely,

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<sup>21</sup> Munson 1988, 93 n. 12 dismisses the relevance of the historical Artemisia's potential mixed ancestry on her father's side: "Although Lygdamis may have been Carian in the proper sense . . . in the light of what Herodotus says about Halicarnassus it is evident that he regarded him of Greek descent, and not of the race he discusses at 1.171". Thus, in Munson's view, even if the real Artemisia was half Carian, Herodotus presents her as wholly Greek. Cf. Munson 2001, 256. Note that Bean and Cook 1955, 97 in their examination of the Halicarnassian peninsula conclude that the real Artemisia was Greek.

<sup>22</sup> Suid. s.vv. Ἡρόδοτος, Πανύασσις, Πίγρης. Cf. McLeod 1966, 95, Mathews 1974, 6, Hornblower 1982, 10 n. 49, 30 n. 194, 349 n. 161. Blümel 1992, 9–27 places Lygdamis, Pigres, and Pisindelis on his list of indigenous names found on Greek inscriptions in Caria.

<sup>23</sup> Masson 1959, 159–64.

<sup>24</sup> Modern assumptions that the fifth-century tyrants of Halicarnassus were Carian perhaps arise from a desire to align this little-known dynasty with later Carian satraps who ruled the city. The fourth-century Hekatomnid rulers include the famous Mausolus and his sister and wife, Artemisia, who succeeded him. They were Carians. Ancient sources sometimes confuse the fourth-century satrap with our Artemisia. It is important to remember that the two ruling families were not related. Bean and Cook 1955, 97 make this point in their discussion of fifth-century Halicarnassus. In his study on Mausolus, Hornblower 1982, 34–51 provides a brief overview of the pre-Hekatomnid and Hekatomnid dynasties in Caria.

<sup>25</sup> See McLeod 1966, Mathews 1974, 5–19, Bean and Cook 1955, 96.

a few Halicarnassians with Carian names have fathers with recognizably Greek names.<sup>26</sup> Hornblower concludes that onomastics reveal the gradual and complex nature of the hellenization of coastal Caria. Greek elements did not simply replace the indigenous Carian population and culture. Rather, the evidence of Halicarnassus and its neighboring towns suggests that in this region Greek and non-Greek peoples mixed and co-existed, each leaving their mark on the other.<sup>27</sup>

Herodotus would have been acutely aware of the hybrid character of Halicarnassus, and I believe that he evokes that character when he identifies Lygdamis and others as “from Halicarnassus”. This in turn impacts on the status of Artemisia as an ethnically ambiguous figure. She comes from a place whose inhabitants display the blending of Greek and non-Greek in their very names.<sup>28</sup> Apart from the question of her Carian blood, the geography of Halicarnassus itself would suggest to Herodotus’ audience the immediacy of Artemisia’s cultural contacts with non-Greeks. On the shores of Asia Minor, Halicarnassus physically bordered on barbarian lands. The Lydians and Persians were never far away. Before becoming part of the Persian Empire, the cities of Caria came under Lydian domination during the rule of Croesus.<sup>29</sup> And of course the Carians themselves had preceded the Greeks in this region, as Herodotus recounted in Book 1 of the *Histories* (1.171). After the arrival of the Greek colonists, Carians remained within Halicarnassus itself as well as in the region immediately inland.<sup>30</sup> While Herodotus does not mention Carians in his initial description of Artemisia, the surrounding narrative reflects an awareness of their significance to the region. At 7.93, Herodotus says that the Carians supplied seventy ships to

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<sup>26</sup> Masson 1959, 161. For the text of this inscription (usually cited as *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 46), see now Blümel 1993. Cf. also *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 45 = Meiggs-Lewis 32.

<sup>27</sup> See Hornblower 1982, 332–51 on the hellenization of Caria. He discusses onomastics in particular at pp. 346–51.

<sup>28</sup> This appears to me to answer the conundrum that Dewald 1981, 125 poses about three unusual individuals within the *Histories* from the region of Halicarnassus: “all three, in other words, disappoint normal sexual expectations; all three are presented in a neutral or positive light. What this says about Herodotus’ sense of Halicarnassus I do not know”. In addition to Artemisia, the other two individuals are a priestess from Pedasa who grows a beard and the eunuch Hermotimus (8.104).

<sup>29</sup> See Hornblower 1982, 16–25.

<sup>30</sup> Meiggs-Lewis 32 records a fifth-century law passed at a joint meeting of the peoples of Halicarnassus and Salmacis. Salmacis appears to have been a Carian community within Halicarnassus that retained its own constitutional and social structures. See Hornblower 1982, 85 and Bean and Cook 1955, 94.

Xerxes' force.<sup>31</sup> Just before he introduces Artemisia, he names three Carian taxiarchs among those of Xerxes' commanders who are worthy of mention (7.98). The last of these Carians, the king Damasithumos, will reappear in the later narrative of the Battle of Salamis. He commands the friendly ship that Artemisia sinks in her controversial bid for survival and the favor of Xerxes (8.87). It is her destruction of Damasithumos that inspires Xerxes to say: "my men have become women, my women have become men" (8.88.3).<sup>32</sup> Whether through blood or cultural association, Artemisia's character reveals barbarian as well as Greek influence. Xerxes' comment once again poses this fact in gendered terms. Artemisia's display of *andreia* represents a very un-Greek assumption by a woman of qualities traditionally associated with men.

As we have seen above, masculine women often are barbarians in the Greek imagination. In addition, they imply the fearsome corollary that Xerxes articulates here: effeminate men. In places where women are manly, men become womanly.<sup>33</sup> Artemisia's manly behavior therefore raises the unspoken possibility that the men of Halicarnassus whom she rules are feminine. One can understand Herodotus' reluctance to pursue this line of reasoning in his representation of Artemisia's *andreia*. Yet he cannot ignore completely the suspicion of effeminacy cast upon the Greeks of Asia Minor. On the one hand, he displaces that suspicion onto the Ionians who occupied the coastline north of Halicarnassus. The Scythians call the Ionians the 'worst' and 'most unmanly' (ἀνανδροτάτους) of all men (4.142).<sup>34</sup> While this condemnation excludes the Dorians of Halicarnassus, Herodotus elsewhere suggests that geography, in addition to ethnicity, can contribute to character.

<sup>31</sup> At this point, he refers back to his earlier discussion of Carian history at 1.171. See Dewald 1987, 164–6 on such cross-referencing as part of Herodotus' authorial stance as 'writer' of his work.

<sup>32</sup> Munson 1988, 98–105 provides a useful discussion of Artemisia's dubious actions at Salamis. Suzanne Saïd has suggested to me that the deceitful nature of Artemisia's battle tactics undercuts Herodotus' earlier claim that she displays *andreia*. I would suggest, however, that the Salamis episode contributes to the portrait of Artemisia as an ambiguous figure, impossible to pin down. Did she purposely target the Carian Damasithumos or only encounter him by chance? Herodotus leaves this question open (cf. 8.87.3).

<sup>33</sup> On the connection in Greek thought between female power and male effeminacy, see Munson 1988, 93, E. Hall 1989, 208, Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1993, 27.

<sup>34</sup> Alty 1982, 12 cautions that anti-Ionian statements in the *Histories* are difficult

In the final chapter of the *Histories*, Herodotus famously attributes to the Persian king Cyrus the view that “soft lands” tend to create “soft men”.

It is customary for soft men to come from soft places, for it is not possible for marvelous fruit and men skilled at warfare to spring from the same ground.

φιλέειν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν μαλακῶν χώρων μαλακοὺς ἄνδρας γίνεσθαι· οὐ γάρ τι τῆς αὐτῆς γῆς εἶναι καρπὸν τε θωμαστὸν φύειν καὶ ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς τὰ πολέμια. (Hdt. 9.122)

As has long been recognized, this passage refers to a theory more fully worked out in the Hippocratic *Airs, Waters, Places*.<sup>35</sup> The second half of this Hippocratic treatise elaborates on the notion that physical environment can affect character, primarily focusing on contrasts between the inhabitants of Europe and of Asia (Hipp. *Aër.* 12–24).<sup>36</sup> The author describes the effects of the spring-like climate of Asia on its inhabitants:

It is reasonable that this land is nearest to the spring in terms of its nature and the moderation of its seasons. Manly courage, endurance, labor, and high-spiritedness could not be produced in such an environment, neither in a native nor in a foreigner. But it is necessary for pleasure to rule there.

εἰκός τε τὴν χώραν ταύτην τοῦ ἡρος ἐγγύτατα εἶναι κατὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν μετριότητα τῶν ὥρέων. Τὸ δὲ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸ ταλαίπωρον καὶ τὸ ἔμπονον καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο ἐν τοιαύτῃ φύσει ἐγγίγνεσθαι οὔτε ὁμοφύλου οὔτε ἄλλοφύλου, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀνάγκη κρατεῖν. (Hipp. *Aër.* 12)

Here the treatise privileges the influence of geography over ethnicity. The distinction ὁμοφύλου/ἄλλοφύλου applies the enervating effects of climate to both non-Greek natives and Greek settlers in Asia Minor.<sup>37</sup> Both the Hippocratic text and the comments of Cyrus in

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to interpret. It is not always clear whether Herodotus is disparaging only Asiatic Greeks for submitting to the slavery of Persian rule, or if his comments have a wider scope.

<sup>35</sup> See for example How and Wells 1979, II: 336–7; Thomas 2000, 106–7.

<sup>36</sup> While the author and date of *Airs, Waters, Places* is unknown, the treatise most likely was composed in the late fifth century. Rather than positing a direct relationship between this text and the *Histories*, scholars suggest that both draw on earlier ethnographic works linking climate and character. See Backhaus 1976, 170–2, Jouanna 1981, 11, 1999, 226–31, Nutton 1994.

<sup>37</sup> This same treatise says that those Asians, Greek or barbarian, who are

the *Histories* reflect the notion that a pleasant physical environment, as exemplified by Asia, precludes the manly courage (*andreion/andreia*) of its inhabitants.<sup>38</sup>

Herodotus does not directly relate environmental theories to Artemisia, a female inhabitant of Asia Minor. In the *Histories* and in *Airs, Waters, Places*, general statements about geographic factors appear to apply to males unless females are singled out explicitly.<sup>39</sup> Yet Herodotus' representation of the 'manly courage' of a woman living in Asia Minor would evoke the issue of environment for his audience. The fact that this region can deprive its men of *andreia* implies that it may invert Greek norms further by fostering this quality in its women. Several related ideas therefore lie behind Artemisia's surprising *andreia*. She is a marginal figure in relation to the Greek mainland, both geographically and ethnically. Physically and culturally she inhabits a space between Greek and non-Greek, as well as between Dorian and Ionian. In addition, while being an autonomous political leader, she serves the great Persian king in battle. Artemisia displays characteristics of several groups, without belonging fully to any one.<sup>40</sup> This ambiguity ultimately accounts for her ability as a woman to embody *andreia*.

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autonomous (αὐτόνομοι) and who do not submit to despotic rule are the most warlike (μαχιμώτατοι) (Hipp. *Aēr.* 16, cf. 23). Later the author adds that *nomos* can create 'manly courage' (*andreion*) in those who do not possess this quality by nature (*phusis*) (*Aēr.* 24). Backhaus 1976, 177–85 attributes this apparent contradiction to the fundamentally ethnocentric world-view of the author. In trying to fit ethnic and cultural biases onto an environmental grid, the Hippocratic author introduces contradictions into his argument. See also Jouanna 1981, 11–14, Tuplin 1999, 64–5, Nutton 1994, Thomas 2000, 86–97 on the question of the ethnocentrism of *Airs, Waters, and Places*.

<sup>38</sup> For a comparison of the views expressed in *Airs, Waters, Places* and in the *Histories*, see Jouanna 1981, 1999, 225–31, Thomas 2000, 75–114.

<sup>39</sup> Note that Cyrus' comments concern "men" (ἄνδρας) rather than both sexes who inhabit soft places (Hdt. 9.122.3). The Hippocratic author uses the broader term *anthrōpoi* to describe various peoples, but he too appears to conceive of this group from the male perspective. For example, he explains that the *anthrōpoi* of Asia who are ruled by despots fight and endure hardships out of necessity. One such hardship is being apart from children, friends, and one's wife (γυναικός) (*Aēr.* 16). When he addresses the effect of climate on both women and men, he makes this explicit through gendered terms (*gunaikes/andres*) (cf. his discussion of Scythians, *Aēr.* 18).

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Hartog 1988, 1–33 on the Scythians in the *Histories* as a people who inhabit a physical and cultural space between Europe and Asia without completely belonging to either continent.

3. *Telines*

The second figure to exhibit marvelous *andreia* in the *Histories* occupies a similarly ambiguous status. After he has narrated the marshalling of Xerxes' troops, Herodotus describes embassies sent by the Greek allies to seek aid for their defense against Persia. Among those approached is the Sicilian Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, whose 'power' (πρήγματα) is said to surpass that of all other Greeks (Hdt. 7.145). The occasion of this embassy prompts Herodotus to recount Gelon's ancestry. He traces Gelon's roots back to the original seventh-century foundation of Gela on Sicily's south coast, the site of Gelon's birth and the place where he first ruled as tyrant (7.153.1). This line of ancestors included Telines, who obtained for his descendants a hereditary priesthood of "the chthonic deities" (τῶν χθονίων θεῶν) (i.e. Demeter and Kore) through single-handedly resolving a political *stasis* (7.153.2).

At the conclusion of this family history, Herodotus expresses amazement that Telines performed such a deed (*ergon*):

It was a marvel to me, considering what I had learned, that Telines accomplished such a deed. For these sorts of deeds I think are not typical of every man, but of one with a good soul and manly strength. But he is said by the inhabitants of Sicily to have been the opposite of those things: a womanly and rather soft man.

Θαμά μοι ὦν καὶ τοῦτο γέγονε πρὸς τὰ πυνθάνομαι, κατεργάσασθαι Τηλίνην ἔργον τοσοῦτον· τὰ τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἔργα οὐ πρὸς [τοῦ] ἅπαντος ἀνδρὸς νενόμικα γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ψυχῆς τε ἀγαθῆς καὶ ρώμης ἀνδρηίης· ὁ δὲ λέγεται πρὸς τῆς Σικελίης τῶν οἰκητόρων τὰ ὑπεναντία τούτων πεφυκέναι θηλυδριῆς τε καὶ μαλακώτερος ἀνὴρ. (Hdt. 7.153.3–4)

Once again, Herodotus' wonder at the appearance of *andreia* relates to expectations about gender. Here, it is not a woman who performs *andreia*, but a man (ἀνὴρ) who reportedly has feminine traits. Telines performs the sort of deed that is 'typical of' (πρὸς + gen.) a man of 'manly' (ἀνδρηίης) strength. The amazing thing is that he 'is said' (λέγεται) by the Sicilians to be the 'opposite' (ὑπεναντία): 'womanly' (θηλυδριῆς).<sup>41</sup> Telines, a man who may or may not be feminine, acts

<sup>41</sup> Note that Herodotus distances himself from the characterization of Telines by attributing it to his Sicilian sources. According to Dewald 1987, 154–5, this is the most frequent pose of the narrator of the *Histories*: he records what he has been



in a manner characteristic of manliness. He calls into question gender distinctions that would deny manly action to a womanly man. Loraux argues that a mixture of masculine and feminine lies at the very heart of Greek concepts of heroism. She poses Heracles as the epitome of the male Greek hero who achieves *andreia* through incorporating the feminine.<sup>42</sup> While the blurring of masculine and feminine might be deemed acceptable in the mythical Heracles, it still elicits Herodotus' wonder when displayed by a priest from Sicily.

In order to understand how Herodotus conceives of a womanly man who performs manly actions, it will be helpful to return to the themes that we explored in relation to Artemisia. First, we must consider why the male Telines was 'womanly' and 'rather soft' (μαλακώτερος), at least in the view of Herodotus' Sicilian sources. We have seen above that the effeminate and soft man represents the male counterpart to the 'manly woman' whom Artemisia evoked. Telines resembles the man from the east who subverts the norms of Greek masculinity. He is like the 'soft men' (μαλακοῦς) whom Cyrus says come from soft places (9.122).<sup>43</sup> He recalls the unmanly and gentle Asians, Greek and non-Greek, described in the Hippocratic *Airs, Waters, Places* (cf. *Aër.* 12, 16). Not surprisingly, then, Herodotus informs us that an unnamed ancestor of Telines came to Sicily from the Eastern Aegean. This man, who was from the island of Telos, accompanied the initial Rhodian foundation of Gela (7.153.1). Telines' name itself may reflect his ancestral ties to this tiny island off the coast of Asia Minor.<sup>44</sup> The family's eastern origins appear to be memorialized both in Telines' name and in his 'womanly' and 'soft' nature.

Herodotus' account of the family's origins points simultaneously to ethnic and geographic influences. He locates Telos through its proximity to the Triopian peninsula (7.153.1), which lies just south of Halicarnassus. In Book 1, Herodotus recounts how Apollo's Triopian

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told without claiming authority over the information. In this guise, which Dewald calls "the onlooker", the narrator may express wonder about a story without necessarily rejecting its truth-value. The authorial stance of the present passage further contributes to Telines' ambiguity, since the narrator's own opinions about Telines' true nature are never made explicit.

<sup>42</sup> Loraux 1995, 116–39.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Redfield 1985, 109–16 on the implicit comparison between hard and soft peoples that runs throughout the *Histories*.

<sup>44</sup> See Kesteman 1970, 409 on the significance of Telines' name.

sanctuary marked the center of a league of Dorian cities which once included Halicarnassus (Hdt. 1.144). Thus while Herodotus associates Telines with the attributes of a stereotypical ‘easterner’, he also points to his Dorian ancestry. Dorian ethnicity may play a role in Telines’ ability to overcome his soft and womanly nature. We recall that Herodotus suggested Artemisia’s Dorianism in his discussion of her *andreia*. But if environment too can affect character, Sicily itself may have induced a change in the nature of Telines’ family. In addition to being Dorian, Telines and his family now dwell in the western Greek world. Perhaps Telines’ feminine traits point back to the east, while his manly actions look forward to the family’s new identity in the west.

Whether or not Sicily’s physical climate can produce manliness, this land does provide Telines with a setting conducive for *andreia*. Herodotus recounts that Telines performed his courageous act when a *stasis*, or factional dispute, had caused part of the population to leave Gela (7.153.2).

Some Geloan men, after they had been defeated in a factional dispute, fled to Maktōrion, a city above Gela. Telines led these men back to Gela, having no force of men, but rather the holy objects of the goddesses.

Ἐς Μακτώριον πόλιν τὴν ὑπὲρ Γέλης οἰκημένην ἔφυγον ἄνδρες Γελῶν στάσι ἐσωθέντες· τούτους ὧν ὁ Τηλίνης κατήγαγε ἐς Γέλην, ἔχων οὐδεμίαν ἀνδρῶν δύναμιν ἀλλὰ ἱρὰ τούτων τῶν θεῶν. (Hdt. 7.153.2–3)

Herodotus alludes to the fact that this situation could easily have resulted in armed conflict, while at the same time making clear that Telines resolves the *stasis* without any ‘force’ (δύναμιν) of men. Instead of resorting to military measures, Telines uses the holy objects (ἱρά) of the chthonic deities to end the dispute.<sup>45</sup> He acts decisively without any protection against the potential for violence and physical harm presented by a *stasis*. We have seen elsewhere in the *Histories* *andreia* linked to a martial context. Here the threat of warfare replaces an actual battle. Telines’ *andreia* resides in the ability to prevent, rather than carry out, civil war. In this instance at least, *stasis* promotes *andreia*.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>45</sup> White 1964, 262–3 discusses this incident as “the first recorded occasion in Sicily on which the [Demeter] cult is employed for extra-religious purposes”.

<sup>46</sup> Contrast Thuc. 3.82, where *stasis* inverts the very meaning of *andreia*. On this passage, see Bassi in this volume.

Telines' actions during the *stasis* suggest not only physical bravery, but political autonomy. He himself is not part of a faction, and he alone restores order to the city.<sup>47</sup> By implication, he serves no party and no leader. His autonomous act, moreover, ensures an ongoing civic status for his family. It is in return for this service that Telines' descendants become the 'priests' (ἱεροφάνται) of Demeter and Kore (7.153.2). As Herodotus says at the conclusion of this episode, Telines has obtained a *geras* ('honor') through his actions. That *geras* is the transformation of a private, family priesthood into an official office.<sup>48</sup> In the following chapters, Herodotus will describe how Telines' descendant Gelon translates that *geras* into an explicitly political position. Gelon is not only a priest, but also a "great tyrant" (τύραννος . . . μέγας, Hdt. 7.156.3), first at Gela and then at Syracuse. Telines paved the way for his family's future political supremacy through his enactment of *andreia*. His story, like Artemisia's, reveals a connection between *andreia* and the ultimate symbol of political authority: the tyrant.<sup>49</sup>

In conclusion, no single category that I have examined accounts for the unexpected manifestations of *andreia* in Herodotus' *Histories*. No one factor in isolation explains how and why two seemingly unlikely figures perform acts of *andreia*. Both Artemisia and Telines have contested identities. Both combine aspects of femininity and masculinity. Both inhabit marginal realms on the edges of the Greek world. Artemisia is located somewhere between Greek and barbarian, while Telines occupies an uncertain position between west and east. Both appear to have Dorian origins and attributes. Both exhibit a degree of political autonomy and leadership that simultaneously

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<sup>47</sup> Kesteman 1970, 406–9 relates Telines' apparent neutrality to the theory that this Geloan *stasis* arose between the descendants of the Rhodian and Cretan founders of the city (see Thuc. 6.4.3 for the Cretan founders). Dunbabin 1948, 64 proposes class conflict as the basis for the *stasis*. There is no definitive evidence for the historical factors that led to the dispute.

<sup>48</sup> How and Wells 1979, II: 192, Dunbabin 1948, 64–5, and Kesteman 1970, 411 read this passage as an explanation for the shift of the Deinomenid priesthood from a private to a civic cult. For the Deinomenid family's use of this cult, see Compennolle 1957 and White 1964, 262–7.

<sup>49</sup> Hartog 1988, 322–39 argues that in the *Histories* tyrants and kings are doomed to failure because of their arrogance and excessive desire. I agree that Herodotus presents the negative and dangerous, even self-destructive, effects of tyranny. Nevertheless, while at the height of his power, the tyrant possesses complete political autonomy.

contributes to, and results from, their acts of *andreia*. It is at the intersection of all these elements that *andreia* can occur.<sup>50</sup>

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## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE *ANDREIA* OF THE HIPPOCRATIC PHYSICIAN AND THE PROBLEM OF INCURABLES

Ralph M. Rosen and Manfred Horstmanshoff

#### 1. *The Battlefield of Disease*

One of the most enduring metaphors of Western medicine has been its conception of illness as an invasive enemy against which the patient and doctor must join forces to do battle. Indeed, the more invisible and mysterious the processes of disease, the more vividly do people seem to invoke the metaphor. So it is not surprising to find that in Antiquity, when the etiology and control of disease was considerably more elusive than it is today, the notion of the body as a battlefield pervaded the medical treatises both implicitly and explicitly.<sup>1</sup> As the other essays in this collection make abundantly clear, when it came to real-life warfare in ancient Greece, the principle virtue was *andreia*, a term which, despite its many semantic nuances, became generally synonymous with military prowess and an almost heroic capacity for bravery. We might expect, therefore, that the Hippocratic physician, engaged as he was in his peculiarly relentless battle against disease, would be readily characterized in the treatises as *andreios*. In fact, however, there seem to be no instances in the Hippocratic corpus where this happens.<sup>2</sup> *Andreia* certainly occurs in contexts where an individual's moral character is discussed as a function of bodily constitution, nutrition or environment,<sup>3</sup> but it does

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Hipp. *Epid.* 1.11: ἡ τέχνη διὰ τριῶν, τὸ νόσημα, ὁ νοσέων, καὶ ὁ ἰατρός· ὁ ἰατρός ὑπηρέτης τῆς τέχνης· ὑπεναντιοῦσθαι τῷ νοσήματι τὸν νοσεῦντα μετὰ τοῦ ἰατροῦ χρή (“The art is composed of three things: the sickness, the patient, and the physician. The physician is the servant of the art, and the patient must join forces with the doctor against the disease”). Parry 1969, 115–16 notes the military metaphors in Thucydides’ description of the plague at Athens (2.47–54).

<sup>2</sup> See von Staden 1996, 404–5.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. *De dieta* 1.28: (on what conditions at conception are necessary for a man to turn out ἀνδρεῖος); *De aere aquis et locis*, *passim*, but cf., e.g. sec. 16, which notes

not happen to be singled out as a virtue particularly associated with the medical profession. Even the deontological works, which self-consciously address matters of professional demeanor and business ethics, never actually use the term in the context of how the Hippocratic doctor ought to behave. Do we conclude, then, that *andreia* was simply not felt to be especially applicable to this type of ancient ‘warrior’? If so, when the ancient physician behaved with what we might call ‘courage’ or ‘steadfastness’, did they themselves, and the non-professional public, conceptualize these qualities differently from more traditional forms of *andreia*?

Although the metaphor of combat was routinely invoked in ancient medical writing, the term *andreia*, used to describe either the physician or the patient, is conspicuously rare. It may be that in an age when illnesses were generally thought to arise from the disequilibrium of the body’s physiology, *andreia*’s close associations with real-life battles made it less appropriate as a description of a physician’s own more metaphorical ‘battle’ against disease. His was a battle not so much against specifically identifiable ‘agents’ that attacked bodies, but against various natural, often nebulously conceived, forces—nutrition, climate, self-neglect, and so on—that altered their internal constitutions in destructive ways. It is useful in this regard to consider how powerfully microbiology has changed our own conceptions of disease. The ability actually to *see* how ‘germs’ cause pathology, has turned them into much more palpable ‘enemies’ for us, and made the metaphor of medicine as a form of combat all the more vivid.<sup>4</sup> It is easier, after all, to anthropomorphize microbial entities as human enemies than the natural forces that loom so large in ancient etiologies of disease.

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that even a man who is ἀνδρείος καὶ εὐψυχος can be undone by unfavorable cultural conditions; cf. also sec. 23: καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν ἡσυχίης καὶ ῥαθυμίας ἡ δειλίη αὐξεται, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ταλαιπωρίας καὶ τῶν πόνων αἱ ἀνδρείαι. Although we are chiefly concerned in this chapter with Hippocratic texts, it is noteworthy that Galen too seems not to have used the term ἀνδρεία to refer explicitly to a physician’s virtue. But see below note 17, where Galen uses the adverbial form, ἀνδρείως, ironically of certain misguided physicians. On the courage of *patients* in enduring pain (and its philosophical associations), see Schrijvers 1990.

<sup>4</sup> For metaphors of warfare, invasion, victory and defeat in modern culture, see Sontag 1977, 62–6. She speaks, for example, of “the American cancer establishment, tirelessly hailing the imminent victory over cancer; the professional pessimism of a large number of cancer specialists, talking like battle-weary officers mired down in an interminable colonial war . . .”

Despite the fact that the lexical term *andreia* was not explicitly used to describe the idiosyncratic virtues of Hippocratic physicians, however, we would like to argue in this chapter both that they conceptualized their activity as a form of *andreia*, and that, in general, patients and the public at large expected from their doctors behavior which in other contexts would allow them to be considered *andreioi*. We propose to make this case by focusing on the Hippocratic discussions of a particularly troubling point of medical ethics, namely, how a doctor should behave in the face of obviously incurable patients. Here, as we shall find, a classic dilemma arises when a profession ostensibly dedicated to healing disease and the relief of human suffering confronts a kind of battle it can never hope to win. As the treatises show, opinions were divided about the proper way to handle such cases, and rationality was not always the main criterion. Personal ego and the reputation of the profession itself were often at stake in this controversy, and questions of duty, honor and integrity evidently came into play on both sides. The treatises reveal, we believe, that the accusations and apologies on this issue fundamentally concerned what can only be regarded as the *andreia* of the physician: was the refusal to treat incurables a dereliction of duty? Did it imply a form of cowardice, like that of the proverbial *rhipsaspis*, who tosses away his armor and flees a terrifying enemy?<sup>5</sup> Or, on the other hand, did such a physician justify his position by applying a more nuanced calculus of knowledge and reason to the notion of courageous behavior in medicine?

Even allowing for the substantive and chronological diversity of the Hippocratic corpus, it is reasonably clear that, as we will see in greater detail below, the 'Hippocratic position' on this issue was that in some cases it was indeed best not to take on incurable cases. In responding to anonymous or hypothetical detractors, these treatises, once again, never invoke *andreia* as such, but the arguments they deploy bear a remarkable resemblance to the famous discussion of the term in Plato's *Laches*. In fact, all the interlocutors in the dialogue at one point or another invoke medicine (*iatrikê*) or physicians

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<sup>5</sup> Jouanna 1999, 110 uses the term "noble flight" to describe how people might perceive a physician who refused to treat an incurable patient: "... a gesture so at variance with the heroic ideal, [that] the physician may seem to have fled from the battle against illness, throwing down his arms in the face of danger and uncertainty".



(*iatroi*) in their attempts to articulate a definition of *andreia*. Insofar as the dialogue ends aporetically, it is difficult to glean from it a definitive Platonic stance on whether physicians could or should possess *andreia*, but the discussion nevertheless clearly suggests that an association between *andreia* and *iatrikê* was commonly made, even if some people found it unconvincing. As we shall argue, the discussion in *Laches* not only clarifies the Hippocratic arguments defending their position on incurables, but also suggests that at the core of this defense lay the fundamental assumption that something akin to *andreia* ought to be seen as the primary virtue of the Hippocratic physician.

It is often noted that ancient medicine was a very 'public' activity. Since the profession was unregulated and there were probably at least as many incompetent as competent physicians, the public was often understandably wary of a physician's claims to expertise. Hence we continually hear of public debates between rival practitioners or schools, and both the Hippocratic treatises, and, later, Galen depict a climate in which physicians seemed constantly engaged in some form of debate, squabbling or even downright abuse. It is no wonder that when they actually saw sick patients, they would doubtless have felt scrutinized by a wider public,<sup>6</sup> interested in assessing not only their skill at healing, but their demeanor and attitude along the way. Their metaphorical battle against disease was as much a spectacle as any real battle, and the physician's virtues as a soldier in this battle were every bit as public as those of a real soldier.<sup>7</sup> One can see, therefore, why a Hippocratic physician's decision to withhold treatment from certain cases would have been a matter of concern that extended far beyond his private dealings with the unfortunate patient. For just as the soldier who shirks his responsibilities on the battlefield is in danger of being branded *anandreios* (unless he can offer a persuasive explanation for behavior that on the surface will always appear reprehensible), so the physician, whose duty to heal the sick and relieve human suffering is professed time and again in the treatises with an almost heroic fervor, can easily give the appearance of repudiating his own principles of combat.

<sup>6</sup> See Jouanna 1999, 75–80 for a discussion of the 'public' aspects of Hippocratic medicine.

<sup>7</sup> Battle metaphors for disease and treatment abound in the Hippocratic corpus. Cf. von Staden 1987, 97–9, and Jouanna 1999, 141 and 342–3 for many examples.

## 2. *The Hippocratic De arte*

The rather cantankerous author of the treatise *De arte* (Περὶ Τέχνης) was clearly reacting to such accusations from critics who regarded the Hippocratic refusal to treat incurables as evidence that medicine was a sham ‘art’ to begin with. Indeed, this author regards his rhetorical mission as battle against ignorance, which seems to require as much courage and bravery as the battle against disease itself.<sup>8</sup>

... but the treatise at hand will oppose those who attack medicine thus, emboldening itself through those it blames, well supplied by the art which it defends, and powerful in the knowledge in which it has been educated.

ὁ δὲ παρεὼν λόγος τοῖσιν ἐς ἱητρικὴν οὕτως ἐμπορευομένοις ἐναντιώσεται, θρασυνόμενος μὲν διὰ τούτους οὓς ψέγει, εὐπορέων δὲ διὰ τὴν τέχνην ἢ βοηθεῖ, δυνάμενος δὲ διὰ σοφίην ἢ πεπαιδευται. (1.15–17)

When the author offers a definition of medicine in the third chapter, it is striking that he includes a statement about incurable patients:

[medicine is] ... broadly speaking to relieve the sufferings of the sick, to mitigate the severity of diseases, and *not to treat those who are overpowered by disease*, knowing that medicine has no power over these cases.

... τὸ δὴ πάμπαν ἀπαλλάσσειν τῶν νοσεόντων τοὺς καμάτους, καὶ τῶν νοσημάτων τὰς σφοδρότητας ἀμβλύνειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐγχειρῆειν τοῖσι κεκρατημένοισιν ὑπὸ τῶν νοσημάτων, εἰδόμενος ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ δύναται ἱητρικῇ. (3.5–8)

The last phrase about incurables reads almost as a deliberate provocation to potential detractors, especially given the phrasing of the first part of his definition, which stresses a total relief of suffering (ἀπαλλάσσειν τῶν νοσεόντων τοὺς καμάτους, καὶ τῶν νοσημάτων τὰς σφοδρότητας ἀμβλύνειν), rather than the actual curing of disease.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> These few lines are laden with the discourse of warfare and military virtues: an enemy attack, (ἐμπορευομένοις), opposition (ἐναντιώσεται); and then the boldness (θρασυνόμενος) and strength (δυνάμενος) necessary to counter the enemy.

<sup>9</sup> Presumably the phrase ἀπαλλάσσειν τῶν νοσεόντων τοὺς καμάτους would imply that a sick patient is not only relieved of his suffering, but also *recovers* from his illness, but this author seems somewhat evasive on this point. A clearer statement that the Hippocratic physician aimed both to cure his patients and to make him as comfortable as possible can be seen in *De articulis* 78: χρὴ δὲ περὶ πλείστου μὲν ποιέεσθαι ἐν πάσῃ τῇ τέχνῃ, ὅπως ὑγιὲς μὲν ποιήσεις τὸ νοσέον· εἰ δὲ πολλοῖσι τρόποισιν οἶόν τε εἶη ὑγιέας ποιέειν, τὸν ἀοχλότατον χρὴ αἰρέεσθαι· (“You should chiefly aim

Why, one might ask, should one withhold relief from an obviously incurable patient?<sup>10</sup> But the author is either insensitive to this apparent paradox (i.e., claiming an art of relief, but withholding it from some patients) or more interested in addressing what he regards as the fundamental charge against medicine, that it just does not ‘work’. As he says in Chapter 4, people are unhappy because medicine cannot cure everyone. When people are cured, according to the detractors, it is merely because they would have been lucky enough to survive even without the intervention of a physician:

... but the art [of medicine] is blamed because not everyone [is restored to health], and those who repudiate [the art], because there are some who are defeated by diseases, say that those who manage to escape them, do so because they’re simply lucky and not because of the art.

... ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντες [ἐξυγιαίνονται], ἐν τούτῳ ἤδη ψέγεται ἡ τέχνη, καὶ φασιν οἱ τὰ χεῖρῳ λέγοντες, διὰ τοὺς ἀλISCOμένους ὑπὸ τῶν νοσημάτων, τοὺς ἀποφεύγοντας αὐτὰ τύχῃ ἀποφεύγειν καὶ οὐ διὰ τὴν τέχνην.

Our author does not deny the force of luck, but argues, as one might expect, that the *tekhnê* of the physician demonstrably abets whatever fortune might hold for a patient (Chs. 5–7). Since most people, he argues, even those who never seek a doctor, would agree that some sort of intervention is called for in the face of a disease (changing a diet or climate, for example),<sup>11</sup> it is difficult to deny that a *tekhnê* that rationalizes and systematizes such intervention would be even more useful to humanity than simply stumbling upon effective treatments haphazardly.

But one can see the trap that the author is unwittingly setting for himself with every step of his argument, and, ironically, we can antic-

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in every aspect of medical practice to make the sick healthy. And if you can produce health in a variety of ways, you should choose the method that causes the least discomfort”).

<sup>10</sup> For a full treatment of the question of ‘incurable’ diseases and patients in the Hippocratic corpus, see von Staden 1987. Von Staden discusses at length the many ways ‘incurability’ could be expressed in the corpus (cf. esp. 75–84), and notes that two approaches seemed current—a binary one (patients and diseases were deemed either curable or non-curable), and a gradational one (they might be curable or incurable depending on external contingencies or an idiosyncratic array of symptoms).

<sup>11</sup> *De arte* 5.9–11 πολλὴ γὰρ ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς μὴ χρωμένους ἰητροῖσι, νοσήσαντας δὲ καὶ ὑγιασθέντας εἶδέναι, ὅτι ἢ δρῶντες τι ἢ μὴ δρῶντες ὑγιασθήσαν. (“For there is no denying that even those who don’t use doctors, but who recover from illness, realize that they have been cured because of something that they’ve done or not done”).

ipate the objection to a position advocating non-intervention in incurable cases. If the author, after all, has just finished arguing that one is generally better off *not* leaving the course of an illness up to chance and fortune, but rather should seek medical advice, why in the case of incurables, should one refuse to intervene, if only to alleviate suffering and (one might argue) make the body possibly more receptive to a chance recovery? The specific charge laid against the Hippocratic position, according to the author in Chapter 8, is that physicians limit themselves to cases which would “cure themselves” (αὐτὰ ὑφ’ ἑαυτῶν ἂν ἐξυγιάζοιτο),<sup>12</sup> while avoiding those where “there is a need of great assistance” (ἐπικουρίας δεῖται μεγάλης):

And there are some who also blame medicine because of those who are unwilling to take on patients who have been defeated by their disease; they say that the cases which they attempt to cure are those which would be cured on their own anyway, but that they don’t touch the cases where there is need of great assistance. But (they say), if medicine is in fact an art, then it ought to cure all cases alike.

εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ καὶ διὰ τοὺς μὴ ἐθέλοντας ἐγχειρέειν τοῖσι κεκρατημένοισιν ὑπὸ τῶν νοσημάτων<sup>13</sup> μέμφονται τὴν ἱητρικὴν, λέγοντες ὡς ταῦτα μὲν καὶ αὐτὰ ὑφ’ ἑαυτῶν ἂν ἐξυγιάζοιτο, ἃ ἐγχειρέουσιν ἰῆσθαι, ἃ δ’ ἐπικουρίας δεῖται μεγάλης, οὐχ ἄπονται, δεῖν δὲ, εἴπερ ἦν ἡ τέχνη, πάνθ’ ὁμοίως ἰῆσθαι.

The detractors maintain that if medicine were really a *tekhnê*, it would at least attempt to cure *all* patients,<sup>14</sup> not just the “easy” cases which

<sup>12</sup> We take it that this really means something like this: “in cases where patients do recover, they would have recovered on their own, without the medical art” rather than that “physicians only take on cases which would otherwise cure themselves”, since obviously physicians routinely treat patients who end up not being cured. The phrasing is elliptical here, but seems to assume that the physician will prognosticate about the patient’s condition, and only decide to treat him if he calculates that there is a good chance of recovery. On Hippocratic prognostication and *andreia*, see below section 4.

<sup>13</sup> Cicero seems to be translating this expression in *Ad Att.* 16.15.5, when he turns in his letter from public affairs to his domestic troubles: *sed me, mi Attice, non sane hoc quidem tempore movet res publica, non quo aut sit mihi quicquam carius aut esse debeat, sed desperatis etiam Hippocrates vetat adhibere medicinam.*

<sup>14</sup> We understand there to be an ellipsis of ἐγχειρέουσιν with the second ἰῆσθαι. What they want is for a physician to take on any sick patient, regardless of the chances of recovery; they certainly would not assume that a physician would successfully cure every patient. In point of fact, there is plenty of evidence outside of this treatise that Hippocratic physicians did treat hopeless cases, and it seems clear that the matter was one of perennial debate. For discussion and references, see Wittern 1979, von Staden 1987, 76 n. 1, 102–12, Jouanna 1999, 109–11; see also van der Eijk 1999.

would be cured anyway. This objection seems simple enough, but it has several revealing implications. First, it clearly assumes a normative model of medicine: if one is going to make the claim that medicine is a *tekhnê*, then one will assume that a *tekhnê* will behave according to certain protocols, that there are certain things it *should* do if it can legitimately be considered a *tekhnê*. So if one claims that the *tekhnê* of medicine is to do one thing (e.g. minister to the sick), you cannot then claim that it also does *not* do that very thing (e.g. when it says it will not treat the incurably sick). In other words, the refusal to treat incurables is here essentially portrayed by the detractors as a repudiation of the stated principles of the *tekhnê* of medicine. Thus, the physician who takes such a position is put in a terrible bind, for he is exposed as either an unethical hypocrite or a simple charlatan who conspires with his colleagues to take on only those cases which will make their empty profession look good.

It is clear that the author of *De arte* deeply resented the implication that the refusal to treat incurables constituted an ethical breach, and he spends the rest of Chapter 8 attempting to explain the position.<sup>15</sup> The core of his explanation lies in an appeal to the proper knowledge of what medicine is and is not capable of doing, and the rational application of this knowledge. Simply put, he says in so many words that medicine has no business trying to fight a battle it cannot hope to win; and it is the *tekhnê* itself which provides the knowledge necessary to determine when this might be the case:

So whenever a person suffers from something bad which is stronger than the tools available to medicine, then one can hardly expect that it can be defeated by medicine.

ὅταν οὖν τι πάθη ἄνθρωπος κακὸν ὃ κρέσσον ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν ἰητρικῇ ὀργάνων, οὐδὲ προσδοκᾶσθαι τοῦτό που δεῖ ὑπὸ ἰητρικῆς κρατηθῆναι ἄν.

This leads him to conclude that some cases are simply 'inappropriate' for the physician to take on, because he has no means strong enough to defeat the disease:

Those who blame physicians who don't take on incurable cases, urge them to treat inappropriate cases no less than appropriate ones. In urging this, they may be admired by people who call themselves physi-

<sup>15</sup> See Cordes 1994, 122–4; for further bibliography on *De arte*, see Cordes, p. 101, n. 63.

cians, but they are ridiculed by ‘real’ physicians [lit.: physicians versed in *tekhne*].

οἱ μὲν οὖν μεμφόμενοι τοὺς τοῖσι κεκρατημένοισι μὴ ἐγχειρόντας παρακελεύονται καὶ ὧν μὴ προσήκει ἄπτεσθαι οὐδὲν ἦσσαν ἢ ὧν προσήκει παρακελεύόμενοι δὲ ταῦτα, ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν σὺννόματι ἱητρῶν θαυμάζονται, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν καὶ τέχνη καταγελῶνται.

Behind this curious statement about ‘inappropriate’ and ‘appropriate’ cases, it seems, lies a contemporary clash between people who expect from their physicians an engaged compassion for the sick patient regardless of the illness, and physicians whose cool, rational attitude towards the nature of illness allows them to keep their distance from patients they deem incurable. This author, in fact, turns the tables and practically accuses any physician who takes on a desperate case of charlatanism (‘physicians in name only’). Yet, from the second sentence quoted above, it appears that many people admired such a physician and presumably found his behavior ethically correct, if not plainly heroic. The author of *De arte* stands his ground, however, maintaining that praise or blame emanating from such people is ‘foolish’ (*aphrones*), and that the real physician should heed only those who have “rationally calculated at what point the activities of craftsmen become finally complete” (λελογισμένων πρὸς ὅτι αἱ ἐργασίαι τῶν δημιουργῶν τελευτώμεναι πλήρεις εἰσὶ). The author’s disdain for the opinions of anyone but an initiated professional, indeed for any unphilosophized position on a medical subject, is palpable. It is easy to see from this little vignette that in this author’s opinion, the Hippocratic physician who refused certain cases as a matter of principle might run counter to popular notions of medical ethics, and risked appearing not only arrogant, but also cowardly.

This controversy, then, between Hippocratic professionals and certain unspecified antagonists, ultimately rests on two opposing ways of conceptualizing medicine as a form of combat. On the one hand, some (presumably non-Hippocratic) physicians, considered ‘foolish’ by our author, plunge headlong into the battle against disease, indiscriminately taking on all cases, and evidently reaping great renown for it (θαυμάζονται). Patients may die, and these physicians may well expect such an outcome from the start, but people admired the fact alone that they would take on even the most desperate cases,<sup>16</sup> just

<sup>16</sup> On the ‘public’, performative aspects of ancient medicine, see Jouanna 1999, 75–6.

as in other contexts the same people might admire a soldier whose *andreia* emboldened him against even the most insurmountable enemy.<sup>17</sup> To the Hippocratic physician, however, according to this author, such behavior was merely reckless and irresponsible. If, through technical knowledge and practical experience, one has rationally determined that a patient is incurable, the only conceivable reasons for treating him would be crass showmanship and self-promotion, which, he would of course argue, have nothing to do with proper medicine. At least the real soldier who fights against a more powerful enemy might get some satisfaction from the idea of martyrdom; whatever kudos a physician reaps from joining forces with an incurable patient against an undefeatable disease, however, is indecorously won in the eyes of at least some Hippocratic physicians, at the expense of his patient's life (since the patient will, of course, die, if the disease is truly incurable). It is, as the passage implies, a cheap victory that turns out upon closer examination to be more cowardly than heroic.

### 3. *Andreia and Prognosis in Plato's Laches*

The author of *De arte* bristles at the insinuation that Hippocratic physicians are morally negligent in refusing to treat incurables, and even though he does not explicitly articulate the debate in terms of *andreia*, it seems that it is something very much akin to this virtue

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<sup>17</sup> Galen notes that in his time some physicians (whom he regards as disingenuous—προσποιουμένοι) resorted to extreme, even self-sacrificial, forms of showmanship in the name of *andreia*; cf. his remarks in *De meth. med.* 12.815, 1–8 Kühn about physicians who, when ill themselves, tried to withstand their pain καρτερῶς τε καὶ ἀνδρείως: οἶδα γὰρ ἐνίους τῶν γενναίων εἶναι προσποιουμένων ἱατρῶν τε καὶ καμνόντων ἀπολλυμένους δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ καρτερῶς τε καὶ ἀνδρείως ὁμόσε χωρεῖν αἰεὶ ταῖς ὀδύναϊς, οὐδὲν τῶν παρηγορικῶν ἐλομένους, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς τραχέσι καὶ ὡς ἔλεγον αὐτοὶ τὴν διάθεσιν ἀνασκευάζουσι διαγιγνομένους βοηθήμασιν, οὓς ἐν χρόνῳ πλείονι θεραπεύσασαι βέλτιον ἦν ἢ τοὺς σπεύδοντας ἀνδρείως ἀποθανεῖν. ("For I know that some physicians put on a show of acting nobly, who, when sick themselves, perish by actually plowing headlong into their pain with fortitude and courage. They refuse to take any painkillers, but treat themselves with harsh remedies, which, as they themselves say, reverse their condition, when it would have been better for them to apply a longer therapy than to die courageously in their zeal"). Clearly, this is a crowd-pleasing form of *andreia*, not the kind Galen would recommend for true physicians. On the charges of cowardice against Galen himself in the biographical tradition (that he fled an uprising in Pergamum on one occasion, and on another that he fled from Rome to avoid the *pestis Antoniniana* of 166 CE), see Walsh, 1931.

which he feels called upon to defend in the case of this particular Hippocratic practice. This becomes especially clear, we believe, when we read *De arte* in the light of the discussion of *andreia* in Plato's *Laches*. There, the specific discussion of *andreia* is framed by the characteristically Socratic question of whether or not truly virtuous behavior requires knowledge and reason; likewise, in *De arte*, the author defends his position on incurables by arguing that it is the only rational position to take, and the contrary position (of treating all cases regardless of the nature of their affliction) stems from ignorance and, by implication, vanity. As in *De arte*, the discussion in *Laches* centers on a discontinuity between popular conceptions of a particular social value and a more philosophized conception of it. When Socrates asks at 190e how his interlocutors, Laches and Nicias, would define *andreia*, Laches cannot believe he would ask such a simple, easily answered question. His response, that *andreia* consists in "remaining at one's post, fighting off the enemy and not fleeing" (ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ μὴ φεύγειν) seems obvious enough to him, as it would to most people,<sup>18</sup> even though Socrates predictably finds it inadequate as a definition. A similar notion of "endurance" at any cost in the face of the enemy seems to be what informs the popular belief intimated in *De arte* that physicians should take on even the most desperate patients. We can see, therefore, why the Hippocratic author of the treatise might feel rather defensive, since if the ethic of "remaining at one's post and not fleeing" was commonly transferred to the realm of medicine, those who did not do so, even for principled reasons, could easily be branded cowards.

In *Laches*, however, as in *De arte*, the prudence of such unreflective engagement with an enemy is questioned. Socrates asks Laches at 193a3 to consider which of two men he would consider the more *andreios*:

Well, suppose a man endures in battle, and his willingness to fight is based on wise calculation because he knows that others are coming to

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<sup>18</sup> See 197b, where Nicias, in a final flourish, distinguishes a popular conception of courage from his own more rigorous conception, which requires the application of knowledge: "And so the things that you and the many call 'courageous', I call 'bold', whereas the acts performed with intelligence are the ones I call 'courageous'" (ταῦτ' οὖν ἃ σὺ καλεῖς ἀνδρεία καὶ οἱ πολλοί, ἐγὼ θρασεία καλῶ, ἀνδρεία δὲ τὰ φρόνιμα περὶ ὧν λέγω).



his aid, and that he will be fighting men who are fewer than those on his side, and inferior to them, and in addition his position is stronger: would you say that this man, with his kind of wisdom and preparation, endures more courageously or a man in the opposite camp who is willing to remain and hold out? (tr. Sprague)

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἐν πολέμῳ καρτεροῦντα ἄνδρα καὶ ἐθέλοντα μάχεσθαι, φρονίμως λογιζόμενον, εἰδότα μὲν ὅτι βοηθήσουσιν ἄλλοι αὐτῷ, πρὸς ἐλάττους δὲ καὶ φαυλοτέρους μαχεῖται ἢ μεθ' ὧν αὐτός ἐστιν, ἐτι δὲ χωρία ἔχει κρείττω, τοῦτον τὸν μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης φρονήσεως καὶ παρασκευῆς καρτεροῦντα ἀνδρειότερον ἂν φαίης ἢ τὸν ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ στρατοπέδῳ ἐθέλοντα ὑπομένειν τε καὶ καρτερεῖν;

Laches' first response is that the man in the "opposite camp" is the more brave; he is not given time to expatiate, but he doubtlessly reflects the attitude of most of his contemporaries. The first man might be admirable in his own way, but his endurance is safer and more predictable, and, Laches might say, it is less easy to describe him as "courageous", at least according to common usage, than the weaker opponent who holds out against him even to the point of his own defeat. Socrates, however, presses his point with similar examples, and Laches must agree with him at 193c9 that "people like this take risks and endure more foolishly than those who do it with *tekhnê*" (καὶ μὴν πού ἀφρονεστέρως γε . . . οἱ τοιοῦτοι κινδυνεύουσιν τε καὶ καρτεροῦσιν ἢ οἱ μετὰ τέχνης αὐτὸ πράττοντες). And since they had earlier agreed (192d) that "foolish daring and endurance is both shameful and injurious" (. . . αἰσχρὰ ἢ ἄφρων τόλμα τε καὶ καρτέρησις . . . ἐφάνη ἡμῖν οὐσα καὶ βλαβερὰ, 193d1), Laches realizes that he seems to have contradicted himself.

The connections between this section of *Laches* and the position of *De arte* should be strikingly clear. Socrates' hypothetical 'knowledgeable' soldier is precisely analogous to the Hippocratic physician in *De arte* who undertakes only those cases which make sense for him based on his knowledge of the medical *tekhnê*, while the valiant and tenacious, but weak and ignorant soldier, who endures in the name of an ill-understood notion of *andreia*, parallels the physician willing to take on even the most hopeless patient in the hope of reaping popular *thauma*.<sup>19</sup> Both Socrates and the author of *De arte*

<sup>19</sup> The closing paragraph of *De arte* reiterates the connection between the knowledge that comes with a *tekhnê* and proper ethical behavior—in this case, the refusal to treat very problematic cases: ὅτι μὲν οὖν καὶ λόγους ἐν ἐαυτῇ εὐπόρους ἐς τὰς ἐπι-

are working to refine popular conceptions of ‘courageous’ behavior by emphasizing the importance of knowledge and rationality for evaluating the outcome of our actions.

The argument in *Laches* proceeds even further, as Nicias takes over as Socrates’ interlocutor and presses the notion, which he attributes ultimately to Socrates (194d), that courage is a kind of wisdom (δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ σοφίαν τινὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν λέγειν)—specifically the knowledge of “what is terrible and what is to be dared in war, and all other situations” (τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, 195a). This line of argument takes the participants along a rocky path towards eventual aporia,<sup>20</sup> but there are several significant ramifications for the ideas in *De arte* along the way. In particular, physicians and the *tekhnê* of medicine figure in this section as a veritable leitmotif, as the interlocutors wrestle with the problem of whether a physician’s technical knowledge qualifies them to be considered *andreioi*. At first Laches brings up the example of physicians at 195b1 as a ploy to repudiate Nicias’ equation of *andreia* and knowledge. Physicians certainly know what things are ‘terrible’ (*deina*), but who would consider *them* ‘courageous’, he asks sarcastically? Nicias agrees definitively he would not either (195b6). Now, this is just the beginning of a rather convoluted section in which the two keep returning to the example of physicians, and it will be useful to analyze their positions in some detail.

The two agree that they would not consider doctors to be ‘courageous’, although Laches thinks that Nicias’ argument equating knowledge with *andreia* ought to lead him to think so. Further, he places physicians in the same company as farmers and all other craftsmen (195b6), and suggests that it would be equally absurd to consider all of these courageous simply because they have some sort of technical knowledge. Nicias does not dispute the absurdity, but he

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κουρίας ἔχει ἡ ἱατρικὴ, καὶ οὐκ εὐδιωρθώτοισι δικαίως οὐκ ἂν ἐγχειρέοι τῆσι νούσοισιν, ἢ ἐγχειρουμένους ἀναμαρτήτους ἂν παρέχοι, οἳ τε νῦν λεγόμενοι λόγοι δηλοῦσιν αἱ τε τῶν εἰδότην τὴν τέχνην ἐπιδείξεις . . . (“that medicine is well stocked with rational arguments in itself to come to its aid, and that it would justly not attempt to treat illnesses which are difficult to cure, or would make those it did take on free from error [i.e., it would work on any disease it did take on], both the discussions of this treatise, and the demonstrations of those who understand the craft, make clear”).

<sup>20</sup> At 199c–e, it becomes clear that the argument has led them to conclude that courage implies all the virtues and a knowledge of all goods and evils, even though they had previously agreed that it was only a part of virtue. At that point, the argument is dropped and the dialogue draws to a close.

dismisses Laches' example of the physician on the grounds that he inflates what they are actually capable of doing. Here, we have what amounts to a normative summary of the limits of contemporary medicine:

[Laches says what's not true . . .] Because he supposes that physicians know something more about the sick than how to say what is healthy and what is sick. But surely that's all they really know; and do you think, Laches, that doctors know this, whether recovery for a patient is more terrible than being sick? Or do you not suppose that for many people it's better not to recover from an illness than to recover? I mean, tell me this: do you say that it's better in all cases for patients to live, and that it's not better for many of them to die?

ὅτι οἶται τοὺς ἰατροὺς πλέον τι εἰδέναι περὶ τοὺς κάμοντας ἢ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν  
 εἰπεῖν οἷόν τε καὶ νοσῶδες, οἱ δὲ δήπου τοσοῦτον μόνον ἴσασιν· εἰ δὲ δεινόν  
 τῷ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ κάμειν, ἡγῆ σὺ τουτί, ὦ Λάχης, τοὺς  
 ἰατροὺς ἐπίστασθαι; ἢ οὐ πολλοῖς οἶει ἐκ τῆς νόσου ἄμεινον εἶναι μὴ ἀναστῆναι  
 ἢ ἀναστῆναι; τοῦτο γὰρ εἰπέ· σὺ πᾶσι φῆς ἄμεινον εἶναι ζῆν καὶ οὐ πολλοῖς  
 κρεῖττον τεθνάναι; (195c7–d2)

Behind this line of questioning lies a debate about what sort of knowledge one could expect from a physician, and Nicias implies that popular opinion would not expect much. It is indeed curious that he asks Laches specifically about a doctor's ability to decide whether all patients are necessarily worth treating or not, and they end up agreeing that this is beyond his normal purview. The physician's job, according to this formulation, is only to articulate what is or is not illness, although he does seem to imply that an 'ideal' physician (i.e. one who would be able to discern what is truly "fearful" [*deina*] and "to be dared" [*tharralea*]) would be able to prognosticate better and decide whether treatment was even indicated.<sup>21</sup> Nicias does not seem

<sup>21</sup> We should emphasize that throughout this dialogue, none of the interlocutors has a particularly high opinion of the medical profession. If pressed, it is likely that they would all deny that physicians in practice have much of what they would regard as true philosophical knowledge; no one in the discussion seems to have much hope, in any case, that a physician is very good at deciding whether it is ethically 'better' for a patient to live or die. Still, merely by leaving open a theoretical possibility that physicians might be capable of such thinking, they allow for the possibility that the medical profession could afford opportunity for displaying genuine *andreia*. See further the discussion below.

especially hopeful that physicians—or any craftsman, for that matter—would ever display this skill, but several times in the discussion, they assume that it is hypothetically possible. At 195d7, for example, Nicias claims that no physician can really distinguish whether a patient is better off dead, and what things would be fearful to which sort of patient, “*except the practitioner who knows the difference between what is and is not fearful, whom I call courageous*” (πλὴν τῷ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἐπιστήμονι, ὃν ἐγὼ ἀνδρεῖον καλῶ). And later, at 196d4, Socrates notes that few would be able to possess Nicias’ criterion for courage (knowledge of the fearful and what should be dared): “neither the physician nor the seer will understand this, and won’t be courageous, *unless he can actually apply this knowledge* (ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην προσλάβῃ). The possibility, in other words, that physicians might in fact possess a genuinely informed *tekhnê* about the prognosis of diseases and the appropriateness of treatment (or non-treatment) is clearly entertained, even if these interlocutors might be hard pressed to think of any good examples. Still, however hypothetical in their minds he remains, such a physician, would, according to Nicias’ definition, possess true *andreia*.

Socrates, for his part, fundamentally endorses Nicias’ notion of *andreia*, but adds that the courageous man will have knowledge of past and present *deîna* and *tharralea* as well as of future ones. Again, medicine serves as an illustrative example (198d5ff.):

For example, when it comes to health, there is no art other than medicine directed at all periods of time, which, though a single art, surveys present, past and future, how things will happen.

οἷον περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν εἰς ἅπαντας τοὺς χρόνους οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ ἰατρικὴ, μία οὖσα, ἐφορᾷ καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ γεγονότα καὶ γενησόμενα ὅπῃ γενήσεται.

He proceeds with a similar argument for farming and generalship, concluding that in all such cases *andreia* consists in the knowledge of past, present and future goods and evils idiosyncratic to each field. In part, this argument is intended to echo Nicias’ earlier assertion at 196a2 that the seer’s art, despite its ability to describe fearful or hopeful future events, is not necessarily courageous, since the seer need not comment on whether such events are *beneficial* to a person. At the same time, however, Socrates wants to retain the notion that *andreia* does imply at least some prognostic skill—one needs a full and genuine understanding of how events will turn out in order to

act prudently and courageously.<sup>22</sup> Without this, one's behavior is little more than some form of recklessness or madness.<sup>23</sup>

#### 4. Conclusion

It should be clear by this point that the Hippocratic author of *De arte* was trying to make exactly this point about his own *tekhnê*, even if he did not focus on *andreia* as such. Indeed, his entire argument defending the Hippocratic refusal to treat incurables privileges the same prognostic skills that Nicias regards as essential for the *andreios* man. The physician's ability to make a cogent decision about whether or not to take on a case, after all, presupposes an understanding both of what a patient should fear and not fear, and of what would be the most beneficial course of action for him. In the opening paragraph of the Hippocratic *Prognostic*, in fact, we find a clearly articu-

<sup>22</sup> If courage was felt to require knowledge of when a person can successfully fight and when when he must withdraw, one wonders what exactly Thucydides thought of the physicians at 2.47.4, who lost their lives in droves trying to minister to the sick: "... Nor were the doctors, at first trying to practice their therapy in ignorance, strong enough [against it]. But they especially died inasmuch as they were around it the most; and no other human skill could withstand it" (οὔτε γὰρ ἰατροὶ ἤρκουν τὸ πρῶτον θεραπεύοντες ἀγνοίᾳ, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ μάλιστα ἔθνησκον ὅσφ καὶ μάλιστα προσήσαν, οὔτε ἄλλη ἀνθρωπεΐα τέχνη σὺδεμΐα). The implication seems to be that it was essentially ignorance that killed these poor doctors, and that if they had understood the real power of the plague, they would (and should) have acted differently. This was no real courage, but lack of experience and insight, much as Socrates holds in *Laches*. See Horstmanshoff 1992 and 1993.

<sup>23</sup> See Nicias' formulation at 197b-c, which Socrates would almost certainly endorse, as far as it goes: "By no means, Laches, do I call courageous wild beasts or anything else that, for lack of understanding, does not fear what should be feared. Rather I would call them rash and mad... My view is that very few have a share of courage and foresight, but that a great many, men and women and children and wild animals, partake in boldness and audacity and rashness and lack of foresight. These cases, which you and the man in the street call courageous, I call rash, whereas the courageous ones are the sensible people I was talking about" (tr. Sprague). See also the similar discussion in Plato *Prt.* 349b-51b, and Protagoras' conclusion, 351a5-b3: οὕτω δὲ κακῇ οὐ ταῦτὸν εἶναι θάρσος τε καὶ ἀνδρείαν· ὥστε συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι τοὺς γε θαρραλέους ἀνδρείους πάντας· θάρσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τέχνης γίγνεται ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ γε καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας, ὥσπερ ἡ δύναμις, ἀνδρεία δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεται ("and likewise in that case daring and courage are not the same, so that it follows that those who are courageous are daring, but not all who are daring are courageous. For daring arises from skill and from spiritedness and madness, like power, but courage comes from the natural state and good cultivation of souls").

lated programmatic rationale of the role of forecasting in medicine, which attests not only the practical but the moral advantages of prognostic skill:

I hold that it is an excellent thing for a physician to practice forecasting. For if he discover and declare by the side of his patients the present, the past and the future, and fill in the gaps in the account given by the sick, he will be the more believed to understand the cases, so that men will confidently entrust themselves to him for treatment. Furthermore, he will carry out the treatment best if he know beforehand from the present symptoms what will take place later. Now to restore every patient to health is impossible. To do so indeed would have been better even than forecasting the future. But as a matter of fact men do die, some owing to the severity of the disease before they summon the physician, others expiring immediately after calling him in—living one day or a little longer—before the physician by his art can combat each disease. It is necessary, therefore, to learn the nature of such diseases, how much they exceed the strength of men's bodies, and to learn how to forecast them. For in this way one will justly win respect and be an able physician. For the longer time you plan to meet each emergency the greater your power to save those who have a chance of recovery, while you will be blameless if you learn and declare beforehand those who will die and those who will get better. (Tr. Jones, slightly modified)

τὸν ἰητρὸν δοκέει μοι ἄριστον εἶναι πρόνοιαν ἐπιτηδεύειν· προγιγνώσκων γὰρ καὶ προλέγων παρὰ τοῖσι νοσέουσι τὰ τε παρεόντα καὶ τὰ προγεγονότα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσσεσθαι, ὁκόσα τε παραλείπουσιν οἱ ἀσθενέοντες ἐκδιηγέμενος, πιστεύουτ' ἂν μᾶλλον γινώσκειν τὰ τῶν νοσεόντων πρήγματα, ὥστε τολμᾶν ἐπιτρέπειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους σφέας ἑωυτοὺς τῷ ἰητρῷ. τὴν δὲ θεραπεῖην ἄριστα ἂν ποιεῖτο, προειδὼς τὰ ἐσόμενα ἐκ τῶν παρεόντων παθημάτων. ὑγίεας μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ἅπαντας τοὺς ἀσθενέοντας ἀδύνατον· τοῦτο γὰρ τοῦ προγιγνώσκειν τὰ μέλλοντα ἀποβήσεσθαι κρέσσον ἂν ἦν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀποθνήσκουσιν, οἱ μὲν πρὶν ἢ καλέσαι τὸν ἰητρὸν, ὑπὸ τῆς ἰσχύος τῆς νούσου, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐσκαλεσάμενοι παραχρῆμα ἐτελεύτησαν, οἱ μὲν ἡμέρην μῆν ζήσαντες, οἱ δὲ ὀλίγῳ πλέονα χρόνον, πρὶν ἢ τὸν ἰητρὸν τῇ τέχνῃ πρὸς ἕκαστον νοῦσημα ἀνταγωνίσασθαι· γινῶναι οὖν χρή τῶν παθέων τῶν τοιούτων τὰς φύσεις, ὁκόσον ὑπὲρ τὴν δυνάμιν εἰσι τῶν σωμάτων, [ἅμα δὲ καὶ εἰ τι θεῖον ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇσι νοῦσοισι,] καὶ τούτεον τὴν πρόνοιαν ἐκμανθάνειν. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν θανμάζοιτο τε δικαίως, καὶ ἰητρὸς ἀγαθὸς ἂν εἴη· καὶ γὰρ οὓς οἶόν τε περιγίγνεσθαι, τούτους ἔτι μᾶλλον δύναιτ' ἂν ὀρθῶς διαφυλάσσειν, ἐκ πλείονος χρόνου προβουλευόμενος πρὸς ἕκαστα, καὶ τοὺς ἀποθανομένους τε καὶ σωθησομένους προγιγνώσκων καὶ προαγορεύων ἀναίτιος ἂν εἴη. (*Prognostic* 1.1)

The emphasis on the physician's knowledge of 'past, present and future' in the first sentence is strikingly reminiscent of the description

of medical prognosis in *Laches*, as is the importance given to an intellectual understanding of the entire course of a disease.<sup>24</sup> Further, both passages hold that the best physicians will display the best skills in prognosis; proper technical knowledge, in short, is the *sine qua non* of an ethically appropriate medical practice. Once again, this passage shows just how ‘public’ medicine was: the physician is fighting a battle (ἡ τὸν ἱητρὸν τῇ τέχνῃ πρὸς ἕκαστον νοῦσημα ἀνταγωνίσασθαι) and all eyes are watching his performance. He aims to be admired for his skills, but he wants this admiration to be won with integrity. As the author states, if a physician can prognosticate well, he will be ‘justly admired’ (... ἂν θαυμάζοιτό τε δικαίως) and will be shown to be a ‘good doctor’ (ἱητρὸς ἀγαθὸς ἂν εἴη). We may contrast this remark with the passage in *De arte* we discussed earlier (see above 102f.) where the author complains about unscrupulous physicians who take on inappropriate cases in order to secure the admiration of charlatan physicians (and presumably the public at large), ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν οὐνόματι ἱητρῶν θαυμάζονται (*De arte* 8).<sup>25</sup> This author, as we have seen, chastises such physicians as part of his explicit defense of the principle of not treating incurable patients.

In *Prognostic*, the problem of incurables is likewise at issue, except in a more positive, and slightly more oblique, way. The author’s point in the final sentence of the quoted passage is that proper prognosis will allow the physician to treat his patients more effectively and to “declare beforehand those who will die and those who will get better” (τοὺς ἀποθανομένους τε καὶ σωθησομένους προγινώσκων καὶ προαγορεύων), and, most significantly, that if he demonstrates good prognostic skills, he will be held blameless (ἀναίτιος ἂν εἴη) for his judgments about recovery and non-recovery.<sup>26</sup> Behind this state-

<sup>24</sup> The passage is replete with verbs of ‘knowing’: προγινώσκων (twice), γινώσκειν, προειδώς, προγινώσκειν, γνῶναι, ἐκμανθάνειν.

<sup>25</sup> Not much had apparently changed even by the early seventeenth century, when the narrator of Jonathan Swift’s *Gulliver’s Travels* (part 4, ch. 6) in describing English culture to the equine Houyhnhnms, reserves this barb for the contemporary physician: “One great Excellency in this Tribe is their Skill at Prognostics, wherein they seldom fail; their Predictions in real Diseases, when they rise to any Degree of Malignity, generally portending Death, which is always in their Power when Recovery is not: And therefore, upon any unexpected Signs of Amendment, after they have pronounced their Sentence, rather than be accused as false Prophets, they know how to approve their Sagacity to the World by a seasonable Dose”.

<sup>26</sup> This attitude, of course, still does not address the question of why a physician would not channel his energies towards palliative care, once he had made the correct prognosis of incurability.

ment lie clear traces of the contemporary debate about incurable patients, for we can assume that when the author speaks of a physician forecasting a patient's death (τοὺς ἀποθανομένους), he is also thinking of that physician's refusal to take on such a case. Someone at some time was evidently always 'blaming' physicians for their stance on whom to treat, but, the author claims, if one can show genuine skill in prognostics, the refusal to treat certain patients is not only rationally defensible but morally justified.

Like most of the Hippocratic treatises, *De arte* and *Prognostic* cannot be dated with any precision, but there is general agreement, both in Antiquity and now,<sup>27</sup> that they were each composed some time in the late fifth century BCE. By the time Plato wrote his *Laches* in the next century, then, the debates about the treatment of incurables must have been well delineated, especially as 'Hippocratic medicine'—both as an abstract construct and a practical methodology—became more clearly articulated in contrast to other therapeutic approaches. It is unclear whether Plato himself first made the connection between *andreia* and medical prognosis, but if he did, it seems to us, he was only expressing ideas already latent within Hippocratic deontological discourse. From the passages we have discussed, it is apparent that, at least in the matter of incurable patients, these physicians felt continually called upon to defend a point of view that clashed with popular conceptions of proper medical conduct, just as in *Laches*, Plato's Socrates, in concert with Nicias, is clearly struggling towards a more rarefied conception of *andreia* than what most people would presumably have endorsed. As such, the debate between those physicians who unreflectively took on all cases regardless of their prospects for recovery, and those who refused incurable patients was fundamentally a debate between two conceptions of heroism, each with its own criteria for *andreia*. The one we might characterize as the traditional and popular version, which valued daring and endurance regardless of the chances of victory (and sometimes all the more in direct proportion to decreasing odds for survival!). The other examined a given situation in which such qualities as daring and endurance might be called for, assessed the risks, and considered what the benefits of 'courageous' action were likely to be. The

<sup>27</sup> On the dating of *De arte*, see Gomperz 1910, 2nd edn, 1–35 with more recent bibliography in Cordes 1994, 101, n. 63. For *Prognostic*, see Alexanderson 1963, 16–23.



criterion in these cases was reason and knowledge, rather than reflexive emotion or a penchant for martyrdom, but the result looked quite different from what one commonly considered *andreia*. Indeed, although it may seem rather alien to us, the Hippocratic insistence on a rational foundation for their methods must have been a minority view that required its own kind of *andreia* to pursue.

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## CHAPTER SIX

### “MOST CITIZENS ARE *EURUPRÔKTOI* NOW”: (UN)MANLINESS IN ARISTOPHANES.

Adriaan Rademaker

#### 1. *Introduction*

Aristophanic comedy tells us much about what it meant to be a man in fifth-century Athens. Many of its protagonists claim for themselves some kind of *andreia*, whether real or feigned, usually when boasting of fearlessness in difficult undertakings,<sup>1</sup> and the poet himself will often assert his own *andreia* when describing his attacks on the monstrous politicians that threaten the city.<sup>2</sup> Conversely, Aristophanic

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<sup>1</sup> The substantive *andreia* is used twice in Aristophanes: once, at *Eq.* 268, by the Paphlagonian in conciliatory acknowledgment of the merits of the Knights in the battle of Solymeia, in the prototypical sense of ‘courage in warfare’; once by the chorus of *Clouds* in mocking admiration of Strepsiades’ fearlessness on entering the ‘scary’ school of Socrates (*Nu.* 511). The adjective *andreios* is used in the sense of ‘courageous in battle’ at *Th.* 839, *Ra.* 1024, *Eccl.* 679, and Heracles is named as the prototypical example of an *andreios* at *Nu.* 1052. Otherwise, the adjective is applied to men only in jest, either mocking someone’s false pretenses of fearlessness, or in sarcastic admiration of unacceptably aggressive behavior. To the first group belong *V.* 1200 (the unheroic Philocleon names the secret theft of his neighbor’s vines as his most courageous deed), *Av.* 91 (Euelpides uses the word in mocking admiration of Pisthetaerus, who pretends not to fear the Epops), and *Ra.* 491, 494, 602 (both Dionysus and Xanthias claim to be *andreios* in front of the fearful Aeacus). In the second category belong *Av.* 1349 (‘father-beaters’ are sarcastically called *andreioi*) and *Lys.* 559 (soldiers running around the *agora* in full armor). The only *dramatis personae* to whom the adjective is applied without sarcasm are, paradoxically, women: Lysistrata in *Lys.* 549, 1108, and the women at the assembly in *Eccl.* 519. Theirs is not the standard ‘martial’ *andreia* of course, but rather the successful management of the affairs of the *polis* when men have made a mess of them. One of the points I make in this chapter is that in the democratic *polis* of fifth-century Athens, using one’s influence in politics is broadly acknowledged as a desirable ‘manly’ quality. If applied to attributes, *andreios* means ‘belonging to the male sex’: *Th.* 154, *Eccl.* 26, 75, 275. The adverbs *andreîos* and *andrikôs* are mostly used in a somewhat more general sense of ‘vigorously, energetically’: *andreîos* *Pa.* 498, 732, *Th.* 656, *Ra.* 372; *andrikôs* *Eq.* 81, 82, 379, 451, 453, 599, *V.* 153, 450, *Pa.* 478, 515, 1307, *Th.* 1204.

<sup>2</sup> See General Introduction to this volume, section 4.

comedy also ridicules many men who are ‘unmanly’ in various ways, such as the cowardly Cleonymus or the effeminates Clisthenes and Agathon,<sup>3</sup> and these examples suggest that there is perhaps more to being a man than the *andreia* of fearlessness alone. The aim of this chapter is to investigate two Aristophanic texts that offer an especially full picture of the ideology of masculinity and manliness to which an Athenian male citizen was expected to conform. These are *Knights*, in which the Sausage-seller through his very depravity becomes a formidable ‘man’ in politics (*Eq.* 178–9), and the *agôn* between the two *logoi* in *Clouds*, who discuss the relative merits of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ ways of education and the types of citizens that these produce. After examining these comic texts, I shall turn for comparison to Aeschines’ *Against Timarchus*, which treats similar aspects of *andreia*, but without the potentially distorting mediation of a comic genre. This text will corroborate that Aristophanes does seem to reflect with reasonable accuracy standards of *andreia* that would have been recognized and endorsed by a substantial part of the comic poet’s audience.

## 2. *The Old and the New Education in Aristophanes’ Clouds*

The *agôn* of *Clouds* is an excellent starting point for our discussion, as it offers the more straightforward conception of *andreia* than *Knights*. Its first speaker, the so-called ‘Stronger Case’ (or simply ‘Strong’, as opposed to his juridically ‘Weak’ opponent),<sup>4</sup> dwells on traditional elementary education, which seems blatantly irrelevant for a young man of Phidippides’ age,<sup>5</sup> and he has nothing but disdain for the ‘intellectual’ training in rhetoric, which his traditional brand of education simply would never include. Moreover, his extended moral-

<sup>3</sup> Cf. p. 122 below.

<sup>4</sup> On the names Κρείττων Λόγος and Ὡττων Λόγος, see also Dover 1968, lvii–lviii, Nussbaum 1980, 50 n. 15, Fisher 1984, 192–3, and MacDowell 1995, 137–8, who notes that they are ‘stronger’ and ‘weaker’ in a juridical sense rather than ‘better’ or ‘worse’ in a moral sense.

<sup>5</sup> This is not to say, as MacDowell 1995, 139 suggests, that the speech is “inappropriate to its context in the play”, just that it is designed to be obviously and comically inappropriate for its addressee. The point is, of course, that the traditional aristocratic education had nothing to offer on rhetoric and on the teaching of political *aretê*.

izing, extolling *sôphrosunê* in the guise of 'quiet and disciplined behavior' and absolute restraint in dealing with *erastai*,<sup>6</sup> is offset by his obvious sexual excitability: in just over twenty lines, he manages to draw attention four times to a boy's thighs and genitals, and once to his reddened buttocks (*ἐπετρίβετο τυπτόμενος*, 972).<sup>7</sup>

But some of the alleged results of this ridiculous teacher's education are serious enough, if old-fashioned and one-sided. Strong emphasizes that *his* education produced those legendary models of traditional manliness, the Marathon-fighters (985–6), and that the young men educated by him will practice athletics (1002, 1009–14) and shy away from places of luxury and idle chatter like the bathhouses, the *agora* and the lawcourts (991, 1003f.). Conversely, the education of Weak will provide Phidippides with an unathletic body, a big tongue and a 'long verdict', and depraved morals (1015–23). In this second part of his speech, Strong is even more clearly the aristocratic conservative. His objection against the *agora*, associated with industrial and mercantile trades,<sup>8</sup> his disdain for the lawcourts<sup>9</sup> and his ideal of *apragmosunê* (1007)<sup>10</sup> seem to reflect conservative disgust of the urban masses and their populist leaders. But it cannot be overlooked that

<sup>6</sup> On *sôphrosunê* in this passage, see North 1966, 98; Fisher 1984, 198, and MacDowell 1995, 139.

<sup>7</sup> Strong's hypocrisy has been described in strong terms by Dover 1968, lxiv–lxvi, Henderson 1975, 76–7, 217–18 and Fisher 1984, 198. MacDowell 1995, 139 argues against this: "He likes the boys to be handsome but not to misbehave themselves, and this view was probably shared by a large proportion of the Athenian audience". That may be quite true for Strong's circles, but there can be no doubt that Aristophanes expects his audience to see in Strong, with his interest in boys and disgust of *katapugosunê* and *euruprôktoi*, a particularly vivid embodiment of the 'hypocrisy' (and the possibly wide gulf between ideology and practice) to which the duplicity of the Athenian norms with regard to pederasty (encouraging to the suitor, discouraging the boy) would lead. Cf. *Plut.* 153–9 and Cohen 1991, 199.

<sup>8</sup> Some influential politicians of the age had made their fortunes as industrialists and merchants; it seems that their conservative rivals disdainfully called them 'men of the market', see Ostwald 1986, 203 n. 16, 214–15. It is certainly no coincidence that in *Knights*, Cleon is overthrown by a Sausage-seller from the *agora*.

<sup>9</sup> Bringing charges before the jury courts seems to have been an important political instrument for some of the 'new' politicians of the day to gain influence, see Ostwald 1986, 208–12 and cf. the charge of *συκοφαντία* against the Paphlagonian at *Eq.* 437.

<sup>10</sup> Carter 1986 portrays three groups of *apragmones* among Athenian citizens: the noble youth (52–75), the peasant farmer (76–98) and the rich quietist. No character in *Clouds* corresponds to this last category. Of the second, Strepsiades is an obvious example (cf. Carter 1986, 84), at least until his debts force him to aspire to 'urbanity'; and the first category is clearly made up of young men who have enjoyed something rather like Strong's education (cf. Carter 1986, 57–8); it is also the cul-

these ideals of restraint are one-sided and even a touch utopian, and this makes Strong especially vulnerable to the attacks of Weak, who will demonstrate that *his* pupils, though admittedly degenerate, are in fact far more successful in civic life.

Weak starts his elenchus by countering Strong's objections against hot baths and the *agora* by means of obvious fallacies (1043–57). He then tackles Strong's praise of *sôphrosunê* and his disdain for rhetoric (1058–82). The benefits of *sôphrosunê* are poor in comparison to the fortune one can make through injustice (*ponêria*, 1065f.) and the pleasures one can have if one ignores conventions of decent behavior and uses one's *phusis* (1078). If one does so, however, one needs oratory to defend oneself if caught in an act of *moikheia*.<sup>11</sup> But what, asks Strong, if your pupil should be punished with the infamous radish treatment?<sup>12</sup> Will he be able to bring up an argument that saves him from becoming *euruprôktos*? Weak could not be less impressed. He shows that this condition is shared by most prominent professionals of all kinds, as well as by the majority of the spectators. Strong is now defeated: if the most successful figures in Athenian public life, as well as most of their less illustrious co-citizens, can violate one of the main imperatives of manliness and yet be 'real men' in the sense of being successful agents in civic life,<sup>13</sup> his defense of traditional morality seems futile.

Thus, Weak's openly immoralist stand at least acknowledges the ideal, deprecated by Strong, of man as a successful agent in civic life. Whereas Strong single-mindedly emphasizes physical training for

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tural environment to which the horse-loving Phidippides initially seems to have been attracted, see *Nu.* 14–6, 69–70, 119–20.

<sup>11</sup> Though typically meaning 'adultery', *μοιχεία* is commonly taken to apply to *any* sexual act with an Athenian woman who falls under the custody of another Athenian citizen. See, e.g., Blundell 1995, 125–6. Cohen 1991, 98–109 argues that the term applies to adultery alone.

<sup>12</sup> According to *Lysias* 1.49, a man who catches another man in an act of *moikheia* was allowed to do to him whatever he liked. On the radish treatment, which seems to have been a traditional means of punishment, cf. Dover 1968, 227 *ad* 1083, and Halperin 1990, 96; Cohen 1989, 385–7 thinks that the radish treatment might have been the fruit of Aristophanes' (and Strong's) imagination, but his remarks in 1995, 148 suggest second thoughts.

<sup>13</sup> For the connection between achievements and 'being a man' in the *polis*, cf. a fragment from Euripides' *Philoctetes* from 431, fr. 788N, 2–3; τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καὶ τι πράσσοντας πλέον | τιμῶμεν ἄνδρας τ' ἐν πόλει νομίζομεν. As appears from fr. 787.1, this attitude was contrasted by the speaker, Odysseus, to the, for him, unviable option of *apragmosunê*. Cf. Carter 1986, 28.

war and athletics, respect for one's parents and compliance with traditional standards of decency, Weak's pupils blatantly fail in all these respects (Phidippides' acquired disrespect for morality will be amply demonstrated in the second *agôn*, where he argues the case for beating one's parents) and disregard the taboo on sexual submission as well, but they acquire a rhetorical agility that makes them rather more successful in some parts of public life. Taken together, the two teaching programs, ludicrously imbalanced in themselves, offer a fuller picture of the standards of behavior associated with manliness: these include (i) courage and physical training, (ii) respect for one's parents and traditional morality, (iii) the avoidance of physical submission and (iv) successful participation in the life of the *polis*. The humorous, if potentially disconcerting 'message' of the *agôn*, is that as things go at present, the last of these ideals comes at the expense of the other three. As we will see in the next section, the same incongruity is exploited, and ultimately resolved, in *Knights*, where the Sausage-seller first beats Cleon by surpassing him in depravity, only to use his newly acquired power for a miraculous rejuvenation of his master Demos.

### 3. *Outdoing Cleon: the Sausage-seller*

Among fictitious characters in Aristophanic plays, the one who most conspicuously fails to live up to the standards of approved male behavior, is the Sausage-seller from *Knights*. He is designated by an oracle as the only one able to do away with the supreme power of Cleon, the Paphlagonian, precisely because he is an even more degenerate character (μιαρώτερος, 329). Although at present free from all kinds of ambition, he is promised a great future by Demos' servant:

You will, according to the oracle, become a great man.—Tell me, how shall I, being a Sausage-seller, become a man?—Well, that is exactly the reason why you will be powerful: you are wicked, a man from the *agora*, and have no inhibitions.

OI: γίγναι γάρ, ὡς ὁ χρησμὸς οὐτοσὶ λέγει,  
ἀνὴρ μέγιστος.

ΑΛ: εἰπέ μοι, καὶ πῶς ἐγὼ  
ἄλλαντοπώλης ὦν ἀνὴρ γενήσομαι;

OI: δι' αὐτὸ γάρ τοι τοῦτο καὶ γίγναι μέγας,  
οὔτι πονηρὸς καὶ ἀγορᾶς εἶ καὶ θρασύς. (*Eq.* 177–81)



cess implied by the *agôn* in *Clouds*, and demonstrated more fully in *Knights*, is resolved by the Sausage-seller, who, when he has become an ἀνὴρ (1255) does away with thefts, shamelessness and *katapugosunê*, and uses his power to reveal himself (and the rejuvenated Demos) as a kind of 'civic' *andreios*. More than other 'good' male protagonists like Dicaeopolis or Bdelycleon, who ultimately pursue private rather than truly civic goals, and like Lysistrata (perhaps the only other Aristophanic protagonist to exhibit 'real' *andreia*) the Sausage-seller turns out to be a benefactor of Athenian democracy.

In this respect, his conduct is paralleled by the self-representation of the comic poet himself, who repeatedly claims to have shown great courage in 'fighting' the dangerous politicians who threaten the welfare of Athenian democracy, notably Cleon.<sup>18</sup> Though, appropriately for a comic poet in a *parabasis*, Aristophanes probably overstates both his own daring and the risks represented by his targets in the strongest terms,<sup>19</sup> and claims for himself the complementary virtue of *sôphrosunê* not necessarily shared by his protagonists, the ideological common ground between the poet's self-representation and the characterization of some of his characters is clearly that successful agency in public life is a manly quality worthy of the highest praise, as long as it is exerted in the service of the common good of the *polis*. Apparently, the fact that it allegedly involves mingling with dirt does not detract from its nobility.

#### 4. *The manly citizen in Aristophanes and Aeschines*

On the evidence of what we have seen so far, the standards of behavior that relate to the concept of the 'manly citizen' in Aristophanes can be divided into four categories. The 'ideal' man will (i) show

<sup>18</sup> Key passages are *Ach.* 633–64, *Eq.* 510–11, *V.* 1017–42. For the poet's courage see the discussions in Hubbard 1991, 61–3 (*Knights*) and 118–21 (*Wasps*), and General Introduction in this volume, section 4.

<sup>19</sup> It will be no coincidence that Aristophanes states his own courage in terms of *tolma* (*Ach.* 646, *Eq.* 510), 'daring', a superlative (and in some cases even excessive) form of *andreia*. For exaggerated descriptions of the 'risks' of tackling his monstrous enemies see *Ach.* 377–840, *Eq.* 511 (Cleon) and especially *V.* 1029–43, dealing with Cleon and (unidentified, cf. Hubbard 1991, 119 n. 14) sycophants. For conventional elements in Aristophanes' presentation of 'his' conflict with Cleon, see Rosen 1988a, 59–82.



courage and prowess in battle, (ii) respect traditional standards of morality, including respect for one's parents, (iii) refrain from submission to the desires of another man, and (iv) be a successful agent in the life of the *polis*, not just capable of handling his own affairs, but also of furthering the welfare of the *polis* as a whole. Of these, the first quality will typically be appraised in terms of *andreia*, but those who benefit the *polis* will also be viewed as *andreioi* if this activity is perceived to require a measure of courage and assertiveness. The comic paradox is that very few men in comedy are able or willing to live up to all these ideals at the same time. Allegedly, some are bundles of aggression and little more than that (like the various generals, all men in *Lysistrata* and also Cleon of *Knights*) whereas many others fall short of 'manliness' in some crucial respect, like the 'coward' Cleonymus, who supposedly threw away his shield in battle,<sup>20</sup> beardless Clisthenes, who is constantly ridiculed as effeminate and given to the subordinate role in sex,<sup>21</sup> and the tragic poet Agathon, who appears on stage in drag in the opening scene of *Thesmophoriazusae* (101–265). A less well-known example in this category is Aripbrates, who is said to be the 'inventor' and a dedicated practitioner of oral sex; the consequence of this submissive behavior is that in *Eccl.* 129, we find him chattering among the women at the assembly.<sup>22</sup> All these figures, indeed, are represented as being no 'real' men, like the *euruprôktoi* who are said to fill the assembly, the courts and the theaters in *Clouds*.

The collection of values relevant for the Athenian male citizen may seem rather heterogeneous at first sight, yet essentially the same picture emerges if one investigates the grounds that could cause an Athenian citizen to suffer *atimia* and lose his citizen rights. The *locus*

<sup>20</sup> *Eq.* 1372, *Nu.* 353, 673–80 (According to Socrates, he should be called Cleonymē), *V.* 19–20, 822–3, *Pa.* 446, 673–9, 1295ff., *Av.* 289–90, 1473–81. Cleonymus is also characterized as a big glutton (*Ach.* 88, *Eq.* 1293) and a liar (*Ach.* 88, *Nu.* 400).

<sup>21</sup> *Ach.* 118 (a eunuch), *Eq.* 1374, *Ra.* 422, fr. 407 (beardless, and generally hairless), *Nu.* 355, *V.* 1187, *Av.* 831, *Lys.* 621–2, *Th.* 235 (effeminate), *Lys.* 1092, *Ra.* 48, 57 (given to the subordinate role in sex). In *Th.* 574–654 he appears on stage as a 'woman' among the *thesmophoriazusae*.

<sup>22</sup> On Aripbrates, see *Eq.* 1281–7, *Pa.* 883–5, *Eccl.* 129, fr. 129. Sommerstein *ad Eq.* 1281 thinks that the Aripbrates of *Eccl.* 129 must be a different person on account of the late date of that play, but there is no obvious candidate, and if Sommerstein is right that he was a comic poet, there is an extra point in *Eccl.* 129 παῦσαι λαλῶν.

*classicus* for a trial of *atimia* is Aeschines' speech *Against Timarchus*.<sup>23</sup> The speaker, Aeschines himself, intends to evade a charge by the anti-Philippans Timarchus and Demosthenes. To this end, he accuses the more vulnerable of the two, Timarchus, of prostituting himself and squandering his patrimony. Aeschines' case does not seem to have been a very strong one, and this induces him to offer a great deal of moralizing on what it means to be a decent citizen, and little proof that Timarchus actually was not. In fact he includes what reads like a full catalogue of offenses liable to punishment with *atimia*, which is only partly relevant to the case against Timarchus. In Chapters 28–30, Aeschines names four categories of offenses: (i) maltreatment and neglect of one's parents, (ii) shrinking from military service or throwing away one's shield, (iii) prostituting oneself or serving as a *hetairos* to another man,<sup>24</sup> and (iv) the neglect of one's family estate.

The penalty on prostitution and *hetairêsis* is explained by Aeschines as follows: "For he who is guilty of selling his own body for *hubris*, will in the opinion of the lawgiver also readily sell the common interests of the city".<sup>25</sup> The last part of this comment may well be special pleading on Aeschines' part, but what is relevant here is that sexual submission to the desires of another man amounts to suffering *hubris* or 'dishonor'. From other sources, it is clear that it is the act of undergoing sexual submission itself, not just taking money for it, that is regarded as hubristic.<sup>26</sup> We cannot be quite sure if *hubris* in this sense was technically restricted to submission in oral and anal sex, nor of course how effective the prohibition of such behavior was in practice,<sup>27</sup> but the relevant point here is that sexual submission,

<sup>23</sup> For the political background of the speech, see Harris 1995, 101–6. For the sexual and social issues involved, see Dover 1978, 23–31, Halperin 1990, 88–104, Winkler 1990, 45–70, Cohen 1991, 171–202.

<sup>24</sup> For *ἐταρεῖν*, entering in a long-term mercenary relationship with a single man, see also Ar. *Pa.* 11, *Ly.* 14.41 and Dem. 22 (*Against Androtion*).

<sup>25</sup> Aeschin. 1.29 τὸν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἐφ' ὕβρει πεπρακότα, καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως ραδίως ἡγήσατο ἀποδόσεσθαι.

<sup>26</sup> See, e.g. Dem. 22.58, Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.30, Pl. *Symp.* 181d4, 188a7, *Leg.* 837c5, and cf. Cohen 1995, 149–51. Aeschines (1.185) even goes as far as to suggest that Timarchus himself is guilty of *hubris* against himself, but this, again, seems to be special pleading.

<sup>27</sup> Cohen 1991, 171–202 sketches an image of Athenian morals that is markedly more severe than the *communis opinio* would suggest, including the authors cited n. 23 above.

just as the other offenses listed by Aeschines, was viewed as incompatible with the role of the free 'dominant' male citizen and liable to be punished with disfranchisement.

Aeschines' list strikingly reads like a catalogue of 'offenses' that comic figures are seen, or said, to perform with relish. For an example of a man maltreating his parents, we have to look no further than Phidippides himself, who ends up beating his father, and is duly named *patraloias* (Nu. 1327). The same accusation is among the 'charges' brought against Weak by Strong in the opening of the *agôn* (Nu. 911); furthermore, the father-beater is prominent among those who cannot gain admission to the land of the birds (*Av.* 1337) as well as among the notable criminals in the underworld (*Ra.* 274, 773). With regard to martial courage and unmanly sexual behavior, I have already noted that the comic caricatures of Cleonymus, Clisthenes and Agathon are primarily to be regarded as examples of 'unmanly' behavior, and, finally, for a man wasting more than what little his father possesses, Phidippides is once again the prime example. Comparison of these examples of unworthy male behavior with Aeschines' criteria for *atimia* strongly suggests that the comic poet was making his characters break very serious standards of appropriate masculine behavior, thereby doubtlessly offering a fair share of comic relief from the stringent standards that applied in real life.

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## CHAPTER SEVEN

# THE RHETORIC OF COURAGE IN THE ATHENIAN ORATORS

Joseph Roisman

### 1. *Courage in the Orators*

*Andreia*, or manly courage, often in a military context, was an ethos and a performative skill that men acquired through socialization, training, and education.<sup>1</sup> For courage to be counted as a virtue, it had to be cultural, not natural. Hence the distinction that the Athenians made between courage and rashness. An act of courage was voluntary and was performed in full awareness of what was at stake. Otherwise, the very same act could be labeled as rashness, because it was deemed natural, and human nature had to be overcome or controlled.<sup>2</sup>

Courage in the form of the ability to master fear was an important masculine attribute. To begin with, men, certainly more than women, were deemed capable of overcoming their natural inclinations, including the wish to avoid danger. To succeed in the battle against fear, experience, reason, and, often, physical prowess and endurance were required, which men were normally assumed to possess (e.g. Hyp. Fr. A 4 [Burt]; Arist. *Pol.* 1338b9–14; Xen. *Oec.*

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<sup>1</sup> E.g. Dem. 60.6–7, 16–17, 25–6; cf. Xen. *Symposium* 2.11–12; Thuc. 1.84.3; Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* (henceforth: *EN*) 3.8 1116a21 and below. Huart 1968, 403–39 argues for a distinction between *andreia*, meaning natural bravery, and *eupsukhia*, meaning courage based on experience and knowledge. The speeches do not support such a distinction, and the term *andreia* is more commonly used than *eupsukhia*, which is usually reserved to the funeral orations: e.g. Lys. 2.4, 8, 14, and see Din. 1.79; Isoc. 12.198; Dem. 61.24. For *eupsukhia* also Dover 1974, 166–8. Thuc. 4.126.4–6 gives a fine example of the concept of military courage, and see de Romilly 1956.

<sup>2</sup> For courage as opposed to rashness see Hyp. Fr. A4 (Burt); Arist. *EN* 3.7 1115b24–1117a27; cf. Eur. *Suppl.* 508–10; Nicias in Plato *Laches* 197a–c. For unmanly cowardice (*anandria* or *deilia*) as belonging to nature: Dem. 21.172; Aes. 3.81, 175; cf. Loraux 1995, 75–87. Natural courage was acknowledged (e.g. Plato *Laches* 196e), but it was not as valuable as cultural courage.

7.25). The Lysian funeral oration shows how courage marked the victory of masculinity over femininity. The speaker produces the case of the Amazons, whose courage defied their biological sex. Because of the Amazons' *eupsukhia* and military skills, people considered them more men than women, until the men of Athens vanquished them and harmonized gender with biological nature (Lys. 2.4–6). In a funeral oration attributed to Demosthenes, heroic Athenian women displayed *andreia* through the patriotic act of self-sacrifice, which invited men to affirm their manhood by surpassing the women (Dem. 60.29). Needless to say, both speakers are more interested in making a rhetorical point than in analyzing gender. Women could be courageous, but it was men, who proved in war what good students of bravery they were. They could gain *doxa*, or fame, on the battlefield, the most coveted honor and memory that men could attain, especially if they took Homer seriously. And even though courage was not always the sum of virtue, a man would have found it difficult to attain public recognition of *aretê* without it.<sup>3</sup>

The link between courage and manly *aretê* attained significance in civilian life too. Showing courage in civic life was associated with other masculine qualities, such as discipline and self-control, intelligence, foresight, endurance and hard work. It was also linked to *philotimia*, the ability to lead and control others, practicing justice, and generally, good moral character.<sup>4</sup> Both in war and peace, in public or private, courage often translated into prioritizing public over private interests. It proved a man's readiness to share danger with other men and allowed him both to display, and benefit from, his male solidarity. Acts of courage demonstrated a man's loyalty to the political and social groups to which he belonged and to their cherished ideals.<sup>5</sup>

Yet these general observations on the nature of courage were hardly above dispute. Because courage was often shown in agonistic contexts, it invited comparisons. In politics, and especially with

<sup>3</sup> For courage and *aretê*: Lys. 2.23; Dem. 60.3, 17; 61.19; Hyp. 6.19; Lyc. 1.108.

<sup>4</sup> Lys. 2.11–14; 16.17; And. 1.107–9; Dem. 18.215; 61.8, 22–3, 26–7, 37–9; cf. Lys. 2.55; Dem. 15.28.

<sup>5</sup> Sharing dangers with others: e.g. Lys. 10.27; Isoc. 6.1. Courage and self-sacrifice: Lys. 16.13, 15–16; cf. And. 1.107; and good citizenship: [Dem.] 50.21; and loyalty to the communities and its ideals: Lys. 2.11–14; 10.27; 16.3. Criticism of preferring personal safety to public danger: Lys. 31.7; Lyc. 1.43. Cf. Missiou 1992, 28–30.

regard to the battlefield, the comparisons tended to be invidious or depreciating. On the national level, the funeral orations dwell on the theme of Athens as a military, manly nation, whose courage, public consciousness, and sense of justice were unsurpassed and justified their claim to lead others. From Lysias in the early fourth century to Hyperides in 322, orators used traditional commonplaces to prove that the Athenians were a community of *andres agathoi* who displayed superior noble courage.<sup>6</sup> Democratic Athens as a warrior state was always victorious, because the Athenians realized better than others the traditional ideals of the hoplite.

The Athenians, however, who liked to believe that they were manlier and more courageous than other nations, had difficulty agreeing on who among their citizens deserved to be recognized as such. The funeral orations show that there was a consensus that men who died fighting for their country deserved public recognition of their masculine bravery and *aretê*. But what about the living, or even the civilian dead? The speeches of the Athenian orators suggest that courage and cowardice were flexibly defined and ascribed to individuals and groups according to the speaker's ends. The reason was that courage could not be securely self-claimed but, as a public virtue, was ascriptive and validated by others. This gave society, state, and individuals the power to reward or injure a man by designating him as courageous or a coward, respectively.

The question of what separated true from false courage occupied both Plato and Aristotle.<sup>7</sup> My interest lies less in the pure form, exact origin, clear definition, and taxonomy of the notion, than in how it was perceived by and presented to the Athenian audience. What the philosophers shared with the orators was the agonistic perception of courage, which resulted in making it a means of distinguishing between men or of excluding them from joining the ranks of the courageous. Unlike the philosophers, however, the orators were much more interested in taking advantage of the ill-defined nature of courage and cowardice and of the impact of context on their meanings.

<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., Lys. 2.7–9, 11–14, 55; Dem. 60.8–11; Hyp. 6.17–19; Missiou 1992, 51–2 with bibliography; cf. And. 1.107–8; Lyc. 1.70, 83, 105; Isoc. 7.74, and generally, Ziolkowski 1981; Loraux 1986, 96–7.

<sup>7</sup> Plato especially in the *Laches* and *Protagoras*, and Aristotle esp. *EN* 3.6–9 1115a6–1117b23; *Eudemian Ethics* 3.1 1229a–1230a; de Romilly 1980; Smoes 1995, 99–280.



The grading of various military services as more courageous than the others may serve as an example. The Athenian Mantitheus privileges hoplite fighting over cavalry in his speech (Lys. 16.13). The accuser of Alcibiades the Younger charged him with desertion because he chose to serve in the cavalry, allegedly out of fear of fighting as a hoplite (Lys. 14.7–10, 14–15). Demosthenes, too, blamed Meidias for choosing for himself the kind of service he would engage in, the cavalry or the navy, depending on its distance from danger (Dem. 21.133, 160–5). On the other hand, Polystratus' son and Lysias' client proudly produces in court his courageous service as a cavalryman and argues that he exhibited identically brave spirit in the cavalry and the infantry (Lys. 20.25). Indeed, the same speaker who accused Alcibiades of opting to fight on a horseback out of cowardice, elsewhere describes fighting in the cavalry approvingly and as involving risk.<sup>8</sup> Ultimately, however, judging one service worthier than another was subjective, depended on the context in which the judgment was given, and, especially, served the interest of the speaker. The rhetoric of litigation encouraged speakers to foreground their own record by demeaning others'.<sup>9</sup>

The rhetoric of courts or assemblies tended to describe masculine courage and control over fear in comparative terms or framed them as a zero-sum commodity. When men argued that they had taken greater risks than others, they actually denied their opponents a claim to courage. These claims were made regarding both military service and civic action. Politicians and litigants often congratulated themselves on their willingness to risk their persons in the public interest. Usually, such a boast was accompanied by derogatory remarks about other political leaders or fellow Athenians, who looked after their own affairs and security.<sup>10</sup> Thus, a speaker in a speech attributed to Demosthenes provocatively suggests to one Aristomedes that he avoid politics because "private life is safe and inactive and free of danger, but that of a politician is open to attack and is dangerous and full of daily contests and troubles. Why not choose [a life]

<sup>8</sup> Lys. 14.14, Cf. Is. 6.5; Isoc. 6.5; Dem. 61.21–3; Burckhardt 1996, 167.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Bugh 1988, 135, 150–3; Spence 1993, 168–72. For ranking hoplites over light-armed troops and rowers see Isoc. 8.48; Raaflaub 1994, 139–42 with 140 n. 87 for bibliography.

<sup>10</sup> E.g. Lys. 10.27; 16.13, 15; And. 2.4, 18; Dem. 1.16; 3.21–2, 32; 8.69, 71; 18.219–20; 19.15–16; 24.3; 50.59; Aes. 2.106–7; Lyc. 1.43; Isoc. 18.60–1.

of quiet instead of risk?" (Dem. 10.70).<sup>11</sup> The speaker does not explicitly condemn the *apragmosunē* lifestyle of private comforts and security. He merely argues that it was not as manly as the life of the active citizen. Yet his ostensible indulgence of others' quietism in fact barred them from claiming courage.

The manipulation of courage and shame occurred even in cases that seem to have been free of controversy. Most Athenian men agreed that it was laudable to take risks in the service of approved goals such as the defense of the city. Demosthenes, however, was able to find cowardice even in military service. He argued that Meidias' contribution of a trireme to the city and his service on the sea were acts of cowardice (*deilia*) and unmanliness (*anandria*), because he allegedly tried to evade more dangerous military operations (Dem. 21.162–5). Behind the attempt to discredit Meidias stood the principle that courage and cowardice could be identified not only by actions, but also by the actors' motives which, in turn, were open to divergent interpretations. This is the reason why even individuals who were publicly recognized for their personal bravery were not immune from character assassination, or from a short public memory. In a society where men competed for honor, or were in conflict with each other, there was an incentive to dispute what courage actually meant and how risk should properly be faced.<sup>12</sup> Evoking *andreia* or *anandria* in the speeches, then, served not just to stimulate men to action but also to elevate oneself and put others down.

I would like to illustrate some of the above observations regarding the complex perception of courage and its manipulation in court, first, through a discussion of the rhetoric of war and peace, and secondly, through an examination of Demosthenes' celebrated speech against Meidias.

<sup>11</sup> Dem. 10.70: 'Αριστόμηδες, οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἄγνοεῖ, τὸν μὲν τῶν ιδιωτῶν βίον ἀσφαλὴ καὶ ἀπράγμονα καὶ ἀκίνδυνον ὄντα, τὸν δὲ τῶν πολιτευομένων φιλαίτιον καὶ σφαλερὸν καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἀγῶνων καὶ κακῶν μεστόν, οὐ τὸν ἡσύχιον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις αἰρεῖ; cf. Dem. 19.100.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. And. 2.17–18; Missiou 1992, 42. Public recognition of individual bravery: e.g. Isoc. 16.29–30 (Alcibiades); Aes. 2.169 (Aeschines); Ridley 1979, 511–12.

## 2. *The Rhetoric of War and Peace*

The Athenians readily admitted that peace was better than war, and were realistic enough not to endorse going into battle whenever someone moved to mobilize the forces.<sup>13</sup> Yet war was more prestigious than peace. As opposed to occasional celebrations of peace on stage or in religious festivals and art in Athens, the city was full of monuments, images and inscriptions commemorating and celebrating military events and victorious men of war, not to mention religious, dramatic, and sport events which reminded the Athenians of their martial virtues.<sup>14</sup> The speakers of the funeral orations too appealed to the notion that war was the arena where the highest honors could be attained. They claimed in their tributes to the fallen Athenians that they met the noblest of deaths and were granted honors of which no man alive was deserving (e.g. Lys. 2.76, 79–80). Their daring was honorable and awe-inspiring, and their *aretê* and manly virtue (*andragathia*) in facing risk was unsurpassed (Hyp. 6.40).<sup>15</sup> Lysurgus echoes these sentiments when he asserts that it is in war that good men are rewarded with the prizes of freedom and *aretê* (Lyc. 1.49), while Demosthenes, wishing to contrast the golden past with the gloomy present, reminds his listeners of the city's wealth and setting of many honorable trophies in the past as opposed to its squandering its money and losing allies in peace in the present (Dem. 13.26–7; cf. Dem. 3.24–8). At least in some circles, war was considered manlier than peace. A pro-Spartan speaker in one of Isocrates' works argues that the lovers of peace are neither acquisitive nor effective guardians of what they have, while the lovers of war are able both to take what they desire and keep it. Those who act in such a manner are deemed "the ultimate men" (or "those most accomplished among men": ὁ ποιούσιν οἱ τέλειοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι

<sup>13</sup> Dem. 5.24–5; 8.56–7; 19.88; Aes. 2.176–7; And. 3.1; cf. Dem. 8.52; 10.55; 19.92, 95, 336; cf. Hdt. 1.87.4; 8.3.1; Thuc. 2.61.1; 4.59.2, 62.2; Xen. *Poroi* 5.5–13; Isoc. 8.19–20, but cf. Isoc. 8.5–8, 36.

<sup>14</sup> Raaflaub 1998. For the theme of peace (*eirênê*) in public art and proclamations in Athens after the Peloponnesian war: Stewart 1997, 152.

<sup>15</sup> See also Dem. 60.33, 36; Hyp. 6.37–8; Contrasting honor with unwillingness to face risk: Lys. 16.13; 31.31; Lyc. 1.76. I do not discuss here clearly self-serving characterization of war and peace (e.g. And. 3.12), or biased contrasting of honor with peace: e.g. Dem. 19.146; Aes. 2.79.

τῶν ἀνδρῶν).<sup>16</sup> The assertion is sophistic, even brutal, but it reflects the view of war as a domain in which men can gain power, win a contest or a prize, and engage in predatory action.

This attitude toward war seemed to have given speakers, who advocated taking a belligerent option, a rhetorical advantage over those who recommended avoiding it. The speeches suggest that it was easy to identify cowardice (*anandria*) with peace or with a reluctance to go to war.<sup>17</sup> A speaker who supported a call for war exhibited the proactive aggressiveness that was expected of a man. Also, he was less likely to be suspected of cowardice, and better able to charge the opposition with showing it.

Early in his political career, Demosthenes met the challenge of opposing a campaign. In 354 BCE, the Athenians were deliberating whether they should fight the Persian king, and Demosthenes advised against taking hasty action. Those who supported a military campaign had in their favor, in addition to the rhetorical display of valor, the Athenian nostalgia for, if not the wish to rebuild, their fifth-century empire that had been founded on victories over the Persians. The allure of empire was reinforced by masculine ambition to exceed past accomplishments. As Demosthenes himself asserted later in his career, in times of peace the Athenians could not emulate the battles, campaigns, and dangers that made their ancestors shine (Dem. 19.269; cf. Dem. 13.26–7).<sup>18</sup> On the present occasion, Demosthenes spoke like a mature adult who supported taking measured and cautious steps. If his rivals' call for an immediate action against the Persian king made them look like men of proactive courage, Demosthenes tried to overcome this advantage by characterizing them as rash and impetuous. He says that it is not hard to acquire a reputation for *andreia* (manly courage) when there is a need for counseling, nor to appear clever in speech when there is danger.

<sup>16</sup> Isoc. 12.242: . . . τοὺς τε πολεμικοὺς πολλὴ διαφέρειν τῶν εἰρηνικῶν· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ οὐτε κτητικούς εἶναι τῶν οὐκ ὄντων οὐτε φύλακας δεινούς τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, τοὺς δ' ἀμφοτέρωθεν δύνασθαι, καὶ λαμβάνειν ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμῶσι καὶ σώζειν ἅπερ ἂν κατάσχωσιν. ἃ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τέλειοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τῶν ἀνδρῶν. I am aware that the interlocutor is trying to contradict Isocrates' characterization of the best men in 12.30–2, but, as he points out, he is not alone in thinking as he does.

<sup>17</sup> Dem. 15.28, 19.218–19; *Pr.* 50.1; *Aes.* 2.137; cf. *Lys.* 34.11; *Isoc.* 6.13.

<sup>18</sup> For the background of the speech *On the Symmories* (Dem. 14): Carlier 1990, 78–99; Sealey 1993, 128–9. Dreams of empire: Badian 1995.

But what is both hard and proper is to show manly courage when facing danger and to give more thoughtful advice than another (Dem. 14.8; cf. 5.24).<sup>19</sup>

Athenian leaders, then, should be like the Homeric heroes: courageous in war and wise in council. Demosthenes adds to these masculine qualifications a practical and prudent approach that, in the context of this speech, is placed above dreams of an empire or a show of aggression. In addition, he bases his cautionary remarks on the popular ideas contrasting men of action with men of words, or apparent courage in speech with real courage on the battlefield. Rather unfairly he requests the opposition to produce tangible proofs of courage in a contest that is limited to words and before the action has taken place (cf. Dem. *Pr.* 50.1). He invokes the expectation that man and state should take the more difficult course of action, and behave pragmatically. Demosthenes' rhetorical strategy is unexceptional. He plays the ambivalent and contradictory perceptions of manhood against each other in order to rank rational and utilitarian considerations above other attributes.<sup>20</sup>

Ironically, Demosthenes found himself later in his career in the position of his rivals when he tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Athenians to send forces against Philip. The orator had to overcome their resistance, which was grounded in the realities of going to war, namely, the inadequate funding of military expeditions and the reluctance of citizens to participate in military campaigns because, *inter alia*, of the poor funding.<sup>21</sup> Demosthenes offers a number of what he considered practical solutions to these difficulties. In addition, he tries to convince his audience of the necessity of taking military action and of making a sacrifice by appealing to their masculine ethos and pride as citizens. He reproaches the Athenians for their laziness and shameful negligence (*ameleia*) when they have allowed opportunities to slip by. Ever since Odysseus, seizing opportunities had been the

<sup>19</sup> Dem. 14.8: ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι χαλεπὸν οὔθ' ὅταν βουλευέσθαι δέῃ, δόξαν ἀνδρείας λαβεῖν, οὔθ' ὅταν κινδυνὸς τις ἐγγὺς ᾖ, δεινὸν εἰπεῖν φανῆναι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ προσήκον, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν κινδύνων τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ἐν δὲ τῷ συμβουλευεῖν φρονιμώτερα τῶν ἄλλων εἰπεῖν ἔχειν.

<sup>20</sup> See also Dem. 14.28; cf. Aes. 2.177. For the praise of caution and deliberate pace: Carter 1986, 46; Crane 1998, 205. For similar challenge and rhetorical devices: Thuc. 1.80–5. For Thucydides' influence on Demosthenes, see, e.g., Yunis 1996, 240–1, 269–77.

<sup>21</sup> E.g. Dem. 1.19–20, 2.13, 24; 3.20, 35; 13.4; Isoc. 8.44, 47–8.

mark of alertness, intelligence, and courage, especially for those claiming a leadership position.<sup>22</sup> Unlike the tremendously energetic and enterprising Philip, the Athenians delay, talk rather than act, avoid service in person or paying war taxes, and sit inactive. Passivity and the inability to overcome one's nature were considered feminine rather than masculine in nature.<sup>23</sup> The Athenians' selfish and apathetic behavior (often blamed on rival orators), was not only detrimental to their national security, but also prevented them from assuming leadership over other Greeks. Given the Athenians' history of leading and protecting the Greeks and fighting for just causes, their present inaction disgraced them and made them traitors of, and deserters from, their manly heritage.<sup>24</sup> Going to war, on the other hand, would make them true leaders and courageous men of action and not merely of words.<sup>25</sup>

Demosthenes is careful, however, in all of his admonitions never to raise doubts about the Athenians' masculine potential or capability of showing true courage and overcoming their present difficulties (e.g. Dem. 14.9). They suffer from poor leadership and lack of spirit and foresight, the latter being weaknesses in a man and a nation, but these are not incorrigible deficiencies. The Athenians need only follow the excellent advice of Demosthenes, get rid of his competitors, and awaken the combative and masculine spirit that characterized the *aretê* of their ancestors.<sup>26</sup> The speaker will not and cannot question the Athenian masculine nature, only their motivation to realize it. Raising doubts about the demos' ability to prove themselves as men-warriors is not only rhetorically counterproductive, but also inconceivable as far as the Athenian self-image is concerned.

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<sup>22</sup> Missing chances; esp. Dem. 1.15; 4.37; 9.38 and see 1.7–8, 3.3; 4.12; cf. Dem. 19.6, 8, 183; Euripides *Temenos* Fr. 745 (N); Aristides 1.281. Courage and opportunities: Dem. 1.24; Aes. 3.163. For the political leader's art of identifying the right opportunity (*kairos*), see Plato *Statesman* with Lane 1998, 137–46, 182–94.

<sup>23</sup> Philip and the Athenians' complacent conduct: e.g. Dem. 2.22–5, 27; 4.9; 8.21, 23, 36, 53; cf. 6.1–4; 10.3; 13.4–5; 14.14–15. Feminine passivity and women's inability to go beyond their nature: e.g. Halperin 1990, 133; Loraux 1986, 147.

<sup>24</sup> Dem. 3.20, 23–4, 27; 8.49; 9.73–4; cf. 6.8–11, 32–3; 10.24, 46, 73; 13.33–5.

<sup>25</sup> Reproaching the Athenians for merely talking or issuing empty decrees: e.g. Dem. 2.12–13; 3.4–5; 4.36–7; 13.33–5. Calling on them to serve in, and pay for, military expeditions: e.g. 1.6, 24; 2.27; 4.44.

<sup>26</sup> E.g. Dem. 3.30, 33–6; 9.36–53, 67; 13.21–31, 34–5; 15.28, 30; Burckhardt 1996, 210, 214.

In sum, when Demosthenes opposed calls to take action and go to war, he equated courage with caution, calmness and thoughtful deliberation, which in fact meant taking no action. But when he tried to move the Athenians into taking military and diplomatic steps, he characterized their inaction as shameful and cowardly.<sup>27</sup> He could accomplish this rhetorical feat because of the elasticity of the concept of masculine courage, which incorporated different interpretations of bravery.

### 3. Civic Courage: *Demosthenes versus Meidias*

A similar manipulation of the concepts of courage could occur on the individual level, as illustrated by Demosthenes' celebrated speech against Meidias.<sup>28</sup> The incident that occasioned this speech took place during the festival of the Dionysia of 348. Demosthenes, who was serving as a *chorêgos* of the men's dithyrambic chorus for his tribe in the festival, was punched in the face by Meidias in front of the crowd in the theater. The formal charge was committing a malfeasance during the festival. But Demosthenes tries to make Meidias guilty of hubris, that is, of insolent behavior and premeditated assault with the intention of dishonoring the victim.<sup>29</sup> The incident was just the latest episode in what Demosthenes describes as a long feud in which he, an exemplary citizen, was victimized by a bully but responded by seeking justice via the polis' institutions.

There was one issue, however, concerning which the reader may sense Demosthenes' discomfort. A free man, who did not react to an insulting blow with a counterblow, could be understood to admit that he deserved such treatment. Demosthenes himself suggests that a man hit insolently resembled a slave.<sup>30</sup> Why did Demosthenes not strike Meidias back?

<sup>27</sup> Shameful apathy: see n. 23 above. Cowardice: Dem. 4.42; 9.35, 67; 15.28; cf. 11.22; 19.218–19.

<sup>28</sup> Among recent studies of Dem. 21 are: Harris 1989; MacDowell 1990; Wilson 1991; Cohen 1991; Fisher 1992, esp. 44–51; Ober 1994; Cohen 1995, esp. 88–101.

<sup>29</sup> For the circumstances of the trial and the nature of the charges, see MacDowell 1990, 1–28, whose chronology of events I follow here. See also Fisher 1992, 38 with n. 13; Cohen 1995, 90–3.

<sup>30</sup> Dem. 21.180; cf. Dem. 21. 72; 24.167; Arist. *EN* 4.5 1126a 6–8; Plato *Gorgias* 483a; Schaps 1998, 169–70; Fisher 1998, 82–3.

If Meidias' big voice and head were complemented by a big body, it is possible that Demosthenes' lack of reaction was due to understandable prudence (Dem. 21.201; cf. 21.71). However, in a public feud such as this one, professed motives counted more than hidden ones. Did he delay the satisfaction of returning a blow in exchange for potentially more painful legal punishment? This was, to a large extent, Demosthenes' line of argument. He says that by refusing to retaliate he acted *sôphronôs*, meaning responsibly, moderately, and with self-restraint (Dem. 21.74). He did not yield to momentary anger but looked for justice and protection from the court, the guardian of the law (Dem. 21.76). It has been argued that Demosthenes' assertions appealed to a dominant code of behavior in Athens, which held personal honor in low regard and emphasized civil conduct and non-retaliatory response. This code would have replaced a more traditional one that called upon the individual to defend himself and his honor by resorting to personal action rather than by appealing to state agencies.<sup>31</sup>

In public, the Athenians undoubtedly ranked obedience to law and civic conduct above violent action in defense of individual honor. But this did not mean that one code fully replaced the other or marginalized it. The two ideologies, one advocating the rule of the law combined with individual self-control, the other defense of one's honor through self-aid and preferably on the spot, coexisted beside each other and exerted pressures on individuals in ways and degrees of intensity determined by context, personal character, the available options, and countless other variables.<sup>32</sup>

Contrasting masculine attitudes supported these conflicting behaviors. Demosthenes displayed his manhood by avoiding violent machismo and by serving the public interest. In spite of Meidias' provocation, his conduct was that of a mature man who controlled his emotions and reactions and showed respect for the law and the solemnity of the occasion. However, his masculine and adult restraint contradicted another masculine expectation, which recommended reciprocal violence and counter-insult. Demosthenes justifies his inaction by

<sup>31</sup> Herman 1993, 1994, 1995, esp. 48–51; cf. 1996.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Cohen 1995, 126. Herman admits such a coexistence (1993, 408; 1994 109), but then goes on to describe the two modes of behavior as almost incompatible ideal types. See the criticism of Schofield 1998, 39 and Fisher 1998, 72, 80–6; cf. Rhodes 1998, 156 n. 47; Christ 1998, 161–6.



urging the jurors to set an example (*paradeigma*) to others and to show that not fighting back against hubristic men with spontaneous rage, but bringing the matter to court, will give the victims legal protection (Dem. 21.76). At the same time, his call to turn his case into an example suggests that his inaction and recourse to the court was not universally adopted. Prudence and self-discipline for one was timidity for another. The dichotomy is noted by Plato, who points out misconceptions that lead the democratic man to identify *sôphrosunê* (moderation, resisting one's desires) with *anandria*: (cowardice or unmanliness) and *anaideia* (shamelessness) (Plato *Rep.* 8 560d–e). Plato is not an unbiased source for democratic attitudes, but his remarks suggest a lack of agreement on how to implement basic values and attitudes.<sup>33</sup> Demosthenes had to convince his audience that his perceived passivity did not make him a lesser man, while Meidias' brand of masculinity, in spite of its aggressive nature, was defective. It was not a light challenge which Demosthenes met, with the help of the rhetoric of masculine honor and courage.

Already at the beginning of his speech Demosthenes claims that the demos had shown its indignation and anger at Meidias, and that many citizens had pressured him to bring this rash (*thrasus*), disgusting (*bdehuros*), and no longer restrainable (*oude kathektos eti*) person to justice (Dem. 21.2).<sup>34</sup> Given this list of deviations from the desirable standard of manhood and civic conduct, it is no wonder that the demos sided with Demosthenes. Later in the speech, he reiterates that the people booed Meidias, were angry at him, and called upon Demosthenes to avenge himself (Dem. 21.2, 215–16, 226). There were surely Athenians who felt that Demosthenes had done right by taking legal action against Meidias, but they were not the ones in need of persuasion. Demosthenes made much of the demos' support of his action in order to isolate his opponent and put him in a position adversarial to the people (cf. Ober 1994, 93–4). In addition, how could his manhood be questioned if the demos stood behind him?

<sup>33</sup> Plato *Rep.* 8 560d; cf. Thuc. 3.82.4. For the link between *sôphrosunê* and *andreia*, see, e.g., Dem. 61.8, 13; Arist. *Politics* 1.5.8 1260a20–4, and North 1966, 170–3, 190.

<sup>34</sup> Dem. 21.2: πολλοί μοι προσίοντες, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ νῦν ὄντων ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ἡξίουσιν καὶ παρεκελεύοντο ἐπεξελθεῖν καὶ παραδοῦναι τοῦτον εἰς ὑμᾶς, ὥς μὲν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, δι' ἀμφοτέρῃ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, καὶ δεινὰ πεπονθέναι νομίζοντες ἐμὲ καὶ δίκην ἅμα βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν ὧν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐτεθέαντο θρασὺν ὄντα καὶ βδελυρὸν καὶ οὐδὲ καθεκτὸν εἶναι.

Demosthenes' virility in the speech is put beyond doubt. It spanned from his putting on his breastplate, joining the ranks of the infantry, and serving as a trierarch, to his employment of military vocabulary to describe his legal action. Thus in telling that he repelled Meidias' false charges, he used the same word as denoted repelling a military onslaught (*diôtheô* 21.124), and he declares that he would have been a "deserter from the ranks of justice" (*leloipenai . . . tēn tou dikaiou taxin*) had he not brought Meidias to trial (21.120).<sup>35</sup> Moreover, Demosthenes demonstrated true courage in suing Meidias. In the course of the speech he refers twice to other victims of Meidias' hubris who, (unlike him), did not, or were afraid to bring him to court (Dem. 21.20, 141). Wisely, he does not criticize them but depicts them sympathetically. The silent suffering of Meidias' victims spoke volumes for his villainy and added to the stature of Demosthenes as a dragon slayer.

Unlike Demosthenes' commendable manhood, Meidias is the incarnation of aberrant masculinity. He is excessively aggressive, out of control, haughty, self-indulgent, cruel, disrespectful of laws and custom, a fifty-year-old man who behaves like a hot-headed youth.<sup>36</sup> At times he conducted himself like a tyrant and at other times like the opposite of aristocratic manly virtues (Dem. 21.131, 174). His breaking into the goldsmith's house at night to destroy the chorus' crowns and Demosthenes' clothing was a show of adversity taken to extremes and of cowardly, nocturnal activity (Dem. 21.16). There is a short distance between deviant masculinity and unmanliness. In contrast to Demosthenes' virility as evidenced by his service as a hoplite, Meidias tried to dodge his military duty and to avoid danger, rode in a silver *astrabê* (mule chair), and took with him on a military campaign fine goblets and wine (Dem. 21.133, 160–6). The depiction of Meidias' easy life makes him fit the stereotype of the hubristic wealthy man and underscores his effeminacy. His inability to separate his luxurious lifestyle from the rigor of the campaign shows that he lacked the toughness of the hoplite. The chair on which he rode was normally used by women or invalids.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>35</sup> Dem. 21.133, 161; cf. 21.3, 189–90.

<sup>36</sup> See Dem. 21.18, and, e.g. 21.1, 79–80, 109, 131, 159, 172, 201. For Meidias' despotic and barbaric conduct: Wilson 1991, 182–4. For Demosthenes' manipulation of the age motif here: Harris 1989, 121–5; Ober 1994, 95–6, 107 n. 25.

<sup>37</sup> Schol. Dem. 21.133 (469a Dilts); Lys. 24.11, and see MacDowell 1990, 351

Demosthenes did not indulge in any exaggerated effeminization of Meidias, either because it would not have gone well with his depiction of him as an overbearing and aggressive person, or because the real Meidias was too well known to be portrayed as womanish. Yet, by alluding to his opponent's unmanliness, Demosthenes deflected criticism of his own masculinity.

The contrast with his rival made Demosthenes deserving of double commendation because he sought retribution as a man should, and he did it, not for personal gratification, but for the benefit of the democratic polis.<sup>38</sup> In addition, Demosthenes produces his own examples of violent encounters that started with an insult and ended tragically, to show that his patience and self-control were prudent and had averted disaster (Dem. 21.70–6). Many Athenians were likely to concur: the masculine defense of personal honor did not justify killing another Athenian. But this realization would not have stopped the same Athenians from having nagging doubts about Demosthenes' manhood or the validity of his mode of retaliation. Demosthenes had to affirm his manhood on all fronts. For this reason he adds that he fully agrees with the man who killed a friend who had hit him at a party, or with anyone else who defended himself (using violence) when dishonored (*atimazomenos*: Dem. 21.74). This sounds like the familiar call "hold me lest I hit him", only in hindsight.<sup>39</sup>

Overall, the speech shows that there were rival notions or paths for a man to adopt in defending his honor and displaying his courage. Demosthenes claims that he was capable of taking the one but chose to follow the other. His rhetoric does not indicate the priority of one ethos of honor or one type of courage over the other in ancient Athens. Nor does it suggest that, in contrast to traditional Mediter-

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with more references; Wilson 1991, 184. For Meidias as a stereotypical rich man: Ober 1989, 209–10, 1994, 94; Cohen 1995, 98–9.

<sup>38</sup> Dem. 21.28, 40, 44–6; Wilson 1991, 169–70; Fisher 1998, 81. For justifying legal actions as revenge, see Hunter 1994, 127–8; Cohen 1995, 101–7; Fisher 1998, 81; Christ 1998, 154–7, and for other declared motives: Christ 1998, 148–59.

<sup>39</sup> Dem. 21.74: καὶ ἑμαυτὸν μὲν γε, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, σωφρόνως, μᾶλλον δ' εὐτυχῶς οἶμαι βεβουλευῆσθαι, ἀνασχόμενον τότε καὶ οὐδὲν ἀνήκεστον ἐξαχθέντα πράττειν· τῷ δ' Εὐαίῳ καὶ πᾶσιν, εἴ τις αὐτῷ βεβοήθηκεν ἀτιμαζόμενος, πολλὴν συγγνώμην ἔχω. δοκοῦσι δέ μοι καὶ τῶν δικασάντων τότε πολλοί. Cf. Isoc. 20.8. This sentiment suggests that there was not a great difference here between the traditional elitist and the demos' democratic honor, and citizen dignity as argued by Wilson 1991, 170–1 and Ober 1994, 98–100.

raean societies of more modern times, fourth-century Athenians popularly advocated, with little or no qualifications, restraint and passivity in the face of an insult, or that the Athenians were not "unduly concerned with honor".<sup>40</sup> Athenian men shaped their responses on individualistic and situational grounds. In foreign policy, going to war or refraining from taking action could be presented as an act of courage, of thoughtless daring, or of cowardice. In the context of a trial, where the power of the jury to arbitrate disputes through the legal code was paramount, it was useful to equate masculinity with obedience to law and *sôphrosunê*. Among young men or in competitions among suitors, a punch in the face was not likely to be answered by a passive response or by reading to the offender the law on hubris. The speeches show the ability of Athenian men to negotiate successfully apparent contradictions within the masculine notions of honor. Such a negotiation can be viewed as a clever and cynical manipulation by practitioners of societal norms. It could equally suggest a tolerance of contradictory behavior and concepts and the ability to make them complement each other. Moreover, we should not disregard the possibility that Demosthenes and others sincerely believed that they were acting according to beneficial social expectations when they chose to follow one set of values over the other.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> For the first view, cf. Cohen 1995, 94–101; for the second: Herman 1993, 1995, esp. 53; 1996.

<sup>41</sup> The paper is based on a more extensive study entitled 'The Rhetoric of Manhood: Masculinity according to the Attic Orators'. I would like to thank the participants of the conference on *Andρεία* for their helpful remarks, and especially the gracious organizers, Ineke Sluiter and Ralph Rosen.

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## CHAPTER EIGHT

### THE HIGH COST OF *ANDREIA* AT ATHENS

Edward E. Cohen

#### 1. *Introduction*

The prime and literal meaning of *andreia* (and accordingly the first definition proffered by the Liddell-Scott-Jones Lexicon) is ‘manliness’, i.e. “the quality or state of having characteristics suitable for a man” (the Webster’s English-language dictionary definition of ‘masculinity’). Extended and figurative uses of *andreia*, however, are common in surviving Greek literature. In the case of fifth- and fourth-century Attic prose and tragic poetry, for example, as many of the other chapters in this book discuss, the term *andreia* is often translated by our word ‘courage’. Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that even in cases where ‘courage’ seems an appropriate translation, the broader concept of ‘manliness’ always determines the Classical conceptualization of ‘courage’. In short, ‘courage’ is only one aspect of what it means to ‘be a man’ in Athens. In this chapter, I focus on another distinctive aspect of *andreia*, which we might call the economic consequences of *andreia*—“the obligation to maintain an independence of occupation . . . and at all costs to avoid seeming to work in a ‘slavish’ way for another”.<sup>1</sup> I will seek to demonstrate how this form of *andreia*, by encouraging male disdain for salaried employment, relegated ‘slavish’ business pursuits to women (and slaves), and deprived Athenian men of economic opportunity and commercial experience.

#### 2. *“Defective Men” in Economic Context*

At Athens, men’s belief in the natural superiority of the Greek male did provide ideological justification for a male-dominated culture and

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<sup>1</sup> Fisher 1998a, 70. Similarly: Cartledge 1993, 148–9; Fisher 1993. Cf. Luc. *Apol.* 10.



for a gender-based segregation of human functions.<sup>2</sup> Yet Athenian masculinity was constructed not only through a polarized opposition to femininity,<sup>3</sup> but through distinctions among men, differentiations that encouraged males to avoid roles and behavior inconsistent with an idealized masculinity.<sup>4</sup> At Athens, male slaves were seen as “defective men” (Todd 1997, 124): for free Athenians, *andreia* accordingly mandated rejection of every servile manifestation. Athenian men, although self-employed in a great variety of occupations, therefore avoided work that required regular and repetitive service for a single employer on an ongoing basis over a continuing period—what we would term a ‘job’. Isocrates and Aristotle equate hired employment (*thêteia*) with slavery (*douleia*).<sup>5</sup> Isaeus laments the free men compelled by a “lack of necessities” to accept paid employment.<sup>6</sup> While Athens did have a labor market, slaves constituted virtually all of those standing daily for hire at Kolônos Agoraioi.<sup>7</sup> Receipt of a salary (*misthophoria*) was the hallmark of a slave: when the Athenian state required coin-testers and mint-workers for continuing service, legislation explicitly provided for the payment of *misthophoriai* to the skilled public slaves (*dêmosioi*) who provided these services on a reg-

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Xen. *Oec.* 7.23–5, 30. On sexual roles in the *Oeconomicus*, see Foucault 1990, 152–65; Said 1982, 99. Similar chauvinistic formulations are often cited as common to Mediterranean groupings, ancient and modern (see e.g. Gilmore 1990), but cf. Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994, 27–9 and (for Greece) Vernant 1989.

<sup>3</sup> Studies of gender traditionally have assumed masculinity to be cognizable only through antithesis with the feminine (see e.g. Kimmel 1987, 12; Seidler 1987, 88; Gilbert 1983, 423; Showalter 1985, 173). Not surprisingly, therefore, modern historians of Greek antiquity have often proceeded from the same assumption, as did some theorists in ancient Greece: see, for example, *Oec.* 1343b3–13 (attributed to Aristotle); Brisson 1986, 32–5; Olender 1978, 178.

<sup>4</sup> Segal 1990, ix–x; Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994, 19–26; Connell 1987, 167–90; Winkler 1990, 45–6.

<sup>5</sup> Isocrates expresses concern (14.48) for the “many reduced to slavery (*δουλεύοντα*) because of petty debts, and others forced to work for wages (*ἐπὶ θητείαν*)”. Cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1367a30–32: “this is the mark of a free man: to engage in no hired employment” (*ἐλευθέρου γὰρ σημεῖον· οὐδὲν ποιεῖν ἔργον θητικόν*).

<sup>6</sup> Isae. 5.39: τοὺς μισθωτοὺς δι’ ἔνδειαν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων. Cf. Dem. 57.45. On *misthōtoi*, see Martini 1997, 49.

<sup>7</sup> Pherecrates, fr. 142 (K-A). See Fuks 1951, 171–3; Garland 1988, 8–9. Marx believed that the formation of a labor market meant the introduction of ‘wage slavery’, a precursor to classical capitalism (1970–2, I.170; cf. Lane 1991, 310–11). But this proposition is not confirmed by the Athenian labor market: “nowhere in the sources do we hear of private establishments employing a staff of hired workers as their normal operation” (Finley 1981, 262–3, n. 6).

ular basis (and for their punishment in the event of absenteeism).<sup>8</sup> Even lucrative managerial positions were disdained by free men: most supervisors accordingly were slaves,<sup>9</sup> even on large estates where high compensation had to be offered to motivate unfree but highly skilled individuals.<sup>10</sup> Thus, in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (2.8), Socrates proposes permanent employment as an estate supervisor to Eutherus, an impoverished free man. But Eutherus curtly rejects the suggestion: managing an employer's property was appropriate only for a slave (2.8.4). In Aristotle's words, "the nature of the free man prevents his living under the control of another".<sup>11</sup>

Another factor inhibiting Athenian male involvement in business was a traditional aristocratic ethic that idealized leisurely dedication to cultural and social activities,<sup>12</sup> condemned all commerce as inherently servile, and insisted that farming alone provided a proper economic arena for the 'free man' (*anēr eleutheros*).<sup>13</sup> In fourth-century Athens, conservative opinion yearned for an earlier period when goods and services were provided, in Aristotle's words, 'naturally' through the self-sufficiency of farm-based households,<sup>14</sup> not through the "monied mode of acquisition" (*khṛēmatistikē ktētikē [tekhnē]*),<sup>15</sup> a relatively recent phenomenon that separated production and exchange from manly *autarkeia* and linked them to profit ("making money from

<sup>8</sup> *SEG* 26.72, lines 49–55. See Figueira 1998, 536–47; Alessandri 1984; Stumpf 1986. Cf. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1492.137; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1388.61–2.

<sup>9</sup> As employees, unfree labor fell into two categories: 'management slaves' (*epitropoi*) and workers (*ergatai*): δούλων δὲ εἶδη δύο, ἐπίτροπος καὶ ἐργάτης. *Oec.* 1344a23–29 (attributed to Aristotle). Pace Humphreys (1978, 297, n. 37) who refers to a 'free overseer,' the text of Menander's *Georgos* (46, 57) provides no information concerning the circumstances and conditions of service of the free youth working (ἐργάζεται: line 47) at Cleaenetus' farm.

<sup>10</sup> See Xen. *Oec.* 12.3; 1.16–17.

<sup>11</sup> Arist. *Rhet.* 1367a33: ἐλευθέρου γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν. Jameson 1997, 100 notes free persons' 'reluctance to admit to the need of working for someone else'. Cf. Humphreys [1983a] 1993, 10; Finley 1981, 122.

<sup>12</sup> See Fisher 1998b, 84–6; Stocks 1936; de Ste. Croix 1981, 114–17.

<sup>13</sup> Xen. *Oec.* 5.1; Eur. *Orestes* 917–22, *Supplices* 881–7; Plato *Laws* 889d; Men. Fr. 338 (Körte/Thierfelder 1953); Ar. *Pax passim*, *Ach.* 32–6. See Hanson 1995, 214–19.

<sup>14</sup> Arist. *Politica* 1258a19–b8. 'Naturally'—κατὰ φύσιν (1258b1). Cf. 1256b10–22; *Rhet.* 1381a21–4; *Oecon.* (attributed to Arist.) 1343a25–b2.

<sup>15</sup> Χρηματιστική, an adjective, is derived from the noun χρήμα which carried a dual meaning of 'money' or of 'property' (goods, chattels etc.). Cf. Meikle 1995, 71: 'khṛēmatistikē' = 'money-getting'; Humphreys [1983] 1993, 12: 'khṛēmatistikē, the art of money-making.'

one another").<sup>16</sup> According to Lysurgus and Hyperides, real Athenian men had, from ancestral times, preferred *andreia* to the acquisition of wealth (*ploutos*).<sup>17</sup> For Plato, 'market people' (*agoraiōi anthrōpoi*) were 'defective men' (*phauloi*) who pursued monetary profit because they were incapable of more acceptable cultural and political pursuits.<sup>18</sup> Aristotle and Xenophon explicitly group the 'commercial crowd' (*agoraios okhlos*) with slaves and servants.<sup>19</sup> Since Greeks tended to construe work not as an economic function but as a mechanism of self-definition,<sup>20</sup> by aristocratic standards men involved in non-agrarian, that is, 'banausic' pursuits—production or trading of goods, labor for monetary compensation, even professional acting or musical performances—were unworthy of 'citizenship',<sup>21</sup> and many oligarchic states wisely and absolutely (according to Aristotle) prohibited *politai* from engaging actively in business.<sup>22</sup> Aristotle's contemporary, Heraclides Ponticus, even saw the avoidance of manual labor as the hallmark of *andreia*, separating 'free men' from slaves and persons of low birth.<sup>23</sup>

In the fourth century, however, many free residents of Attica did engage in commercial activities. Although state maintenance funds and paid public service offered a practical means to avoid employment arrangements considered demeaning,<sup>24</sup> numerous Athenians *were* self-employed in craft or trade,<sup>25</sup> and many others followed entre-

<sup>16</sup> Arist. *Politica* 1258b1–4: οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐστὶν . . . ἡ ὀβολοστατικὴ. Aristotle recognizes the introduction of coinage as the precondition to the development of retail trade (τὸ καπηλικόν), but explicitly differentiates an earlier, 'simple' state of this trade from the profit-seeking, complex market activity existing in his own time (*Politica* 1257b1–5).

<sup>17</sup> 1.108: οἱ πρόγονοι . . . καὶ καταφανῆ ἐποίησαν τὴν ἀνδρείαν τοῦ πλούτου . . . περιγυνομένην. Cf. Hyp. 6.19.

<sup>18</sup> Plato, *Rep.* 371c. Cf. Plato, *Pr.* 347c; *Politicus* 289c.

<sup>19</sup> See Arist. *Politica* 1291b14–30, 1289b26–34; Xen. *Hellenica* 6.2.23.

<sup>20</sup> See von Reden 1992; Loraux 1995, 44–58; Vernant 1971, 2.17. Cf. Schwimmer 1979.

<sup>21</sup> On the virulent opposition to *banausia*, see, e.g., *Politica* 1337b18–22; 1258b25–7, 33–9; 1260a41–b2; 1277a36–7; 1277b33–1278a13; 1277a32–b7; 1341b8–18. Cf. Humphreys 1978, esp. 148–9.

<sup>22</sup> Χρηματίζεσθαι (*Politica* 1316b3–5). Cf. Ober 1991, 125.

<sup>23</sup> *Peri Hêdonês* (quoted in Athen. 512b4–6): ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἡδεσθαι καὶ τὸ τρυφᾶν ἐλευθέρων . . . τὸ δὲ πονεῖν δούλων καὶ ταπεινῶν. See Wehrli 1969, fr. 55.

<sup>24</sup> The Athenian state offered paid service in the armed forces, and compensation for frequent jury duty and assembly meetings; for 'incapacitated' *politai* of limited means, there were outright public grants (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 49.4; cf. Lysias 24).

<sup>25</sup> See Hopper 1979, 140; Finley 1981, 99; Ehrenberg 1962, 162; Osborne 1995, 30. Antagonism to working under a master should not be confused with antipathy to labor itself: see Wood 1988, 126–45, esp. 139.

preneurial pursuits.<sup>26</sup> Athenians were ‘fishermen, shopkeepers, market gardeners and small craftsmen’ (Humphreys 1978, 148), and pursued innumerable other specialized callings.<sup>27</sup> In many fields the same functions might be performed indiscriminately by slave workers or by free labor,<sup>28</sup> but service by free persons was usually for a single specific task or for a limited period of time and seldom exclusive to a single employer: we typically encounter Athenian businessmen working on their own for a variety of customers, or agents undertaking a limited task for an individual client.<sup>29</sup>

Yet many businesses (workshops, stores, banks, service ‘operations’ etc.) required repetitive service on a regular basis over an extended period of time.<sup>30</sup> For the staffing of these Athenian *ergasiai*, however, only slaves were available. In Lysias 24, an Athenian unable to work easily at his own business but too poor to buy a slave does not even consider the possibility of hiring a free man to work for him: instead he pursues an option that some modern males might find insufficiently *macho*—he seeks public assistance (24.6). In questioning whether collateral security had actually been delivered, a creditor assumes that a bank’s staff would have been exclusively servile.<sup>31</sup>

As a result, many *douloi* (albeit in all probability a small minority of the unfree inhabitants of Attica) were able to acquire skills, to obtain business knowledge, to develop valuable contacts—and to prosper, at the expense of free males in thrall to *andreia*. But the slaves’ very importance entailed for their owners financial danger and/or financial accommodation. Overseers and managers often had detailed knowledge of household finance and sometimes controlled

<sup>26</sup> See Thompson 1983; Garnsey 1980. For the significance of such activities in the ancient world, see Goody 1986, 177–84.

<sup>27</sup> For a survey of “the extensive horizontal specialization in the Athenian economy,” and the resultant profusion of discrete labor functions, see Harris (forthcoming) (*Symposium* 1999).

<sup>28</sup> See Ehrenberg 1962, 183, 185. For parallel functioning by slave and free labor in the construction trades, see Randall 1953; Burford 1972; E. Cohen 2000, 187.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. the maritime entrepreneur who introduces a client to the bank of Heraclides in Dem. 33.7; Agyrrius who serves Pasion as a representative in litigational matters (Isoc. 17.31–2; cf. Stroud 1998: 22, Strauss 1987: 142); Archestratus who provided the bond for Pasion (Isoc. 17.43); Stephanus’ relationship with the banker Aristolochus at Dem. 45.64.

<sup>30</sup> For the complex commercialization of the fourth-century Athenian economy, see Shipton 1997. Cf. Theokhares 1983, 100–14; Gophas 1994; Kanellopoulos 1987, 19–22.

<sup>31</sup> Dem. 49.51: τίς ὁ παραλαβὼν τῶν οἰκετῶν τῶν ἡμετέρων;

substantial assets: the slave Moschion, for example, enriched himself through his complete knowledge of Conon's household affairs (Dem. 48.14–15); another *doulos*, Cittus, supposedly appropriated for himself and his confederates some 36,000 drachmas (Isoc. 17.11–12). To avoid the possibility of such losses (and for other reasons: Cohen 1998), masters sometimes chose to enter into arrangements under which slaves maintained their own households and operated their own businesses, while paying their owners fixed sums periodically. These *douloi khôris oikountes* ('slaves living independently') often enjoyed—in the words of an Athenian observer—considerable prosperity, and some even 'lived magnificently' (*megaloprepôs diaitasthai*).<sup>32</sup> The *douloi* Xenon, Euphron, Euphraeus and Callistratus—while still enslaved<sup>33</sup>—as principals operated the largest bank in Athens, that of Pasion.<sup>34</sup> Pasion himself—while still unfree—had played a major role in his owners' bank (Dem. 36.43), and thereafter in his own *trapeza*.<sup>35</sup> Phormion (who ultimately succeeded Pasion as Athens' most important financier: Dem. 36.4, 11, 37; 45. 31–2)—while still a slave—had been a partner in a maritime trading business.<sup>36</sup> Similarly the slave Lampis was the owner/operator (*nauklêros*) of a substantial com-

<sup>32</sup> ἕωςι τοὺς δούλους τρυφᾶν αὐτόθι καὶ ἐνίους μεγαλοπρεπῶς διαιτᾶσθαι ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.11).

<sup>33</sup> They functioned pursuant to a leasing arrangement (*misthōsis*) with their masters that provided for a fixed rent: see Dem. 36.43, 46, 48; E. Cohen 1992, 76. Only on expiration of the lease did their owners καὶ ἐλευθέρους ἀφείσαν (Dem. 36.14) ('enfranchised them', see Harrison 1968–71, I.175, n. 2). On this phrase—standard Greek for manumission of slaves—see E. Cohen 2000, 121, n. 21.

<sup>34</sup> Even Thompson, who sees banks as 'insignificant' in the Athenian economy, recognizes the significance of "the lendable deposits (and) private resources of a tycoon like Pasion" (1979, 240).

<sup>35</sup> Although he was an important *trapezistês* by the 390s (Isoc. 17), Pasion was not then a *politês* (see 17.33 [use of Pythodorus the *politês* as his agent], 17.41 [his inclusion among the *xenoi eispherontes*]). While it is generally assumed that he was manumitted prior to the events described in Isoc. 17 (cf. Davies 1971, 429–30), in fact we do not know when he obtained his freedom. His inclusion among the *xenoi eispherontes* offers no evidence for his possible manumission: nothing is known of Athens' taxation of prosperous unfree inhabitants of Attica. Under the provisions of the grain-tax law discovered in the Athenian agora in 1986, bidding among potential tax-farmers was not limited to Athenian *politai* (see Stroud 1998, 64–6; cf. Langdon 1994). Slave entrepreneurs may therefore have been included among the *praimenoi*.

<sup>36</sup> See Dem. 49.31, where Timosthenes, active in overseas commerce, is characterized as Phormion's κοινωνός at a time when Phormion was still a *doulos*. (Κοινωνός is difficult to translate: see E. Cohen 1992, 76, n. 71.) Davies 1971, 432 sees "Phormion's later activity as a shipowner" as having its 'roots' in this earlier business involvement in maritime trade.

mercial vessel: he entered into contracts with free persons (Dem. 34.5–10), lent substantial sums to customers (34.6),<sup>37</sup> received repayment of large amounts on behalf of other lenders (34.23, 31), even received the special exemption from taxes (*ateleia*) provided by Paerisades of Bosphorus on the export of grain to Athens,<sup>38</sup> and provided a deposition in the arbitration proceedings relating to an Athenian legal action (34.18–19). Likewise Zenothemis, identified as a slave in Demosthenes 32, was actively engaged in maritime commerce and lending: allegedly the owner of a substantial commercial cargo, he litigated in his own name as a principal in the Athenian courts.<sup>39</sup> (He is explicitly described as one of the *khôris oikountes* residing at Athens with his wife and children [Dem. 34.37].) We also know, for further examples, of the charcoal-burner in Menander's *Epitrepontes*, a slave who lives outside the city with his wife and provides his owner with a portion of his earnings;<sup>40</sup> the slave Aristarchus, a leather-worker who is listed on the Attic stelai with an assortment of chattels that—in defiance of modern conceptualization—are described as belonging to the slave rather than to his master Adeimantus;<sup>41</sup> a group of nine or ten unfree leather-workers, whose leader paid their owner three obols for himself per day, two for each of the other slaves, and kept any remaining revenues (Aesch. 1.97); a *doulos* who operated his master's business for a fixed payment and was free to retain any additional income after expenses (Milyas in Dem. 27); the slave in Hyperides, *Against Athenogenes* who operated a perfume business with substantial financing but whose only contact with his master was to provide him with a monthly accounting;<sup>42</sup> slaves operating their own businesses in the *agora* and personally liable for legal transgressions without reference to their masters (Stroud 1974, 181–2,

<sup>37</sup> See Thompson 1980, 144–5.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Hervagault and Mactoux 1974, 90–1; Perotti 1974, 52–4.

<sup>39</sup> Dem. 32.4: ὑπηρετὴς Ἑγεστράτου. A Massilian, he borrowed money at Syracuse, claimed to have lent the funds against the security of maritime cargo, and litigated with other claimants to the collateral upon its arrival at Athens (32.9).

<sup>40</sup> See lines 378–80. Cf. Biezunska-Malowist (1966, 65–72).

<sup>41</sup> Stele 6. 21, 31–46 (Pritchett, Amyx and Pippin 1953). The sales described in the *stelai* (IG I<sup>3</sup>. 421–30) appear to have occurred between 415 and 413. See Langdon 1991, 70; Halloff 1990.

<sup>42</sup> The considerable scale of the business is suggested by the colossal amount of debts incurred in its operation: five talents composed of both conventional (*khrea*) and *eranos* loans (Hyp. *Ath.* 7, 14, 19).

lines 30–2); and numerous other slaves operating in similarly autonomous arrangements.<sup>43</sup>

But male slaves were not the exclusive beneficiaries of an *andreia* averse to commerce. Both Foucauldian discourse and feminist ideology anticipate a shared advantage to persons—here women and slaves—similarly disadvantaged by male hierarchical hegemony,<sup>44</sup> and modern historians of ancient Athens have written extensively on this symbiosis.<sup>45</sup> And so it is not surprising that women—for male antiquity the defective sex<sup>46</sup>—joined slaves, Athens' defective men, in benefiting financially from the economically defective Athenian male concept of *andreia*.

### 3. *Defective Women' in Social Context*

Scholars tend to view the Athenian *oikos* ('household') as "simply 'the private sphere' to which women's activities were relegated".<sup>47</sup> For Murnaghan, for example, "outside is the only really desirable place to be" (1988, 13). But, in contrast to modern Westernized societies with their focus on personal rights and obligations,<sup>48</sup> the *oikos*—and not the individual<sup>49</sup>—was the basic constitutive element of Athenian society. Juridically, "the polis was an aggregation of *oikoi*" (Wolff 1944, 93), with a legal system based on "the rights of families as

<sup>43</sup> In addition to the testimonia cited in the text, see, e.g., Andoc. 1.38; Teles fr. 4.b (pp. 46–7 Hense); Theophr. *Characteres* 30.15; [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.10–11 ['sans doute': Perotti (1974, 50, n. 15)]; and the activities of slaves identified as μισθοφοροῦντα, many of whom may have maintained their own *oikoi* ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.17; Xen. *De vectigalibus* 4.14–15, 19, 23; Isae. 8.35; Dem. 53.21; Dem. 27.20–1; Dem. 28.12; Theophr. *Characteres* 30.17). Dem. 59.31, although preserved in Athenian context, *stricto sensu* refers to a non-Athenian situation.

<sup>44</sup> See Foucault 1984, 381–2; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 233. Cf. Ackelsberg 1983, and Diamond and Quinby 1988: *passim*. In comedy, slaves, free women and children are portrayed as allies in contesting free adult male authority. See Humphreys [1983a] 1993, 76, n. 6.

<sup>45</sup> See, for example, the Introduction (especially p. 3) and the various essays in Joshel and Murnaghan 1998; Vidal-Naquet 1981, 183.

<sup>46</sup> See Dubois 1988, 183.

<sup>47</sup> Foxhall 1994, 138 (who disagrees with this tendency).

<sup>48</sup> For the differing ancient and modern approaches to individual status and rights, see Ostwald 1996 and the essays in H. Jones 1998.

<sup>49</sup> Morris 1987, 3: in ancient Greece "there were no natural rights of the individual". Cf. Miller 1974, 1995, *passim*.

corporate groups”.<sup>50</sup> “Since economic enterprises largely existed and were managed within the structure of households” (Foxhall 1994, 139), the ‘household’ even occupied central position in Athenian economic life.<sup>51</sup> Ownership of property effectively came within the control of the *oikos*, and production of income, within its activities. And women’s central—sometimes dominating—position within the Athenian *oikos* offered women material and personal advantage—partly a result of *andreia*’s preference for non-economic pursuits.

Although in practice both men and women might personally use or alienate individual items of property such as money in their possession<sup>52</sup> or jewelry, clothing, tools or servants,<sup>53</sup> and individual men and women are sometimes referred to as though personally the owners of realty,<sup>54</sup> at Athens most wealth—especially ancestral property

<sup>50</sup> Todd 1993, 206. Cf. Roy 1999, 1; Hansen 1997, 10–12. The primacy of the *oikos* is the literal starting point for the two standard treatments of Athenian substantive law (Beauchet ([1897] 1969, I.3 and Harrison 1968–71, I.1). (Todd sets out [208–11, 225–7] the substantial difficulties inherent in MacDowell’s rejection [1989] of the *opinio communis*).

<sup>51</sup> See Arist. *Politica* 1252; Xen. *Oecon.*, esp. 1.5, 6.4; Lys. 1 and 32. Cf. Cox 1998, 13; Ogden 1996, 42; Strauss 1993, 35, 43; Todd 1993, 206; Patterson 1990, 43–4, 51, 55–7, 59, 1981: 9–10; Jameson 1990, 179; Foxhall 1989, 1994, 1996, 140–52, and (forthcoming); Sissa 1986; Hallett 1984, 72–6; Sealey 1984, 112; Hunter 1981, 15; Lotze 1981, 169; Fisher 1976, II, 5ff.; Lacey 1968, 88–90; Ledl 1907, 8. Sourvinou-Inwood (1995, 113) notes the *oikos* to be “the basic economic unit of the polis” but finds “some ambiguity as to the extent to which the basic social unit is the *oikos* or the individual”.

<sup>52</sup> Archippe, for example, the wife successively of the Athenian banking tycoons (and former slaves) Pasion and Phormion, seems clearly to have had monetary assets fully recognized, in a legal context, as her own: Apollodorus is accused in court of seeking 3,000 *dr.* from her estate ‘in addition to the 2,000 *dr.* which she had given to Phormion’s children’ (Dem. 36.14). Cf. the four talents in cash attributed to Cleoboule (Dem. 27.53, 55; 28.47–8), the substantial resources controlled by the wife of Polyeuctus (Dem. 41), and the loan transactions engaged in by Hyperbolus’ mother (according to Ar. *Thesmophoriazusae* 839–45).

<sup>53</sup> Pasion in his will ‘gives to Archippe as dowry one talent from Peparethus, another talent here at Athens, a *synoikia* (multiple dwelling-house) worth 100 *mnai*, female slaves, gold jewelry, and the other items of hers which are inside (the house)’ (Dem. 45.28). Cf. Dem. 36.8; Finley 1951 [1985]: 192, no. 175A (house [*oikia*] in the center of Athens given to a woman as dowry). For the legal and economic issues relating to such dispositions, see E. Cohen 1992, 101–10; Carey 1991; Whitehead 1986.

<sup>54</sup> For ‘ownership’ by females, see *SEG* 12.100, lines 67–71 (field bordering on silver mine listed in fourth-century records of the *poletai* as belonging to ‘the wife of Charmylus’) and Finley [1951] 1985: 192 (175A [Fine 7]): house attributable to dowry of Archille (ὄρος οἰκίας προικὸς Ἀρχίλλῃ), (“not a security transaction” according to Finley). Cf. Archippe’s multiple-residence building (preceding note). A woman is reported on a fragmentary *horos*-inscription as one of the lenders in a real-estate



(*patrôia*)—belonged to the various *oikoi*.<sup>55</sup> The senior male in an *oikos*, often referred to as the *kurios* (a term for which “there is really no modern expression”: Wolff 1944, 46–7, n. 22), was not the ‘owner’ of family property, but rather the household representative or ‘steward’ (Hunter 1994, 12) in dealing publicly with household assets.<sup>56</sup> Thus it is the *oikos* itself that Isaeus characterizes as undertaking the daunting liturgical services required of the few who qualified, by primacy of visible wealth, to shoulder those oppressive burdens of taxation and civic honor (liturgies) of which wealthy Athenians often complained.<sup>57</sup> It is likewise the *oikos* that bears the significant imposts on capital (the *eisphora* and *proeisphora*), the extraordinary levies that were imposed at intervals to provide funds for a specific undertaking such as a naval campaign.<sup>58</sup> Transfer of property through inheritance was effectuated exclusively through the *oikos*. Since men with legitimate children—probably the vast majority of adult males despite high infantile mortality<sup>59</sup>—could not make testamentary dispositions of assets by will,<sup>60</sup> decedents’ successory arrangements were essentially only mechanisms by which the heirless *oikos* might arrange for the marriage of a female relative/household member, or adopt a male to serve as putative future *kurios*.<sup>61</sup> There is no Athenian example of a testamentary disposition of *oikos* assets permanently outside the household.<sup>62</sup>

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financing (Fine 1951: no. 28; cf. Finley [1951] 1985, 188). Harris sees this arrangement as providing a mechanism for women in business effectively to own real property by foreclosing, through a male ‘straw party,’ on pledged real-estate (1992, 319). “This *horos* demonstrates that women’s role in financial matters was potentially much more extensive than the evidence of Athenian law would lead us to assume” (*idem*, p. 311).

<sup>55</sup> Isae. Fr. 8, 6.25. Cf. Lys. 19.37; Dem. 39.6, 35. See Harrison 1968–71, I.233; Asheri 1963, 1–4; Foxhall (1989 and forthcoming).

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Schaps 1998, 163–7.

<sup>57</sup> οἶκον τριηραρχοῦντα: Isae. 7.32, cf. 42. For the functions of the *triêrarkhoi* or the *leitourgountes* as psychologically and financially equivalent to the payment of fiscal imposts by ‘taxpayers,’ see Arist. *Politica* 1291a33–4; [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.13; Dem. 21.151, 153, 208; Isoc. 8.128; Lys. 27.9–10. Cf. Davies 1971: xx.

<sup>58</sup> On the *eisphora* system, see Thomsen 1964; Gabrielsen 1994, esp. 184ff.; Brun 1983, 3–73; Gera 1975, 31–84.

<sup>59</sup> Foxhall 1989, 29. Cf. Ogden 1996, 157–63.

<sup>60</sup> Men with legitimate sons (παῖδες γνήσιοι ἄρρενες) could make no arrangements whatsoever (Dem. 46.14, 20.102, 44.49, 44.67; Isae. 3.1, 6, 9, 29; cf. Lane-Fox 1985, 224–5; de Ste. Croix 1970, 389–90). Complex legal regulations controlled dispositions by those whose only direct heirs were daughters (*epiklēroi*): see Harrison 1968, 309–12; Todd 1993, 226–31.

<sup>61</sup> See Thompson 1981; Hunter 1994, 9–13; Rubinstein 1993, 17–18.

<sup>62</sup> Thus Demosthenes’ father grants Therippides only the *use* (καρπώσασθαι) of a

Since wealth belonged to the *oikos*, its waste by the household's male representative (*kurios*) was punishable by his full or partial loss of citizenship rights.<sup>63</sup> Female members of the household on occasion objected openly to the sale of assets felt to be integral to an *oikos* (Aeschin. 1.99). But even incremental assets—fresh wealth (*epiktêta*) augmenting inherited property—were generally produced not by individuals but by and through the household (which was the physical location of virtually all *tekhnai*,<sup>64</sup> the skilled activities of craft or trade that encompassed every profession, skilled callings, 'manufacturing' activities, and even financial businesses and operations).<sup>65</sup> Aeschines (1.124) describes how a single house might be used successively as both a business-place and home by a doctor, a smith, a fuller, a carpenter—and a brothel-keeper. Even the permanent physical premises of banks—which required a secure venue for cash and other valuables—were generally coextensive with the residence of the proprietor (where the continual presence of members of the *oikos* presumably furnished additional protection).<sup>66</sup> Even in silver mining (where actual extraction was necessarily conducted on and within state-owned mineral-bearing properties), related business operations—ranging from those dependent on a single slave (as in Andoc. 1.38) through enterprises commanding an entire ore washery (Dem. 37)—functioned on a household basis: to protect the silver

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sum of money in gratitude for his anticipated services (Dem. 27.5), not the outright bequest that might have otherwise been expected (Thompson 1981, 18). (At Lys. 19.39, Timotheus is said to have bequeathed some money for religious purposes, but the speaker emphasizes that this will was made in Cyprus, outside Athenian jurisdiction. Cf. Isae. 3.45–51; Men. *Dyscolus* 729–39; Harpocr., s.v. *notheia*; Suda, s.v. *epiklêros*; Schol. Ar. *Aves* 1655–6. See generally Gernet 1955, 121–49; Paoli 1976, 559–70; Harrison 1968–71, 1.143–9.

<sup>63</sup> See Aesch. 1.154. Transfer of assets into non-visible (*ἀφανής*) form (to evade taxes or avoid creditors, for example) carried the risk of adversaries' charges of 'waste' of an estate: Aesch. 1.101.

<sup>64</sup> See, for example, Xen. *Oec.* 9; Ar. *Thesm.* 415–20; Men. *Samia* 234–6. Jameson (1990, 184–7) surveys both archaeological and literary evidence for work at home. Cf. J. Jones 1975, 68–71; Thompson and Wycherley 1972, 173–85.

<sup>65</sup> Thus *tekhnai* include pursuits as varied as medicine, food-making and catering, architecture, metal-working, production of beds and of swords, and banking. See Pollux' listing of *tekhnai* (esp. 7.170, 7.155 and 7.159: cf. 4.7, 22); Xen. *Oec.* 1.1; Dem. 27.9, 45.71.

<sup>66</sup> For the bank of Pasion, see Dem. 49.22; 52.8, 14. Since residences even of persons having no connection with the banking business often encompassed substantial security features (Young 1956, 122–46; Osborne 1985a, 31–4, 63–7; Pečirka 1973, 123–8), valuables and documents were likely to have been no less secure in such private residences than in separate business edifices.

often present in the washing-rooms, homes at Thoricus (in the mining area of Attica) were apparently built with special attention to security (Jones 1975, 121–2).

Merger of commerce and *oikos* was so complete that even the wealthiest entrepreneurs of fourth-century Attica—the bankers<sup>67</sup>—sought to insure continuation of their banks (*trapezai*) by providing, on their deaths, for marriage of their widows to their chief slaves (to whom control of the banking business often devolved) (Dem. 36.28–9). Although marriage of a free member of a banking household to a slave or former slave was seen even by the Athenians as a special response to the business imperatives of financial operations (Dem. 36.30), the substantial involvement of wives in banking businesses was consonant with women's widespread involvement in business activities at Athens—in retailing, crafts, and a variety of other callings.<sup>68</sup> As Foxhall has shown (1994), following pioneering studies by Hunter, the presence within many *oikoi* of more than a single generation often resulted in the senior female member's significant influence—sometimes even dominance. Late marriage for men (usually at about thirty) encouraged prolonged male adolescence and dependence; early marriage for women (often shortly after puberty) meant early maturation—and most significantly, in many cases early widowhood. Hence, the Athenian phenomenon (described by Aeschines) of numerous naïve young men of wealth whose widowed mothers actively managed the family property.<sup>69</sup> This phenomenon of the strong wife or widow is exemplified in the dominant familial influence of Cleoboule, mother of the Athenian leader, Demosthenes,<sup>70</sup> and in the mother and wife of the wealthy and influential Lysias, who did not dare to bring his girlfriend, even chaperoned by her 'mother,' to his own house!<sup>71</sup> Archippe (the widow of the Athenian tycoon Pasion) dominated her *oikos*: she was intimately conversant with all aspects of the family's banking business and had such control over

<sup>67</sup> For the wealth of bankers (*trapezitai*), see, e.g., Isoc. 17.2, Dem. 36.4–6, 57 (regarding the banker Phormion), Dem. 45.72. Cf. E. Cohen 1992, 22, 65–6, 88–90; Thompson 1983.

<sup>68</sup> For the ubiquity of female commercial activity at Athens, see Herfst 1922 [1980]; D. Cohen 1990, 156–7; Brock 1994.

<sup>69</sup> 1.170. Cf. Roy 1999, 8; Günther 1993.

<sup>70</sup> See Dem. 27 and related speeches. Cf. Hunter 1989b, 43–6; Foxhall 1996, 144–7.

<sup>71</sup> Dem. 59.22.

the bank's records that she was even accused of having destroyed them to prevent development of legal claims against Pasion's successor, her second husband Phormion (Dem. 36.14, 18). Menander's fictional Crobyle likewise controls her *oikos*: mistress of land, building, 'everything', she ejects from the house a servant girl who has annoyed her, leaving her husband to mutter his unhappiness at the power of his wealthy wife (Fr. 333–4 Koerte, 402–3 Kock).

This is the context in which to view the frequent references to women's power and responsibility within the household.<sup>72</sup> According to Xenophon, the wife bore primary responsibility for managing the household.<sup>73</sup> In Euripides' words, "women order households".<sup>74</sup> Aristotle derides as 'absurd' Plato's suggestion that women and men, on the analogy of animal life, can do the same work: human females, unlike their biological counterparts in lower orders, have households to run!<sup>75</sup> Aristophanes proffers women's skillful financial management as an object of emulation for men in their public activities.<sup>76</sup>

Men, for their part, had *andreia* which led them to emphasize political, social and military pursuits, and to appropriate the veneer of exclusive legal authority—*politeia* in public affairs, *kurieia* in private matters. But the reality of women's extensive involvement in commerce effectively abrogated *kurieia* as a barrier to female business operations, implicitly in the many large-scale transactions undertaken by women for their own account,<sup>77</sup> explicitly in retail transactions where the law formally recognized women's right to contract, without male representation, in an unlimited number of reasonably significant individual transactions. (The limit for a single commitment was the value of one *medimnos* of barley [often about US \$300 in

<sup>72</sup> See Dimakis 1998.

<sup>73</sup> *Oec.* 7.35–43, 9.14–17. Her control of the domestic slaves made her a veritable queen (ὡςπερ βασίλισσαν: 9.15).

<sup>74</sup> '... nor in the absence of a woman is even the prosperous household well provided for.' Eur. *Mel. Des.* Fr. 660 Mette 1982, lines 9–11 (*P. Berl.* 9772 and *P. Oxy.* 1176 Fr. 39, Col. 11) (Fr. 13: Auffret 1987): νέμουσι δ' οἴκους καὶ τὰ ναυστολούμενα ἔσω δόμων σώιζουσιν, οὐδ' ἔρημιαί γυναικὸς οἶκος εὐπινῆς ὃ γε ὄλβιος· (οὐδ' ὄλβιος: *P. Oxy.*). Cf. Todd 1993, 204–6.

<sup>75</sup> *Republic* 451d ff. *Politica* 1264b4–6: ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θηρίων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραβολήν, ὅτι δεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν τὰς γυναῖκας τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, οἷς οἰκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν.

<sup>76</sup> *Lys.* 489–95. Cf. Henderson 1987, 113–15.

<sup>77</sup> For examples and discussion of this phenomenon, see Hunter 1994, 19–29; Schaps 1979, 52–6.

purchasing power equivalence, but at times as much as \$1,500–\$2,000)].<sup>78</sup> There was even a category of woman described as *kuria heautês* ('self-representative', that is, not dependent for legal purposes on a man).<sup>79</sup> For the business needs of *men* without *politeia* (free non-citizens and slaves—the majority of the male population),<sup>80</sup> the legal system also offered multifaceted accommodation. The law came to offer recognition of slaves' responsibility for their own business debts; court acceptance of slaves and free non-citizens as parties and witnesses in certain areas of commercial litigation (in contravention of the general rules allowing access to polis courts only to citizens of the polis); and acceptance of mercantile 'agency' as a mechanism to overcome remaining legal disabilities.<sup>81</sup> But Athenian men—*pace* Aristophanes—did monopolize the making of public policy. To be sure, responsive to *andreia*'s militaristic dimension,<sup>82</sup> they used their control of public affairs to involve Athens in murderous, almost constant warfare. But such manifestations of *andreia*—by disrupting male economic endeavor and by depriving *oikoi* of the many men who were killed or maimed—only increased business dependence on women, slaves and foreigners.

When the entrepreneurial Diodotus of Lysias 32, for example, was mobilized for a military expedition, he provided his wife with

<sup>78</sup> Isae. 10.10: συμβάλλειν μηδὲ γυναικὶ πέρα μεδίμνου κριθῶν. Cf. Aesch. 1.18. (One *medimnos* of barley often cost about three drachmas, but at times rose to as much as eighteen.) This was more than sufficient to meet normal retail requirements: Dimakis 1994, 33, 329, n. 77; Hunter 1989a, 294; Foxhall and Forbes 1982, 86; Kuenen-Janssens 1941, 212.

<sup>79</sup> Men. *Perikeiromenê* 497; Xen. *Mem.* 3.11; Dem. 59. 45–6; Antiphanes fr. 210 (K-A). Other examples in Bremmer 1985; Hunter 1989b. The number of such 'female heads of household' is impossible to determine (Hunter 1994, 33).

<sup>80</sup> A census (Athen. 272C) conducted between 317 and 307 reported resident foreigners as about half the number of citizens, and a higher proportion if unregistered alien residents and transients are added (Hansen 1991, 93). Since the metic population was more variable in number than the citizen body (Xen. *De vectigalibus* 2.1–7; Isoc. 8.21; Lévy 1988: 54), the percentage of free foreigners in the earlier (and more prosperous) decades of the fourth century may have been even greater: Thür (1989, 118) estimates the metic population for this period at about 100,000. The number of slaves was also very large: the Athenians believed that the servile population exceeded that of the free (Isager and Hansen 1975, 16–17; cf. Garnsey 1980, 1). From a male citizen body which he estimates at 30,000, Hansen extrapolates a total population of 300,000 or more (1991, 93–4).

<sup>81</sup> E. Cohen 1992, 94–101; Gernet 1955, 159–64; McKelchnie 1989, 185.

<sup>82</sup> *Andreia* as adult males' display of battlefield bravery: Lyc. 1.104; Hyp. 6.19; Ar. *Nubes* 510, *Ranae* 372–80 (humorously). Cf. Dover 1974, 165–7; Wheeler 1991, 138.

business information, documents and cash. When he died shortly thereafter in the Athenian military disaster at Ephesus in 410/9, she was able to use her knowledge of the business and her control of records to challenge her male relative Diogeiton's efforts to usurp the family wealth.

Cowardice, however, not *andreia*, is the defining characteristic of Athenogenes, one of the protagonists in *Against Athenogenes* written by Hyperides between 330 and 324.<sup>83</sup> This unique court presentation chronicles the only Athenian business 'deal' preserved in detail, the sale of a perfume operation for a total price, including assumption of debt, of approximately 42,000 drachmas (some millions of current US dollars, in purchasing power equivalence). In this speech, Epicrates, an Athenian citizen, claims that Athenogenes conspired with a manipulative female business-broker (Antigona) and a slave businessman (Midas) to induce him to assume the ruinous debts of a worthless perfumery operation—when all he wanted was sex with the slave businessman's son! The case offers confirmation of the model presented in this paper and an example of legal discourse as "a key to understanding the collective mind-set of (a) society",<sup>84</sup> here that of the hundreds of Athenian male jurors to whom Epicrates was appealing. Modern scholars generally characterize an Athenian court proceeding not as a search for truth but as a staged production in which the litigants construct personae with which the male jurors can identify and sympathize.<sup>85</sup> Epicrates does construct a clear self-image—that of a naïve farmer ripe for financial plucking<sup>86</sup>—a self-portrayal, of course, highly laudatory under Athenian concepts of *andreia*, albeit pitiful by the *macho* standards of Wall Street or the City. His adversaries—female, foreign, unfree—in contrast are characterized as highly capable in business: Athenogenes—Egyptian, market-savvy and knowledgeable of Athenian law and litigation (*Ath.* 3);

<sup>83</sup> For the date see *Ath.* 31: Alexander's decree of 324, restoring Greek exiles to their native cities, had not yet been issued; the Troezenian cooperation with Athens in 480 is referred to as having occurred more than 150 years earlier.

<sup>84</sup> Todd 1993, 70. Cf. Bruns 1992, 106–7; Rouland 1994, 129–30.

<sup>85</sup> 'The Athenian law courts were a public stage upon which private enmities were played out' (Osborne 1985b, 52). Cf. Scafuro 1997, 64 (with specific reference to *Against Athenogenes*); Humphreys 1983b, 248, 1985; Biscardi 1970. On the relationship between forensic rhetoric and forensic 'truth', see Johnstone 1999, 70–92, 164 n. 99.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. *Ath.* 3, 26, 36.

Antigona—a brilliant and manipulative business-woman with deal-making expertise who skillfully ‘cuts herself in’ for a three hundred drachma brokerage commission;<sup>87</sup> the slave Midas, operating for his own account and able to obtain tens of thousands of drachmas in business credit (note 42 above). As presented by the hapless Epicrates, the hugely-successful Athenogenes—operator of a small chain of businesses—is an affront to *andreia*: instead of reporting for military service when Athens mobilized for Chaeroneia (as Athenian law required of male metics) he instead fled to Troezen (where he prospered) and returned to Athens only in peacetime to separate Epicrates—Athenian farmer, soldier and business naïf—from his money (*Ath.* 29). Once again the economic cost of *andreia* was not insubstantial, but what did that matter to the *macho* Athenian male? Or in the irresponsible aphorism of *andreia*, οὐ φροντὶς Ἱπποκλείδῃ.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> See *Ath.* 2, 3, 5, 18.

<sup>88</sup> “Who gives a damn?” Hdt. 129.5. Literally: ‘What does Hippocles care?’, the response of a prominent Athenian male after his irresponsible behavior cost him his marriage and hence a fortune. Hence (Herodotus reports) the Athenian proverb (ἀπὸ τούτου μὲν τοῦτο ὀνομάζεται).

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## CHAPTER NINE

# THE ORDEAL OF THE DIVINE SIGN: DIVINATION AND MANLINESS IN ARCHAIC AND CLASSICAL GREECE<sup>1</sup>

Peter T. Struck

### 1. *Introduction*

In Greek and Roman texts about divination, manliness and manly courage are only a very remote concern, if a concern at all.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, these texts seem to ignore the entire field of merely human values. They are much more interested in relating the human to something trans-human. In *De divinatione*, our most important source for ancient divinatory theory, Cicero even sets up the term *virtus* (functionally absent from the rest of the work) in opposition to any supposed value of divination. Speaking of Deiotarus, the Galatian tetrarch, who sided with Pompey and whom Cicero defended in the *Pro rege Deiotaro*, Cicero denies that the consultation of omens had anything to do with his choosing to side with Pompey: “In my view, Deiotarus made use of the auspices of *virtus*, and *virtus* forbids us from looking to fortune until honor is rendered” (*Virtutis auspiciis video esse usum Deiotarum, quae vetat spectare fortunam, dum praestetur fides*) (*De div.* II.79). Notions of manliness and courage are also foreign to the divination texts of Plutarch, another important source on the topic. Neither the term ἀνδρεία, nor any substantial consideration of courage or manly spirit, appear in his three works dealing most directly with divination (*De E*, *De Pythiae oraculis*, *De defectu oraculorum*).

In these texts, we find highlighted the relationship not between human and human, but between human and divine. The prophet

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<sup>1</sup> I am grateful for helpful comments from colleagues at the Penn-Leiden Colloquium on Ancient Values and the Bryn Mawr Classics Colloquium. The editors of this volume deserve special acknowledgment for their detailed and careful guidance.

<sup>2</sup> Some standard texts are: Plato *Timaeus* 71–2, *Phaedrus* 244a–245c, 264e–266d; Aristotle, *On Divination Through Dreams*; Cicero, *On Divination*; Plutarch, *De E*, *De Pythiae oraculis*, *De defectu oraculorum*; Iamblichus, *On the Mysteries*; Porphyry, *On Philosophy From Oracles*.

discovers eruptions of the divine in the mundane and translates from that world to this. In such heady processes as these, the concerns of mere mortals are a trifle, and the terms ἀνδρεία and *virtus* have very little relevance. Any considerations of ‘manliness’ that they might address are subordinated to the notions of ‘creatureliness’ embedded in the terms ἄνθρωπος and *homo*—each of which are central concerns for these texts.<sup>3</sup> We might summarize this by saying that theories of divination operate within a cosmos that is arranged, for the most part, vertically. They focus on supposed separations and distinctions between different orders of being. Some small piece of the world, whether an omen, an oracular pronouncement, or a dream image, becomes a readable microcosmic representation of some larger state of affairs in the cosmos. This could be the simple will of a divinity, as we find in earlier texts, or it could be the great architecture of the universe that is leading inexorably toward a particular future, as we find in Stoic reasoning. But in all these cases divinatory theorists are concerned to find links between different strata in some implied or explicit cosmic hierarchy, and from this Olympian vantage a man is first an ἄνθρωπος and only tangentially is he an ἀνὴρ who has ἀνδρεία.

But it is also clear that when we look at literary representations of individual cases of divination, we find a rather stark contrast. These texts exhibit what is almost a preoccupation with the notion of manliness. They foreground the question of which actions are fitting and proper for a Greek or Roman male. As we might expect, the historical record preserves moments of divination where great historical or political outcomes are at stake. Typically, we see men in authority facing grave situations. They confront divinatory messages and we watch the drama of a character test unfold, as they, through persuasive speech and martial prowess, reveal their mettle, along with their ἀνδρεία, to their minions and to us. The process of reading the divine sign becomes, in practice, very little divine and very much a test of the human male’s abilities, and capacities to mobilize others’ abilities, to act in a group for a common goal. In literary representations the divine sign sets in motion a negotiation over strictly horizontal human-to-human relationships—specifically,

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<sup>3</sup> To give a rough indication, ἄνθρωπος appears 68 times in 54 Stephanus pages of the Plutarch texts; *homo* appears 82 times in the two books of Cicero’s *De divinatione*, or in about every third numbered paragraph.

men struggling with themselves and with other men in tests of strength. The preoccupations with manly courage that are made clear in these divinatory engagements highlight the absence of such concerns in the theory that supposedly undergirds them. We will return to this point in closing.

I will look at four famous cases of divination as they are represented in the literary evidence, all from the archaic and classical Greeks: Sophocles' Oedipus, Homer's treatment of Hector in *Iliad* 12, Agamemnon's dream in *Iliad* 2, and the famous 'wooden wall' episode in Herodotus. These examples are chosen with several criteria in mind: they are well-known incidents from formative texts which would have had an exaggerated role to play in the Greek imagination, also they present a sampling of the breadth of literary genres and divinatory situations, as well as a sampling of degrees of success in outcome. These episodes show the three main types of classical signs (two oracles, one omen, and one dream) couched in epic, tragedy, and history, some of which turn out well for the protagonist, some of which do not. The distribution of types and genres sets a modest control against generalizing from features idiosyncratic to one of them. The variation in outcomes helps illuminate what personal qualities make a diviner a *good* reader of signs.

In these cases divine signs represent one of the challenges that a male protagonist might be forced to negotiate. In each case a man in a position of political or military dominance faces a moment of crisis that threatens his dominant position. The sign thrusts itself into the crisis and tests the man's status and strength. I have called this test the 'ordeal of the divine sign'. We might expect a good sign-reader to be marked with some special affiliation with the gods or a divine intelligence. However, these four central texts indicate that success in such an ordeal derives from a different set of qualities, qualities which are bound up with Greek notions of manliness—effective leadership, courage, and decisiveness. As is the case in other types of ordeal faced by a hero, the resolution of the challenge (here the proper reading of the sign) is reached by the protagonist who is most strongly marked with the traits of a strong and effective Greek male.

A further aspect of this ordeal soon becomes clear and is worth remarking on at the outset: divine signs force the protagonist to negotiate his political or military success, and to display the manly qualities of effective leadership, courage, and decisiveness, on a particular field of contest, one which is also the domain of the ancient



Greek adult male: the public assembly. The protagonist's success in interpreting the oracle rests on his ability to make an effective public statement of its meaning to his peers.<sup>4</sup> That the focus shifts to talk rather than action should not lead us to discount the manliness that is at stake in the ordeal of the divine sign. Sarah Pomeroy made clear that the space of public speaking is specifically male space.<sup>5</sup> In addition, David Cohen's investigation of the public and private spheres in classical Athens has shown how strongly gendered these arenas are.<sup>6</sup> The most public, most male sphere is that of the public assembly, where men argue with other men in order to win glory through political success.<sup>7</sup> Even a quick glance through the literature confirms that the man in classical Athens would have seen a reflection of this view in the literature current in his day. Aeschylus' Clytaemnestra earned herself manly epithets, not only for taking bold action, but also for her vocal participation in the public affairs of her city.<sup>8</sup> Speaking and adult manhood are again tied together in the case of Homer's Telemachus. Athena goads Telemachus, almost in the same breath, to stop acting like a boy (οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ νηπιῖας ὀχέειν, ἐπεὶ οὐκέτι τηλίκος ἔσσι, *Od.* 1.297) and to call and address an assembly, something he has never yet done (*Od.* 1.272–3). The suitors translate this action (and the words he speaks) as a threat to their positions as dominant males.

## 2. *Background on divination*

A few general comments on divination might be in order to begin. As a working definition I understand divination to be a process of

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<sup>4</sup> In the case of the 'wooden wall' episode, Manetti, Sluiter, and Vernant have made the observation that dialogue speech and public debate take over from divine speech in the interpretive process. Vernant 1991, 312–4; Manetti 1993, 32–4; Sluiter 1997, 164–5.

<sup>5</sup> Pomeroy 1975, 79–84.

<sup>6</sup> Cohen 1991, 70–83.

<sup>7</sup> Rather than seeing them as a binary opposition, Cohen opts for levels of degree between public and private spheres, which are sometimes more relational than absolute categories. While he cautions against equating separation with seclusion and isolation, Cohen also makes clear that men and women lead quite distinct lives in their respective spheres in classical Athens. See Cohen 1989, 3–13.

<sup>8</sup> Her heart is ἀνδρόβουλον (*Ag.* 11). The chorus sums up at line 351, "Madam, you speak wisely, in the manner of a sensible man." (γύναι, κατ' ἀνδρα σώφρον' εὐφρόνως λέγεις.)

reading signs thought to be underwritten by some form of divinity. These signs sometimes have to do with the future (as in Delphi's prediction that Croesus would bring down a great empire) but other times they have to do with the past (as in the oracle's role in helping Oedipus locate his father's murderer), or the present (as when the Pythia determines the strange brew that Croesus is cooking, *Hdt.* 1.47). There are many common forms of divination, including by oracles, dreams, entrails, and birds.

If one is looking for a comprehensive treatment of the topic, one needs to go all the way back to Bouché-LeClercq's massive four-volume study, now over a hundred years old. His approach was largely taxonomic, laying out the ancient forms of divinatory activity in Greece and Rome and assembling a near-comprehensive range of evidence under each type. In the last several decades the main advances in scholarship have been made in three general areas. First, we find studies of what we might call the social history of divination. These analyze divination's uses for constructing social orders, and highlight the political and military usefulness of divinatory rites.<sup>9</sup> A leader uses divination to shore up public opinion on some question of general concern and then mobilizes that sentiment for his own ends. Detienne and Vernant have developed another approach, which grew out of structuralist anthropology, and have looked at the position of divination within what might be called an archaeology of truth.<sup>10</sup> Their approach analyzes the rules of the language game that operate within various schemes of divination and sets them in the context of the development of other modes of thinking and other discourses: philosophical, rhetorical, sophistic, etc. Finally, and most recently, divination has received attention from those interested in ancient semiotics. Here the work of Giovanni Manetti and Ineke Sluiter has been at the forefront.<sup>11</sup> The Greeks advanced some of their most sophisticated theories of signs in contemplating divinatory practices.

In addition to these general approaches, the work of Fontenrose must be considered. He has shown that literary depictions of divine signs, such as I am examining, differ in instructive ways from

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<sup>9</sup> Pritchett 1979.

<sup>10</sup> Vernant 1991, with references; Detienne 1996.

<sup>11</sup> Manetti 1993; Sluiter 1997.

consultations of the oracles as verified by epigraphical evidence.<sup>12</sup> A privileging of the epigraphical evidence, such as that which Fontenrose uses,<sup>13</sup> has struck some as too narrow,<sup>14</sup> and, indeed, Fontenrose's dismissal of the ambiguity of the Delphic oracle as nothing but a literary fiction forces him to ignore an important part of the contemporary impact of ancient oracles. Be that as it may, I am operating from the premise that even if only legendary, or quasi-historical, the literary evidence, in inception and reception, is invaluable for gauging what the Greeks *understood* divination to be. In other words, while such legendary incidents may have limited use in reconstructing the actual practice of divination from a social-historical perspective, they are reliable evidence for how divination operated in the thought world of the Greeks, including in this case how divination formed one of the possible tests of a Greek man's ability to be an effective leader in martial and political contexts.

### 3. *The Ordeal of Oedipus*

Sophocles' Oedipus is a master of interpretation. He wins his position as dominant male in the city, *πρώτος ἀνδρῶν* (33), precisely because of his ability to unscramble riddles. The sphinx speaks in riddles, *αἰνίγματα*, just as oracles do.<sup>15</sup> The three oracles that drive Oedipus' tale send him through the most brutal of public ordeals.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Fontenrose 1978.

<sup>13</sup> Fontenrose insists on using "contemporary accounts" as the basis for determining which oracles are genuine (Fontenrose 1978, 11–12). Functionally, this strongly weights the epigraphical evidence. Of his list of 75 genuine oracles, 47, or 63%, are secured by inscriptions.

<sup>14</sup> See Pritchett 1979, 301–2, n. 22, "Just as students of Athenian finance have erred seriously in failing to realize that the chief type of financial record inscribed on stone was limited to borrowings from the gods, so some scholars have made the mistaken assumption that, because oracles recorded in inscriptions related chiefly to cult foundations and sacrifices, this epigraphical evidence reflects the complete activity of the oracle. The argument that the epigraphical oracles can be used as criteria to establish what oracles were genuine and what fictitious is an erroneous one". See text *ad loc.* for fuller citations.

<sup>15</sup> For oracular *αἰνίγματα*, see Pindar *Pythian Ode* 8.40; Aeschylus, *Ag.* 1112 (see helpful commentary in Fraenkel's edition [Oxford, 1950] which expands on the notion of a "riddle" as a mantic utterance), 1183, *Prometheus Bound* 833; Euripides, *Ion* 533; Aristophanes, *Eq.* 196; Plato *Charm.* 164e, *Symp.* 192d, *Tim.* 72b.

<sup>16</sup> The oracle to Jocasta and Laius that their son would kill his father; the

Sophocles leaves no doubt that the contest embodied in the oracles severely tests Oedipus' ἀνδρεία. He consistently activates the semantic field of manliness in Oedipus' struggle to read the oracle. Oedipus is aware that what he is facing is a test of his character. He says he would be κακός if he failed to read the divine message's intent for him. (76) Unraveling the oracle's message is a struggle (πόνος, 314), which will help to guard and protect (ἐρύω) the city (312). Many times his struggle to act according to the oracle is cast in martial terms. He positions himself as the σύμμαχος of the divine will (135, 245, 274). If Teiresias should refuse to help, he would be a traitor to the city (προδοῦναι, 331). Oedipus rejects any faltering as cowardice (δειλία, 536). Sophocles makes reference to Oedipus' standing as an ἀνὴρ among his peers. The story traces an arc as Oedipus tumbles from his opening position as first among men, which as we said he earned through his ability to interpret. By the end, his failure to fathom the oracles has lowered him to his final position as worst of men, κάκιστος ἀνὴρ (1433). The engine that moves him along this path, from prime example of the ἀνὴρ to worst example, is his struggle to understand and react to Delphi's pronouncements on him.

Oedipus is a protagonist whose manhood is challenged by the confrontation with a divine sign, and the challenges he faces play out particularly in the arena of public dialogue and debate. The oracles provoke a series of lengthy public oratorical struggles with Teiresias, Creon, and Jocasta—the long dialogue contest scenes that are the centerpiece of the tragedy. His failure in this arena of reckoning with the oracle is a failure of public speech. Sophocles gives us a number of indications here. Oedipus is an overbearing king, unwilling and unable to accept advice from subordinates. He treats a string of advisers roughly and rudely, accusing them all in turn of conspiring against him, including Teiresias, Creon, and Jocasta herself. After this treatment of Creon, the Chorus chastises the overweening pride that gives birth to the tyrant—ὑβρις φυτεύει τύραννον (873). The chorus then immediately contrasts the city ruled by this figure with one where healthy conflict is allowed to flourish.

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oracle to Oedipus that he would kill his father; the oracle to Creon that Oedipus is the killer.

But I pray that god never put an end to the struggle that is beneficial to the city

τὸ καλῶς δ' ἔχον  
πόλει πάλαισμα μήποτε λῦσαι θεὸν αἰτοῦμαι. (880–1)

Filtered through the lens of democracy, Oedipus is here compared in his failings to those overbearing rulers who famously allow no dissent, no meaningful public dialogue-speech, and whose autocratic rule stands in such sharp contrast to classical democratic ideals. Like the overweening tyrant, Oedipus fails in the give-and-take of public debate. He is unable to persuade his people that his readings of the oracle are correct, unable to soothe their fears through his own greater courage, and unable until the end to face the situation of his own making. Oedipus' famous ἀμαρτία, his temper, overcomes his ability to persuade. Three times in his struggle with Teiresias his ὀργή prevents him from persuading Teiresias to speak (337, 344, 345). The chorus offers Oedipus' temper as an excuse, suggesting that he may not have meant what he said about Creon, having been under the influence of his ὀργή (524). In another place where speech fails, his anger acts as the spur to violence that makes him kill his father (800–14).

In these cases, Oedipus is ill equipped to negotiate the crisis in front of him not because of a lack of interpretive power *per se*, but rather because of another failing, his inability to dominate in the manly arena of public discourse. Of course, Oedipus' outcome appears predetermined. Can we rightly say that it is a test of his manly qualities of persuading his peers when no other outcome seems possible? We will soon see that Oedipus' situation is not unique, the conclusion to his drama is not any more foregone than are those of other famous men who are faced with the ordeal of the divine sign. Protagonists are regularly faced with grim challenges and even foregone conclusions, and yet they can find other ways to measure up the situations, face up to the divine messages, develop a plan to move forward, and bring it into action by persuading their peers. Oedipus reacts with paranoia and denial. He loses credibility with his subordinates and is forced to drift powerlessly and alone toward his fated end. As we will see next, the contrast with Hector, who faces an equally predetermined outcome, could not be clearer.

4. *Hector*

In Book 12 of the *Iliad*, the Trojans slice their way toward the Greek camp and in the end breach the walls. In the midst of this advance, a terrifying omen appears. An eagle comes streaking across the sky with a snake in its talons. The snake bites the eagle and the eagle, writhing in pain, drops it into the midst of the Trojan host.

The bird, in a spasm of pain, threw it to the ground, dropped it into the center of the throng, and flew off shrieking on a blast of wind. The Trojans shuddered at the glistening coils lying in their midst, a portent from Aegis-bearing Zeus.<sup>17</sup>

ὁ δ' ἀπὸ ἔθεν ἦκε χαμᾶζε  
ἀλγήσας ὀδύνῃσι, μέσῳ δ' ἐνὶ κάββαλ' ὀμίλῳ,  
αὐτὸς δὲ κλάγξας πέτετο πνοῆς ἀνέμοιο.  
Τρῶες δ' ἐρρίγησαν ὅπως ἴδον αἰόλον ὄφιν  
κείμενον ἐν μέσσοισι, Διὸς τέρας αἰγιόχοιο. (*Il.* 12.205–9)

The two phrases μέσῳ ἐνὶ ὀμίλῳ and ἐν μέσσοισι deserve some attention. The phrase recurs in several contexts as a formula for placing something into the public arena.<sup>18</sup> Prizes for athletic competition, the spoils of war, and gifts are all set down ἐν μέσῳ or ἐς μέσον before they are distributed.<sup>19</sup> This spot also becomes the place of public discourse, from which a central figure uses dialogue speech to attempt to persuade his peers. To deliberate on a particular course of action becomes, in idiomatic Greek, “to set the matter down in the middle” (ἐς μέσον [προ-/κατα-/] τιθέναι τὸ πρᾶγμα). To express one’s opinion in the assembly is “to take one’s opinion to the middle” (φέρειν γνώμην ἐς μέσον). To leave that form of speech is to “withdraw from the middle” (ἐκ μέσου κατήμενος). At the beginning of the assembly, the formula is used to open the very process of political debate: “What man has good advice for the city and wishes to bring it to the middle” (τίς θέλει πόλει χρηστόν τι βούλευμ' ἐς μέσον φέρειν ἔχων)? To be positioned in the center comes to mean, formulaically, to

<sup>17</sup> Homer text *OCT*; translations modified from Lombardo and Murnaghan 1997.

<sup>18</sup> The observation is made by Detienne 1996, 89–106. Detienne has persuasively assembled the evidence for the pivotal importance of the position “at the middle” as marking a public space that literally creates a location for public dialogue-speech to exist. Though he discusses neither divination nor this text in particular in his analysis, his observation nicely illuminates Homer’s treatment of Hector.

<sup>19</sup> For citations, see Detienne 1996, 89–106.

enter into the public language of dialogue-speech and to engage and attempt to persuade the public's attention.

This background provides an enriched context for understanding Homer when he says that the omen dropped in their midst. This particular omen literally drops from on high into the arena of public discourse. The flow of the text confirms this. It no sooner lands than the debate begins. We saw also in the Oedipus situation that a divine sign provokes debate. When the snake lands, Polydamas appeals to Hector, first remarking that he is loathe to disagree with him, lest Hector lose stature. As the men stand by paralyzed by fear, claiming that things will turn out for the Trojans just as with the bird who was stung by the snake, "This", Polydamas concludes,

is how a seer would respond, one who  
knows omens well and has the people's trust.

ὦδέ χ' ὑποκρίναιτο θεοπρόπος, ὃς σάφα θυμῷ  
εἶδειν τεράων καὶ οἱ πειθοίαιτο λαοί. (*Il.* 12.228–9)

Hector dismisses this reading. He refers back to an earlier sign in Book 8, which appears when Hector taunts Diomedes, asserting his own machismo by calling him no better than a woman and boasting that he would not let Diomedes carry off any Trojan women. Three times, Diomedes is tempted to wheel around on Hector, but each time, Zeus thunders down from Mount Ida, "signaling", as Homer tells us, "that it was the Trojans' turn to win" (170–1). At that time, Hector roused his troops and pressed the Greeks. Hector recalls this episode in order to confront Polydamas' interpretation. He claims that thundering Zeus has already assented to him and held out victory to him, and asks why he should be concerned with mere birds when he has heard Zeus' thunder:

Birds? You want me to obey birds,  
Polydamas? I don't care which way birds fly,  
Right to the sunrise or left into the dusk.  
All we have to do is obey great Zeus,  
Lord of mortals and immortals alike.  
One omen is best: to fight for your country.

τὴν δ' οἰωνοῖσι τανυπτερύγεσσι κελεύεις  
πειθεσθαι, τῶν οὔ τι μετατρέπομ' οὐδ' ἀλεγίζω  
εἴτ' ἐπὶ δεξι' ἴωσι πρὸς ἥω τ' ἡέλιόν τε,  
εἴτ' ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ τοί γε ποτὶ ζῳφον ἡρόεντα.

ἡμεῖς δὲ μέγαλοιο Διὸς πειθόμεθα βουλῇ,  
ὃς πᾶσι θνητοῖσι καὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ἀνάσσει.  
εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης. (*Il.* 12.237–43)

With these words, which Cicero echoes in the quotation with which I started, Hector unfreezes his men and energizes them to begin the furious and successful assault to breach the walls. The outline of this episode is familiar. A leading man of his society, who has earned a high place through manly action, faces an omen that specifically challenges his dominant position. Hector works through the crisis not through a special affiliation with the gods or a divine intelligence, but through his own ability to master the situation in the manly arenas of public persuasion and action. To drive this point home, his solution to the problem is offered specifically in opposition to professional readers of divine signs.

This particular situation has several layers of complexity, which add nuances to the ordeal of the divine sign. Hector's reading turns on denying the significance of the bird-omen altogether. To ignore a divine sign risks impiety, of course, and Hector seems to be running this risk. But there are several factors to consider here. First, the Trojan general is not simply dismissive of a divine sign, he is forced into a position of having to choose between apparently conflicting signs, thunder in Book 8 and a bird-omen in Book 12. He asserts the importance of one over another. Throughout the *Iliad* Zeus perverts the language of omens to manipulate both Greeks and Trojans. The thunder from Book 8, like Agamemnon's deceptive dream in Book 2, reflects the divine will, as all signs do. However, in these contexts, they especially reflect divine caprice. The *Iliad*'s Zeus has few qualms about using the Trojans as cannon fodder. His overarching design in the epic is to help Thetis and Achilles by temporarily inflicting pain on the Greeks. In this scheme the Trojans are simply an instrument to execute Achilles' wrath against his own people. The collection of divine signs in the *Iliad* reflects this attitude, and pushes to the fore the fissures of divine duplicity. In this context, Hector's refusal to accept the defeat apparently signaled by the omen adds a real depth and strength to the courageous manliness of his character. It functions similarly to Achilles' refusal to shrink away from his life, though it has been prophesied that he will die a young man.

Faced with conflicting signs Hector invokes a plausible scale of divinatory value, where Zeus' thunder wins out over a lesser form



of sign. Does Hector, for all his display of manly bravery and charismatic leadership, actually read the oracle correctly? In support of his judgment, we can compare Homer's narrative voice in each incident. The narrator makes clear that the thunder in Book 8 rings for the Trojans, it does not make a similarly unequivocal statement about the bird-omen. What exactly *did* the bird and snake mean in Book 12? We cannot *completely* clear up the issue from our *ex eventu* vantage. Was it signaling ultimate doom for the Trojans? Alternatively, was it, like the thunder in Book 8, signaling a temporary success for the Trojans, which, in fact, happens? We are left, like the Trojans, with a little bit of interpretive leeway. In my view, this is precisely the opportunity of which a forceful Greek man will avail himself. It is a daylight that Oedipus fails to find. As we will see in a moment, Themistocles, when faced with an equally gloomy sign, will like Hector find a way to exploit ambiguity for his own purposes, and mobilize his society into action. Doubtless, the strongest message from the Hector episode, in its intricate construction, is the superior nature of Hector's bravery and leadership. His interpretation is quick and decisive, it springs his men into action and secures his position as the dominant figure on the scene. Hector's higher-order character is made even clearer when seen against Zeus' duplicity. The divine caprice in the *Iliad* undermines our confidence in the largest structures of the cosmos. Against this crumbling façade, Hector's own manly courage and perseverance stand out in even starker relief.

### 5. *Agamemnon*

Agamemnon faces a similar display of divine caprice in Book 2 of the *Iliad*. As is the case with Hector, we begin with a man in a position of military prominence. His dominant position is explicitly set in the balance by the appearance of a divine sign. He plays out his drama in the public assembly using the tools of dialogue-speech. The outcome is determined not so much by his abilities to win a divine language game, as by his ability to dominate the language game of men in the struggles of martial leadership. As with Hector, the case of Agamemnon shows that the divine oracle prompts a trial of manly virtues—specifically his position as best man of the Achaeans, and his skills as a leader of armies.

As Book 2 opens, Thetis has already convinced Zeus to punish Agamemnon and the Greeks for their treatment of Achilles. Zeus engineers a temporary setback for them at the hands of the Trojans. He begins to put his plan into action by sending a cruel dream (οὔλος ὄνειρος) to Agamemnon. This dream erroneously tells Agamemnon that now is an auspicious time to attack the Trojans. As is the case with all other divine signs we have examined, Agamemnon's dream immediately engages the attention of a public forum. The king's first move on waking up, after he dresses himself, is to order the heralds to call a public assembly (2.50–2). In preparation, he huddles with his counselors to discuss the meaning of the oracle and what it has to say for their conduct of the war. Nestor responds positively to Agamemnon's report of the dream, which is perhaps unsurprising given that the dream features himself as the speaker, although he only calls attention to the status of the dreamer. He says that they have no reason to doubt the truth of the dream:

If any other of the Achaeans related the dream  
 We might declare it a false thing and turn our back on it.  
 But as it is, he saw it who professes to be the best by far of the  
 Achaeans.

εἰ μὲν τις τὸν ὄνειρον Ἀχαιῶν ἄλλος ἔνισπε  
 ψεύδός κεν φαίμεν καὶ νοσφίζοίμεθα μᾶλλον·  
 νῦν δ' ἵδεν ὃς μέγ' ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν εὐχεται εἶναι. (*Il.* 2.80–2).

Nestor's response sets the tone for the entire episode by directly linking the trustworthiness of the dream to the dreamer's putative standing as ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν. Nestor's appeal is based on a general rule of thumb—the notion that a dominant man would see a true dream. Since we know Agamemnon's dream to be false, the dream subtly yet unmistakably undermines his claim to be best of the Greeks. Once again a divine sign serves explicitly as a challenge to the dominant position of a leading man of society.

The pivotal issue that opens the *Iliad*—the contest over which man holds prime position over the Greek host—is crystallized in the dream that stands as a further example of the central position of notions of manly prowess within the ordeal of the divine sign. Agamemnon and Achilles have just engaged in the cut and thrust of debate in the public assembly, and Agamemnon's inelegant 'victory' sends Achilles sulking to his tent and sets in motion a string of disastrous incidents of Greek suffering and defeat, set right only when Achilles

rejoins the battle. Agamemnon's manifold failures during the dream episode are explicitly missteps in the manly arenas of public speech. First, in the smaller session with his counselors Nestor's speech weakens Agamemnon's position of authority not only in its content, but in its position within the narrative. The verdict that Nestor renders on Agamemnon's dream, cited above, is somewhat out of place. Agamemnon has just reported his dream to this group, but the thrust of his statement is to set out the next step in his plan of action. Since the gods are on their side, he will launch a strike, but first he will put the men to the test by claiming he is ready to surrender the fight and go home. Presumably this plan is meant to re-instill their sense of purpose, in the same manner that an embattled politician might call a no-confidence vote to shore up support. The group of counselors does not at that point leap into action, nor do they even assent to the plan. They are rather detained while Nestor delivers his verdict on whether the premise of Agamemnon's plan is even sound. At this point in the narrative comes Nestor's positive judgment on the validity of the dream. After the judgment is rendered, Agamemnon does not re-enter the discussion and lead the group into action, Nestor does (ὥς ἄρα φωνήσας βουλῆς ἐξῆρχε νέεσθαι [2.84]), reinforcing Agamemnon's impotence in the face of this challenge. In the scene following, in the larger assembly, Agamemnon's speech to the troops hardly brings out his qualities as a military leader, as compared, say, with Hector's stirring appeal to Polydamas. The plan goes famously awry. The men pick up with vigor to leave (like a great swell of the ocean [144]) and are only turned back to their duty by divine intervention (155–65) and the skillful maneuverings of Odysseus, who actually removes Agamemnon's staff from him (185–7) and goes about restoring order by force and persuasion. Though Agamemnon faces a divine caprice that is equally pernicious to the one Hector does, hardly a hint of sympathy with him can survive the near comic irony of his situation. Agamemnon addresses the men solemnly, speaking duplicitously of the divine will that is thwarting them, and urges the troops to go home—just about capturing the truth of their situation, though he speaks the reverse of what he thinks is true.

Here again, a divine sign challenges a person in a position of strength in the manly fields of military and political endeavor. The protagonist must prove his worthiness by using the tools of public, dialogue speech to rally support for a particular military plan. In

marked contrast to the previous example, Agamemnon's qualities of effective leadership, courage, and power to bring his will to bear through persuasion are all shown wanting. He is unable to meet the test that the dream provokes. He fails to take control of the situation, is unable to persuade and motivate either his lieutenants or his men. His failures in the ordeal put his position as ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν in serious doubt. Also absent are the indications, so apparent with Hector, of a warrior bravely facing up to the dictates of fate. Agamemnon's misguided scheme to test the troops intrudes and takes over the narrative, contrasting sharply with Hector's quick and decisive judgment.

### 6. *Themistocles*

The wooden wall oracle from Herodotus is well known and so I will give only a bare outline of it. As they are pressed by the Persians, the Athenians send envoys to consult at Delphi. These envoys receive bleak words, beginning from the first address:

Why sit you, doomed ones? Flee to the world's end, leaving  
Home and the heights your city circles like a wheel.

ὦ μέλαιοι, τί κάθησθε; Λιπὼν φύγ' ἐς ἔσχατα γαίης  
δώματα καὶ πόλιος τροχοειδέος ἄκρα κάρηνα. (7.140)<sup>20</sup>

The consultants object to the oracle, interestingly, and ask for another prophecy or they threaten to camp out in front of the temple and never leave. The Pythia issues another bleak prophecy, still urging retreat, but with these lines included also:

Yet Zeus the all-seeing grants to Athene's prayer  
That the wooden wall only shall not fall, but help you and your  
children . . .

Divine Salamis, you will bring death to women's sons  
When the corn is scattered, or the harvest gathered in.

τείχος Τριτογενεῖ ξύλινον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς  
μοῦνον ἀπόρθητον τελέθειν, τὸ σὲ τέκνα τ' ὀνήσει. . . .  
ὦ θεῖη Σαλαμῖς, ἀπολεῖς δὲ σὺ τέκνα γυναικῶν  
ἣ που σκιδναμένης Δημήτερος ἢ συνιούσης. (7.141)

<sup>20</sup> Herodotus text *OCT*; translations modified from de Sélincourt 1996.

The envoys return and Themistocles makes his triumphant entry onto Herodotus' stage. Themistocles is the main advocate for reading the oracle as an endorsement of the Athenian navy, on behalf of which he has already extended his prestige. He solves the final riddle facing those who support his interpretation, by pointing out that the Pythia calls Salamis 'divine'. Had she meant to indicate that it would be Greek sons who would perish, she surely would have used some negative epithet. Like the ordeals of Hector and Agamemnon, this divine sign places grave military issues in the balance, and so activates a host of concerns that center on manly courage in a martial context. The epic heroes are warriors in battle. As Herodotus casts this scene, and as the machineries of Athenian democracy produce it, this historical hero steps into the place of a Hector or an Agamemnon, but now in the form of a fifth-century statesman.

As Sluiter, Manetti, and Vernant have pointed out, Themistocles' interpretation serves political and rhetorical ends, and this engagement is cast as a straightforward contest of public speakers.<sup>21</sup> Themistocles disagrees with the professional seers, the *χρησμολόγοι*, and his interpretation carries the day—a marker that we are now within the public arena of dialogue-speech, where the experts in divine language are at a disadvantage. A few particularities of Herodotus' language are instructive in this respect. The envoys receive the divine word and bring it back to the public, where policy will be made (*ἀπήγγελλον ἐς τὸν δῆμον* [7.142]). Without even breaking the sentence, and clearly as a matter of course, Herodotus reports that the process of public argument begins.

Once again, the divine words straightaway provoke a public debate. The debate carries forward and Themistocles wins the day by persuading the people to follow his interpretation. In the end, as Vernant has pointed out, the people express their decision to follow Themistocles in precisely the same language formula they use to ratify any decision reached in public debate. They "judged it preferable" to the advice of his opponents, the professional seers (*Ἀθηναῖοι ταῦτα σφίσι ἔγνωσαν αἰρετώτερα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ τῶν χρησμολόγων* [7.143]).<sup>22</sup> However, Herodotus closes his discussion of the case this way:

<sup>21</sup> See above, n. 4.

<sup>22</sup> Vernant 1991, 312–14.

And they determined in debate, after the discussion on the oracle, to take the god's advice and meet the invader at sea with all the force they possessed.

ἔδοξε τέ σφι μετὰ τὸ χρηστήριον βουλευομένοισι ἐπιόντα ἐπὶ τὴν  
Ἑλλάδα τὸν βάρβαρον δέκεσθαι τῇσι νηυσὶ πανδημεῖ, τῷ θεῷ πειθομένους.  
(7.144)

The speech has shifted from public-centered dialogue-speech, seamlessly, back into a divine dictate. The outcome that Themistocles won by public dialogue is immediately underwritten by the oracle. If we trace the oscillations here, we find a piece of divine speech that provokes a public debate whose result is once again ratified with the imprint of the divine. This is a curious process that all takes place without self-conscious comment from Herodotus, as though nothing out of the ordinary has happened. As a direct result of these interchanges, Themistocles' effectiveness on the public stage is secured. His victory falls squarely within the manly arena of military leadership and is won on the field of public persuasion, which as we have noted is consistently gendered strongly male in the classical Athenian imagination. His effectiveness on this stage of manly action secures for his plan the imprimatur of the divine speech of the Pythia.

In both the cases of Themistocles and Hector we find men of high standing in their societies, whose position as dominant males is brought to trial by a divine sign. In both cases, the divine speech operates as a provocation to public-assembly speech. Both men carry the day and secure their positions as first among men by successfully negotiating the oracle among their peers, persuading them that their reading is best, and in this way bringing their will to bear on the oracle and securing its power to further their manly prowess in the field of military achievement. Equally, in the dialogue-speech portion of the drama, each hero wins out over supposed experts in divine speech. While Agamemnon and Oedipus work better as negative examples, all these episodes suggest that the divinatory process is actually a contest that tests manly virtues, embedded in the give and take of public speaking.

7. *Language difference*

In all the cases we have examined, we see an oscillation between two realms of language, one the domain of the gods, one of men. The protagonists in these struggles succeed or fail according to their performance in the second domain. Those who succeed are able to harness the power of divine language and put it into the service of their own ambitions and their own standing as powerful figures in the arenas of manly accomplishment. Those who fail are overcome by divine signs. Sorting out these two languages has shown divination in its literary representations as a productive site for testing and thereby confirming Greek notions of manliness.

An early work of Marcel Detienne adds to this general picture. I suggest a small modification in a schema that he lays down in his *Les Maîtres de vérité* first published in 1967 (English trans., *Masters of Truth*, 1996). Detienne there looks at the emergence of philosophical and legal languages in the Greek *polis* and compares these new ways of speaking with other forms of speech that he claims predate them. He generates an evolutionary dichotomy, between what he calls efficacious, magico-religious speech, which had the capacity to produce effects in and of itself, and secular dialogue speech, which complemented but did not constitute action. In his most provocative chapter he locates a secularization of speech within Greek warrior culture, when the shift from religious language to dialogue language took place. While this kind of speech is present in the earliest attestations of warriors—Homer's heroes speechify as much as they fight—Detienne locates a decisive shift around 650 BCE within the particular military development of the hoplite phalanx, in which battles began to be won by teams of rough equals rather than heroes and their horses. The warrior figure, in Detienne's understanding, establishes this new form—which is no longer of a piece with the efficacious speech of poets, diviners, and kings—as a tool to persuade and mobilize his peers. Detienne's work then suggests a deeper and richer tie between debate and manliness. The field of martial endeavor, where peers win recognition for their manliness, is actually a precondition for the formation of public dialogue-speech, over and against the older, more archaic forms, of which divine signs are perhaps the purest example.

Interestingly, in the double witnesses to ancient divination, we find both forms of speech operative. The omen or oracle drops into the

secular world like a nugget of magico-religious speech that provokes a contest fought with the tools of dialogue-speech. In each case dialogue-speech, formed in the crucible of martial endeavor, gets the upper hand on divine speech. In my view, this suggests a modification of Detienne's theory. Rather than see these two categories of speech in an evolutionary relationship, where one ascends at a particular historical moment, we will do better to place them in a synchronic and dialectical relation.<sup>23</sup> It is my suspicion that both these forms of speech can be found in many periods of Greek history, operating in tandem and relying on each other to function. This is certainly the case in the literary examples from the archaic and classical periods presented here.

The ordeal of the divine sign operates according to a mechanism that relies on and enacts the ongoing dialectic between divine speech and human dialogue-speech. Each makes up for serious deficiencies found in the other. In his distaste for the sophist and the orator, Plato goes to great lengths to point out the weaknesses of public oratory. In short, it always threatens to be 'just words'. Talking opens the possibility of lying and misrepresentation, which always lurks behind the speech meant to persuade. While public speeches threaten to founder on a certain lightness of meaning, magico-religious speech fails for just the opposite reason. Its impenetrable density of meaning makes the divine language inscrutable. While we can be assured that it means *something*, we cannot be sure what the meaning is. On the other side of the coin, the two forms of speech carry opposite strengths. Dialogue speech acts as a curative to the paralysis that the former tends to produce, born from shock, confusion, awe, and fear; and divine speech anchors public speech to something whose meaningfulness is beyond doubt.

This dialectic produces a situation in which, in practice, a divine sign comes to mean precisely what the best of the men who read it says it means. The correct reading of it is, by definition, that which is delivered by the hero who is best equipped, with the tools of persuasive speech, to press his case on his peers. The process is short-circuited when an unworthy protagonist picks up these materials.

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<sup>23</sup> This is not to say that Detienne's claim of the importance of the rise of the hoplite is dispensable. I still find this original observation most compelling. My only suggestion here is to shift the focus from an evolutionary model, not to supplant it altogether.



The divine sign, then, is not so much a message as a fulcrum for the push and pull of conflict during which human meanings are made, and values are hammered out. It does not so much carry a meaning, as guarantee that some meaning is there to be found. In this sense then, the omen inserts itself into human speech as a starting point. This brings us back to the split in the evidence with which we opened. The absence of manliness (and other human values) from ancient theories about divination now seems more purposive and also more productive. This absence helps keep divinatory messages from being confused with day-to-day speech—where such values are continuously being forged. Confusions of this sort would pose grave dangers. Were the difference between divine and human speech to be confounded, the oracles might be mistaken for ‘mere talk’. This would pose problems for divination’s power, but perhaps more important, it would also sacrifice a useful source of authority in the formation of human values. Without the secure and always interpretable divine voice in close proximity, humans would be left to their own devices in the struggle over social goods.

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## CHAPTER TEN

### ARISTOTLE ON *ANDREIA*, DIVINE AND SUB-HUMAN VIRTUES

Marguerite Deslauriers

#### 1. *Introduction*

We can learn something about Aristotle's understanding of the virtue of *andreia* by considering the kinds of beings he thinks cannot have *andreia* properly speaking, and by examining the reasons he offers for the exclusion of these kinds.<sup>1</sup> I will argue that Aristotle's account of the virtue of *andreia* functions not only to distinguish certain groups of people from others, but also to distinguish people from gods. On Aristotle's account, neither slaves nor women can have *andreia* in the strict sense, because of a certain incapacity of the rational part of their soul. Aristotle also denies *andreia* to the gods; but that the gods do not have *andreia* is not due to an incapacity of reason. On the face of it, Aristotle's reasons for claiming that women and slaves on the one hand, and the gods on the other, do not have *andreia*, seem quite different. My aim here is to establish that there is a common principle which accounts for the exclusion of both gods and women and slaves: that principle is that to have *andreia* one must act for the sake of the noble, and (for quite different reasons) neither those

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<sup>1</sup> *Andreia* is often considered a problematic virtue for Aristotle, because it seems to present difficulties for certain of his claims about the structure and function of virtue. Several of these difficulties have to do with the emotions of fear and confidence, the emotions in which Aristotle says that *andreia* is a mean. So, for example, does Aristotle understand *andreia* to be a question of the control of fear, and if so, why is it not a kind of continence rather than a virtue? (See Ross 1923, 204–6); How does the courageous person feel while exercising the virtue of courage? (Leighton, 1988). Another sort of difficulty concerns the pleasure that the virtuous person is supposed to experience in being virtuous—how can the courageous person, while feeling fear and risking death, experience pleasure or enjoy a happy life? (See Hutchinson 1986, 71 and Broadie, 1991, 319–20). I do not take up these questions in this paper; my focus is rather on what we can learn from the case of *andreia* about Aristotle's reasons for restricting the virtues to certain kinds of people.

people with an imperfect or non-functional rational capacity nor the gods can act for the sake of the noble.

I will consider three kinds of passages. First, I will look to the description of *andreia* at *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.6–9, to establish what *andreia* as a moral virtue is according to Aristotle. Second, I will examine the argument at *Politics* 1.13 to show that women and slaves have virtues that are different in kind from the virtues of free men. This passage makes clear that women and slaves cannot have *andreia* in the strict sense (although they can develop a virtue called *andreia*) because of the ways in which reason fails to govern in their cases. Finally I will consider the arguments at *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.8 and 1.12 to show that the gods do not have moral virtues. These passages make clear that because of the nature of *andreia* the possession of *andreia* would not be a good for the gods. I will argue that in the case both of women and slaves, on the one hand, and the gods, on the other, it is the nature of what they are, and not the circumstance in which they happen to find themselves, that explains why they cannot have *andreia*.

## 2. *Andreia, Bodies and Lives*

Aristotle defines *andreia* as a mean in *feelings* of fear and confidence (*EN* 3.6 1115a6–7). Alternatively, *andreia* is a mean with respect to *things* that inspire confidence or fear (3.7 1116a10–11). So *andreia* either is a feeling, or is concerned with things that inspire such feelings. And the feeling is a feeling that occurs on the continuum bounded by fear at one extreme and over-confidence or recklessness at the other.<sup>2</sup>

Aristotle claims that we fear terrible things (τὰ φοβερὰ; 1115a8). *Andreia* is not, however, concerned with all terrible things, but only with the greatest of terrible things (1115a25). The greatest of terrible things is death. Death is the greatest because it is the limit (πέρας) of life (1115a27). As the limit of life, death marks the end of all human possibility, all desire, choice and action. As Aristotle tells us,

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<sup>2</sup> There may be more than one continuum. It is worth asking whether *andreia* is a mean in one scale (bounded by confidence on one end and fear on the other), or a mean on two different scales (one bounded by excessive and deficient confidence, the other by excessive and deficient fear). See Pears 1980.

nothing seems to be good or bad to the dead (1115a28). This is important as a way of understanding why death is the greatest of terrible things; it means that the most terrible thing for a person is to have nothing to pursue or avoid—since we pursue only those things that seem good to us, and avoid only those things that seem bad. And if we have nothing to pursue or avoid, then we have no moral agency.

Aristotle restricts the domain of *andreia* further. *Andreia* is not concerned with just *any* death, but only with the noblest, which is death in battle (1115a30). What is the evidence that death in battle is the noblest kind of death? First of all, such deaths take place in the greatest and noblest risk (ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ) (1115a30–1). Second, we treat deaths in battle as the noblest (1115a31–2). Deaths in battle are then noblest because they occur in noble circumstances, morally speaking: they occur when the moral agent has chosen to undertake a risk which is itself noble. That it is the noblest risk is evident from the way in which we treat people who die while undertaking such risk: we treat them as noble, and so they, and their deaths, are noble.

Finally, Aristotle adds a significant qualification: that *andreia* causes one to choose or endure things *because* it is noble to do so. This is expressed in different ways. At 3.7 1115b23, Aristotle says that the brave man endures and does things according to courage *for the sake of* the noble (καλοῦ δι' ἕνεκα). At 1116a11–12 he says that *andreia* (the virtue itself) chooses and endures *because it is noble* (ὅτι καλόν) to do so or because it is shameful not to so choose and endure; he uses the same phrase again at 1117a17. At 1116b30–1, Aristotle says that courageous men act because of or due to the noble (διὰ τὸ καλόν). This is also the phrase he uses when he distinguishes those who appear brave because they are angry from those who are truly brave—those who are angry do not act due to the noble, and they do not act according to reason but rather according to feeling (1117a7–9). This establishes a connection between acting for the sake of the noble and acting according to reason: in order to act for the sake of the noble one must use reason to determine what the noble is. One implication of this is that if one's reason is in some way failing, one will not be able reliably to determine what the noble is.

Let me emphasize two points connected with this account of *andreia*. The first is that death is not equally terrible for everyone; rather, it is more terrible for certain people. How terrible it is depends on

one's social status. This is because while death, the greatest of terrible things, is of course available to every mortal being, death in the greatest and noblest risk is not available to everyone. For some people, death in the greatest and noblest risk is not available because the social function such people perform does not include going to war. If one cannot die on the battlefield, one cannot, according to Aristotle, risk or experience the most terrible death. Notice that the terribleness of death is then a matter of objective fact and not a matter of subjective appreciation. That is, when Aristotle speaks of more and less terrible deaths, he is not speaking of how such deaths appear to those who might experience them, but of certain intrinsic features of the different deaths.<sup>3</sup>

The second point is that Aristotle refuses to allow that many moral states commonly *called* *andreia* are indeed *andreia*, because they fail to meet the requirement that *andreia* causes one to act "for the sake of" honor. This makes clear the importance of the requirement. The virtuous man is able to face death and wounds precisely "*because* it is noble to do so" (ὅτι καλόν) (1117b6–10). For this reason, Aristotle says that political courage is most like proper courage because it "arises from virtue; for it is because of (διὰ) shame and because of a desire for the noble [i.e. honor]", (3.8 1116a27–30). And Aristotle establishes the contrast between passion and true courage by appeal to this requirement: brave men act for the sake of the noble, but passion aids them, whereas merely passionate men act on feeling, and not for the sake of the noble—they do not have choice (προαίρεσιν) and aim (τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα) (1116b30–1; 1117a4–5, 7–9). In order to have *andreia*, properly speaking, one must then act for the sake of the noble, in the sense that one's primary motivation must be the desire for the noble.

We might ask here why it is that Aristotle insists that the noblest danger presents the best opportunity for displaying courage. One

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<sup>3</sup> Consider the contrast between this claim about the terribleness of death and another claim Aristotle makes, that the more virtuous a man, the more painful for him the thought of death (*EN* 3.9 1117b9–13). The reason for this is that the loss of moral agency is more painful for a virtuous man than for others. What a virtuous man loses in death is more valuable to him than what a vicious man loses, and so the death of a virtuous man is experienced as more painful than the death of a vicious man. The painfulness of the possibility of death for the virtuous man is treated by Aristotle as a subjective matter, but the terribleness of his death is treated as a matter of objective fact.

might think, on the contrary, that the least noble circumstances in which death might occur (Aristotle offers disease and drowning at 1115a28–9 as examples of unlovely ways of dying) offer the best opportunities for courage. That is, one might think that because it would be more painful to die in circumstances lacking nobility, those circumstances would provide the best occasions for displays of courage. Why does Aristotle think otherwise? The answer lies in the requirement that to be *andreios* one must have the noble as one's aim in risking death. As we have seen, *andreia* is primarily a virtue which aims at achieving the noble; it is not primarily a virtue which aims at enduring what is painful. So, while someone who endures the pain of disease or drowning might well be admirable, such a person could not be *andreios* strictly speaking, because there is nothing noble to be gained from such a death; the agent's motive cannot be to achieve something noble.

This might seem only to relocate the question, to the question of nobility. Why suppose that nobility can be achieved only through death in battle? Why not think that other deaths, endured without complaint, are equally noble? The answer to this is unclear, but there are two possible ways of understanding why Aristotle takes death in battle to be the noblest (the two ways are not incompatible, and so both might be correct). One has to do with the goal of all virtuous activity, which is the happy life. The immediate goal of courageous action is victory in battle, but victory in battle is for the sake of peace (10.7 1177b5–6). And peace is not an end in itself; rather peace is for the sake of the intellectual activities that constitute the good life. That is, the person who takes courageous action in order to gain victory in order to enjoy peace in order to amuse himself with trivial pursuits is not, in Aristotle's terms, a virtuous person. He is not virtuous because he has not acted, ultimately, for the sake of the noble.<sup>4</sup> If this is right, then the nobility of death in battle has to do with what death in battle gains for the *polis*: the conditions in which citizens can lead happy lives.

Another way of interpreting Aristotle's claim that death in battle is the noblest relies on Aristotle's understanding of the nature of the virtues as empirically established. That is, his list of the individual virtues, and his description of the feelings the virtuous person is

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<sup>4</sup> For this argument, see Kraut 1989, 336–7.

disposed to feel and the actions he is disposed to perform, are entirely conventional. Moreover, his method in the *Nicomachean Ethics* explicitly relies on common opinion: "... we ought to start from what is known to us [as opposed to known 'absolutely']". Therefore it is necessary for any one who is to listen adequately to lectures about what is noble and just and, generally, about political matters to have been brought up in noble habits. For the facts ( $\tau\acute{o}$  ὅτι) are the starting-point, and if they are sufficiently plain to him, he will not need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get starting-points," (1.4 1095b2–8).<sup>5</sup> The facts in moral and political matters are often the *endoxa*, or common conceptions on the subject.<sup>6</sup> So what is noble is whatever we treat as noble. This, as we have seen, is explicit in the account of *andreia*.

### 3. *Men, Women and Slaves: andreia and different human functions*

With this account of *andreia* in mind, consider Aristotle's claim in the first book of the *Politics* that women and slaves cannot have *andreia* in the strict sense. The claim is introduced in a discussion of virtue. Aristotle's primary concern in Book 1 is to establish that ruling is not simply a question of possessing the science of ruling, and to establish that all kinds of rule are not the same.<sup>7</sup> He does this by addressing two questions which he formulates in 1.3. The first is, "Is the rule of a master a science?" or, "Are the management of a household and the mastership of slaves and the political and royal rule all the same?" (1253b18–20). The second is, "Is slavery natural or just?" (1253b20–3). Aristotle argues that possession of a science is not sufficient for excellence as a master or ruler; one must also have the moral virtues and the intellectual virtue of *phronêsis*

<sup>5</sup> Burnet 1900, 17 glosses this passage as, "Since the starting-point or first principle of *Politics* is 'the that', i.e. the fact that the definition of Happiness is whatever we may find it to be, and since any one who has been well brought up either has that definition or can easily get it by a dialectical process, the one thing needful for the intending student is a good up-bringing".

<sup>6</sup> For the most influential argument that for Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* the *phainomena*, or the facts, are not (or not only) matters of observation, but also matters of common agreement, see G. E. L. Owen 1986, esp. 240–1.

<sup>7</sup> Schofield makes this point at 1990, 19–20. He argues that the issue which dominates *Politics* A is that there is not just one form of rule (contrary to Plato). See also Natali 1979–80; Kelsen 1977, 172–5; and Kahn 1990, esp. 28.

(1255b16–22; 1260a14–20; 1277a14–16). He also argues that slavery is just, on the grounds that if one is lacking the faculty of deliberative reason, one must submit to the deliberative reason of some other person. The two arguments are connected. If there are different kinds of people (slaves—people without a deliberative faculty, and free men—those with a deliberative faculty) then there are different kinds of rule appropriate to each, nor is there a single science of ruling the acquisition of which is sufficient to make one an excellent ruler, because ruling will in part be a question of knowing what kind of person one is ruling over, and that is not a matter of science. The question of virtue arises in this context: if there were a science of ruling, and if there were not different kinds of people, then virtue would also be the same for everyone. If there are different kinds of people, then there must be different virtues attributable to those kinds.

At *Politics* 1.13 Aristotle asks then whether the virtue of slaves, of women, and of children is the same as the virtue of free men (1259b21–36). He suggests that there are political problems whichever way one answers. If one says that there is no difference, then one cannot justify the relations between ‘natural’ rulers (free adult men) and others. If we take the virtues of natural rulers and natural subjects to be simply identical, then the naturalness of both the rule and the subjection would be threatened (“For if a noble nature is equally required in both, why should one of them always rule and the other always be ruled?” (1259b34–6)).<sup>8</sup> If, on the other hand, one says that there *is* an important difference between the virtues of free men and the virtues of natural subjects, one must be careful to grant those who are naturally ruled *some* kind of virtue, since they are after all people.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Notice that Aristotle here takes it as an assumption that there are natural rulers and natural subjects.

<sup>9</sup> Aristotle seems to have two reasons for insisting that slaves and women are people and so do have human virtue. The first is that if slaves, and, by extension, women, were utterly without virtue or incapable of virtue, then they could not be good natural subjects, i.e. they could not obey well (1259b40–1260a2). Yet, women and slaves have a capacity for obedience, and so there are virtuous women and slaves (those who practice obedience). So women and slaves cannot be incapable of virtue. The second reason that Aristotle insists on the humanity of natural subjects is that if women and slaves had no virtue, and were not people, then the relation between them and the head of the household could not be characterized as a case of, or a model for, political rule. In particular, if natural subjects were not



Aristotle rejects what might seem to be the obvious solution to these difficulties: to say that natural subjects and natural rulers have the same virtues, but possess them in different degrees (τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον). He argues that if natural rulers and natural subjects had the same virtues, even if the natural rulers were to have *more* of those virtues, the rule of natural rulers would not be legitimate (“for the difference between ruler and subject is a difference of kind, which the difference of more and less never is” (1259b36–8)). In other words, this position, like the position that the virtues of natural rulers and natural subjects are simply identical, does not allow us to justify adequately that one sort of person should rule and the other sort be ruled.<sup>10</sup>

The task Aristotle then sets for himself is to explain how those who are naturally ruled can have virtue which is importantly different in kind from the virtue of those who naturally rule.

The first point Aristotle makes in the discussion in *Politics* 1.13 is that the question is not so much whether slaves can have virtues (since even instruments have virtues—e.g. knives can be sharp or dull), as whether slaves can have *human* virtues. The contrast is not just with inanimate instruments, but also with animals. If slaves possess only ‘bodily services’ (τὰς σωματικὰς ὑπηρεσίας) then slaves can be virtuous only in the way that animals can, by excelling in certain tasks that require bodily excellence. So the question is whether slaves can have virtues other than the virtues of instruments or animals—whether they can have the virtues of free persons. Aristotle then extends the question to women and children, by asking whether in general natural subjects can have the virtues of free adult men.

Aristotle has thus set the parameters of his own response: natural subjects must have virtue, that virtue must be human, and that human virtue must be different in kind from the virtue of free adult

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people, then persuasion would have no role to play in the interaction between natural rulers and natural subjects; force and coercion would be the appropriate mechanisms for ensuring compliance. Because Aristotle takes household relations to be a model for political relations, and because he argues that force and coercion are illegitimate means of ensuring compliance in the political realm, he has to make room for persuasion in household relations. Persuasion requires some measure of reason in those subject to rule in the household, which in turn requires that those subjected should be human.

<sup>10</sup> This is the argument against Plato and Xenophon.

men (the virtues which he describes at length in the *Nicomachean Ethics*). If the virtues of women and slaves are human, that will mean that they involve reason. Aristotle exploits an analogy between the parts of the soul and the parts of the state, where what naturally rules is identified as some faculty which has reason (presumably, practical reason or the deliberative faculty), and what is naturally ruled is some faculty which does not have reason (but which, presumably, is capable of obeying reason) (1260a4–7). The distinction between what rules and what is ruled is very general: Aristotle insists that almost all things rule and are ruled by nature. In this way, the organization of the soul and the polis are examples of a principle common to all things: that some parts are intended by nature to rule and some intended by nature to be ruled. Aristotle then distinguishes the virtues of women, children, and slaves from the virtue of free men according to the nature of the deliberative faculty in each, and the relation of that deliberative faculty to the part of the non-rational soul which can obey. What Aristotle has then to explain is just how the virtues of women, children and slaves differ from the virtue of free men, while remaining recognizably human, i.e. rational in some sense.

The virtue of women, children, and slaves, unlike the virtue of free men, is not to function as a ruler, but to function in some role of obedience. This is a difference which Aristotle does not treat as circumstantial. It is not because women and slaves find themselves contingently in the role of subjects that their virtue is different from that of free men; if this were the case, then women and slaves might develop the virtues of free men, were they to assume the role of rulers, which would suggest then that women, children, slaves and free men could in principle exchange places. Moreover, because the difference in virtue is not circumstantial it is not a difference in degree. The virtues of women and slaves are not the same *kind* of virtues that free men possess, developed to a lesser degree. If they were, it would again suggest that women and slaves on the one hand, and free men on the other, were not different kinds of people, but the same kind of person in different circumstances. In saying that the difference in virtues among different kinds of people is not a difference in degree but in kind, Aristotle is saying that the virtues of different kinds of people cannot be the same *hexis* differently disposed, or the same *hexis* but less so (what could this mean?), but must be different *hexeis*.

What then is the difference in the *hexeis*? Aristotle finds the distinction in the virtues of free men, on the one hand, and slaves and women, on the other, on a difference in the relation of the deliberative faculty to some other part or function of the soul. The crucial passage is at 1.13 1260a8–14: "... almost all things rule and are ruled according to nature. But the kind of rule differs—the free man rules over the slave after another manner from that in which the male rules over the female or the man over the child; although the parts of the soul are present in all of them, they are present in different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature". The claim with respect to children and with respect to slaves is straightforward; children have undeveloped deliberative faculties, the immaturity of which makes them natural subjects, but only for a time. Slaves are natural subjects all their lives, because they lack altogether a deliberative faculty.

The status of the deliberative faculties of women is less clear. It is very difficult to construe the claim that the deliberative faculty of women is ἄκρως—'without authority'. Two lines of interpretation prevail. According to one, Aristotle means to say that the deliberative faculty of women is without authority relative to the faculty of appetite and desire, so that deliberative reason in women is easily overcome by some appetite or desire.<sup>11</sup> According to the other, the deliberative faculty of women is without authority in the political context, in relation to the deliberative faculties of men.<sup>12</sup> There are serious difficulties with both these lines of interpretation, difficulties which I think are ultimately irresolvable, because Aristotle cannot reconcile his view that women are naturally subject to men with his view that their deliberative reason is mature and functional, if unauthoritative.<sup>13</sup> The important point for my purposes here, however, is that children, slaves, and women all lack an active faculty of delib-

<sup>11</sup> See Fortenbaugh 1977, Modrak 1994, and Spelman 1983.

<sup>12</sup> See Swanson 1992, and Deslauriers 1993. Francis Sparshott offers a rather different line of interpretation, denying that Aristotle means to say that women are overcome by emotion, and taking the lack of authority of a woman's deliberative faculty to be a function of the age difference between (adolescent) wives and (middle-aged) husbands; Sparshott also recognizes that if this is what Aristotle meant, he ought to have justified the age difference as natural (1985, 187–8).

<sup>13</sup> See appendix.

erative reason, whether through absence, immaturity or some mysterious failing of authority.

Aristotle gives the same names to the virtues that he attributes to natural subjects and natural rulers. He asks whether slaves can have temperance, courage, justice and the like (1259b21–6), whether a woman ought to be temperate and courageous and just, whether a child can be temperate (1259b28–32); and responds by asking rhetorically whether a natural subject can obey well if he is intemperate and cowardly or unjust (1259b40–1260a2). Moreover, at 1260a20–4 Aristotle explicitly attributes temperance, courage and justice to women as well as men, insisting that they are different, specifying that the courage of a man (and also the justice and temperance?) are evidenced in commanding, that of the woman in obeying. And at 3.4 1277b25–9, he states clearly, “*Phronêsis* is the only virtue peculiar to the ruler. It would seem that all other virtues must belong equally to ruler and subject. The virtue of the subject is certainly not *phronêsis*, but only true opinion”. We have seen that this difference in virtue cannot be simply a difference in degree, or a difference in the circumstances in which the *hexis* is manifested rather than a difference in the *hexis* itself. If we take courage as an example, the question is then: how can the courage of free men, slaves and women, all be courage, and yet be different in kind and not in degree or circumstances? To answer that, we need to address another question: is a well-functioning deliberative faculty not a necessary requirement for the possession of virtue? Or, how can women and slaves have any kind of human virtue, even virtues of obedience, if their deliberative faculties are missing or somehow ineffectual?

To make the problem clearer, consider how Aristotle characterizes virtue. The definition of moral virtue at *EN* 2.6 1106b36–1107a2 is, “Excellence, then, is a state (*hexis*) concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it”. The intellectual virtue of *phronêsis* is: “. . . a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods . . . There being two parts of the soul that possess reason, it must be the excellence of one of the two, i.e. of that part which forms opinions; for opinion is about what can be otherwise, and so is practical wisdom. But yet it is not only a reasoned state; this is shown by the fact that a state of that sort may be forgotten but practical wisdom cannot” (*EN* 6.5 1140b20–30). And the connection between the moral virtues and

*phronêsis* is made plain at *EN* 6.13. Having asserted that moral excellences involve practical wisdom, Aristotle goes on to say, "This is why some say that all the excellences are forms of practical wisdom, and why Socrates in one respect was on the right track while in another he went astray; in thinking that all the excellences were forms of practical wisdom he was wrong, but in saying they implied practical wisdom he was right" (1144b17–21). He adds, "... it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral excellence" (1144b30–2).

These passages of course raise many issues. I wish to emphasize just those claims that will be useful in understanding the virtues of women and slaves. First, *phronêsis* is a virtue of the rational part of the soul, and of a particular part of that part—namely, the part that takes as its objects things that might be otherwise, the part that Aristotle identifies as the deliberative faculty. Second, *phronêsis* is a necessary condition for the possession of any moral virtue, and the possession of all the moral virtues is a necessary condition for the possession of *phronêsis*. How, then, can either women or slaves possess virtue at all, since slaves lack the rational faculty and women possess one without authority?

Aristotle's answer to this question seems to lie in the distinction between virtues of the subject and virtues of the ruler: if what it is to be a virtuous subject is to be someone who is good at obeying, then one will have to have the excellence of that part of the soul which is capable of obedience—which Aristotle identifies with the part which generates appetites (*EN* 1.13 1102b28–33). The suggestion seems to be that natural subjects can have human virtue, then, by, as it were, borrowing the *phronêsis* of a natural ruler. (Again, at 1277b25–9, Aristotle states clearly, "*Phronêsis* is the only virtue peculiar to the ruler.") Their faculty of appetites must be trained to submit to reason—ultimately only to produce appetites in accordance with reason—but the reason in question is not their own, but that of the natural ruler. On the most charitable interpretation, this explains how Aristotle can say that natural slaves, although without a faculty of deliberation, have all the parts of the soul, as well as that slaves and women do have virtue which is human and yet different in kind from that of free adult men. It is human because it is a virtue that requires reason—although the reason in question is only the reason that understands rather than the reason that generates reasons. It is different in kind and not only in degree pre-

cisely because it is a virtue of the appetitive and not of the deliberative faculty of the soul, whereas the virtue of free men will be of both the appetitive and the deliberative faculties. It is different from the virtue (such as it is) of animals, and involves all parts of the soul, again because it involves some capacity for reason.

Thus at *Politics* 1.13 1260a31–3 Aristotle says, “Since a child is incomplete, it is clear that the virtue also of a child is not relative to himself alone (αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτόν) but relative to the complete [man] and to the teacher. And likewise [the virtue] of a slave is relative to the master (πρὸς δεσπότην)”. The virtue is relative to the person in authority, and yet belongs to the child or the slave, so that we can speak of the virtue of the slave or of the child, and not only of the virtue of the person in authority. What is important here is that the virtue of the child or slave is possible only because, while the *phronêsis* must be borrowed from the person in authority, the correct desire must belong to the child or slave. Since Aristotle argues that it is desire rather than any cognitive faculty which is the ultimate origin of action, the virtue can be said to belong to the child or slave because the desire belongs to that child or slave.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, “It is clear that it is necessary that the master is the cause of such virtue in the slave, and not one who [merely?] has the art of mastership which trains the slave in his functions.<sup>15</sup> Therefore those who deprive slaves of reason and say that we should use only commands are mistaken. For we ought to admonish (νοουθετεῖν) slaves even more than children” (1260b3–7). That we ought to admonish slaves means that we ought to offer reasons to the slave, in the expectation that the desires of the slave can be formed in light of reasons. That the master is the cause of virtue in the slave must mean that the master, using his faculty of deliberation, and admonishing the slave appropriately, can cause the slave to have the right desires, which are then of course the foundation of the virtue of the slave. That the master does not, or should not, merely issue commands to the slave,

<sup>14</sup> At *De anima* 3.10 433a21 and again at 433b10–11, Aristotle says that the faculty of desire (rather than the whole soul) produces movement. This is because there is no movement without desire—and (since one might object that neither is there movement without some faculty of judgment or intellect, however primitive) because desire provides the source of the movement for reason, in providing the object of desire (433a18–20).

<sup>15</sup> The text of this last phrase is uncertain. The sense must be inferred from the next sentence.

but offer reasons, makes clear that the desires of the slave are subject to reason, if not to his own reason.

Because Aristotle locates the source of action in the faculty of desire rather than reason, he can more plausibly claim that the slave and the woman who borrow *phronêsis* from a master or a husband can nonetheless be virtuous in their own right; it will be a matter of cultivating correct desires. Moreover, the account of the slave as a part of the master contributes to the explanation of the virtue of the slave as human and yet distinct from the virtue of the master. A slave is a part of the master because he is a possession of his master: "A possession is spoken of as a part . . . for the part is not only a part of something else, but also wholly belongs to it, and this is also true of a possession" (*Politics* 1.4 1254a8–11). This relation of belonging is part of the definition of slave at 1254a14–17: "One who is a human being belonging by nature not to himself but to another is by nature a slave, and a person is a human being belonging to another if being a person he is an article of property . . ." A passage in the *Eudemian Ethics* explains this part/whole relation by analogy with other such relations: "But since the relations of soul and body, craftsman and tool and master and slave are similar, between the two terms of each of these pairs there is no association; for they are not two, but the former is one and the latter a part of that one, not one itself; nor is good divisible between them, but that of both belongs to the one for whose sake they exist" (1241b18–24).<sup>16</sup> It makes sense to speak of the excellence of the tool of a craftsman, although the tool is a part of the craftsman, and although its excellence depends on its use at the hands of the craftsman. Similarly, the virtue of the slave is in one sense independent of his master, and in another sense dependent on that master.

The account Aristotle offers (in the *Politics* and the *EN*) of the role of reason relative to nature and habituation in the development of virtue supports the claim that the possession of the reason that understands is sufficient for virtue that is properly human virtue. At *Politics* 7.13 1332b3–5 Aristotle notes three things that make people virtuous: nature (φύσις), habit (ἔθος), and reason (λόγος). He remarks

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<sup>16</sup> Again, at *Politics* 1.6 1255b9–11 Aristotle makes the same point about the good of master and slave: ". . . the interests of part and whole, of body and soul, are the same, and the slave is a part of the master".

that, “in many cases people act under the influence of reason against their habits and nature, if they are persuaded (ἐὺν πεισθῶσιν) that it is better that it should be otherwise”. The importance of reason, then, in the development of virtue, is not so much that it can produce reasons for acting other than according to nature and habit, but rather that it can respond to reasons offered (presumably by oneself or some other rational agent) for acting otherwise. That is, it is the capacity to be *persuaded* by reasons for action that Aristotle identifies here as a factor in the acquisition of human virtue. A parallel passage at *EN* 10.9 makes the same point in slightly different terms. Aristotle claims: “... argument and teaching, we may suspect, are not powerful with all men, but the soul of the student must first have been cultivated by means of habits for noble joy and noble hatred, like earth which is to nourish the seed. For he who lives as passion directs will not hear argument that dissuades him, nor understand it if he does; and how can we persuade one in such a state to change his ways?” (1179b23–8). Hearing and understanding reason are here the necessary pre-conditions for being persuaded, so that the capacity for being persuaded must entail the capacities for listening to and understanding reasons offered for and against certain actions. Again, virtue depends crucially on this capacity for understanding reason rather than producing reason; Aristotle introduces the passage by saying, “Now some think that we are made good by nature, others by habituation, others by teaching.” The ‘teaching’ becomes ‘argument and teaching’, susceptibility to which, as we have learned, depends on being able to listen to reasons, understand reasons, and ultimately to be persuaded by reasons.<sup>17</sup>

Finally, at *Politics* 3.4 Aristotle compares the relation between the virtue of ruling and the virtue of obeying, both of which are present in the good person, with the relation between male and female virtue (1277b18–25). If the virtue of male and female are different in kind, i.e. not the same ἕξις, then the virtue of ruling and the virtue of obeying are also different in kind. This makes sense, since Aristotle identifies ruling with the male and obeying with the female, and locates the virtue of obedience in the faculty of desire and the virtue of ruling in the faculty of reason.

<sup>17</sup> See Cassin 1993, 375–6 for a discussion of these passages as evidence that, “La rationalité ... fonctionne nécessairement aussi dans le registre de la discursivité rhétorique”.



If we consider this account of the difference in the kinds of virtue available to free men on the one hand, and women and slaves on the other, we see that the reason natural subjects cannot have *andreia* proper is not, fundamentally, that they cannot risk death in more or less honorable ways. It is rather that they cannot determine what would be for the sake of the noble, because this would require a functioning *bouleutikon*. Natural subjects can, however, be persuaded that a certain course of action is for a noble end, and can desire and perform that action, which is why they can have a virtue called *andreia*.

#### 4. *Men and Gods: Why andreia is not Divine*

Let us now consider the case of the gods. As with the case of women and slaves, one might think that the reason that the gods cannot have *andreia* is that they do not find themselves in the sorts of circumstances that call for *andreia*. And as with the case of women and slaves, I argue that while this is true, there is a more fundamental explanation in the account of the cognitive activity and moral agency of the gods.

There are two different arguments to show that the gods do not have virtue, generally, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.<sup>18</sup> The argument that has attracted more comment is found at *EN* 10.8 1178b7ff. The context of the passage is an argument for the contemplative life as complete happiness for people, but it tells us quite a lot about how Aristotle understands the gods to live. Aristotle takes for granted that the gods lead a life such that they are blessed and happy (μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι). He asks a series of questions, concerned with the circumstances in which we manifest the moral virtues, intended to show the absurdity of supposing that the gods have lives like ours. It is ridiculous to suppose that the gods do any of the following:

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<sup>18</sup> The scope of the claim about the gods and virtues in the *EN* is not clear. Aristotle calls many things divine—the planets, the Olympian gods (which may or may not exist), Heracles. When he claims that the gods do not have the virtues it is not clear whether he means to say that nothing that is divine has virtues, or only that some divine things do not have the virtues. I shall assume that he means that nothing divine has the virtues. At the same time, I think the claim is of particular interest with respect to one divine thing, the first principle of *Meta*. 1072b13–14, which is an unmoved mover, but also good.

make contracts or repay deposits; undertake frightening things or run risks; give away money; act temperately. It is ridiculous for reasons that are fundamental but prosaic: the gods do not have money, nor do they have unworthy appetites. Aristotle concludes that because the things concerned with actions (τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις) are small and unworthy of gods, the gods cannot engage in such actions. Hence they cannot have the virtues associated with such actions, the moral virtues: the gods cannot be just or courageous, generous or moderate in physical pleasures. Neither, of course, can the gods be vicious in any way; the point is *not* that the gods have some incapacity for exercising virtue. It is rather that the issue of virtue or vice does not come up for the gods in the way that it does for us, because their lives are so radically different from ours that no opportunity presents itself which requires the moral virtues.

The difference between the kind of life we lead and the kind led by the gods has everything to do with our nature: we have bodies and suffer passions, and as a result take actions which manifest, or fail to manifest, the virtues appropriate to beings with bodies and passions. Aristotle is clear that it is because the moral virtues and the intellectual virtue of *phronêsis* are connected with passions that they belong to us as composites of body and soul; and, most importantly for my purposes here, that the moral virtues and *phronêsis* are as a result *human* virtues (1178a19–22). He adds that the virtue of *nous* is separate.<sup>19</sup> So it is because the gods do not have bodies, are not composites of soul and body, and therefore do not have passions, that they do not have virtues.

A little later, at 1178b3–5 Aristotle emphasizes this distinction between the moral virtues and their requirements and the virtue of *nous*. He suggests not only that such things as money, physical strength, and the opportunity to enjoy physical pleasures are unnecessary for

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<sup>19</sup> Interestingly, because they take the point about intellectual virtue to be an analogy, Gauthier and Jolif 1970 do not take seriously the claim that god does not have moral virtue: “Dès lors, le cas des vertus morales n’est pas autre: il est trop évident que Dieu ne les possède pas *comme nous*; mais il ne suit pas de là qu’on ne puisse les transposer en lui analogiquement, exactement comme on le fait pour la pensée . . .” But transposing the moral virtues to Aristotle’s god (despite Saints Augustine and Thomas Aquinas) is much more difficult than transposing the intellectual virtue of *nous*, requiring much more manipulation. In particular, the obstacle is that Aristotle argues that the very things which are necessary for the practice of the moral virtues are impediments to *nous*.

the activity of contemplation (τὴν θεωρίαν), but that they are positive hindrances to that activity. This is important if the life of the gods is to be better than ours, as it must be. The material conditions for the exercise of moral virtues must be not just things that the gods as a matter of fact do not have, but things that the gods could not have, and could not want to have, because their possession would in some way interfere with the life of a god, the exercise of *nous* or contemplation.

I want to insist on two points in this first argument (the argument at *EN* 10. 8 1178b7ff.) to show that the gods do not have virtue, before turning to the second argument for the same conclusion. The first point is that the gods do not have the virtues because they do not *do* the sorts of things, or do not *have* the sorts of things, that are necessary for the practice of the moral virtues; and that Aristotle here treats doing such things and having such things not just as inferior to a life of contemplation but as in some way *incompatible* with a life of contemplation. The second point in this first argument that I want to emphasize is that there is only one moral or intellectual virtue which the gods might have: the virtue of *nous*. That is, the claim is not that the gods cannot have the moral virtues, but can have the intellectual virtues; the claim is rather that the gods cannot have any of the virtues of a person, moral or intellectual, with the sole exception of *nous*.

The second argument to show that the gods do not have virtue is at *EN* 1.12 1101b10ff. Aristotle asks whether happiness is among things that are praised (τῶν ἐπαινετῶν) or among those that are honored (τῶν τιμίων), and concludes that it ought to be honored rather than praised. Honoring involves calling things blessed and happy; praising seems to be a matter of calling things virtuous or excellent.<sup>20</sup> The passage establishes that the things we praise are those which are in some way referred to or relative to something else (πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν). So, for example, we praise the courageous person and more generally we praise the good or virtue because of actions and deeds (διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα); the suggestion is that the virtuous person and virtue itself are relative to the actions performed by

<sup>20</sup> Gauthier and Jolif (*ad* 1101b24) point out that the term μακαρίζειν means to call someone a μάκαρ, which is to say 'happy like a god'. To be a μάκαρ is to have knowledge of god, whether that knowledge is acquired by the revelation of the mysteries, or by philosophy.

that person or the actions which manifest that virtue. Those things we honor are, on the other hand, 'complete' (τῶν τιμίων καὶ τελείων). To say that the things we honor are complete is to say that they are those things by reference to which we measure or judge the things praised (πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι) (1101b30–1).<sup>21</sup> God is among the things we honor rather than praise (along with the good); whereas virtue is among the things we praise.<sup>22</sup> This suggests that the gods do not have virtues. If the gods were to have virtues, then we would praise the gods, since we praise those with virtues. But we do not praise the gods; rather, we honor them. Hence the gods do not have virtues.

The point of the passage is to demonstrate that happiness is complete; that it is honored rather than praised is evidence of this. Aristotle in this context says that happiness itself is a principle, an ἀρχή, in the sense that it is for the sake of happiness that we do everything else. This argument gives content to the notion of the complete or non-relative good: it is what other things are for the sake of. Now, virtues are relative to something absolute. So virtuous activities are relative, to the good or to happiness, because they are for the sake of something else (as well as themselves), that is, for the sake of the good or of happiness; and virtue itself is thus relative to the good or to happiness. That god is not praised but honored means that god is not relative to something else, and that means that god is not for the sake of something else. We are perhaps then justified in assuming that if god is not for the sake of something else it is because god's activities, whatever constitutes god's life, are not conducted for the sake of something else. Notice that while this means that the gods cannot employ themselves as people do in activities which are for the sake of something else (namely, happiness), it leaves open the possibility that the gods engage in some activity which,

<sup>21</sup> At *EN* 3.5 1114a23–30 Aristotle, in the discussion of the voluntary, says that we blame those vices of body and soul that we acquire voluntarily, but not those that we have by nature (the implication is also that we praise those virtues that we acquire voluntarily). This point is not of course incompatible with Aristotle's claims here.

<sup>22</sup> Notice that it is not only virtue as a disposition that is good relative to something else (namely virtue in act) but also individual acts of virtue are good relative to virtue as such. Gauthier and Jolif (*ad* 1101b24) take the contrast case to be complete human virtue: "l'activité vertueuse totale qui est le bonheur et surtout la contemplation qui en est le sommet et qui est le bonheur achevé . . . est un bien absolu".

while not strictly virtuous, is the perfect or complete manifestation of imperfect or relative activities, activities which do count as virtuous. My point is that the life of *nous* as lived by the gods is not a life of human virtue, but it is a life that is the perfect manifestation of what in a human life can only be realized imperfectly.

From these two arguments we can see that the claim that the gods do not have virtue is complex. Each argument contributes one part of what I take to be a single explanation. The argument at 1.12 makes the fundamental point that the gods are good in a way that is not relative to anything else, or measured in terms of anything else, but is somehow absolute and a standard or measure for other kinds of goodness. Now, the goodness bestowed by virtue is relative to, or for the sake of, something else. So the goodness of gods cannot be a question of virtue. The argument at 10.8 suggests that it is because the life of the gods is different from ours in basic ways that their goodness is non-relative. The perfect and non-relative goodness of the gods is a function of the nature of the activity of god, an activity which is not for the sake of something else. This activity not only does not require a body and the passions which accompany the possession of a body, it requires in fact that a god should not have a body and passions. This means that it is because the goodness of the gods is perfect and non-relative that the gods do not perform the sorts of actions which call for moral virtues or any of the virtues of the λογιστικόν part of the rational faculty. They do not perform those sorts of actions because of the kind of being a god is: a being without a body, and without passions. It is because of what gods do not have that they do not have virtues. It is not just that they do not have bodies, money, or unworthy appetites; more importantly it is that they are not the kind of being who could have any of these things, or for whom any of these things would count as a good.

Before continuing, let me mention a third argument, at *EN* 5.9 1137a26ff., also intended to show that the gods do not have virtues. It is an argument that seems to reiterate the point of the second argument, and yet in doing so conflicts with the first. Aristotle specifies that just acts (τὰ δίκαια) are concerned with absolute goods, and involve too much or too little (ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τοῦτοις καὶ ἔλλειψιν) of such goods. He claims that justice, or just acts are peculiarly human (ἀνθρώπινον). A distinction is drawn between three classes of beings: those who can have too much or too little of things that are absolutely

good, those for whom there is no excess of absolute goods, and those to whom the absolute goods offer no benefit at all, to whom the absolute goods are even harmful. The first class consists of people. In the second class Aristotle includes the gods (qualifying this with a 'perhaps'). The third class is the class of bestial beings that Aristotle distinguishes from the vicious, incontinent, continent and virtuous at *EN* 7.1 1145a22–7.<sup>23</sup> In this context, bestial beings seem to be something other than people (rather than particularly bad people), just as the gods are something other than people. Aristotle's point in saying that justice is human is that only people can be just or unjust, and so both the gods and the bestial beings must be something other than people.

The argument then is that the gods do not have justice, because justice is a matter of ensuring that the right quantity of absolute goods is distributed, but the right amount depends on there being too much or too little in a given case, and since the gods can never have too much of any absolute good, there is no right amount in their case, and hence no justice. The argument may appear to be strange; what could the gods possibly be receiving? We would expect Aristotle to say that the gods cannot be said to be just or unjust not because they cannot have too many good things, but rather because they have nothing to distribute and nothing to receive. That is, we would expect him to argue as he does at 1178b, that justice is human because entering into contracts and giving and receiving are small matters, beneath the gods. However, he does not so argue, nor is he making the point of the argument at 1101b10ff., that the activity of the god is something perfect and complete, and not something for the sake of something else. The point is rather that there can be no excess with respect to anything unqualifiedly good in the case of the gods. The strangeness of this argument can, I think, be attributed to the gods Aristotle has in mind here. Whatever divine beings they are, they do not include the first divine principle which Aristotle identifies with the good and with *nous*. It is an argument in which

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<sup>23</sup> In this passage, Aristotle reports that "they say that gods come to be from people through an excess of virtue". This of course suggests that gods are virtuous, indeed supremely virtuous. But Aristotle goes on to contradict this view, saying (although there is no argument here) that just as bestial beings are neither virtuous nor bad, so too gods are neither virtuous nor bad, but in a state that is more honorable than virtue.

we find Aristotle incorporating traditional or conventional views of the gods (specifically, the idea that they act in the ways that we do and that they are just like people, only better and eternal), views that he explicitly rejects in other passages.<sup>24</sup> In this sense it is anomalous with respect to the first two arguments we have considered.

If we consider these arguments to show that the gods do not have moral virtues, we see that Aristotle's reasons for this conclusion are not what they might first appear to be. It is true, of course, that the gods cannot die, and that they have no body and no passions. And it is true that in order to have *andreia* one must have a body and death must be a possibility. But these are not the fundamental reasons that the gods cannot have *andreia*. Rather, the gods cannot have *andreia* because they cannot act for the sake of the noble. Indeed, they cannot act for the sake of anything else at all. They act for their own sake, and their actions are noble because they themselves are noble.

### 5. Conclusion

I have tried to show that the most basic, although not the only, reason that gods, on the one hand, and women and slaves, on the other, cannot have *andreia* properly speaking, is that *andreia* requires that one adopt a certain attitude to fear and confidence in the face of what is most terrible, and that one do so for the sake of the noble. Since, for different reasons, neither natural subjects nor gods can act for the sake of the noble, neither can have *andreia*.

### *Appendix on the status of the deliberative faculties of women*

Both prevailing lines of interpretation on the status of the deliberative faculties of women are problematic. The first, according to which Aristotle means to say that the deliberative faculty of women is without authority relative to the faculty of appetite and desire, so that deliberative reason in women is easily overcome by some appetite or desire, lacks textual authority. Aristotle does not say or imply that women have difficulty mastering their emotions. (But see Modrak 1994, 213, who argues that Aristotle does say things which suggest

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<sup>24</sup> See *Meta.* 12.8 1074b1–14. See also Verdenius 1960.

that women cannot control their appetites.) Moreover, it leads to philosophical problems. If this is what he meant, then he could not distinguish women from 'akratics', and yet he needs to if he is to attribute virtue to women, as he does. If women as a group cannot submit their appetites to reason (even if the reason is not their own), then women as a group cannot be virtuous; and yet we know that Aristotle wishes to claim that they can be virtuous.

The line of interpretation according to which the deliberative faculty of women is without authority relative to the deliberative faculty of men, in the context of city life, has certain advantages. If Aristotle means only that women do not have authority in political contexts and relative to men, then he seems to be making an empirical point: as a matter of fact, men do not accept the rational authority of women—but this is just a matter of custom. This interpretation accords with Aristotle's usage of ἄκυρος elsewhere, where he applies it, for example, to superseded contracts and inoperative laws. This is the one occurrence of ἄκυρος in the *Politics*. It occurs in nine other passages in the corpus, twice in the *Rhetoric* (1376b12; 1376b27), once in the *EN* (1151b15), three times in the zoological works (*GA* 772b27; 778a1; *MA* 698b7) and three times in the *Constitution of Athens* (45.3.4; 68.3.4; 68.4.11). In the *Rhetoric* it is a contract or business arrangement which is said to be ἄκυρος, and the sense is clearly 'without binding force' or 'invalid'. The one instance of ἄκυρος in the *EN* is closely related; the arguments or opinions of a person are said to be ἄκυρα like ψηφίσματα: Gauthier and Jolif translate it "nuls et non avenues". Again, the instances in the *Constitution of Athens* are similar—in one case the Council is said to be ἄκυρος in the sense that it does not have jurisdiction; in the two other cases, in the same passage where Aristotle discusses voting procedures for juries, he refers to one ballot box as ἄκυρος, and to the ballots which are deposited in this box as ἄκυροι. The box which is κύριος is distinguished from one which is ἄκυρος by its material (wood rather than bronze); this evidently does not affect its function, but serves only to make it identifiable; and nothing at all distinguishes the κύριος ψηφός from the one which is ἄκυρος, except the box into which it is deposited. All this suggests that ἄκυρος means 'without authority' when the absence of authority is due not to any incapacity on the part of that which is ἄκυρος, but simply to convention. It also makes some sense of the surprising passage at 1.12 1259b1–10 where Aristotle claims that men rule women 'constitutionally': "For although there



may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by nature fitter for command than the female, just as the elder and full grown is superior to the younger and more immature. But in most constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all. Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavor to create a difference of outward forms and names and titles of respect, which may be illustrated by the saying of Amasis about his foot-pan. The relation of the male to the female is always of this kind.” If women are free (except, presumably, those who are natural slaves), then the rule of men over women is like constitutional rule, except that the roles of ruler and ruled are fixed. What is surprising in the passage is, first, the claim that there can be free persons who are naturally subject to other free persons; second, the claim that the rule of men over women is ‘political’—since in the *EN* Aristotle has characterized it as aristocratic in the sense that it is based on merit (8.10 1160b32–3; 8.11 1161a22–3). That men rule over women because they are somehow better makes better sense of the claim that women have a deliberative faculty that is somehow deficient, particularly if that claim is that the deficiency is natural.

This second interpretation has then the serious difficulty that it is incompatible with Aristotle’s reiterated claim that women are ‘naturally’ subject to men. If men and women are equals, if the lack of authority is customary rather than natural, then women should not be subject to men by nature. Yet, as we have seen, Aristotle says that they are naturally subject to men. Any interpretation of the claim that women have a deliberative faculty without authority then has to overcome the serious difficulty of accommodating two claims that are incompatible: that the rule of men over women is ‘constitutional’ (which suggests a rule of equal over equal) and the claim that women are natural subjects. I do not believe this difficulty can be overcome.

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## CHAPTER ELEVEN

### PARADOXICAL *ANDREIA*: SOCRATIC ECHOES IN STOIC 'MANLY COURAGE'

Helen Cullyer

#### 1. *Introduction*

From the classical period onward *andreia* was commonly understood as the part of human *aretê* that consists of daring (*tolma*) and endurance or perseverance (*karteria*) when manifested in the male spheres of war and politics. An individual could not be described as *andreios* unless he had performed certain courageous actions, and the opportunities for *andreia* were thus limited. These conclusions echo the sentiment of Smoes 1995 that courage is for the Greeks 'un phénomène public'.<sup>1</sup> The suggestion of Plato's Socrates and assertion of the early Stoics that *andreia* is knowledge, is, therefore, surprising and problematic on several counts. For these philosophers appear to wrench *andreia* away from the public realm, and to locate it instead within the psyche of the individual.

In this chapter, I consider the Socratic origins and the Stoic reception of the fundamental questions raised by intellectualist conceptions of *andreia*.<sup>2</sup> In the first part of this chapter (section 2), I address the philosophical coherence of the Socratic and Stoic conceptions of courage. If *andreia*, along with the other virtues, is ethical knowledge, is there any meaningful way in which courage is distinct from temperance, or justice, or any of the other *aretai*? I argue that the Stoics are able to answer this question, which is raised but not satisfactorily answered in Plato's early dialogues, especially the *Laches*. In the second part of this chapter (section 3), I address the relation of the

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<sup>1</sup> Smoes 1995, 282.

<sup>2</sup> It is well known that Socrates serves as the ethical paradigm for Hellenistic schools and sects as diverse as Stoics and Cyrenaics, and that the Stoics in particular owe to Socrates a doctrinal inheritance. See in particular Long 1988, 1993, and Striker 1994.

Socratic and Stoic conceptions of courage to common conceptions of *andreia* in the ancient world. I show that the Stoic and Socratic conceptions of *andreia* are less idiosyncratic than they first appear, and in fact support a familiar Greek ethical paradigm, which is active, communal and manly, and which embraces a heroic standard of conduct. I argue, however, that some of the Stoic concessions to common conceptions of *andreia* actually undermine strict Stoic dogma. I conclude that Stoic *andreia* is a phenomenon whose paradoxical spirit echoes that of Socrates and his doctrines as portrayed in the early Platonic corpus. While some of these Stoic paradoxes are merely superficial and were created quite deliberately by the Stoics to spur on their pupils to inquiry, others, I believe, were quite unconscious, and illuminate some significant inconsistencies in Stoic doctrine.

## 2. *The Unity of Virtue and Andreia*

The final argument of Plato's *Laches* ends in *aporia*. The agreed conclusion that courage is moral knowledge raises a severe problem. For if courage is moral knowledge, courage turns out to be the whole of virtue, rather than one distinct virtue. The Stoic Chrysippus adopts the Socratic suggestion that courage is knowledge, but also defends the common-sense position that each cardinal virtue is qualitatively distinct. I argue here that Chrysippus endorses premises either identical to, or at least very similar to, each of those in the final argument of the *Laches* (2.1–2.2). I also argue that Chrysippus provides a subtle explanation of the relationship of the virtues to each other, whereby *andreia* is, in a sense, the whole of virtue, yet is also a specific *poiôtês* (a 'quality' or 'suchness') which is only one part or aspect of that condition which is virtue itself (2.3–2.5). Thus the paradoxical close to Plato's *Laches* is explained by Chrysippus, but also superficially preserved in a genuinely Socratic manner.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> I should make it clear here that we have no ancient evidence that Chrysippus acknowledged his debt to the *Laches*, nor is it important for my argument that Chrysippus should have conceived of himself as responding to the *Laches* in his discussion of *andreia*. However, I do want to claim that Chrysippus was influenced and inspired by his reading of the *Laches* and other Platonic dialogues. We do know that Chrysippus was an avid and sometimes critical reader of Plato. He seems to

2.1 *The Final Argument of the Laches*

Nicias suggests, following something that he has heard from Socrates on a previous occasion, that courage is a kind of knowledge. As Nicias' response is validated by Socrates' authority, one might expect that the response would yield a satisfactory definition of *andreia*, unlike the previous suggestions of Laches. Laches' first attempt to define the virtue as 'fighting with the enemy and not abandoning one's post' (Pl. *Laches* 190e) is rejected by Socrates, who holds that *andreia* is a psychic disposition rather than a certain type of action. Laches' second attempt to define *andreia*, this time as 'endurance of the soul' and more precisely as 'wise endurance' (Pl. *Laches* 192c, 192d), fails because Socrates shows him that the 'foolish' endurance of those acting without technical skill or factual knowledge is sometimes more courageous than the endurance of the knowledgeable. However, though Nicias' suggestion is promising, he and Socrates soon run into trouble. I summarize the final argument (Pl. *Laches* 196dff.) below:

1. Courage is knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope.
  2. Courage is a part of virtue.
  3. Courage is knowledge of future goods (hopeful things) and future evils (fearful things).
  4. The same knowledge has understanding of the same things whether past, present, or future.
  5. Courage is knowledge of goods and evils in past, present, and future.
  6. Virtue is knowledge of goods and evils in past, present, and future
  7. Courage is the whole of virtue.
- BUT Courage is a part of virtue (2)

Modern scholars have proposed various solutions to the final contradiction, but most have argued that the reader is to understand that one of the premises of the argument is to be rejected.<sup>4</sup> I do

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have drawn on Plato's *Timaeus* for his own cosmological theory and reacted critically to Plato's account of justice in the *Republic*. See Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnantiis* 1052C–D (= *SVF* 2.604 = LS 64e), and 1040A (= *SVF* 3.313); cf. *De communibus notitiis* (1070E–F = *SVF* 3.455).

<sup>4</sup> For Kraut 1984 and Vlastos 1981, Plato's Socrates does indeed think that

not intend to evaluate the modern reactions to the final argument of the *Laches*, but I hope to show that the Stoic reaction to the problem differs significantly from any modern interpretation.

## 2.2 *Chrysippus' Dilemma*

The Stoic Chrysippus appears to be caught in the dilemma of the *Laches* in that he holds both that courage is the whole of virtue and that courage is a qualitatively distinct part of virtue. For the early Stoics virtue, like the *hégemonikon* of the soul itself, is a unity. Virtue is knowledge, the power to make 'strong' assents to hormetic action-guiding impressions of the type 'x is to-be-endured', or 'x is to-be-chosen'.<sup>5</sup> 'Strong' here is to be understood objectively in that the assents made are unable to be reversed by any argument brought to bear against them. Moreover, the wise man's assents are made to propositions that are true. It is the sage's recognition of the truth, consistency, and rational justification of certain propositions which makes his assents strong.

But how do the individual virtues fit into this picture? The unity of the virtues appears to be validated by the account of the four cardinal virtues (wisdom, temperance, courage, and justice) in the summary of Stoic ethics in Stobaeus' *Eclogae*. The cardinal virtues, though defined differently, are all 'knowledges' or 'skills', which share both their end and their theorems (Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 2.63.7).<sup>6</sup> Though the virtues differ in their primary points (*kephalaia*), each virtue includes, as secondary theorems within in its own system, those of the other

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courage is a part of virtue, and thus recognizes that the all-inclusive definition of courage given is in some way insufficient. Penner 1973, 1992, drawing on comparative evidence from other early Platonic dialogues, especially the *Protagoras*, argues that the only premise that Plato's Socrates cannot endorse is premise two. For courage, justice, temperance, and all the other ethical excellences are, on the view of Plato's Socrates, knowledge of good and evil, though the identity, argues Penner, is one of reference and not of meaning. Thus Socrates is not denying that the virtues have different definitions, though he does claim that all the terms refer to the same state of soul. For Devereux 1977, following Bonitz, the absurd conclusion points to Plato's criticism of the historical Socrates' claim that virtue is knowledge; a claim which destroys the differences between the virtues.

<sup>5</sup> An assent to an impression constitutes a voluntary acceptance of it. An act of assent in the case of a hormetic impression is both a belief and an impulse to act.

<sup>6</sup> References to Stobaeus' *Eclogae* use the volume, page, and line number of Wachsmuth and Hense's edition [1884–1912].

virtues (ibid. 2.63.10–25). The primary points of wisdom are to contemplate and consider what is to be done; of temperance to keep impulses stable and to contemplate the impulses; of courage to consider what is to be endured; of justice to consider what each person merits. Chrysippus defines *andreia* as “knowledge of what is to be endured, of what is not to be endured, and what falls into neither class” (Philo, *Allegories of the Laws* 1.68 = *SVF* 3.263), or “knowledge of things terrible, of things not-terrible, and of things which fall into neither class” (Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 2.59.9 = *SVF* 3.262). In terms of Stoic value theory, since only virtue and those things which partake of it are good, and only vice and those things which partake of it are bad, while everything else is indifferent, the threefold division of these definitions can be understood as “knowledge of good things, of bad things, and of indifferent things”. This appears to be exhaustive of moral knowledge just like the definition of courage at the end of the *Laches*. This Stoic thesis of unity generates a very strong version of the inter-entailment thesis of the virtues. Not only does the possession of one virtue entail the possession of all the others, but also every virtuous action is performed in accordance with all the virtues (Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnantiis* 1046E–F; Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 2.63.8–10).

Yet Chrysippus was so keen to stress the differences between the virtues that he wrote two books on the subject; *On the Differences between the Virtues* and *Concerning the fact that the Virtues are Qualities* (Diogenes Laertius 7.202). The second title seems to be explicated by testimony from Galen that Chrysippus explained the multiplicity of virtues by appealing not to “relative disposition . . . but to a qualitative difference of the substances with which they belong” (Galen, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* 7.586 = LS 29E). Chrysippus, then, wanted the multiplicity of virtue terms to reflect an ontological reality. Individuals are qualified by the corporeal virtues, each of which is a peculiar quality.<sup>7</sup> This view clearly distinguishes him from Aristo

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<sup>7</sup> Quality, or more strictly the qualified, is the second genus of corporeal existing things in Stoic ontology. The Stoics are careful not to confuse linguistic entities with the psychic qualities that they signify. The Stoics draw a threefold distinction between signifier (a corporeal utterance), name-bearer (the external corporeal object), and the *lekton* (incorporeal signification). When a subject is paired with a predicate, the meaning of the whole proposition (for example, ‘Cato is courageous’ or ‘courage is wisdom’) constitutes a complete *lekton*. Courage, a corporeal quality of psychic



of Chios who held that virtue is one thing but can be used in different ways, and from Menedemus who held that there is one single virtue, wisdom, called by many names (Plutarch, *De virtute morali* 440E—441D).<sup>8</sup> However, despite the fact that Chrysippus held that every virtuous action is performed in accordance with every virtue, he also wrote that “the virtuous man is not always acting bravely (*andrizesthai*), nor is the vicious man always acting in a cowardly manner, since it is when certain things arise in their impressions that the former must remain steadfast and the latter back away” (Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnantiis* 1046F = *SVF* 3.243 = *LS* 61F).<sup>9</sup> Surveying all this evidence together, it is hard to resist the conclusion that Chrysippus is caught in exactly the same dilemma in which Socrates and his interlocutors find themselves at the end of the *Laches*. On the one hand, *andreia* appears to be the whole of virtue, and every virtuous action a courageous action. On the other hand, Chrysippus wants to maintain that *andreia* is a peculiar quality, and that the virtuous agent is not always acting courageously, though he is surely always acting virtuously. Is there a way out of this dilemma? Or is Chrysippus caught, as Plutarch believes, in an ineluctable self-contradiction?

### 2.3 *A Preliminary Solution to the Dilemma*

I shall begin by investigating the significance of the strong version of the inter-entailment thesis, that every virtuous action is done in accordance with all the virtues, and its relation to Chrysippus’ claim that the sage is not always acting courageously. Long and Sedley 1987 dissolve the tension in the following way. They argue that

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*pneuma*, is itself a cause of the incomplete incorporeal *lekton* ‘is courageous’ (see Sluiter 2000).

<sup>8</sup> Zeno is problematic in this regard. Plutarch (*De Stoicorum repugnantiis* 1043C) reports that Zeno held that there were four cardinal virtues which were inseparable but distinct, but yet defined courage as ‘prudence in matters requiring endurance’ and justice as ‘prudence in matters requiring distributions’. Thus, Plutarch complains, though Zeno held the virtues to be distinct, the definitions imply that the virtues are actually one thing, prudence, and derive different meanings from the different circumstances in which prudence can be exhibited. It is probable that Zeno’s position was not fully worked out, and that Chrysippus felt that his theory of the virtues was an explication of Zeno’s treatment, rather than an innovation.

<sup>9</sup> It should be noted that several editors have suggested emending the text after ‘since’ (*hōs*), but I retain, with Long and Sedley 1987, the reading of the mss: *hōs deon en phantasiais epipheromenōn tinōn*.

although an action may be described primarily as courageous or courageously performed, the act is not performed in a way that is inconsistent with wisdom, temperance and justice, since the theorems of courage itself include the theorems of the other virtues.<sup>10</sup> However, recently John Cooper 1998 has suggested a more radical interpretation. He argues that Chrysippus' virtues are not to be consigned to one sphere or type of action, but rather that "each virtue has a specific task in the formation of any and every virtuous action as such". Although the virtues remain qualitatively distinct in that each retains its own 'primary perspective', in every action the sage must take into account what is to be done, what each person merits, how to keep impulses steady, and what is to be endured. All virtues are actively in play all the time. I shall argue here that Cooper's interpretation does not account satisfactorily for Chrysippus' statement that the wise man is not always acting courageously. I shall suggest an alternative explanation of the distinct nature of *andreia* that takes into account both Plutarch's testimony and the close association of *andreia* and *sôphrosunê*.

In support of Cooper's reading are Chrysippus' definitions of courage and its subordinate virtues. It is clear that the Stoic definitions permit an interpretation of *andreia* as broad as the one envisioned by Socrates at *Laches* 191d–e. Socrates states that courage is not only exhibited in war, and that it is a quality manifested by "those who are clever at fighting desire and pleasure, whether by standing their ground or running away", as well as by those who endure fear and pain. The definitions of Chrysippus, attested in Stobaeus, make no reference to a martial context for bravery, nor do they (with the exception of *tharraleotês*) rule out the possibility that bravery concerns not only circumstances which are likely to inspire fear and pain in the non-virtuous, but also circumstances which may inspire desire and pleasure in the ignorant.<sup>11</sup> In Stoic terms, courage may be exhibited when 'preferred indifferents' (apparent goods) or 'dispreferred

<sup>10</sup> Long and Sedley 1987, I.38

<sup>11</sup> *Andreia* (courage): knowledge of things terrible, of things not-terrible, and of things which fall into neither class (Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 2.59.10–11). Virtues subordinate to *andreia* (Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 2.61.12–62.2): *karteria* (perseverance) is knowledge disposed to abide by things judged correctly; *tharraleotês* (confidence) is knowledge by which we know that we will not suffer anything terrible; *megalopsukhia* (greatness of soul) is knowledge which puts us above those things that happen naturally to

indifferents' (apparent evils) are either present or expected.<sup>12</sup> The potentially wide and Socratic scope of Stoic *andreia* makes it more likely that courage is indeed involved in every virtuous action.

Yet Cooper's interpretation clearly runs into trouble when we consider the passage from Plutarch (LS 61F). If courage is in play all the time, how can it be that the sage is not always acting bravely (*andrizesthai*)? Cooper himself addresses this by glossing *andrizesthai* as "acting when the higher reaches of courage's knowledge have been brought into play".<sup>13</sup> But what in our sources corresponds to the 'higher reaches' of courage's knowledge? The 'higher reaches' cannot be the primary points (*kephalaia*) of courage, since on Cooper's view all the main points of each virtue are at work in the exercise of each virtuous action. The concept of 'higher reaches' seems alien to our Greek sources.

We must look, therefore, for an alternative interpretation of *andrizesthai*. The verb is rare and sometimes means "to play the part of a brave man" (see Plato, *Theaetetus* 151d; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1115b4). This may suggest that Chrysippus means nothing more than that the sage's bravery may not always be manifest to others, since he only 'performs' like a courageous man in certain dangerous circumstances, though of course in reality psychic courage is involved in every virtuous action that he performs, even when it is not apparent. However, Plutarch's testimony suggests something else. For he states that according to Chrysippus, the sage does not always act bravely nor the vicious man in a cowardly manner "since it is only when certain things arise in their impressions that the former must remain steadfast and the latter back away". It is this last

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both good and bad people; *eupsukhia* (soundness of soul) is knowledge of the soul which makes itself unconquerable; *philoponia* (love of toil) is knowledge productive of the things lying before one; knowledge which is not thwarted by toil.

<sup>12</sup> The Stoic class of preferred indifferents includes apparent goods of the soul, body, and things external to the soul and body, while dispreferred indifferents are their opposites. The class of preferred indifferents is roughly congruent with Aristotle's 'goods of fortune' and what he terms *ta ekstos agatha*. This latter phrase most often refers to any goods external to the soul (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1099a31; 1098b26, *Eudemian Ethics* 1218b32), as Cooper 1985 notes. The Stoics include within the class of preferred indifferents of the soul, 'moral advancement', which Aristotle would not count as one of the 'external goods' on any interpretation of the phrase. Though preferred indifferents do have some value they are neither constituents of nor instrumental to *eudaimonia*. They are strictly incommensurable with genuine goods.

<sup>13</sup> Cooper 1998, 259 n. 36.

clause which is crucial to understanding the qualitative distinctness of *andreia*, on Chrysippus' view. It suggests that the *kephalaia* (primary points) of courage are only triggered by certain impressions. For the primary theorems of courage to be activated, the type of action-guiding activating impression, according to the definitions of *andreia* (see page 216f. above), will surely be 'x is-to-be endured/not-to-be-endured'. I take it that a thing which is not terrible (*ou deinon*) is judged 'to-be-endured' by the wise agent, while a thing that is terrible (*deinon*) is judged 'not to-be-endured'. Courage's 'secondary theorems', the *kephalaia* of the other virtues, will remain passive, unless they are activated by other impressions.

Of course, in many actions all the virtues, or many of them will be actively in play. In fact, it is certain that *phronêsis*, which deals with the 'nuts and bolts' of practical reasoning, is active all the time, and it is likely that *sôphrosunê*, whose concern is that impulses do not run out of control, is active most of the time. The spheres of justice and courage, however, seem more restricted. Pace Cooper, it is not the case that *andreia* is necessarily involved in every virtuous action, though of course, as Long and Sedley 1987 point out, it is the case that no virtuous action is performed with cowardice. There is a distinction between merely 'in accordance with courage' and 'acting courageously'.

This interpretation of the paradox perceived by Plutarch, moreover, makes good sense when we consider the similarities in the psychology of the sage and non-sage. Let us imagine a lone sage on the battlefield faced with an onslaught by a multitude of the enemy, and let us imagine that the concomitant circumstances are such that it is right for him to stand his ground. Courage comes into play here because the assent to the impression 'this is to-be-endured' overcomes both other hormetic impressions, such as 'death is to be avoided', and involuntary affects such as trembling and sweating, which the sage will suffer no less than the non-sage.<sup>14</sup> However, does

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<sup>14</sup> The 'involuntary affects' which I refer to here are the so-called *propatheiai*. Seneca describes such affects in the *De Ira* as the first stage of the development of *pathos*: "the first movement is involuntary, like a preparation for an emotion and a kind of threat" (Seneca, *De ira* 2.4.1). Since the *propatheiai* are involuntary, the sage may suffer them but retain his virtue intact. Though some scholars have argued that the *propatheiai* are a Posidonian innovation, Graver 1999 argues convincingly that the theory may go all the way back to Chrysippus.

this theory of activating impressions mean that the scope of Stoic *andreia* is not, in fact, so wide as that envisioned by Socrates in the *Laches*? Does Stoic bravery actually only concern the expectation and presence of apparently bad things; things which inspire fear and grief respectively in the non-sage? If the scope of Stoic *andreia* is as wide as that envisioned by Socrates in the *Laches*, how is *andreia* distinct from *sôphrosunê*?

## 2.4 *Andreia and Sôphrosunê*

The close association between courage and *sôphrosunê* in Stoic theory is illuminated by an example in which both virtues are exhibited in the same action.<sup>15</sup> Let us imagine a sage engaged in some civil service for his state who perceives that there is an opportunity to take a peaceful vacation in the country, though such a vacation is inappropriate in the circumstances. He will surely judge that his present service is ‘to-be-endured’ and will not form an irrational desire for the vacation. This is because despite the fact that he construes the vacation as ‘preferred’, he judges his continued service as reasonable, all things considered, and “what is reasonable is endurable” (Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.2.1). The close association of courage and temperance is also apparent in Plato’s *Laches*, in which, as Gould 1987 notes, the scope of *andreia* is so wide that courage and *sôphrosunê* appear to be conflated.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, as Joseph Roisman points out (this volume), the connection between *andreia* and *sôphrosunê* was exploited in the rhetoric of the Athenian orators as the virtuous antithesis of a corrupt form of courage, thoughtless audacity.

Given this close connection between the virtues of temperance and courage, how are the two qualities distinct on the early Stoic view?

<sup>15</sup> Indeed, it is interesting to note that when the Stoic Panaetius diverges from the usual four cardinal virtues (prudence, temperance, courage and justice), his third cardinal virtue, *megalopsukhia*, at the core of which is a ‘despising of things external’, seems to have been a mixture of *andreia* and *sôphrosunê*, as Van Straaten 1946 observes. However, as Stephen White has pointed out to me, there also seems to be new emphasis on ‘greatness of soul’ as a civic and civil virtue in the Panaetian *De officiis*.

<sup>16</sup> The close connection between *andreia* and *sôphrosunê* is to be found in several other Platonic dialogues both early and late. In the *Charmides*, the topic is temperance, but the initial dramatic setting, Socrates’ return from Potidaea, is suggestive of Socrates’ own *andreia*. See also Plato, *Laws* 633d.

For as we have seen, Chrysippus was keen to stress the qualitative distinctness of the virtues. Temperance, according to Chrysippus, is concerned with "keeping impulses steady", that is with the avoidance of the four passions, lust, pleasure, fear, and grief, which have both affective and cognitive components.<sup>17</sup> The scope of *andreia* is arguably narrower. Courage, I think, is only exercised in the face of an involuntary loss, or voluntary renunciation of a significant amount of natural value (i.e. a potential loss of preferred things).<sup>18</sup> In fact, the impressions which initially activate courage are not 'x is to-be-endured', but rather impressions such as 'x is extremely dispreferred' or 'x is preferred, but much less preferred than y'.<sup>19</sup> In these cases, the natural response would be to form an impulse not to select x.<sup>20</sup> However, in situations where x cannot be avoided, or in situations where the natural disvalue of x is eclipsed by the value of some action that is deemed right by the theorems of the virtues, the loss of value is accepted and even embraced without grief or fear. For the loss is understood to be 'dispreferred', but known not to be truly bad. Thus the soldier who risks his life or the civil servant who renounces his vacation without fear, or even, to use another example, the mother who remembers the death of her child without grief all possess and manifest courage. However, in many situations, even those which call for the other virtues, no significant risk of loss is encountered and courage not employed. Yet even the most fortunate individual, whose life is unusually free from life's vicissitudes, will have need of courage at some time, if only when confronted with the inevitability of his or her own death. The Stoics agree with Socrates that the opportunities available for the exercise

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<sup>17</sup> For a full discussion of the relationship between thought and emotion in early Stoic thought see Brennan 1998.

<sup>18</sup> That the loss of natural value should be significant is, I think, shown by testimony from Plutarch. Chrysippus seems to have disapproved of the praising and honoring of trivial actions which are 'accidental' results (*tôn sumbainontôn*) of the virtues, for example, enduring the bite of a fly (Plutarch, *De communibus notitiis* 1061a; *De Stoicorum repugantiis* 1039a). Although all actions performed by the sage are equally right, enduring the bite of a fly presumably does not require the impression 'this is to-be-endured' to be consciously assented to by the sage.

<sup>19</sup> Many thanks to Stephen White for suggesting this point to me.

<sup>20</sup> According to Stoic theory, preferred and dispreferred indifferents are productive of impulse. Preferred indifferents which are 'in accordance with nature' are 'to-be-selected' and dispreferred indifferents which are 'contrary to nature' are 'to-be-deselected' or 'not-to-be-taken' (Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 2.82, 20–1).

and manifestation of courage are universal. We will investigate later how far the Stoics hold to this doctrine consistently.

### 2.5 *The Stoic Solution to the Laches*

We noted that Chrysippus finds himself in the same dilemma as Socrates and his interlocutors at the end of the *Laches*. On the one hand, *andreia* appears to be the whole of virtue, and every virtuous action a courageous action. On the other hand, it is argued that *andreia* is a qualitatively distinct virtue, and that the virtuous agent is not always acting courageously. The Stoic dilemma is brought out particularly in the testimony of Plutarch (*De Stoicorum repugnantiis* 1046f). I rejected Cooper's explanation (1998) of the qualitative distinctness of *andreia*, since it cannot account satisfactorily for Chrysippus' assertion that the "wise man is not always acting courageously". I argued instead that the "wise man does not always act courageously" because 'acting courageously' is understood as acting when the primary theorems are activated by certain impressions. The qualitative distinctness of courage is constituted by its unique sensitivity to the potential loss or renunciation of a significant amount of natural value. *Andreia* is the whole of moral knowledge, to the extent that it itself includes the theorems of the other virtues which it may potentially need in order to decide what is and what is not 'to-be-endured'. But, in so far as *andreia* has its own perspective, and in so far as *andreia* does not necessarily play an active role in every moral decision, it is merely a part of virtue. In the following section, I investigate how far the Stoic view harmonises with common conceptions of *andreia*, and how far Stoic theory is consistent with Stoic *exempla* of *andreia* in action.

### 3. *Andreia, Public Life and Heroism*

For the Stoics, as for Plato's Socrates, knowledge is necessary and sufficient for a courageous disposition. Stoic psychology provides the theoretical grounding for this assertion.<sup>21</sup> Is this internalization of

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<sup>21</sup> As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the impressions with which ethical knowledge is concerned are hormetic impressions, i.e. those with some action-guiding

*andreia* completely at odds with the ancient emphasis on *andreia* as action in the public sphere.<sup>22</sup> Two considerations may suggest that the Stoic conception of *andreia* is particularly non-traditional. Firstly, the close connection between *andreia* and *sôphrosunê*, also apparent in Plato, suggests that *andreia* has become a 'quieter' virtue; a virtue of endurance and of self-control rather than of perseverance in action.<sup>23</sup> Secondly, according to Stoic value-theory, since virtue is the only true good and vice the only true evil, it seems that the Stoic brave man cares for nothing outside himself, and thus that virtue as a whole might appear 'lazy' and 'sluggish' (Nussbaum 1994). Finally, according to Stoic determinism, it can be objected (and was objected in antiquity), that since everything is fated, there is simply no point in battling an illness or an enemy. One should simply do nothing and let fate take its course (Cicero, *De fato* 28–30 = LS 55S). The last point is complex, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the full implications of Stoic determinism. However, it is clear that the Stoics can answer the first two points on several counts, and a consideration of the Stoic answers show that the Stoic conception of *andreia* is not so different from common conceptions as it might first appear.

The close connection between courage and temperance is not unknown in popular morality (see e.g. Joseph Roisman's paper in this volume), and one supposes a temperate and courageous abstention from the excessive *pathê* of grief and fear can itself count as an

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content, such as 'this is to-be-avoided' or 'this is to-be-chosen'. Individuals have the power to assent to, or to reject, impressions, and an assent to an hormetic impression is itself an impulse to act, a psychic movement which in the sage is strong and irreversible by any argument. There is thus no conceptual gap between judgment and desire (or to put it in Stoic terminology, between judgment and impulse). Moreover, the early Stoics held a doctrine of psychological monism such that there are no truly irrational faculties in or parts of the soul's *hêgemonikon*. Furthermore, the material *pneuma* of the soul stretches from the *hêgemonikon* located in the heart, throughout the whole body, with the result that every voluntary movement is either an act of the *hêgemonikon* itself, or at the very least an act of psychic *pneuma* which the *hêgemonikon* causes to move. Once an impulse is formed, appropriate bodily movements will ensue as the *pneuma* is moved in appropriate ways by the *pneuma* of the *hêgemonikon*.

<sup>22</sup> See, for example, the chapters of Harrell and Deslauriers in this volume.

<sup>23</sup> One might argue that endurance (*karteria*) has always been at the heart of *andreia*. However, as Gould 1987 points out, *karteria* can also mean 'perseverance', which suggests something rather more active and aggressive than passive and defensive 'endurance'. An example of the verbal form *karterein* can be found in this sense at *Laches* 192e2–3: "if a man were to persevere in spending his money wisely ..."



action. However, virtuous abstention from action could turn into a kind of laziness and sluggishness, not so much total inactivity, but rather a shirking of one's responsibilities to one's community, in contradistinction to the common conception of *andreia* as a martial or at least political virtue involving the risking of personal life and safety for that of friends, family, or state. Diogenes Laertius reports how Cleanthes was charged with this kind of laziness and cowardice. The philosopher was reproached for being *atolmos* and for being a coward (Diogenes Laertius 7.170), but he was certainly not inactive. His customary activities, however, digging and watering gardens to earn money, were solitary pursuits. His penchant for a solitary existence is crystallized by the anecdote that when he saw a solitary man talking to himself, he said to him, "you are not talking to a bad man" (Diogenes Laertius 7.174).<sup>24</sup>

Yet there is evidence that the Stoics themselves propounded a more active and communal version of *andreia* than is suggested by viewing the virtue as mere endurance or a species or close relative of *sôphrosunê*. As Striker 1994 points out, the *telos* of virtuous action for the Stoics is not the possession of virtue itself, but the exercise of virtue, and to exercise one's virtue is simply to make a rationally grounded selection and deselection of externals ('preferred' and 'dispreferred' indifferents) in accordance with the theorems of the virtues. The 'principal points' of courage will often work in concert with those of temperance, but also with those of justice, of which one of the subordinate virtues is *khrestotês*; knowledge productive of good deeds (Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 2.62.3). Therefore, when courage and justice are exercised simultaneously the result of such activity will be

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<sup>24</sup> In general, the early Stoic attitudes to the sage's participation in political life are quite vague and ambiguous. Despite Plutarch's testimony that the sage, according to Chrysippus, will make public speeches and engage in politics (Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnantis* 1034B = *SVF* 3.698 = *LS* 66C), Diogenes Laertius reports a qualified version of the statement that seems to be supported by other evidence. According to Chrysippus, the wise man will engage in politics if nothing hinders him (D.L. 7.121). The factors hindering the sage could be physical infirmities, but may also be constituted by serious political defects in the state in which the sage is living. In ideal circumstances the ideal agent will surely take political control, or at least share political responsibility, but in less than ideal circumstances the sage may well remain politically inactive. Thus we read in Stobaeus that, according to the Stoics, the wise man should only be active in politics in those states which are advancing toward the condition of the ideal state (Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 2.94.6–10) and that one should not engage in politics if one is unable to benefit the state (ibid. 2.111.3–8).

beneficial to the community. This point is well illustrated by the *exemplum* of Heracles, a favorite of Stoic and Stoic-inspired authors:<sup>25</sup>

Or how do you think Heracles would have turned out, if such a lion had not appeared, and a hydra, and a stag, and a boar, and certain vicious and savage men, whom he drove out and cleared the world of? And what would he have been doing in the absence of such enemies? Is it not obvious that he would have wrapped himself in a blanket and slept? In the first place, then, he would never have become Heracles while snoring away his whole life in luxury and ease. And even if he had, what good would it have done him? What would have been the use of those arms of his, and of his strength in general, of his endurance and nobility, if there had not been such circumstances and occasions to stir and excite him? (Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.6.32–4, trans. Dobbin)

In Chrysippean terms the two virtues exemplified by Heracles here are *philoponia* (love of toil; subordinate to *andreia*) and *khrestotês*. Cicero, surely drawing either on Panaetius or another Stoic source, similarly praises Heracles as a lover of toil and benefactor of mankind at *De officiis* 3.25:

It is more in accordance with nature to undertake the greatest labors and toils in order to help and conserve all races of men, in imitation of Heracles . . . than it is to live in solitude, even though you might not only be free from all toil, but also enjoy the greatest pleasures and overflow with every resource so that you excel in beauty and strength too.

Cicero's stress here on the political nature of the human race and the 'active' rather than 'contemplative' life of the virtuous agent is quite consistent with what we know from the doxographical information concerning the early Stoics. Diogenes Laertius tells us that the Stoics hold that the wise man will not live in solitude for he is naturally *koinônikos* and *praktikos* (social and practical) and, moreover, despite the intellectual core of *andreia*, the sage will engage in physical training to augment the endurance of the body (Diogenes Laertius 7.36). The combination in the Stoic sage of intellectual effort and acumen and practical courage and justice also recalls, of course, the figure of Socrates who combined intellectual inquiry with powers of physical endurance (as Alcibiades tells us in the *Symposium*) and

<sup>25</sup> And the prototypical representative of 'manliness', see General Introduction.

service to the Athenian state: in battle at Potidaea and Delium, in a civil capacity by voting against the conviction of the generals after Arginusae, and, as Socrates would have it in the *Apology*, by encouraging Athenians to care for truth, wisdom, and the state of their souls.

The frequency of Heracles and Socrates as *exempla* in Stoic texts points to the fact that the Stoic conception of *andreia* is congruent not only with an active and practical Greek conception of courage, but also with a heroic conception of that virtue. Of course, the Stoics sometimes engage in an ironic inversion of the heroic paradigm. Thus they called Cleanthes a 'second Heracles' for his decidedly unheroic ability to support financially not only himself but a 'second Cleanthes' through his industrious gardening (Diogenes Laertius 7.170). Yet often the heroic paradigm is used without irony, as we sometimes find in Plato's dialogues.

Though Socrates' value system and even physical appearance seems quite different from that of Heracles or the heroes of the Trojan cycle, Plato's Socrates compares himself to Achilles in the *Apology*. For Socrates, like Achilles eager to avenge Patroclus, is completely contemptuous of the danger and death that he faces, and preserves his moral integrity (Pl. *Apology* 28c–d).<sup>26</sup> It is this contempt and *apatheia* which Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics* (97b15–20) describes as the kind of *megalosukhia* (greatness of soul) which is exemplified by Socrates. As another sense of the term Aristotle mentions the 'ability to endure dishonor', a characteristic of Achilles, Ajax, and Alcibiades. Superficially these two senses point to two very different conceptions of the virtue, one philosophic and the other heroic. Yet the two may be closer together than is first apparent, as Gill 1996, Smoes 1995, and White 1992 realize.<sup>27</sup> Indeed, Aeschines in his *In Timarchum* (145.1–12) describes Achilles rushing to avenge the slaughter of his companion *megalosukhōs*. I take it that the adverb here signifies that

<sup>26</sup> Note that Hobbs 2000 argues that the role of Achilles changes dramatically in Plato's later work, until he is fully discredited as a role model of any kind in the *Republic*.

<sup>27</sup> This point is recognized by Gill 1996, 318 n. 306. White 1992 too recognizes the similarity: "the common denominator, though obscured by popular usage, is upholding principles that one has adopted as one's own, regardless of the consequences". Smoes has an especially good discussion of the *andreia* of Socrates, and sees echoes of Socrates in Aristotle's discussion of *megalosukhia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: 1995, 286–7. See also Smoes 1993 on the philosopher as hero.

he is indifferent to and contemptuous of his own impending death. The parallels between this passage and Socrates' comparison of himself with Achilles in the *Apology* are striking. I suggest that Stoic *megalo-sukhia*, a virtue subordinate to *andreia*, and defined as "knowledge which puts one above things that happen naturally to both good and bad people" is both philosophic and heroic; a combination which is itself Socratic. For the Stoic inheritance from Socrates, that the value of life and death is negligible in comparison with, or is even strictly incommensurable with, the value of *aretê* in action, grounds philosophically a heroic standard of behavior where death and danger are not only despised but embraced when acting 'for the sake of the *kalon*'.<sup>28</sup>

However, though there is undoubtedly a heroic element in Stoic *andreia*, it would be a mistake to claim that it is a heroic virtue. I only want to make the weaker claim that Stoic *andreia* embraces a heroic standard of behavior from which no sage is exempt. However, much of the time, of course, *andreia* will be exercised on a small and often inconspicuous scale. For, while, as we have argued, courage is only exercised in the face of the risk of a loss of significant natural value, this may not always occur in the public eye or on a heroic scale. The Stoic sage does not have to find himself confronted with Herculean labors to exercise his bravery, but when confronted with Herculean labors he must confront them like a Heracles, or a Socrates. Indeed Epictetus' *exemplum* of Heracles follows immediately upon a series of rhetorical questions ("Have you not received faculties that allow you to bear whatever happens? Have you not got magnanimity? Courage? Have you not received the powers of endurance?") that are juxtaposed with a decidedly unheroic negative example of

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<sup>28</sup> Aristotelian *andreia* can also be heroic, as is brought out by White 1992 and Hardie 1978. Aristotle's truly courageous agent is admirable in that when he risks his life for a noble goal, he risks losing a valuable and genuine good (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1117b6–10; cf. 1124b6–8), and thus his courage has the element of true self-sacrifice which is arguably more 'heroic' than the deed of an individual who has, and/or believes that he has, nothing to lose, and who places no value on his own continued existence. The Stoic sage is not one who puts no value on his own life. He knows that life is 'preferred'. However, 'preferred' things have only *prima facie* value and are strictly incommensurable with the value of virtue and virtuous actions. When the sage judges that 'all things considered it is right to go to certain death', the value of life cannot even be compared with the rightness and goodness of the action. The sage goes willingly and energetically to face his death, whereas the Aristotelian *kalos kagathos* does not. See also Marguerite Deslauriers in this volume.

an imaginary interlocutor complaining about a running nose (Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.6.28–32).

The Stoics' penchant for heroic and conspicuously honorable deeds as *exempla* reveals a somewhat uncomfortable collocation of strict philosophical dogma and more conventional opinions. This becomes particularly clear when we consider more carefully Epictetus' use of Heracles. On the one hand, the Stoic sage is supposed to be completely independent from the vicissitudes of *tukhê*. He can exercise his virtues, and thus live in accordance with nature, without possessing apparent goods (preferred indifferents). For such possessions are neither constituents of nor instrumental to the *telos* which is completely 'up to us' to attain. The point is made clearly and forcefully by Epictetus. Everyone, like Heracles, should make the best use of preferred and dispreferred circumstances that they possibly can, and only then will they 'live in accordance with nature'. Of course, according to the Stoics, one must accept what befalls one as the works of providence and not malign or indifferent *tukhê*. Yet it is striking that Epictetus' employment of Heracles stresses the importance of things that are not 'up to us'. For Heracles is the wondrous hero that he is because of his actions, which are dependent on his bizarre meetings with terrible beasts. His good moral character is clearly not sufficient for manifestations of his *andreia*. Furthermore, Epictetus actually states that he would not have been Heracles at all had the stag, hydra, and Nemean lion never existed. For a Stoic, the emphasis is unusual. The emphasis in Stoic virtue is on the 'how' rather than on the 'what' (Nebel 1938). While 'what is appropriate' (*to kathêkon*) forms the content of right action, it is the state of mind of the agent that makes the action right (*to katorthôma*). Virtue depends on whether the correct impulses and judgments are formed, not on whether a course of action is objectively successful, nor on enjoying optimal circumstances in which to act.

One could argue that neither Heracles nor Socrates are conceived of as sages themselves, and thus their performance of merely appropriate acts (*kathêkonta*) is stressed. For the Stoics professed that a sage had never existed anywhere (Plutarch, *De communibus notitiis* 1076b), although Chrysippus held that the individual who has made such moral progress that he is on the brink of sagehood, though technically ignorant, performs all the 'proper functions' or 'appropriate actions' (Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 5.906.18–907.5 = *SVF* 3.510 = LS 59 I), though he does not perform these as 'right actions' (*katorthômata*).

However, there is a great difference between Heracles and Socrates. What is remarkable about Socrates is that he always does the right thing, because he has near perfect ethical acumen.<sup>29</sup> What is remarkable about Heracles, it seems, is not that he possessed ethical acumen or even physical strength, but that he encountered monsters and perils. Opportunity, in this case, makes the brave man. But surely, according to Stoic dogma, even if Heracles had not encountered these beasts, he could have exercised *andreia* merely by encountering, with (near) perfect rationality, the vicissitudes of every day life, both those as trivial as a running nose, and those as serious as the prospect of death.

It is, of course, incredibly hard to wrestle Stoic doctrine out of the highly rhetorical passage of Epictetus. Moreover, there is a danger in reading any passage out of context. The Heracles *exemplum* is located within a chapter on the subject of Providence, and is not part of a discussion of *andreia*, or heroic virtue explicitly. The point that Epictetus hammers home to his audience is that one should not complain about apparent bad luck. Apparent evils are in fact providential, since they provide us with the opportunity to fully realize in action our moral potential. Yet it is hard not to conclude that the choice of Heracles as a paradigm of conduct runs the risk of inconsistency with Stoic doctrine. As we have seen, it is the figure of Socrates which unites a traditional conception of heroic and active *andreia* with the intellectualized Stoic conception. However, the figure of Heracles, at least in Epictetus, seems inconsistent with the Stoic claim that acting in accordance with *andreia* is independent of opportunities for heroic action, and suggests a gap, unacknowledged by the Stoics, between traditional concepts of manly courage and their own dogmatic conceptions.

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<sup>29</sup> Alexander Nehamas 1987 has written that though Socrates seemed to have failed in his quest for knowledge, he "still lived the life of someone who appeared to possess the virtues, and who also, therefore, must in some way or another (if his view is at all correct) have possessed the knowledge in question". The Stoic view of Socrates may have been very similar. Socrates' moral progress was so advanced that not only did he perform all the 'proper functions', but he had also attained such ethical understanding that while still being technically ignorant, he practically appeared to be a sage himself.

#### 4. Conclusion: Paradoxical *Andreia*

The Stoic conception of *andreia* is in many ways as paradoxical as the Socratic conception in the *Laches*. While the Stoics strive to solve the paradox of the unity of the virtues, in some senses they preserve much of the paradoxical nature of the Socratic project and Socrates' life as portrayed by Plato. In the Stoic school, superficial paradoxes, which are ultimately soluble in terms of Stoic doctrine, are used to stimulate students to inquiry and reflection. The first of the Stoic paradoxes of *andreia* falls into this category:

1. *Andreia* is and is not the whole of virtue. It is the whole of virtue in that every virtue consists of the same theorems. But this does not mean that the virtues are blankly homogeneous. For *andreia* is a part of virtue in that it is a specific quality, marked off from other virtues by a sensitivity to impressions concerning a significant loss of natural value. Thus its exercise is dependent on the occurrence of the right type of impressions.

However, we have also identified a second paradox:

2. Stoic *andreia* is at once opposed to and congruent with heroic *andreia*. It is opposed in that the Stoics do not view physical strength, honor, or even objective success as goods. Moreover, they claim that the exercise of *andreia* is entirely 'up to us'. Yet Stoic *andreia* is heroic in its embracing of death and danger for the sake of the noble and honorable.

As we have seen, this paradox is rendered even more paradoxical by the frequent *exemplum* of Heracles in Stoic texts. For it seems that in the employment of Heracles as a moral paradigm, there is an implicit acknowledgement that *andreia* is not 'up to us' and does, in fact, depend on the opportunities for its exercise. According to Stoic dogma, a Heracles who failed to perform his labors, and who inhabited a world where such wild beasts did not exist, should still be capable of exercising *andreia*. Yet Epictetus gives the impression that such a character would not be actively *andreios*, as he would spend his life asleep! In this case, the choice of *exemplum* to illustrate Stoic doctrine results in a paradox, which is neither superficial nor intentional, but points rather to inconsistency.

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## CHAPTER TWELVE

### ROMAN MEN AND GREEK VIRTUE

Myles McDonnell

#### 1. *Introduction*

Anthropological research has shown that in most cultures manhood is regarded not as a status gained merely by coming of age, but as something that must be demonstrated or won, a concept that is precarious, elusive, and exclusionary. Anthropologists have also learned that the status itself can vary widely from one culture to another in regard to content and definition.<sup>1</sup> The status, moreover, can also change over time. By examining the Greek and Latin terms for manliness, and by placing them in a context of historical and sociolinguistic change, this paper will delineate a principal difference between the ways in which manhood was conceived by elite Greeks and Romans respectively. It will argue that, as with so much else, Greek ideas about ideal manliness, and in particular the place that ethical considerations played in them, affected and altered Roman attitudes over the course of the last two centuries of the Republic. It will also argue that in the last half-century of the Republic's existence, a period of marked social, political, and ideological discontinuity, divergent ideals of manliness, one drawing openly on an Hellenic model, the other claiming to represent traditional values, were publicly debated, and that the contested meaning of Roman manliness played a critical ideological role in the crisis that shook and finally ended the Roman Republic.

The basic relationship between the Greek word for manliness, ἀνδρεία, and the principal Latin term for the concept, *virtus*, is well established. *Virtus* was used to translate, and was translated by, not only ἀνδρεία but also ἀρετή; the clearest examples come from

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<sup>1</sup> See the cross-cultural study of Gilmore 1990, *passim*, with references to more specialized studies.

bilingual inscriptions.<sup>2</sup> Ἀρετή, of course, has a wide range of meanings, but in both literature and inscriptions it is commonly synonymous with ἀνδρεία, and when it translates *virtus* it often denotes physical prowess or courage. One reason why *virtus* was regularly used to translate both ἀνδρεία and ἀρετή is Latin's shortage of words,<sup>3</sup> but the practice also underlines an important difference between ideal manliness among ancient Greeks and Romans. In Greek culture the principal term for ideal manly behavior was not ἀνδρεία but rather ἀρετή, which from its earliest occurrences denoted many things, only one of which was physical prowess or courage. Ἀνδρεία itself came to be regarded as only one aspect of the broader ideal represented by ἀρετή.<sup>4</sup> In Rome, however, physical prowess or courage, especially as displayed in war, remained the central element of manliness throughout the Republican period and into the Empire. This both corresponds to the highly militaristic nature of Roman Republican society and is supported by usage. For although *virtus* displays a variety of meanings in pre-classical Latin, by far its most common single meaning is physical prowess or courage; true even in the private world of Roman comedy.

The 'courageous' meaning of *virtus* is, however, minimized in the major philological studies of D. C. Earl and Werner Eisenhut, which hold that it is but one aspect of a wide-ranging concept. But both studies misinterpret *virtus* in pre-classical Latin. Eisenhut's idea that from the beginning *virtus* had broad semantic significance centering around the idea of general capability does not stand up to scrutiny (see below). Earl's influential theory of a *virtus*-complex of moral ideals, in which *virtus* functions as an all-embracing concept which subsumed other cardinal Roman virtues, is demonstrably untrue. It is contradicted by usages found in the works of Ennius and Caesar, among others, in which *virtus* is contrasted to ethical concepts and

<sup>2</sup> E.g. *CIL* I<sup>2</sup> 743 = *ILLRP* 372, *CIL* I<sup>2</sup> 725 = *ILS* 31.

<sup>3</sup> Sen. *Contro.* 7.1.17, Gell. *NA* 2.26.7, and Lausberg 1960, 289–90.

<sup>4</sup> By the fourth century BCE, the status of ἀνδρεία had declined in philosophical circles. Both Plato and Isocrates downgraded the value of courage in relation to the other virtues; see Pl. *Rep.* Bks. I and II; Isoc. 12.197, with North 1966. Panaetius, following Aristotle, seems to have replaced ἀνδρεία in the traditional Stoic catalogue of virtues with μεγαλοψυχία—'high-mindedness', see Dyke 1981, 153–61. For the four Greek virtues—ἀρεταί—see North 1966 and Wallace-Hadrill 1981, 301–3.

behavior. In his tragedy *Hectoris Lytra*, for example, Ennius has a character make the statement that justice—*ius*—is better than *virtus* because bad men often possess *virtus*:

justice is better than *virtus*, for bad men often acquire *virtus*:  
 justice and fairness take themselves far away from bad men.  
 (sc. 188–89 Vahlen = 200–1 *ROL* = 155–6 Jocelyn)<sup>5</sup>

melius est virtute ius, nam saepe virtutem mali  
 nanciscuntur: ius atque aecum se a malis spernit procul.

In Book 3 of *De bello civili*, Julius Caesar tells the story of Raucillus and Egus, Allobrogian brothers who commanded Caesar's Gallic cavalry and who had won position and wealth because of the great *virtus* they had displayed in war:

... men of outstanding *virtus*, whose excellent and very brave services Caesar had employed in all his Gallic wars. Because of this he had given to them the highest offices in their own country, and had seen to it that they, extraordinarily, were enrolled in the Senate, and had awarded to them land in Gaul captured from enemies and a great amount of very valuable booty, and had turned them from poor to rich men. Because of their *virtus*, these men were not only held in honor by Caesar, but were also dear to the army. (*BC* 3.59.1–3)

... singulari virtute homines, quorum opera Caesar omnibus Gallicis bellis optima fortissimaque erat usus. His domi ob has causas amplissimos magistratus mandaverat atque eos extra ordinem in senatum legendos curaverat agrosque in Gallia ex hostibus captos praemiaque rei pecuniariae magna tribuerat locupletesque ex egentibus fecerat. Hi propter virtutem non solum apud Caesarem in honore erant sed etiam apud exercitum cari habebantur;

But the two Gauls succumbed to greed and embezzled their troopers' pay.<sup>6</sup> Caesar clearly describes their conduct as an ethical failing, which occasioned public scorn as well as guilt:

<sup>5</sup> The lines repeat a famous Socratic dictum about justice—*δίκη*—and courage—*ἀνδρεία*, see Xen. *Symp.* 3.4, Pl. *Prot.* 329e, also Isoc. 4.197. In Greek literature one does not find *ἀρετή* contrasted with ethical ideals as Ennius here contrasts *virtus* to *ius*. Quite the contrary, Theognis wrote that “the whole of *ἀρετή* is summed up in justice”—*ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη συλλήβδην πᾶς ἀρετή ἔστιν* (147). By the mid-fourth century this idea had become proverbial, see Arist. *EN* 1129b29, and Adkins 1960, 78.

<sup>6</sup> Caes. *BC* 3.59.3.

Nevertheless, this affair caused these men [Raucillus and Egus] great discredit and scorn in the sight of all, and they realized that this was due not only to the aspersions of strangers, but also to the judgment of their friends and to their own conscience. (*BC* 3.60.2)

Magnum tamen haec res illis offensionem et contemptionem ad omnis attulit, idque ita esse cum ex aliorum obiectionibus tum etiam ex domestico iudicio atque animi conscientia intellegebant.

On learning of their crimes, however, Caesar decided to treat the brothers leniently, and did so, he tells us, because of their *virtus*.<sup>7</sup>

Caesar, deciding that it was not the time for punishment, and conceding much to their *virtus*, postponed the whole business. (*BC* 3.60.1)

Caesar neque tempus illud animadversionis esse existimans et multa virtuti eorum concedens rem totam distulit.

Neither Ennius' lines nor Caesar's explanation would make sense if *virtus* were normally considered a single all-inclusive and ethical concept. On the other hand, Caesar's contemporary Cicero, when discussing the importance of *virtus* to ideal friendship, describes a general ethical meaning of *virtus*, which he contrasts to the Stoic's use of the term, as a colloquial usage: *sed haec ipsa virtus amicitiam et gignit et continet nec sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest. Iam virtutem ex consuetudine vitae sermonisque nostri interpretemur nec eam, ut quidam docti, verborum magnificentia metiamur*—"but this very *virtus* both engenders and preserves friendship, nor can friendship possibly exist without *virtus*. Now let us interpret *virtus* by the usage of life and conversation, and not define it with pompous words as certain learned men do" (*De amicitia* 21). Not infrequently, Cicero also employs *virtus* as a unified, all-embracing, ethical term.<sup>8</sup> *Virtus* was a more complex value than modern scholarship has supposed.

## 2. *Martial Virtus*

This is not the place for a detailed critique of earlier scholarship on *virtus*,<sup>9</sup> but a few representative examples will be provided of how

<sup>7</sup> For Caesar's careful and pure diction see Cic. *Brut.* 261.

<sup>8</sup> For Cicero's use of *virtus* as an all-embracing ethical term see, e.g. *Off.* 3.13, *De or.* 3.136, *Mur.* 30, *Imp. Pom.* 64.

<sup>9</sup> For which see McDonnell forthcoming.

Plautine usages of *virtus* have been incorrectly interpreted as non-martial, beginning with a passage from the prologue of *Amphitruo*.

For why should I mention (as in tragedies  
I have seen others, Neptune, Virtus, Victoria,  
Mars, Bellona, recalling whatever good deeds  
they have done for you) the benefits that my father,  
ruler of the gods, has designed for all? (*Amph.* 41–5)

nam quid ego memorem (ut alios in tragoediis  
vidi, Neptunum, Virtutem, Victoriam,  
Martem, Bellonam commemorare quae bona  
vobis fecissent) quis bene factis meu' pater,  
deorum regnator, architectust omnibus?

Eisenhut argued that in these lines *Virtus* is not a martial deity because, he claimed, Neptune is not a martial deity.<sup>10</sup> But Victoria, Mars, and Bellona were all gods of war, and among such bellicose companions a martial meaning for *Virtus* seems obvious. Moreover, the status of Neptune as a god of victory at sea is well attested for the age of Plautus and later. It was to Neptune that Scipio Africanus credited his great victory at Cartagena (Carthago nova) in 210 BCE, and before setting out on his African campaign in 204 he sacrificed to Neptune.<sup>11</sup> Eisenhut also misinterpreted *virtus* as a non-specific word meaning capability or proficiency—*Tüchtigkeit*—at *Pseudolus* 581–2.<sup>12</sup>

... for I have already prepared in such a way  
in my mind the troops,  
tricks and deceits in double and triple lines, so that I can do battle  
with enemies anywhere  
(trusting, I may say, in the *virtus* of my ancestors, in my own  
energy and my wicked deceit,)  
so that I can easily conquer, easily despoil my enemies with  
my deceptions. (*Pseud.* 579–82)

... nam ego in meo pectore prius  
ita paravi copias,  
duplicis, triplicis dolos, perfidias, ut, ubiquomque hostibus  
congrédia

<sup>10</sup> On *Amphitruo* 41–3 see Eisenhut 1974, cols. 896–7.

<sup>11</sup> On Scipio at Cartagena, see Polyb. 10.11.7, with Skutsch 1966, 126; for the African campaign, App. *Pun.* 13, cf. Livy 29.27.

<sup>12</sup> Eisenhut 1973, 25.

(maiorum meum fretus virtute dicam, mea industria et  
malitia fraudulenta),  
facile ut vincam, facile ut spoliem meos perduellis  
meis perfidiis.

But here the usage occurs in an extended military metaphor in which a slave compares his guileful plans to those of a general attacking a city; cf. *meas legiones adducam; si expugno . . . post ad oppidum hoc vetus continuo meum protinus obducam* (*Pseud.* 585–7). Similarly, according to Earl, at Plautus' *Truculentus* 493–6 *virtus* is the quality “from which good oratory arises”.<sup>13</sup>

Doers are far more beneficial to the people than  
noisy clever men:  
*virtus* easily finds its own ringing eloquence,  
without *virtus* a shrill citizen is to my mind  
like a wailing woman,  
who praises others, but is, in truth, not able to do the  
same for herself. (*Truc.* 493–6)

strenui nimio plus prosunt populo quam arguti et cati:  
facile sibi facunditatem virtus argutam invenit,  
sine virtuti argutum civem mihi habeam pro praefica,  
quae alios conlaudat, eapse sese vero non potest.

In fact, in this passage a soldier is presenting the familiar contrast between words and deeds, the latter martial and represented by *virtus*.

The general problem with Earl's and Eisenhut's analyses of *virtus*, as well as with studies of other Roman values, is that they tend to project usages found in late Republican and Imperial literature back to occurrences of the term as it was used in early Latin. The consequence of this emphasis on uses of *virtus* found in classical Latin has been, on the one hand, to undervalue the meaning of *virtus* that predominates in pre-classical Latin—which is martial prowess or courage—and on the other hand, to underestimate seriously the extent of Hellenic influence on *virtus* in pre-classical Latin, particularly in the form of semantic borrowing from ἀρετή. It is the contrast between martial *virtus*, which seems to have been traditional, and meanings of *virtus* that were influenced by ἀρετή that this chapter will emphasize.

<sup>13</sup> Earl 1960, 235–43, 241.

3. *Virtus and Aretê*

That some usages of *virtus* were borrowed from ἀρετή is certain, illustrated best by the ascription of *virtus* to animals and inanimate objects—lions, elephants, even trees. Given the strong etymological bond between *virtus* and *vir*—to Roman ears *virtus* must have sounded much like the English ‘manly’ and the German *männlich*—this represents a fairly radical semantic shift.<sup>14</sup> Semantic shifts of this kind occur in two ways: either as an indigenous development of the native language, or as the result of foreign linguistic influences. In the case of *virtus* we can be fairly certain that it was the latter. For in addition to the fact that the ascription of *virtus* to animals and inanimate objects violates the etymological bond between *virtus* and *vir*,<sup>15</sup> such usages of *virtus* are rare.<sup>16</sup> Most important, however, is that while the Romans themselves regarded the attribution of *virtus* to non-human subjects as aberrant, as is stated by Cicero: *nam nec arboris nec equi virtus quae dicitur, in quo abutimur nomine, . . .* “For neither what we call, when we misapply (or ‘use in a loose way’) the word, the *virtus* of a tree or of a horse . . .” (*De legibus* 1.45),<sup>17</sup> such usages were

<sup>14</sup> *Virtus* of lions—Lucr. 5.863; of an elephant—*De bello Africano* 72.4; of trees—*virtus ulmorum*—or perhaps forearms (the text is uncertain)—*virtus ulnorum* at Plaut. *Asin.* 547.

<sup>15</sup> The bond is clear from the frequent combination of the words in the *figura etymologica*—e.g. Plaut. *Asin.* 556–7, *Amph.* 212, Cic. *Sest.* 93, 76, *Tusc.* 2.43, *Planc.* 12. See Eisenhut 1973, 12–13, and Lausberg 1960, 328–9. The bond between *virtus* and *vir* fits what Stern 1932, 202–3 called a derivational group, “consisting of all members of the derivatives of one stem that are still apprehended by linguistic feeling as belonging together”.

<sup>16</sup> Of the over 140 occurrences of *virtus* in pre-classical Latin the word is used of inanimate objects or abstract ideas in only six instances, is applied to deities eight times (all but one in the Plautine collocation *virtute deum*), and is directly attributed to a woman once, in the context of a jocular sexual role reversal. Such uses are somewhat more frequent in later Latin, but they remain unusual. See Plaut. *Amph.* 925 and for the role reversal, McDonnell 1983 (= 1986), 54–80. In classical Latin *virtus* is attributed to women at Cic. *Ad Att.* 10.8.9, 11.17.5, and *Ad fam.* 14.1.1 (where *virtus* is qualified by *fortitudo*), also at Hor. *Carm.* 3.24.22–3 (where it is qualified by *castitas*). Later attributions of *virtus* to non-human subjects usually occur in works closely modeled on Greek works. Lucretius’ *virtute pedumque* (5.966) is clearly taken from ποδῶν ἀρετήν (Hom. *Il.* 20.411), and the poet’s ascription of *virtus* to lions at 5.858 and 863 certainly translates ἀνδρεία of Greek fables, see Parry 1952, *fab. Grae.* 284, but cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1284a15 for the lion’s ἀρετή. For full discussion see McDonnell (forthcoming).

<sup>17</sup> On the passage see Kenter 1972, 182. On *abusio* see Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.34; cf. 12.10.34, and see also Eisenhut 1973, 12–13.



regular with ἀρετή, which was applied to a wide range of subjects to indicate 'what is best', and was regularly used of things both animate and inanimate—men, horses, wool, eyes and ears—as well as of abstract qualities.<sup>18</sup>

The clearest example of the influence of ἀρετή is the application of *virtus* to farmland to designate its excellence or fertility, found at Cato's *De agricultura* 1.2—*uti bonum caelum habeat, ne calamitosum siet; solo bono, sua virtute valeat*—"[The farmland] should have good weather, so that there will not be a disaster; the soil must be good, and should be strong by its own *virtus*", and in a fragment of Lucilius—*fundi delectat virtus te, vilicus paulo/strenuior si evaserit*,—"The *virtus* of a farm gladdens you, if the overseer/turns out to be more energetic" (532–3 Marx = 557–8 *ROL* = 528–9 Krenkel). This usage is very rare in Latin, but starting with Herodotus ἀρετή is frequently found denoting good land, and it is Polybius' regular term for fertile land.<sup>19</sup> The influence of ἀρετή can also be discerned in other usages where *virtus* is applied to things other than men.<sup>20</sup> *Virtus* was of course not the only Latin word whose meaning was expanded by borrowings from Greek.<sup>21</sup> Many other instances have been identified. For exam-

<sup>18</sup> See above all Arist. *EN* 1106a15. Ἀρετή is used of horses at Hom. *Il.* 23.276; wool at Hdt. 3.106; eyes and ears at Pl. *Rep.* 352–6, and of abstract qualities at Pl. *Leg.* 772b and 643d. For a collection of the usages of ἀρετή, see Ludwig 1906. For the basic meaning of ἀρετή as 'excellence', see Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1913, 169–78, and Jaeger 1939, 5–6.

<sup>19</sup> See Hdt. 4.198, 7.5, 8.144, Pl. *Critias* 110e, 117b–c, *Alcib.* I 122d, Isoc. 4.108, 11.14. Mausersberger 1956, 220 listed eleven such usages of ἀρετή. Eisenhut 1973, 31 deemed that this meaning of *virtus* is impossible without the influence of ἀρετή. In a sense Cato's phrase *virtute valeat* is a metaphor based on the martial meaning of *virtus*, but on the close relationship between metaphor and semantic borrowing, see Lausberg 1960, 289–90 on *abusio*.

<sup>20</sup> The use of *virtus* at Plautus' *Miles Gloriosus* 728—*pro virtute ut veneat*—to mean the excellence or the value of merchandise, for example, is odd. But ἀρετή was used in this way to denote value (e.g. ἡθὺς τι χρυσοῦν πρὸς ἀρετὴν κεκτημένης/ὄντως ἐταίρας. Antiphanes, *fr.* 212 Kock), and Plautus seems to have followed his Greek model closely in this passage; see Leo 1912, 115–19. Eisenhut 1973, 27–8, maintained that this use of *virtus* is impossible without the influence of ἀρετή. At Plautus, *Mostellaria* 173 the *ancilla* Scapha flatters her courtesan mistress Philematium with the phrase *virtute formai* in what is a stock scene from Greek New Comedy, the τέχνη ἐρωτική; see Leo 1895, 140ff. Note the Homeric parallel in the words spoken by Penelope . . . ἦ τοι ἐμὴν ἀρετὴν εἰδὸς τε δέμας τε/ᾠλεσαν ἀθάνατοι . . .—"in truth, the excellence of my beauty and my form the immortal gods destroyed" (*Od.* 18.251 and 19.124), with the Greek accusative of respect translated by a Latin genitive construction.

<sup>21</sup> For Greek influences on Latin see Meillet 1928, 104–260 and Kaimio 1979. For 'loanwords' see Weise 1882. Nouns are the elements most readily transferred,

ple, Plautus' use of *ludus*, the Latin word for 'entertainment' or 'show', to mean 'school' at *Rudens* 43 is a borrowing from the Greek word for both 'leisure' and 'school'—σχολή.<sup>22</sup>

#### 4. *The Sociolinguistic Context*

How and why such semantic borrowings took place among the ancient Romans is obscure. Some have explained this, and the related phenomenon of the large numbers of Greek words used by Plautus, by reference to an educated Roman elite, whose knowledge of and familiarity with Greek somehow trickled down to the city's non-elite population; an unsatisfactory suggestion.<sup>23</sup> Others have pointed to the significant numbers of Roman soldiers who during the third century had served in Magna Graecia and who had no doubt picked up some Greek.<sup>24</sup> Semantic borrowing of the type we are dealing with is variously described by linguistic scholars as 'semantic calque', 'loan-shift', or 'loan synonym'. A loan synonym extends the semantic range of an indigenous word by analogy with a foreign word which has wider references, but some common meaning.<sup>25</sup> Sociolinguistic research, however, has shown that this type of semantic borrowing is most

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see Whitney 1881, 5–25 and Poplack, Sankoff and Miller 1988, 47–104. For the phenomenon in Latin and further examples see Ernout 1954, 86–91 and Löfstedt 1942, 433ff.

<sup>22</sup> Also, e.g. *silva*, the Latin word for 'forest', used to mean 'material', at Plautus *Miles Gloriosus* 1154, from the Greek word for 'forest'—ύλη, which also means 'material' or 'matter', and Ennius' use of *imber*, Latin for 'rain', at *Annales* 516 (Skutsch) to mean 'water' from the Greek ύμβρος, meaning both 'rain' and 'water'.

<sup>23</sup> This view of Greek at Rome is clearly set out by Boyancé 1956, 124–5, who argued from the fact that in the city of Rome the majority of Greek names are found in Latin inscriptions, that Greek was not used by Greek inhabitants; cf. Gruen 1992, 232.

<sup>24</sup> Frank 1930, 70, also 69, n. 2, 72, n. 6, and 73, n. 7, 80, seriously overestimated the importance of Roman soldiers' knowledge of Greek. Horsfall 1993, 798, 1996a, 21–2, 1996b, 103–4, is more balanced, but it seems doubtful that Greek so acquired would have by itself enabled soldiers to understand the amount of Greek that occurs in Plautus (an average of about 90 occurrences per play).

<sup>25</sup> Weinreich 1953, 47–62, termed the general phenomenon 'lexical interference'. 'Loan synonym', specifically 'loan confusion', under the general rubric 'loan shift', was coined by Haugen 1950, 210–31, esp. 219–20. German scholars refer to the phenomenon simply as *Lehnbedeutung*, see Betz 1939, 33–5, and Kronasser 1952, 140–4. Modern linguistic theory sees the phenomenon as evidence of the vitality of a language; ancient writers associated it with *inopia sermonis*; see Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.34, Cic. *De or.* 3.155, and Lausberg 1960, 289–90.

frequent among bilingual populations, and that for it to have a sustained effect on the indigenous language the bilingual community must be stable.<sup>26</sup> I would argue that the principal cause of the phenomenon we are dealing with was the presence in Rome of a significant Greek-speaking population that was predominantly servile or of servile origin. Since these people were working in the streets and elite homes of Rome, they were perforce bilingual in Greek and Latin. That such a population existed in third- and second-century Rome should not be doubted. It was standard Roman practice to enslave the populations of captured communities, and Greeks were not exempted.<sup>27</sup> Numbers of Greek cities were captured during and after the war with Pyrrhus (280–275),<sup>28</sup> and large numbers of Greeks are reported to have been enslaved during the protracted, but unevenly documented Punic Wars; many more must have gone unrecorded.<sup>29</sup> A conservative estimate puts the number of Greeks enslaved during the second half of the third century at between 90,000 and 100,000

<sup>26</sup> For the relationship between bilingualism and linguistic borrowing see Paul 1968, chap. 2, Haugen 1956, 22–7, and Weinreich 1953, 54.

<sup>27</sup> On the enslavement of Greeks see Dion. Hal. 19.9.4 and Polyb. 9.39.2. Captured communities whose populations were not enslaved were exceptions, see Polyb. 10.17.6–16. Bradley 1994, records only two instances of Romans capturing a city where it is specifically stated that slaves were not taken (Livy 26.47.1–3 and Polyb. 10.17.6–16). Both concern Scipio Africanus' campaigns in Spain and the contexts make it clear that these are exceptions that prove the rule. The important studies of Horsfall 1996a, 1996b, 100–19 rightly stress the role of the non-elite in the process of Hellenization in Rome. But he overestimates the importance of Roman soldiers who had campaigned in Magna Graecia, who would not have formed a bilingual core community necessary for sustained linguistic influence.

<sup>28</sup> Pausanias 6.3.12, records that during the Pyrrhic war several Greek cities in Italy were destroyed by Romans and Epeirotes. Some slaves would have been taken when rebellious Croton and Locri were recaptured by the Romans in 278/7; see Zon. 8.6, Front. *Strat.* 3.6.4, App. *Samm.* 12.1–2. In 276 the Locrians killed the Roman garrison and returned to their alliance with Pyrrhus (Zon. 8.6). See De Sanctis 1907, 411–12, esp. 412, n. 2, Lomas 1993, 55; but cf. Beloch 1925, 555, n. 2. The Romans garrisoned Croton after the war (Zon. 8.6). Livy, 24.3.1, states that Croton lost half its population in the Pyrrhic War. Although Roman peace terms were not onerous, the fact that the new regime at Locri went out of its way to show loyalty by producing coins displaying Roma crowned by a figure identified as Πίστις (*BMC, Greek Coins—Italy*, 365, 15), suggests that anti-Roman Locrians had been punished.

<sup>29</sup> Frank 1933, 67 and 100. According to Brunt 1971, 67, for the number of slaves in Italy during the Hannibalic War “an estimate of 500,000 need not be too high”.

persons.<sup>30</sup> If as few as a quarter of these reached Rome, the number of Greek speakers residing in the capital during the second half of the third century would have amounted to about 12 percent of the city's population, which has been placed at around 200,000 in 200 BCE.<sup>31</sup> To these must be added the number of free Greek immigrants engaged in Rome's commerce, manufacture, and other activities. It is reasonable to assume that during the second half of the third century Greek speakers made up at least 15 percent of the population of Rome.<sup>32</sup> This is well within the range necessary to significantly affect the language habits of the native speaking population. As a result of this, and of the even greater number of Greeks entering Rome over the course of the second and first centuries, the process of monolingual Greek slaves becoming bilingual in Latin would then have been repeated over and over, ensuring that the sound of Greek continued to be heard, and to exert influence, in the homes and streets of Rome.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Enslaved populations: Agrigentum in 262 (Diod. 23.9.1; Orosius, IV 7.6; Polyb. 1.19.15); Agrigentum in 210 (Liv. 26.40.13); Tarentum (Liv. 27.16). For Greek communities enslaved during the Pyrrhic and Punic Wars see Volkmann 1961, 20–4, 41–3, 55–6; also Toynbee 1965, 168–72, esp. 171–2. For estimates of the populations of the Greek cities in question see Beloch 1886 for Sicily 281–90, Magna Graecia 301–3, Greece 180–190, and Rome 392ff. For slaves being included under the term booty see Vogel 1953, 1200–13. Cf. Horsfall 1993, 806–7. Livy 28.11.9 records a shortage of slaves in 206 in the context of farming in Latium. That only three years earlier 30,000 had been enslaved at the capture of Tarentum (Livy 27.16.7) suggests that many of the Tarentines had been taken to Rome. Although Greek servile names do not provide a valid criterion for Greek origins, see Solin 1971, 151–8, the fact that many Roman masters gave Greek names to non-Greek slaves suggests that Greek slaves had higher prestige. For the importance to the Romans of skilled workmen among war captives compare Scipio's making the artisans—*χειροτεχναί*—of New Carthage into public slaves of Rome (Polyb. 10.17.9–10).

<sup>31</sup> Population estimates for this period are informed guesses. Brunt 1971, 69, estimated the population of Rome in the early third century to be about 180,000, and thought that it had doubled by c. 133. Morley 1996, 39, posited as a 'working figure' 200,000 for c. 200 BCE, of which he estimated that 50,000 were slaves. Manumission was relatively frequent, but would have had little effect on the language habits of the freedperson.

<sup>32</sup> Kaimio 1979, 23–4, estimated that Greek slaves or persons of Greek servile extraction constituted 20 to 30 percent of Rome's population in the late Republic and Empire.

<sup>33</sup> Later arriving immigrants tend to learn the native language faster from bilingual compatriots who preceded them; see Fishman 1986, 62. Recent studies have revealed various other factors, such as discrimination and family structure, affecting language maintenance; Boyd and Latoma 1999, and Tosi 1999. Among Roman slaves the lack of stable family structures might have discouraged maintenance of Greek, and diseases and late marriages limited the growth of both servile and freed

If we imagine the streets of third- and second-century Rome as frequented by numerous native Greek speakers, a high proportion of them slaves going about the daily business assigned to them by their masters, we find ourselves in the world of Plautus. For, as was pointed out long ago by Leo and others, and as has been confirmed by statistical studies, in Plautus' plays the great majority of Greek words are spoken by slaves or characters of low status.<sup>34</sup> Plautine comedy is full of Greek words, phrases, and word-play, and a high proportion of them have to do with domestic life, retail commerce, and street life.<sup>35</sup> Some of these were certainly introduced by Plautus himself, since he modeled his plays, sometimes with close verbal parallels, on Greek originals.<sup>36</sup> But it has been demonstrated that other Greek words and phrases in the plays cannot have been taken from the models of New Comedy, but must have been part of the everyday speech of contemporary Rome.<sup>37</sup> So the use of the Greek word οἴχεται—"it is gone", in comic contrast to *apparet*—"it is visible, or present", at *Trinummus* 413, would be pointless if it were not readily understood by the audience. Similarly the phrase *dicam scribere*, meaning "to bring a law suit", at Plautus, *Aulularia* 760, and *Poenulus* 800, describes a Greek legal procedure—δίκην γράφειν—which can only have been familiar to Plautus' Roman audience through contact with Greeks.<sup>38</sup>

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populations, see Morley 1996, 45; Brunt 1971, 143–6, and Treggiari 1969, 35. But the number of Greek slaves entering Rome increased significantly over the course of the second and first centuries BCE, and the Greek-speaking population of Rome was demonstrably large in the Imperial period; see MacMullen 1993, 47–64. So there clearly was a continuous and substantial bilingual Greek-Latin population in ancient Rome.

<sup>34</sup> Tuchnaendler 1876, 66, Leo 1883, 558–87, esp. 566f., 1912, 106–7, Middleman 1938, Shipp 1953, 105–12, Gilleland 1979, Maltby 1995, 31–69, with lists of Greek words in Appendix I. The same is true for Terence, see Maltby 1985, 110–23. The recent attempt to deny this by Jocelyn 1999, 168–95, is learned, but excessively literary and unconvincing.

<sup>35</sup> On Greek words in Plautus see Sturtevant 1925, 9–14, Fraenkel 1923, 195, n. 1 = 1960, 185, n. 1, Hough 1934, 346–64, with bibliography in n. 3, Middleman 1938, Shipp 1953, 105–12, 1955, 139–52, Seaman 1954, 115–19, and Ernout 1954, 71–6.

<sup>36</sup> See Handley 1968, *passim*.

<sup>37</sup> See Leo 1912, 106–7, Fraenkel 1923, 195, n. 1 = 1960, 185, n. 1, Sturtevant 1925, 9–14, and Shipp 1953, 105–12.

<sup>38</sup> This is true whether or not Plautus found the Greek phrase in his original; cf. Scafuro 1997, 94–6. For the Greek procedure see Boyé 1922, 101–2. On *dicam scribere* as a non-Roman procedure see Kaser 1966, 170, n. 36. It was used by Cicero to describe the provincial procedure used in a case brought by one Sicilian

In the conversations that took place in the streets, markets, and in some of the elite homes of ancient Rome, Greek and Latin were constantly being interspersed. Linguistically, the situation must have resembled that of the bustling immigrant neighborhoods of twentieth-century American cities. But unlike modern cities, Rome in the time of Plautus was not segregated or 'zoned' into elite and non-elite neighborhoods, but rather displayed a pattern of spatial integration of commerce and politics, with large parts of the Roman Forum being fronted by both elite houses and shops.<sup>39</sup> In ancient Rome language mixing was not confined to the non-elite classes. Here was an atmosphere capable of fostering the types of linguistic borrowing that can be observed in the works of Plautus and other early Latin authors. Here also was an atmosphere in which upper-class Romans, who were so inclined, would have been able to master the Greek language with relative ease. It is to be noted that elite Romans who learned to speak Greek well under such circumstance would not necessarily be learned in, or even sympathetic towards Greek literature or culture; an important consideration in evaluating the degree to which a Roman who spoke Greek fluently was truly Hellenized.

### 5. *Ethical* virtus

Since ἀρετή's basic meaning of 'excellence' clearly did affect some usages of *virtus*, it is reasonable to ask if the Greek word had also influenced the use of *virtus* to denote human excellence, and in particular moral excellence. There are reasons to think that it did. In Greek culture ethical considerations had gained new prominence during the fifth century when the Sophistic movement, and Socrates, called into question the meaning of numbers of central moral concepts, ἀρετή among them, by uncompromisingly applying ethical standards of right and wrong to traditional societal values, and by demonstrating the disjuncture between the two. But no such ethical

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Greek, Heraclius, against another; see *Verr.* 2.37, 38, 42, 44, and 59. Other than these instances, *dica* occurs only at Ter. *Phorm.* 127, 329, and 608, and in Fronto, see Maurach 1975, 286, and Donatus, Ter. *Phorm.* 329.3—*DICAM* δίκη *Graeca causa est, quae fit dica ut ἀκτή acta*, Καλλιόπη *Calliopa*.

<sup>39</sup> See Wallace-Hadrill 1991, 261–4.

revolution had taken place in Rome. In the same way that the Roman gods aided not the ethically good but the ritually correct, and that Roman law assisted the person who followed correct legal procedure over one who might have had the better claim,<sup>40</sup> so too in judging the behavior of a public man ethical conduct was secondary to martial prowess. This is not to say that Romans regarded ethical behavior as unimportant, but that in regard to ideal manly behavior issues of right or wrong were not paramount. The attitude is well illustrated by the story of the upright C. Fabricius Luscinus, who said to have supported for the consulship of 290 a man he despised for his unethical conduct, P. Cornelius Rufinus, because Rufinus was an outstanding warrior and an experienced commander.<sup>41</sup>

As the traditionally warlike society of mid-Republican Rome was adapting to a more ethically sophisticated Greek culture, it was natural that the meaning of central concepts would also expand their primary field of reference. So *fides*, meaning 'trust' or 'loyalty', was expanded from a morally important but essentially social, religious, and legal concept to a word that contained the ethical references of the Greek term πίστις.<sup>42</sup> Similarly, the word *sapientia*, related to *sapor*—'flavor', or 'sense of taste', and traditionally denoting practical knowledge,<sup>43</sup> became, under the influence of the Greek term σοφία, a word denoting philosophical wisdom as an ethical standard and a cultural ideal.<sup>44</sup> Since *virtus* certainly took on a variety of new meanings bor-

<sup>40</sup> Contra Hanson 1959, 48–101. Bailey 1932, 85–6 remarked on the lack of ethical content in Roman prayers (although a passage he cited, Cic. *ND* 3.87, reflects Academic as well as native Roman belief). For the legalistic nature of Roman religion see e.g. Livy 22.10, with North 1976.

<sup>41</sup> *bellator bonus militarisque disciplinae peritus*—"A good fighter and experienced in military tactics" Gell. *NA* 4.8, Cic. *De orat.* 2.268.

<sup>42</sup> Although Fraenkel 1916 went too far when he claimed that in early Latin *fides* is *moralisch farblos*, he was correct about occurrences of *fides* as an ethical term denoting 'honesty' or 'sincerity' reflecting the semantic influence of πίστις. The critique of Heinze 1929 demonstrated only that *fides* was a traditional Roman value with strong religious associations. But traditional reverence and religious ties do not necessarily make an ethical concept; ethics and traditional religion are often in conflict; cf. Gruen 1982, 64, n. 68. *Fides* represented a type of social obligation, between patron and client for example, and the degree of mercy or protection afforded to a person or foreign state *in fide* depended no more on right or wrong or on justice than did a patron's advocacy of his client's cause in the courts.

<sup>43</sup> ... *nam phronesis est sapientia* (*Truc.* 79). Lindsay bracketed the last line, Leo retained it; see Leo 1912, 95, n. 3. Even if the line is a gloss the correspondence of *sapientia* and φρόνησις in the Plautine usage is patent; see Garbarino 1965–6, 255–7.

<sup>44</sup> Plautus *St.* 123–5; *Per.* 549–60. The question of the parasite at *Per.* 549, *Satin*

rowed from ἀρετή, it is likely that the decidedly ethical connotations of ἀρετή also affected the Latin word. For although the martial meaning of ἀρετή predominates in Greek epics, histories, and tragedies, the ethical sense of ἀρετή was extremely common in Greek literature of the fourth century and later.<sup>45</sup> It was especially so in Middle and New Comedy, where ἀρετή seems to have been employed almost exclusively as an ethical term.<sup>46</sup> Conversely, when *virtus* has an ethical meaning in pre-classical Latin, it is almost always found in Latin adaptations of Greek comedies. Moreover, in the Latin plays almost all occurrences of ethical *virtus* are found in dramatic situations that conform to a few moralizing *topoi* with which ἀρετή is regularly associated in Greek comedy: lectures about virtue and vice by a father to a son, or one friend to another; speeches of self-reproach by a contrite youth; and accusations against a guardian or teacher for corrupting his ward.

How did this semantic borrowing actually take place? Studies of semantic borrowing among better-documented bilingual or bidialectal populations have shown that meanings transferred from one language or dialect to another are often stabilized by their presence in popular literary or theatrical works.<sup>47</sup> One can imagine numbers of

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*Athenae tibi sunt visae fortunatae atque opiparae?*, parodies a *topos* of Greek tragedy and therefore indicates a Greek source; see Van Hook 1934, and Cecchi 1960.

<sup>45</sup> The development of ἀρετή as an ethical term has been treated by Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1913, 169–89, Adkins 1960, see also North 1966, 168–83.

<sup>46</sup> Of the fourteen times it occurs in the fragments of Middle and New Comedy, only once does ἀρετή have a clearly non-ethical denotation. Only in Anonymous fr. 412 (Kock) ἡ δ' ἀρετή μόνη/καὶ διὰ καλοῦ τοῦ σώματος καταφαίνεται is the meaning not ethical. Ἀρετή is clearly ethical at Antiphanes fr. 210 (K); Philemon fr. 71 (K); Menander fr. 338 (Koerte = fr. 408 Kock); fr. 493 (Koerte = fr. 1109 Kock); Anaxandrides fr. 2 in Austin 1973 = Alexander fr. 5 (Kock); Anon. frags. 126, 163, 190, 195, 1286 (Kock). In Menander fr. 179c (Koerte = fr. 203 Kock) ἀρετή is almost certainly ethical, as is a new text printed by E. W. Handley, *BICS* 26 (1976) 85. In Antiphanes fr. 212 (K) ἀρετή may be ethical. I have found ἀρετή seven times in the fragments of fourth-century and later Greek tragedies collected in Snell-Kannicht = *TGF* (1981, 1986). The word has ethical denotations in five, possibly six of these instances; Carcinus (70) fr. 4 (*TGF* I); Diogenes Sinopensis (88) fr. 3 (*TGF* I); Apollonidas (152) fr. 2 (*TGF* I); Zenodotus (215) fr. 1 (*TGF* I); Anon. fr. 346 (*TGF* II); Anon. fr. 327 (*TGF* II). At Antiphon (55) fr. 2 (*TGF* I) ἀρετή denotes bravery. In Aeschylus and Sophocles ἀρετή usually means courage; in Euripides the word is about evenly divided between valorous and ethical references. Ἀρετή is used with a wide variety of meanings by fourth-century rhetoricians.

<sup>47</sup> Also by their use in public statements by a widely known figure; see Hope 1971, 610, discussing Italianisms in French, and Gallicisms in Italian. In modern



ways in which neologisms heard in popular plays may have affected the Latin spoken and written by contemporary and later Romans; one, however, happens to be documented. Nicholas Horsfall has recently shown that the people of ancient Rome regularly memorized songs, which they then sang publicly in the street and parks of the city. Some of these songs were learned in the theater and were learned well. Theater audiences are reported to have known the lines of plays well enough to recite them *en masse* when an actor had missed his cue.<sup>48</sup> This practice demonstrates the existence of at least one sociolinguistic link between neologisms in surviving texts of Roman comedies, and their effect on the development of the Latin language. For Romans who had memorized and then repeatedly recited lines they had heard in the theater, would have internalized and then popularized new or expanded usages the lines might contain.

Usages of *virtus* heard in dramatic performances were only one way in which the Greek concept of ἀρετή influenced and broadened the meaning of the word that presented ideal Roman male behavior. The ethical denotations that *virtus* acquired was part of a general pattern of cultural change—Hellenization—that Roman society was undergoing in the period of the middle to late Republic. Cultural change occasioned by Greek influences also helps to explain the contradiction in the use of *virtus*, where, on the one hand, the word could refer to an ethical standard of conduct as used by Plautus and Cicero, while on the other, it could be contrasted to ethical concepts and behavior by Ennius and Caesar. The contradiction reflects a distinction observed in many cultures between societal norms and mores, and a more strictly ethical consideration of right and wrong. In some cultures, ancient Greece among them, the two more or less correspond, but in ancient Rome native moral concepts seem to have been predominantly social as opposed to private, and they centered around the ideas of function and success rather than abstract ethi-

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American culture usages that originated in Black English have become colloquialisms in large part through the medium of popular music, see Dillard 1977, 61–83.

<sup>48</sup> Ov. *Fast.* 3.535—*illic et cantant quidquid didicere theatri* . . . —“there [the festival of Anna Perenna on the Campus Martius] they also sang whatever they had learned in the theaters;” cf. Gell. *NA* 4.5.5, Stat. *Silv.* 1.2.172. On theater audiences see Hor. *Serm.* 2.3.60–1, Suet, *Galb.* 13. See Horsfall 1996b, 101–2, and 1996a, 9–16, with copious additional references from Christian writers. On the importance of music see Horsfall 1996a, 16–20.

cal notions of right and wrong.<sup>49</sup> The process by which Romans adopted certain Greek cultural ideals was complex and not without conflict.

### 6. *Competing Ideals of Manliness*

As is generally the case with our sources for ancient Rome, evidence for the conflict appears in the political arena, where the divergent meanings of *virtus* were publicly contested. The contest, moreover, played an ideological role in the crisis of the late Republic, which is evident in the history and literature of the period. Not surprisingly the political debate over *virtus* arose when what was the first generation of Roman senators to have a significant number of fully Hellenized members came to its political maturity. I speak of the generation born after 165 BCE, which includes Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, and Q. Lutatius Catulus, and which came to power roughly from 110 to 100 BCE, a period marked out by Plutarch as the time when intellectual characteristics associated with Hellenism—"philosophical doctrines, skill in argumentation, and clever wordiness"—had begun to be held in high esteem in Rome.<sup>50</sup> This was a time when Rome's political leadership prided itself on its cultivated tastes, and openly proclaimed its philhellenism.

It was this philhellenism that C. Marius challenged, and his challenge was centered around competing definitions of Roman manliness. Marius' career was built on a reputation for martial *virtus*, and on attacks against the over-refined and un-military Hellenism of the Roman nobility. The story and the principal texts—Sallust and Plutarch—are well known. But one text that is relevant to the issue of manliness, a fragment of a republican censorial speech entitled *De ducendis uxoribus*—"On getting married"—has been overlooked,

<sup>49</sup> The distinction between ethical concepts and social values in ancient Rome was explored by Heinze 1960, 83, and by Drexler 1965, 137 = 1967, 448. For the social and political nature of Roman moral values and their difference from Greek ethics see Schwartz 1951, 13.

<sup>50</sup> ἤδη τότε λόγων καὶ σοφισμάτων καὶ στωικῆς παρρησίας εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἤρχοντο σεμνύνειν τὰ τοιαῦτα. Plut. *Fort. Rom.* 318E, cf. 322D, dated by Plutarch to the period of the Cimbric Wars (c. 109–101) and to the time of M. Aemilius Scaurus, consul in 115.

principally because the speech has been almost universally mis-attributed. A number of years ago I argued, and according to Ernst Badian's recent and welcome comment, demonstrated "beyond reasonable doubt", that the speech in question was that of Marius' great enemy, Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, who became censor in 102 BCE.<sup>51</sup> There are reasons to believe that the speech, which became famous, was delivered in connection with the censor's final act, the *lustrum*,<sup>52</sup> which, given the tumultuous nature of Numidicus' censorship, must have occurred near the end of the censors' term in the early fall of 101. This was precisely the time of Marius' great Cimbric triumph, when he received extraordinary honors as the savior of Italy, and also announced his vow to dedicate a temple to *Honos et Virtus*.<sup>53</sup> Soon after, however, a bitter political dispute arose between Metellus and Marius over the consulship of 100, and between Marius and his co-consul Q. Lutatius Catulus over credit for the great victory over the Cimbri at Vercellae.<sup>54</sup>

Plutarch's description of the battle of Vercellae (*Marius* 26.3–5) is of interest because it follows the version of Marius' enemy Sulla. It states that before the battle both generals, Catulus and Marius, made vows to the gods. Catulus' vow was to *Fortuna huiusce diei* (Fortune of that day)—καθιερώσειν τὴν τύχην τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκείνης.<sup>55</sup> Plutarch's optimate source was characteristically vague about Marius' vow, recording only that he sacrificed a hecatomb 'to the gods', but since Marius later dedicated a temple to *Honos et Virtus* with the spoils of his German victories, his vow was almost certainly to this cultic pair.<sup>56</sup> Immediately after describing the two vows, however, Plutarch

<sup>51</sup> Despite its assignment to Numidicus by Gellius, the fragment had been almost universally attributed to Metellus Macedonicus, see McDonnell 1987, 81–98, Badian 1988 = 1997, 106–12. The objection of Holford-Strevens 1988, 227–8, who in discussing errors involving proper names in the text of *Noctes Atticae* disregards any possibility of scribal errors, is specious, see Badian 1988 = 1997, 110, n. 2.

<sup>52</sup> Censors entered office in April—Mommsen 1887, 352; *contio*—Varro, *L.* 6.93; cf. McDonnell 1987, 88, n. 26.

<sup>53</sup> On Marius' temple see Richardson 1992, 190, and Palombi 1996b.

<sup>54</sup> So Badian 1984, 101–47, 121, n. 46, who places the triumph in September or early October. Plutarch, *Mar.* 26.9, gives the date of the battle. On the joint triumph of Marius and Catulus see Plut. *Mar.* 27.10; Cic. *Tusc.* 5. 56. For Catulus' rapid defection from Marius see Carney 1960, 94–5; Passerini 1971, 42–3; and Valgiglio 1956, 125, n. 5.

<sup>55</sup> Plut. *Mar.* 26.3.

<sup>56</sup> For the temple spoils of the German victory see *CIL* I<sup>2</sup> p. 195, no. 18. There is no mention of Marius making a vow before his victory over the Teutoni and Ambrones at Aquae Sextiae. The suggestion of Van Ooteghem 1964, 254, follow-

goes on to write, "When the attack had begun, according to the account of Sulla, an event indicating [divine] wrath happened to Marius"—γενομένης δὲ τῆς ἐφόδου πρᾶγμα νεμεσητὸν παθεῖν τὸν Μάριον οἱ περὶ Σύλλαν ἱστοροῦσι. Plutarch then (26.5–6) describes how, blinded by the dust of battle, Marius led his army right past the Cimbri, who then attacked the army of Catulus and were defeated by it.<sup>57</sup>

The optimate charge that at the battle where he had called on the aid of divine *Virtus*, Marius had been rejected because of divine anger, provides a context for the concluding section of the speech made by Numidicus shortly after Marius' victory.

The immortal gods have the greatest power, but they should not be better disposed to us than our parents are. But parents, if their children continue to do wrong, disinherit them. Why therefore should we expect different behavior from the immortal gods, unless we end these evil policies? It is fair that the gods are well disposed only to those who are not opposed to them. The gods ought to approve virtue, not bestow it.<sup>58</sup> (*ORF* 18 4 = Gellius *NA* 1.6.8)

Di immortales plurimum possunt; sed non plus velle nobis debent quam parentes. At parentes, si pergunt liberi errare, bonis exheredant. Quid ergo nos ab immortalibus dissimilius exspectemus, nisi malis rationibus finem facimus? Is demum deos propitios esse accums est, qui sibi adversarii non sunt. Di immortales virtutem adprobare, non adhibere debent.

Here Numidicus treats the relationship between the gods and *virtus*; strikingly appropriate at a time when a temple had recently been vowed to divine *Virtus*. Numidicus begins by addressing the power of the gods and what men should expect of it, and compares the gods to parents. The gods, he says, favor only those who do not

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ing Broughton 1953–4, 211, that Marius' vow was to *Magna Mater*, whose temple had burnt down in 111, is unacceptable. That temple was rebuilt by a Metellus (Ovid, *Fast.* 4.347–8) either Numidicus, as held by Richardson 1992, 242, or by Caprarius (cos. 133), as argued by Gwyn Morgan 1973, 215–45.

<sup>57</sup> For how Marius' tactics at Vercellae allowed Catulus, whose army held the center, to claim the victory, see Völkl 1954, 82–9.

<sup>58</sup> In strict grammar the reflexive pronoun *sibi* in the penultimate sentence should refer to the subject of the verb in its own clause, in which case *qui sibi adversarii non sunt* would mean, "who are not their own enemies". But since *deos* is the virtual subject of the main clause, and since in preclassical Latin the pronouns *is* and *se* are frequently interchangeable, e.g. *ORF* 8.4.58 = Gell. *NA* 10.3.14, with the comment of Courtney 1999, 87, and the other examples he refers to on p. 159, it is best to construe *sibi* as referring to *deos*. The alternative translation does not negate the interpretation presented here.

oppose them, and, as parents disinherit bad children, so the gods turn away from those who continually do wrong. The sentiment fits well with what was the optimate view of the recently contested victory at Vercellae. The Marian version had it that before battle Marius had sought the aid of divine *Virtus* by vowing a temple, and that he had been given a resounding victory. But Marius' enemies denied both the divine support and the victory. As Sulla later wrote, the gods of battle had turned away from Marius at Vercellae, showing their anger by misleading his army, and giving the victory to Catulus (Plut. *Mar.* 26.5–6).

After describing the nature of the gods' favor, Numidicus turns to *virtus*. The rather abrupt transition from divine favor to *virtus* makes perfect sense if the reference is to Marius' temple of *Honos et Virtus*. But it is the seemingly obscure concluding sentiment that "The gods ought to approve *virtus*, not bestow it"—*di immortales virtutem adprobare, non adhibere debent*—that provides the key to the ideological conflict between Marius and his philhellenic adversaries. What is being contrasted here, and in the entire passage, are two opposing notions about manly excellence, '*virtus*',—one Roman, the other Greek. The Roman *virtus* that Marius claimed, and the cult he patronized, was martial rather than ethical in nature. It was this notion of *virtus* that Numidicus and his philhellene associates contested. The Greek word for virtue was ἀρετή which had decidedly ethical denotations, and *virtus* was the standard Latin word used to translate it.<sup>59</sup> As can be seen from the reference to *malis rationibus*, in his speech Numidicus presents *virtus* as an ethical quality.

The distinction Numidicus draws between 'approving' and 'bestowing' *virtus* reflects another aspect of the contrast between Greek and Roman ideas about virtue. Although ἀρετή is sometimes described as being possessed by gods or sought from the gods,<sup>60</sup> in Greek popular thought, literature, and rhetoric, ἀρετή above all represented

<sup>59</sup> On ἀρετή as an ethical term see above n. 45. For *virtus* as the standard word to translate ἀρετή see Eisenhut 1973, 14–22, esp. 19ff.

<sup>60</sup> 'Αρετή of the gods occurs at Hom. *Il.* 9.498, but the attribution is rare in literature. Theocritus, 17.135ff., asks Ptolemy Philadelphus to seek ἀρετή from Zeus, and Callimachus, *Hymn* 1.94–6, asks Zeus to give ἀρετή and ὄλβος (clearly not a divine quality) to the king. Philosophers debated whether or not ἀρετή was even compatible with the idea of deity: on one side, Pl. *Leg.* 631b–d, and for Stoic doctrine, Cic. *ND* 2.79–80, 30–9, 153; on the other side Arist. *EN* 1145a25–7, 1178b 10–15; Sex. Emp., *Adv. Phys.* 152–77.

the innate excellence of a human, counterpoised to or complemented by some extra-human power, most commonly fortune—*τύχη*.<sup>61</sup> Furthermore, although personified in literature, *ἀρετή* was never honored with an official public cult by Greeks.<sup>62</sup> The Roman view was quite different. Specific abstract qualities such as *virtus* were regarded as divine entities that bestowed their power on humans: *Ita Virtus, quae dat virtutem, Honor, qui honorem, Concordia, quae concordiam, Victoria, quae dat victoriam*—"For it is the divinity *Virtus* who gives courage, the divinity *Honos* who gives honor, divine *Concordia* who gives concord, and divine *Victoria* who gives victory" (Varro, *apud* Aug. *CD* 4.24, fr. 189). *Virtus* had been recognized as a deity with a state cult since 205.<sup>63</sup>

The *virtus* of Marius was a martial value, in essence social rather than ethical, and it was regarded as a divine entity that bestowed its power on its favorites. Numidicus' ethical *virtus*, and his statement about the gods approving and not bestowing what is an innate human quality, expresses a Greek view that is not only opposed to Marius' martial Roman *virtus*, but that seeks to redefine the traditional Roman concept of manliness to fit the more Hellenized and less martial

<sup>61</sup> For the prominence of *ἀρετή* as human excellence see Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1913, 169–78; and Jaeger 1939, 5–10. The *ἀρετή*–*τύχη* pairing is ubiquitous. A contrast between the two is also implied at Thuc. 1.40 and 2.87.3ff. See Isoc. 4.91, 11.10, Lycurg. *Leoc.* 48, Dem. 61.9, 61.32, 60.19–20, Pl. *Ti.* 25e–26e, *Leg.* 709b–c, Arist. *NE* 1101a6ff., Polyb. 29.21, and see Wehrli 1949, frs. 79–81 and 57–8, also Nepos, *Lys.* 1.1 and *Eum.* 1.1.

<sup>62</sup> Contra Smith 1993, 57. The private cult of *Ἀρετή* in a domestic context attested by a late second-early first century BCE inscription (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 985) of a religious association in Philadelphia (Alaşehir) in Lydia, provides no support whatsoever for a public cult. On the inscription see Weinreich 1919, 1–68, esp. 15–21, and Barton and Horsley 1981, 7–41. (I owe the second reference to Angelos Chaniotes.) Nor is the statue—*ἄγαλμα*—of *Ἀρετή* carried together with statues of the king and the *Polis* of Corinth in great procession of Ptolemy II Philadelphus (Athen. 201d) evidence for a cult, since the word *ἄγαλμα* need not refer to a cult statue, but only to one that was kept in a sacred precinct; see Price 1984, 176–9; esp. 178, n. 4. Cults honoring the divine qualities of Hellenistic rulers did not celebrate their *ἀρετή*, Habicht 1956, 223. The earliest reliable evidence for a cult to *Ἀρετή* is a second-century CE inscription from Aphrodisias (*CIG* II 2786), which records an Antonia Flavia who was priestess. But this was an adaptation of the Roman cult to *Virtus*. Likewise the reference at Philo, *Vita Soph.* 1.25.11; so rightly Wernicke 1895, 678.

<sup>63</sup> For the temple to *Honos et Virtus* originally vowed by M. Claudius Marcellus in 222 see Richardson 1992, 190 and Palombi 1996a. For Varro's text see Cardauns 1976 = Agahd 1898, fr. 91. The definition of *virtus* given by Augustine at *CD* 4.21 = fr. 95 Agahd, is not from Varro, see Cardauns, 2.216.

experiences and values of the men who dominated the senatorial establishment in the late second century.<sup>64</sup>

The cultural conflict that was the context for Numidicus' contrasting of traditional martial Roman *virtus* to a Hellenized ethical conception of the term did not last beyond Marius and his contemporaries. One reason is that Marius' political success had taught philhellenic senators of following generations to conceal from the public the extent of their Greek erudition.<sup>65</sup> Public debate among senators about Hellenization was a thing of the past. But in addition, the nature of the Roman elite had itself changed. The large-scale immigration to Italy of illustrious Greek intellectuals fleeing the Mithridatic Wars exposed greater numbers of upper-class Romans to first-class Greek learning and instruction, creating a generation of elite Romans that was, across the board, more thoroughly Hellenized than that of Catulus and Numidicus.<sup>66</sup> Marius' strident anti-Greek public stance became outdated because, in effect, it could no longer be taken seriously.

But Numidicus' contrast did reappear in the work of an historian for whom the failure of traditional Roman *virtus* plays a central role in his melancholy account of the Republic's fall. Sallust famously compared C. Julius Caesar and M. Porcius Cato as the two men of his time who exemplified *virtus*—but the *virtus* that each man displayed was as different as the men themselves. After listing the outstanding characteristics of Caesar, Sallust writes: *sibi magnum imperium, exercitum, bellum novum exoptabat, ubi virtus enitescere posset*—"He longed for a great command, an army, and a new war, where his *virtus* could shine" (*BC* 54.4). There is nothing ethical about this *virtus*. It is the martial quality that Caesar himself writes of in his Commentaries, and it depends on externals.<sup>67</sup> Caesar needed a war to show his *vir-*

<sup>64</sup> For the relationship between the diminished and fundamentally altered military experience of elite Romans and the decline of the Roman cavalry during the second century BCE see McDonnell, forthcoming; and McCall 2001.

<sup>65</sup> Among Roman senators who concealed their knowledge of Greek culture were the orators M. Antonius and L. Licinius Crassus (both born around 140 BCE); Cic. *De orat.* 2.4; see Rawson 1985, 4, and Cicero himself in his speeches; e.g. *Verr.* 4.4–5, 13.94.

<sup>66</sup> For Greek intellectuals fleeing the Mithridatic Wars causing a cultural turning point at Rome, see Rawson 1985, 7–10.

<sup>67</sup> For *virtus* in Caesar's commentaries see Eisenhut 1973, 44–6. Sallust's description of Caesar's mores at *BC* 54.2–4 is suspiciously similar to Cicero on Catilina at *Cael.* 13; cf. Q. Cic. *Comm. pet.* 9.

*tus*. Elsewhere, Sallust's opinion of the lust for a command—*cupido imperii*—is clear: *igitur primo pecuniae, deinde imperi cupido crevit: ea quasi materies omnium malorum fuisse*—"therefore the lust for money first, then for command grew: these provided, as it were, the occasion for all evils" (*BC* 10.3).<sup>68</sup> Related to *ambitio* and *aviditas*, together with the desire for money, it is the basis of all evils.

Cato, on the other hand, both during his life and especially after his philosopher's death, enjoyed a reputation as the philosopher-statesman, the perfect Stoic, the epitome of virtue.<sup>69</sup> For Sallust, Cato's civic and private *virtus* approaches the ideal:

But Cato was devoted to restraint, propriety, but most of all to austerity; he did not contend in wealth with the wealthy nor in political connections with the well connected, but in *virtus* with the energetic, in restraint with the disciplined, in integrity with the blameless; he wished to be, rather than to seem good: therefore the less he sought glory, the more it followed him. (*BC* 54.5–6)

at Catoni studium modestiae, decoris sed maxume severitatis erat; non divitiis cum divite neque factione cum factioso, sed cum strenuo virtute, cum modesto pudore, cum innocente abstinentia certabat; esse quam videri bonus malebat: ita, quo minus petebat gloriam, eo magis illum adsequebatur.

"To be rather than to appear good": a noble sentiment, and Sallust's highest praise,<sup>70</sup> but a definition of virtue, and of manliness, that is ethical, and private, and Greek. Adapted from a line of Greek

<sup>68</sup> In addition, Caesar's *bellum novum* would recall Cato's charge of *bellum iniustum*. Cf. Thuc. 3.82.8, with Perrochat 1949, 15; also *BI* 63.2, 6. Cato had proposed that Caesar be surrendered to the Germans, see Suet. *DI* 24.3, Plut. *Cat. Min.* 51.1–5, App. *Gall.* 18.2; cf. Cato's *iustum imperium* at *BC* 52.21 to *bellum novum*.

<sup>69</sup> Before his suicide, Cato debated Stoic doctrine and read Plato's *Phaedo*, see Plut. *Cat. Min.* 67–72; on his reputation for ethical *virtus*, Cic. *Phil.* 13.30, *omnium gentium virtute princeps*, "the leader of all people in virtue"; *Brut.* 18, *perfectissimus Stoicus*, "the perfect Stoic"; Vell. Pat. 2.35.2, *homo virtuti simillimus et per omnia ingenio diis quam hominibus propior*. "a man similar to virtue itself and whose character through everything was closer to the gods than to men". For his reputation during his life see Cic. *Sest.* 60, *Att.* 2.1.8. Cato used philosophical arguments in his speeches, Cic. *Ac. Pr.* 1 *praef.* 1. At *BC* 54.6, Sallust paraphrases the famous remark of the elder Cato (Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 10.4) but modifies it to accommodate the non-martial qualities of the great-grandson, who did not enjoy a reputation as a great soldier. The most Plutarch can say about Cato's tenure as a commander (Plut. *Cat. Min.* 8–11, esp. 9.3f.) is that he was honest and just.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *BC* 54.5–6 and *BI* 83.1 on Metellus. That in his comparison Sallust favors Cato is clear; see McGushin 1977, 309–11 and Shimron 1967. On Sallust's use of *virtus*, see Batstone 1988 with the critique in McDonnell (forthcoming).



tragedy—οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει (Aeschylus, *Sept.* 589)—it is as foreign to the tradition of native Roman *virtus* as it is to the great generals of the late Republic who exploited that tradition.

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## CHAPTER THIRTEEN

### ATHLETICS, *ANDREIA* AND THE *ASKÊSIS*-CULTURE IN THE ROMAN EAST\*

Onno van Nijf

#### 1. *Introduction: Tiberius Claudius Rufus*<sup>1</sup>

The neocorate demos of the Smyrnaeans.  
To Tiberius Claudius Rufus their  
own fellow citizen, a champion of many contests,  
a champion of Sacred contests, a member of the Synod  
who stood out among the pancratiasts of his own day  
on account of his *andreia* and *sôphrosunê*  
and who due to his acquaintance with the imperial family  
obtained the hereditary title of  
xystarch of all the contests to be  
held in Smyrna. (The city) has honored (him)  
at its own expense, as had the people of Elis.<sup>2</sup>

Some time between 41 and 123 CE the athlete Tiberius Claudius Rufus, a pancratiast, received an honorific monument at the site of Olympia, a privilege of Olympic victors only.<sup>3</sup> The authors of the monument were the demos of his hometown, Smyrna, and the city

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<sup>1</sup> *I. v.O* 55 (= *SIG*<sup>3</sup>, 1073 I = *IK* 24.1, 657) .

<sup>2</sup> ὁ νεωκόρος Ζμυρναίων δήμος | Τιβέριον Κλαύδιον Ῥούφον, τὸν | ἑαυτοῦ πολεΐτην,  
ἄνδρα πλειστο | νείκην καὶ ἱερωνείκην ἀπὸ συνόδου, | τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν παγκρατιαστῶν  
| ἀνδρεΐα τε καὶ σωφροσύνη διενένκαντα | καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ζεβαστοὺς | γνῶσιν  
τυχόντα τῆς διὰ γένους ξυσταρχίας πάντων τῶν ἀγομένων | ἀγῶνων ἐν Ζμύρνηι,  
ἐτείμησεν | ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων, καθὼς καὶ Ἡλεῖοι.

<sup>3</sup> Golden 1998, 84–8 , cf. Pliny *NH* xxxiv, 16.

of Elis, where he celebrated his triumphs. Both cities commemorated their decision in a separate inscription on the monument.<sup>4</sup>

The inscription from the city of Smyrna first draws attention to the athletic achievements of Rufus: he was a multiple victor, a victor in sacred games, as well as a member of the international association of athletes. He was also described as the outstanding pancratiast of his days. His virtues were indeed deemed exemplary, as he obtained from the emperor the hereditary title of *xystarch* at all the competitions in Smyrna, which would have put him in charge of discipline among the competing athletes.<sup>5</sup> The job would have demanded moral as well as athletic qualifications, which may be why his *sôphrosunê* was singled out. However, it would appear that this elevated position among his rivals was not simply due to his athletic talents. Rufus may not have been just an imposing athlete: he seems to have belonged to the Smyrniote elite, as is shown by a coin from the Trajanic era, indicating that he performed a local magistracy.<sup>6</sup> The fact that he seems to have been a personal acquaintance of the imperial family points in the same direction.

The monument, then, may reflect his social status as well as his athletic prowess. We do not have the statue that will have crowned this base, but we may safely assume that it will have portrayed him as a powerful athlete, and that it will have put his masculine identity on display. This at least, is suggested by the fact that his *andreia*, his masculinity, is a key attribute in Smyrna's representation of this successful athlete and high-ranking citizen. For it was in *andreia*, besides *sôphrosunê*, that he surpassed his fellow athletes. The second inscription that was found on the same monument, suggests that his reputation for *andreia* may have depended—partly at least—on his performance as a pancratiast. The text states that he had defeated many of the greatest champions, before appearing in the finals. There he seems to have met his match, but “rather risking his life than giving up hope of victory he held out until night fell and the stars were seen”.<sup>7</sup>

This inscription for Tib. Claudius Rufus, then, confronts us with two related issues that I want to explore briefly in this chapter: the

<sup>4</sup> The inscription by the Eleians is *I.v.O.* 54 (= *SIG*<sup>3</sup>, 1073 II).

<sup>5</sup> *IK* 24.1, 657 comm.

<sup>6</sup> Moretti 1957, no. 808, with reference to *BMC*, Ionia, p. 272, no. 324.

<sup>7</sup> *I.v.O.* 54 = *SIG*<sup>3</sup>, 1073 II, ll. 31–5.

link between athletic achievement and elite status, and the importance of athletic competence for the construction of ideals of masculinity. I shall argue that *andreia* was a key attribute in the self-presentation of members of the urban elites in the Roman East, and against some recent scholarship on the topic, I shall maintain that physical prowess and athletic training remained a major source of masculine identity. The continuing popularity of traditional Greek athletic training in the gymnasium, and performance in the stadium was closely linked to the political demands of the oligarchic regimes of the Roman East.

Although ancient history has been written (mostly) by men (mostly) about men, the question what it was to *be* a man, has only recently become a topic of historical investigation. Various aspects of ancient masculinity have been discussed, at times from unexpected perspectives, but there has been remarkably little attention for the role of athletics.<sup>8</sup> This is not simply an oversight: it has been maintained that athletics was not a respectable source of male identity at all:

Manliness was not a birthright. It was something that had to be won. Perhaps physical strength once had been the definitive criterion of masculine excellence on the semi-legendary playing fields of Ilion and Latium, but by Hellenistic and Roman times the sedentary elite of the ancient city had turned away from warfare and gymnastics as definitive activities, firmly redrawing the lines of competitive space so as to exclude those without wealth, education or leisure.

These are the words of Maud Gleason in the conclusions of her pathbreaking study *Making Men*.<sup>9</sup> If Gleason is right, a chapter on the role of athletics in the production of masculinity can be very short indeed. We need to establish, therefore, whether the inscription for Rufus was an exceptional document, and whether the elites of the Roman East were as uninterested in athletics as Gleason seems to imply.

## 2. *Athletes in the elite*

Who were the ancient athletes? Modern debates on the social background of Greek and Roman athletes have a long history, which

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<sup>8</sup> Gleason 1995, 1999; Foxhall and Salmon 1998a; Foxhall and Salmon 1998b.

<sup>9</sup> Gleason 1995, 159; cf. Gleason 1999, 69.



has been influenced by contemporary discussions on amateurism in modern athletics. The tone was set by E. N. Gardiner and H. A. Harris, who were themselves ardent supporters of the nineteenth-century Anglo-American amateur movement.<sup>10</sup> Amateurism was in their view an ideal that went back to early antiquity, even if it had not been universally practiced. Accordingly, the earliest descriptions of athletic competitions, by Homer, were thought to portray athletes as 'amateur gentlemen' marked by a love of competition for its own sake, but as soon as payments were introduced (by the sixth century BCE!) the decline apparently set in. Athletes became professionals, and increasingly they belonged to the lower classes. In this view the elite withdrew to other competitive spaces to demonstrate their worth.

This view, though it has become a popular image, has now been discredited among experts. In an important series of articles, H. W. Pleket has demonstrated that it is anachronistic to discuss payments of athletes in the terms of the modern amateurism debate.<sup>11</sup> He argues, convincingly to my mind, that the elite athletes were always present in ancient athletics, and that they had always accepted payment in the form of valuables or cash. They would not accept however, that their athletic activities were defined by such exchanges. They remained first and foremost members of the Graeco-Roman leisure class. There is some controversy, however, surrounding the relative importance of aristocrats in the athletic world.

Some scholars, and most notably D. C. Young have argued that there must have been more room for poorer competitors than has often been allowed.<sup>12</sup> The very existence of payments (and of subsidies for talented youngsters) must have made it possible—in principle—for some athletes to make a living from athletics.<sup>13</sup> The most successful champions among them may have entered a process of social mobility, adopting the values and the types of behavior typical for the local elites on the way. In their self-presentation they were often indistinguishable from the traditional elites. It is an altogether different matter, however, to argue on this basis that many

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<sup>10</sup> Gardner 1930, Harris 1964, 1972. For a discussion and further references, see Golden 1998, 141–6.

<sup>11</sup> Pleket 1974, 1975, 1992.

<sup>12</sup> Young 1984, 1988.

<sup>13</sup> Robert 1967, 28–32 for a case of subsidy.

lower class athletes took this road, or even that they dominated (parts of) the field in the Roman period, or any period for that matter.

Fortunately it is sufficient for my purposes, merely to be able to demonstrate that the elite continued to compete, and more importantly, that they attached sufficient importance to their athletic achievements to make these integral to their self-presentation. My discussion will be based largely on honorific inscriptions, which were an essential vehicle of elite self-presentation. The growth of the epigraphic habit during the first centuries of our era can at least partially be attributed to wider political and social changes which brought with them, in the words of R. van Bremen "not only a verticalization of the relationships between the wealthy and politically active few and their fellow citizens . . . but [which] also placed the families of those who governed at the center of civic ideology, imagery, and language".<sup>14</sup> Honorific monuments played a crucial part in this process, as they helped to inscribe the names and the faces of the ruling oligarchies indelibly in the collective memory.<sup>15</sup> The rule of the elite depended increasingly on this kind of symbolic action: on their success in presenting a coherent and convincing self-image on the public stage through ritual practice, and artistic or epigraphical representation.

Various ideological constructs helped to shape this self-presentation.<sup>16</sup> Our attention has been drawn to the importance of exemplary generosity (*euergetism*),<sup>17</sup> to the ideological importance of kinship, marriage and procreation;<sup>18</sup> and to the Roman emperor and the state as a source of ideological support.<sup>19</sup> Recently, the focus has been on the link between power and Greek rhetoric and *paideia*.<sup>20</sup> However, in this debate little attention has been paid to the physical element; to the ideological importance of the well-trained body which was put on display in the thousands of honorific monuments that commemorated the athletic achievements of the elite.

To illustrate my case I would like to discuss briefly two athletes from the Roman period. My first example is a local champion from

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<sup>14</sup> Van Bremen 1996, 163.

<sup>15</sup> Van Bremen 1996, esp. ch. 6, and van Nijf 2000.

<sup>16</sup> For an excellent discussion of the archaeological aspects of self-presentation, see Smith 1998.

<sup>17</sup> Veyne 1976.

<sup>18</sup> Van Bremen 1996.

<sup>19</sup> Gordon 1990, Lendon 1997.

<sup>20</sup> Brown 1992, Gleason 1995.

the small Pisidian city of Termessus. M. Aurelius Artemon, who was also known as Didymus, was a boy victor in wrestling, organized as part of a local Asclepius festival around the year 230. A statue was set up by himself, or by one of his relatives, in the portico alongside one of the main roads leading into the city to commemorate the event.<sup>21</sup> No further record of him exists, but as he seems to have belonged to one of the best known families from Termessus, he might well have ended his days as a quiet member of the Termessian elite, cherishing the memories of his youthful athletic days every time he saw his statue in the city center.<sup>22</sup>

A similar case is presented by the wrestler and pancratiast Lucius Septimius Flavianus Flavillianus, a native of Lycian Oenoanda. He first won the boys' wrestling competition in the Melagreia festival between 217 and 222. The demos erected an honorific statue for this promising young athlete.<sup>23</sup> We can pick up the thread of Flavillianus' career in c. 230s, when he received a number of other honorific inscriptions that celebrated his further victories in contests of Oenoanda and abroad.<sup>24</sup> The last texts show that Flavillianus had made a considerable career in athletics. He had become an athlete of international renown, as he was styled a *pleistoneikês* (multiple victor) and a *hieroneikês*, i.e. he had won crowns in some of the most prestigious stephanitic games of the *oikoumenê* in Athens, Laodicea, Argos, Ephesus, and Naples.

Like M. Aurelius Artemon, this champion was a member of the elite in his home town. He was a member of the family of the Licinniani, who are well attested epigraphically, and his father was a Lyciarch—as we know from the famous genealogical inscription that was set up by his aunt Licinna.<sup>25</sup> Seen in this light, the multiple statues for Flavillianus do not only reflect his athletic success: they are also a comment on his background. We have in him, therefore, a world famous athlete—a specialist, we would say professional—but

<sup>21</sup> TAM 3.1 188.

<sup>22</sup> For the genealogy of the Termessian elite, see the studies of Heberdey 1923, 1929.

<sup>23</sup> Hall and Milner 1994, no. 30.

<sup>24</sup> Hall and Milner 1994, nos. 31, 32, and 5.

<sup>25</sup> IGR III, 500 (V). "Flavius Diogenes, the Lyciarch, . . . had from his second wife . . . a son Flavillianus, who trained as a pancratiast and who was crowned victor in sacred contests" Cf. Hall and Milner 1994, 15, and Hall, Milner et al. 1996, 122–3.

also a member of a top family who could expect to obtain office and distinction in his hometown as his birthright.

Hundreds, indeed thousands, of similar inscriptions commemorated throughout the Roman East the athletic exploits of members of the urban elites. Everywhere, the scions of elite families continued to train in the *gymnasion*, to perform in the games of their hometowns, and sometimes to travel the world as full-time athletes. Elite athletes dominated the scene, perhaps not in numbers, but certainly with their ideology.<sup>26</sup>

Athletic excellence had long been an important element in (aristocratic) self-representation from Homer onwards. The image of the heroic nude had been used to represent athletes in dedications and on funerary monuments since the Archaic *kouroi*, and it remained on the repertory ever since.<sup>27</sup> Athletics were traditionally a legitimate field for epigraphic and statuary representation, not only at Olympia but also at home. We know that many Olympic victors received honorific statues in the city center at their return. Less-prominent victories were also deemed worthy of epigraphic commemoration, as we have seen. Throughout the Roman East members of the elite received honorific statues, commemorating even the most trifling athletic victory, that were set up by their home town, their families, or by their friends. Athletic monuments must have been an important element in the urban landscape.

In some cities, such as Termessus athletic statues even dominated the scene. In this small town, high up the rough mountains of Pisidia, the local elite received honorific inscriptions just as their peers did everywhere else, most of which have survived in situ. It is striking that about 50 percent of the inscriptions commemorate athletic achievement. It is also striking that athletic inscriptions occupied prominent positions in the urban landscape.<sup>28</sup> Walking about in the civic center of Termessus, it was impossible to avoid the image of the victorious athlete, underscoring the basic message that athletic competence was a major source of elite identity.

Such cases suggest that Rufus was not an exception: many of his peers were still keen on training and competing in the traditional

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<sup>26</sup> As has been demonstrated by Pleket 1974, 1975, 1992.

<sup>27</sup> Osborne 1998.

<sup>28</sup> Van Nijf 2000.

Greek games, and they were only too willing to display their athletic competence through an impressive series of inscriptions and monuments. The image of a sedentary non-athletic elite is based on a remarkable misreading of the *Zeitgeist*. Athletics still had a role as a major source of elite identity under Roman rule. In the following pages I want to explore a few suggestions as to why this might have been so.

### 3. *Why Athletics?*

What made the image of athletic competence so attractive to the Graeco-Roman elite? There are many answers to this question, all of which I cannot discuss in equal depth. I have discussed elsewhere the importance of athletics as a marker of Greek cultural identity, which was highly prized by a provincial elite whose own claims to Greek ethnic identity were often tenuous.<sup>29</sup> Below I shall mention the role of the family, but I shall focus my discussion on the role of athletics in a civic context.

One important aspect of the victory inscriptions is that they located the victors in the context of their family. The glory of athletic victory had never been a purely personal experience, but it was always seen as something that reflected on the family—the *oikos*—of the victor. Leslie Kurke's excellent study of the victory odes of Pindar makes this point with some force.<sup>30</sup> Aristocratic families (in Pindar's time no less than in the Roman period) were engaged in a highly competitive battle for *kleos*, the prestige and renown attached to a family's name, which is a form of symbolic capital. Athletic victory was one of the most common sources of *kleos* (military victory—less relevant in our period—was another), and care was taken to integrate athletic victory into the family of the victor. Epinician poetry, with its many references to the *oikos* of the victor, fulfilled this role in the age of Pindar, but it was not the only medium that could perform this transformation.

Honorific statues with inscriptions did something very similar: they commemorated—and thereby immortalized—the victors, and by nam-

<sup>29</sup> I have discussed this link in van Nijf 1999 and 2001. For a more literary approach to the subject, see König 2000.

<sup>30</sup> Kurke 1991.

ing them made explicit their family ties. M. Aurelius Artemon of Termessus did not simply state that he belonged to a noble family, but he listed his direct ancestors, thereby consciously presenting himself as standing in a family tradition: M. Aurelius Artemon, also known as Didymus, the son of M. Aur. Aristonicus, who was the son of Trocondas, who was the son of Trocondas, who was the son of Trocondas, who was the son of Trocondas, who was the son of Attes . . .

The number of generations listed, is perhaps exceptional, but this kind of 'genealogical bookkeeping' was not uncommon. It may have been particularly effective in the case of boy victors—who did not really have a social persona of their own worth commemorating. Their honorific monuments were presented as a renewal of past achievements and of future glory of the family. This message could be underscored by the location of the agonistic statues. The monuments for members of one family could be placed in the immediate vicinity of each other. In Termessus we can see how a few elite families dominated entire streets with clusters of their honorific inscriptions, among which athletic monuments were particularly well represented. The effect was to display athletic excellence as a key attribute of a particular family on a par with the other qualities that were necessary for elite status.<sup>31</sup>

#### 4. *Athletics in the City*

The glory of an athletic success did not only affect the victor, and his family, but it was a matter of interest to the city as a whole. Athletes competed on behalf of their city in the international games, and the crowns that athletes won were obtained for the polis. Victors of sacred-crown games were officially announced, and would be the object of praise. The conventions of civic praise could differ widely: besides an honorific inscription, they could include *eiselasis*, the right to a triumphal entry into the city, *sitēsis*, or ritual dinner with the civic magistrates, prominent positions in local processions, honorific seats in local stadia and theaters, and in some cases life-long tax-free allowances that were dignified with the name *opsônion*.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Van Nijf 2000.

<sup>32</sup> For a discussion of the various honors, and the representations of victory in

These rewards presented athletic success as on a par with civic euergetism: the expenditure of effort (or in the case of an equestrian victory, of money) on behalf of the city, was presented and perceived as a major civic benefaction. Honorific texts praised the victors in the same terms, using the same vocabulary, as that used for civic benefactors. The two spheres were often referred to in the same text. It would seem, then, that by virtue of an important victory the athlete became a public benefactor—a status which was the *telos* of the sons of elite families anyway, and which was one of the ideological supports of the regime of the notables.

### 5. *Perfect Bodies: Perfect Citizens*

Finally I would like to suggest that the popularity of athletics was connected with the importance of the body in expressing cultural and social ideals. In good Greek tradition, citizenship was an ideal that was not only a matter of actions, gestures or even a mentality (patriotism) but also of physical comportment: successful citizens have successful bodies. Civic space in Graeco-Roman cities—as indeed in most Mediterranean cities—served as a public stage, where actors operated under the constant gaze of their fellow citizens, who would act as judges. “Just as a man’s behaviour was judged in the light of a civic ideal, so too was his physicality”.<sup>33</sup> The citizens’ bodies—and particularly those of the aristocrats—were scrutinized within the complex guidelines of traditionally acceptable behavior in the context of daily life, in the spotlights of political drama, and most of all in the many athletic contests and competitions that were organized by the Greek cities. Here, more than anywhere else the link between good citizenship and the body was publicly demonstrated.<sup>34</sup> This image of the self-controlled public man was the product of a rigorous program of physical and mental training and discipline (*askêsis*) that began early in life and which ended only with death.

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literature and art, see Golden 1998, 73–103; the implications of civic banquets have been discussed by Schmitt-Pantel 1992; on the subsidies for sacred victors, see also Pliny *Ep. Tra.* 118–19.

<sup>33</sup> This quote is taken from Jo Sonin’s unpublished Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, on non-verbal communication in classical Athens: Sonin 1999.

<sup>34</sup> For a discussion of the importance of traditional aristocratic values in the Athenian construction of masculinity, see Cartledge 1998.

For centuries this training had been the central element of Greek civic education in the *gymnasion*: even in the Roman period the *gymnasion* remained the place where young men were instructed in the various ‘*techniques de corps*’ that they were required to perform as real men, and thus as proper citizens.<sup>35</sup> Inscriptions set up for trainers and *kosmētai* (supervisors of the gymnasia) would single out their contributions to making the boys into men.<sup>36</sup>

Specialist teachers, hired by the city or paid for by benefactors, instructed the youth in the range of athletic, artistic and intellectual activities that were essential to the self-image of the citizens, as cultivated, as well as cultural, Greeks. Although the ephebes had to learn their Homer, of course, much of their time must have been dedicated to preparing for and performing in the familiar athletic contests that were such a common feature of *gymnasion* life: running contests; the *pentathlon*, but also the heavy numbers: boxing, wrestling and *pankration*. From an early age, Greek boys learned there that masculinity depended not simply on physical fitness, but that it was a value that could be measured, and that had to be displayed in competition.

This was made explicit in a number of less familiar competitions that were organized in the context of the *gymnasion*, and in a limited number of civic festivals. These so-called ‘judgment contests’ included events as *euexia* (comportment), *eutaxia* (discipline), and *philoponia* (endurance).<sup>37</sup> The best-known examples were of course *euanthia* competitions that were held in Athens in the context of the Panathenaea and the Theseia. We do not know exactly how the contestants were judged, but it seems clear that beauty, physical fitness, and military valor each may have played a part. It is significant, however, that in Athens at least, these contests were limited to citizens, which suggests that the masculinity put on display was seen as a civic value *par excellence*.

This type of competition seems to have disappeared in the Roman period, but there is sufficient evidence to show that *andreia* continued to be defined in military or athletic terms. The inscription for Rufus is only one example.<sup>38</sup> The term does not only appear in

<sup>35</sup> Mauss 1935.

<sup>36</sup> E.g. *IG* II–III, 1006, ll. 59–60 and *I.v. E.* 6, l. 15.

<sup>37</sup> Crowther 1991, 1985.

<sup>38</sup> *IG* IV.1, 618 for a runner from Epidaurus, who was an *andreias paradeigma*. *IG* V.1 660, see also below for a discussion of Roueché 1993, nos. 72, and 89.



honorific contexts, however. Herodian describes how the emperor Septimius Severus tried to please the Roman people by organizing victory games, at which 'interpreters of the Muses and students of *andreia*' appeared, or, as we would say: musicians and athletes.<sup>39</sup>

Visual evidence points in the same agonistic direction. A personification of *Andreia*, which was found on a relief in the theater in Hierapolis stands alongside representations of other athletic disciplines, such as running and a representation of the synod of athletes.<sup>40</sup> (See Fig. 1)



Fig. 1 *Andreia*

<sup>39</sup> Herodian iii.8.

<sup>40</sup> Fig. 1: Ritti 1985, 68, ph. Pl. Va.

However, one of the most striking uses of the term *andreia* in an agonistic context can be found on an honorific inscription from Aphrodisias that was erected by the city of Ephesus for the Aphrodisian athlete Aurelius Achilles who had entered the Olympic games for Ephesus. The inscription singles out his extraordinary *andreia* twice.<sup>41</sup>

... (the city i.e. Ephesus) has welcomed Aurelius Achilles—who has both undertaken the training of his body, and is also most noble in competition, and most dignified in his way of life and his conduct, so that in him all virtue of body and soul is blended—the city has welcomed him) often, both in previous contests, which he adorned, having competed impressively and with full *andreia*, and especially in the contest of the Olympia, because when the city encouraged him—as if it were his own fatherland—to proceed to the ultimate competition, and to the category of men, he listened, and was persuaded by the encouragement, and defeated his opponents, and bound on the (crown of) olive with such glory that his (?display of) *andreia* and eagerness are to be numbered among the most distinguished of contests.

<p>             Αὐρ(ήλιον) Ἀχιλλέα, σώματος μὲν ἄσκη-              σιν ἐπανελόμενον, ἀθλήσεως δὲ              τὸν γενναϊότατον, βίου δὲ καὶ προ-              αιρέσεως τὸν σεμνότατον, ὥς ἐν αὐ-              τῇ πάσαν κεκρᾶσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅσην           </p>	20
<p>             ψυχῆς ἐστὶν καὶ σώματος, ἀποδε-              ξαμένης μὲν πολλάκις καὶ ἐν τοῖς              φθάνουσιν ἀγῶσιν οἷς ἐκόσμησεν              διαπρεπῶς καὶ μετὰ πάσης ἀγω-              νισάμενος ἀνδρείας, μάλιστα δὲ           </p>	25
<p>             ἐν τῷ τῶν Ὀλυμπίων ἀγῶνι, ὅτι προ-              τρεψαμένης αὐτὸν ὡς πατρίδος              τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸ τελεώτατον τῶν              ἀγωνισμάτων καὶ τὴν κρίσιν τῶν ἀν-              δρῶν μετελθεῖν, ὑπακούσας κα[ῖ]           </p>	30
<p>             πεισθεὶς τῇ προτροπῇ τοὺς τε ἀν-              τιπάλους κατηγωνίσατο καὶ μετὰ              τοσαύτης δόξης τὸν κότινον ἀνε-              δήσατο ὥς ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα τῶν              εὐδοκιμησάντων ἀγωνισμάτων           </p>	35
<p>             καταριθμεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνδρείαν αὐ-              τοῦ καὶ προθυμίαν           </p>	[κτλ.]

Aurelius Achilles is clearly akin to our Rufus: to be admired not only for his athleticism, but also for his conduct and dignity. A sim-

<sup>41</sup> Roueché 1993, no. 72, ll. 16–37.

ilar image is conjured up by literary representations of the *askêsis*-culture of the gymnasium, as for example Lucian's *Anarcharsis*. Dio Chrysostom's discourses on the fictitious boxer Melancomas make a similar point: athletic training produces citizens who are seen to embody civic ideals. Here we have Dio's description of the boxer Melancomas:<sup>42</sup>

That man was more courageous and bigger than any other man in the world, not merely than any of his opponents; and furthermore he was the most beautiful. And if he had remained a private citizen (*idiôtês*) and had not gone in for boxing at all, I believe that he would have become widely known simply on account of his beauty.

The text goes on to emphasize his beauty (*kallos*), self-control (*sôphrosunê*), his pedigree (*eugeneia*), and, of course, his manliness (*andreia*), all standard qualities of the elite. Melancomas embodies not only an athletic, but also a social ideal, but it is striking that it was the athletic activity, the boxing, that effected his transformation into a 'public figure'. The civic connection was also put on display in a relief from Aphrodisias with another personified *Andreia*. On the famous monument for the benefactor Zoilus (first century CE), we see the personification of *Andreia*, not only next to *Timê* (honor) but also near *Dêmos* and *Polis*, thus firmly locating 'masculinity' in a civic context.<sup>43</sup> (Fig. 2). Texts and monuments such as these suggest that the *gymnasion* remained a school in civic virtue of which the well-trained body was a major expression.

## 6. Other Voices

Now, with so much at stake in the display of the ideal male body, it does not come as a surprise that there were other authorities at hand, who claimed a superior understanding of its workings, and who offered alternative roads towards its production, and towards the construction of a true masculine identity. Many of these voices were in explicit debate with athletes and their trainers.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Dio Chrysostomus *Or.* 28.5.

<sup>43</sup> Fig. 2: Smith 1993.

<sup>44</sup> There is no space to discuss here the interesting fact that in classical Athens debates on the value of athletic training for masculine identity, had overt political overtones: athleticism was associated with the pro-Spartan elite. Cf. Cartledge 1988, and Osborne 1998.




Fig. 2 *Andreia* on the Zoilos relief in Aphrodisias

In the first place there seem to have been dissenters inside the gymnasia. Matthew Dickie has recently argued that Greek elites in the Roman period left athletics (and especially the heavy numbers such as boxing, wrestling and pankration) increasingly to professional musclemen, and turned their attention to 'callisthenics'.<sup>45</sup> Dickie is right, of course, to suggest that traditional sport historians have neglected the importance of music and dance in the physical education of the gymnasium. However, this cannot have been a particularly new development of the Roman period: musical and athletic disciplines had been equally valued in the Pythian games and elsewhere, since the beginnings of Greek agonistics. Dancing, most famously the armed *purhikhê* dance, had been an element of gymnasium education since the classical period, certainly in Athens.<sup>46</sup> Another case is the *halma*, the long jump, which was apparently accompanied by a musical instrument, which suggests that elegance and rhythmic movements (*eurhuthmoi kinêseis*) must have played a part.<sup>47</sup>

I do not think, however, that this shows that members of the Greek elites turned their backs *en masse* to the heavy numbers in favor of 'callisthenics'. In the first place, they may well have practiced both, as did for example the wrestling and boxing elite of Termessus, who also competed in *paian* dancing.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, there is no indication that the heavy numbers became less popular: hundreds, thousands of inscriptions in honor of heavy athletes throughout the Roman East are testimony to their continuing popularity, at least until the fourth century (as a recent find from Olympia shows).<sup>49</sup> And, most importantly, cases such as that of Flavillianus, and numerous examples from Termessus and elsewhere make clear that the heavy numbers remained attractive to upper-class performers. Not all of them may have looked like, or wanted to look like, the Farnese Heracles (an icon, rather than a portrait), but if they wanted to win at an international level, they must have had the physique to match. Two statues from Aphrodisias represent heavy athletes, probably boxers; it is not difficult to register that masculinity was put on display here.<sup>50</sup> (Fig. 3).

<sup>45</sup> Dickie 1993.

<sup>46</sup> Kyle 1992, 94–5.

<sup>47</sup> Decker 1995, 97–8.

<sup>48</sup> E.g. *TAM* iii, 1, 163.

<sup>49</sup> Ebert 1997.

<sup>50</sup> Fig. 3: Inan and Alföldi-Rosenbaum 1979, nos. 190 and 191. The inscriptions Roueché 1993, nos. 74 and 75 are likely to have accompanied these statues.




Fig. 3 Athletes from Aphrodisias

Having said that, I would accept that the role of traditional athletic training, especially training for the heavy numbers, was not (and never had been) undisputed, not even inside the *gymnasion*, and that other exercises were also practiced. I doubt however, that these were ever more popular than the traditional training practices. Literary works can be a tricky guide to what really went on in the *gymnasia*.

Most examples of what may seem to amount to a critique of athletic training can be found in works of a highly polemical nature. The physician Galen, for example, addresses to the athletes and their trainers the kind of vitriolic attacks, that he usually reserves for other doctors who threatened his supremacy: athletes were really *athlioi*, 'a sorry lot', athletic trainers exercised a 'perverted art', and he compares them with squealing pigs. The real *gumnastikê tekhnê*, was found in the works of Hippocrates or—of course—of Galen himself.<sup>51</sup>

Not only doctors, but also physiognomists, philosophers, and even dream-interpreters offered rival theories and practices of the body. Recently we have learned that Sophists also claimed to be experts in 'making men'.<sup>52</sup> These texts often contain—negative—references to the world of the gymnasium. The authors were at pains, of course, to persuade their audiences that there were other effective ways to fashion a masculine identity than 'working out in the gym', but they emphasized the physical efforts also involved in their practices. Vocal training, we are told, was really hard work:<sup>53</sup>

The daily use of the voice in speaking aloud is a marvelous form of exercise, conducive not only to health, but also to strength; not the strength of the wrestler, which lays on flesh, and makes the exterior solid like the walls of a building, but a strength that engenders an all-pervasive vigor and a real energy in the most vital and dominant parts.

Modern scholars have tended to take such statements at face value, as a reliable indicator of the *Zeitgeist*, and as an unproblematic reflection of elite attitudes and practices connected with athletics. However, these texts should be seen against the background of intensely competitive intellectual life, where debate often took the

<sup>51</sup> See e.g. Galen, *An Exhortation to Study the Arts*; and *To Thrasyboulos: Is Healthiness a Part of Medicine or of Gymnastics?; The Exercises with the Small Ball*.

<sup>52</sup> Gleason 1995.

<sup>53</sup> Plutarch, *Advice on health*, (*Mor.*) 130A–B.

form of a public *agôn*.<sup>54</sup> Doctors, sophists, physiognomists, and athletic trainers were jockeying for position in a contest for the status and power associated with true knowledge (*sophia*) or with a truly effective practice (*tekhnê*) of the body. The debate was fierce, and highly rhetorical: persuasiveness depended as often on misrepresenting an opponent, or on denying him the moral right to speak. For example one sophist, the author of a treatise on 'hygienic declamation', simply claimed "athletes are generally more thick-headed than other people".<sup>55</sup> It may have created a laugh, but it was an effective strategy in a rhetorical context.

In other words: it is perhaps not so surprising that doctors and rhetoricians won the argument in their own works, but we cannot use these texts to show that they also won the argument in the *gymnasia* of the time. Their popularity and success might well have been a rhetorical artifact, a mirage fabricated by the Sophist themselves. Galen gives us a hint of the situation:<sup>56</sup>

Athletics holds out the promise of strength, brings with it popular fame, and is rewarded by our elders with financial payment—as if athletes were some kind of public heroes. There is a danger that it may deceive some young men into supposing it an art (*tekhnê*).

Galen's fears turn out to have been quite realistic: as we have seen above, traditional athletic training continued to exert a massive appeal among the upper classes. Rhetoricians, physicians, and the advocates of other *tekhnai* of the body seem to have *reacted* to this dominance: not only do their frequent and hostile returns to athletic knowledge and practices betray a concern that their own position may have been less secure than they would have liked, but the constant use and reworking of athletic metaphors, suggest that athletic training and competition remained the dominant frame of reference for many of the participants in these debates about manliness.

An unfortunate consequence of the traditional view is that it perpetuates the (modern) myth that athletics and high culture are separate and mutually exclusive spheres of life. We should not forget that upper-class boys received their rhetorical and their athletic training at the same institution: the *gymnasion*, which provided some with

<sup>54</sup> Barton 1994, esp. ch. 2 and 3.

<sup>55</sup> Anon. 'On hygienic declamation' in: Oribasius 6.10.16.

<sup>56</sup> Galen *Exhortation* 9 (20).



an introduction to the intellectual fast lane of the world of the sophists, which for many others was a springboard to a successful career as an international or regional sports star, but which for the great majority provided the solid basis for a quiet and comfortable life as a local councillor. It should not come as a big surprise then, that athletic and cultural practices were seen not only as compatible, but as mutually implicated manifestations of the dominant *gymnasion* culture.

Examples of this close symbiosis are not hard to find. A number of inscriptions from Oenoanda commemorate a quadrennial festival that was founded by a local *grammatikos*, i.e. a schoolteacher. The benefactor added poetic and other cultural contests at a later stage, but initially the contest had been purely athletic.<sup>57</sup> The schoolteacher had a famous wrestler as brother-in-law, who had sufficient literary skills to compose a verse inscription.<sup>58</sup> These monuments clearly show that athletics and culture were two sides of the same coin. Another striking example of this mentality comes from Aphrodisias, where an honorific inscription presented a local athlete as a classy combination of brawn and brain.<sup>59</sup>

Since Callicrates, son of Diogenes, from Aphrodisias, pancratiast, and victor in sacred games, multiple victor, who from his earliest youth having turned to the ways of virtue, obtained by sweat and labor his noble reputation with all people to the ends of the inhabited world, on the basis of both his *andreia*, and of the complete wisdom (*sophia*) which he obtained by his labors; for, having excelled all the ancients with his body, he was admired for his physique, also taking care of his soul, he was admired for his conduct.

ἐπεὶ Καλλικράτης Διογέ[ου]ς Ἀφρο]-  
 δεισιεὺς πανκρατιαστῆς ἱερονεΐκη[ς πλεισ]-  
 [τ]ονείκης ἀπὸ πρώτης ἡλικίας ε[ἰς τὰς ὁ]- 10  
 δοὺς τῆς ἀρετῆς τραπεῖς ἰδρῶσι [καὶ πό]-  
 νοις ἐκτήσατο τὴν εὐκλεῆ δόξαν [ἀνδρειό]-  
 τητός τε παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις καθ' [ὅλης τῆς]  
 οἰκουμένης γίνεται διὰ τε τὴν ὀλόκλη[ηρον]  
 αὐτῷ πεφιλοπονημένην σοφίαν· σώματι γὰρ ὑ- 15  
 περβαλὼν ἅπαντας ἀρχαίους ἐθανμάσθη [τὴν]  
 [φύ]σιν, ψυχῇ τε ἐπιμελούμενος ἐμακαρί-  
 ζετο τὸν τρόπον·

<sup>57</sup> The dossier can be found in Hall and Milner 1994 and *SEG* xliv, 1156–82.

<sup>58</sup> Hall and Milner 1994, no. 18b = *SEG* xliv, 1182.

<sup>59</sup> Roueché 1993, no. 89 with emendations by J. Ebert.

Athletics and literature were clearly presented as two complementary ingredients of traditional Greek *paideia* of which Callicrates was the embodiment. These themes are topical: the accomplished athlete was no barbarian, but someone who fully partook of the best that traditional Greek culture, *paideia* had to offer.

I suggest that this unity of athletic and cultural *paideia* as the fount of Greek cultural identity lies behind a remarkable, but underused, sophistic text: Philostratus' *Gymnastikos*. This treatise presents itself as a skillful apology for traditional Greek athletic practice, written from the perspective of an athletic trainer. It is a sophisticated document, the status of which is far from certain. Is it an epideictic speech that a trainer might deliver when put on the spot if he wanted to defend the status of his own competition, or was it set up as a contribution to a wider debate on the value of physical education?<sup>60</sup> Whatever it was, the text is clearly concerned to raise the status of athletics as an intellectual discipline, as it engages in debate with other *tekhnai* of the body, in particular physiognomics and medicine (whose views are skillfully misrepresented in the way we would expect from a top sophist).

At any rate, it should not surprise us that a sophist should write a treatise on athletic training. All disciplines that made a claim to be a socially worthwhile type of knowledge or *tekhnê*, had to be persuasive to a cultured audience. As Philostratus put it:<sup>61</sup>

The *gymnastês* ought to be neither talkative nor unskilled in speech, that the efficacy of his art neither be injured by garrulity nor appear too crude from being unaccompanied by good speech.

But there was more at stake than technical competence here: athletics had always been central to the self-definition of Greek males. As a sophist, Philostratus was concerned with Greek identity, and advocated the continuing relevance of traditional Greek culture under Roman rule.<sup>62</sup> In this context it is not so surprising that he turned his attention to athletics as well. The *Gymnastikos* can thus be read as a defense of athletics as an integral part of traditional *paideia*.

<sup>60</sup> A good discussion can be found in König 2000.

<sup>61</sup> *Gymnastikos* 25.

<sup>62</sup> Flintermann 1995.

## 7. Conclusion

I have maintained that athletic excellence was a defining element of male identity among the elites of the Roman East, and a major ideological support of their regime. I have discussed several reasons why this might have been the case, but I have focused on the importance of the male body in expressing social and cultural values such as civic virtue and manliness. Athletic training and performance still offered a highly effective way of acquiring and displaying these qualities. Moreover, I have argued that athletics were an integral part of traditional Greek *paideia*. For many notables and their sons athletics must have been an attractive way of staking out a claim to Greek cultural identity. The *gymnasion* was, and remained, the place where the scions of elite families were schooled in civic virtue through rigorous physical, athletic training. If we want to capture the Zeitgeist, 'Second Athletics' is as appropriate a label as is 'Second Sophistic'.

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## CHAPTER FOURTEEN

### LIKE THE LABORS OF HERACLES: *ANDREIA* AND *PAIDEIA* IN GREEK CULTURE UNDER ROME

Joy Connolly

#### 1. *Introduction*

Can *andreia* be learned? For ancient writers on education, with some qualifications, the answer was yes. According to an anecdote told in the second century CE, the lawgiver Lycurgus convinced his fellow Spartans with the following experiment. He brought out two puppies, chosen from the same litter and then reared in different ways, and set them down a short distance away from a bowl of food and a live hare. The puppy trained to be self-sufficient and spirited leapt after the hare; his pampered counterpart waddled over to the dish. Character, the narrator concludes, is a phenomenon of habituation: “if one were to say that the virtues of character are the habits of character, he would not be far wrong” ([Plutarch] *Moralia* 3B). Less colorfully, but with the same essential point in mind, Aristotle advises men to make *andreia* a habit, like fortitude and a sense of justice, all virtues necessary for the good polis (*Politics* 1334a17). For Aristotle and the rhetorical tradition of pedagogy that followed him, ethical habituation relies on the spectacle of *exempla*.<sup>1</sup> The education in *ars rhetorica* undertaken by Greek and Roman elites was a powerful combination of body-mind training that bent all the pupil’s powers of emulation toward the goal of acquiring the habits, the look, of a manly man.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This is true for Plato as well, though his theory of character development is more complicated. In the *Laches*, Plato’s dialogue on *andreia*, Socrates’ interlocutors bring their sons to a performance of hoplite exercise, so that by witnessing the courageous citizen body in action the boys will learn to emulate it. Socrates does not dispute this view, but changes its terms: see the analysis of Goldhill and von Reden 1999, 267–77.

<sup>2</sup> Brown 1992, 48–9 focuses on the control of anger proper to elite men; Gleason 1995, 88–102 discusses various masculine qualities in a wide selection of imperial medical texts and physiognomical treatises.

As supervisors of adolescent boys through the crucial period of their development into good men, teachers of rhetoric assumed a heavy burden of virtuous exemplarity, of which *andreia* was a significant element.<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, quoting Hector's famous declaration in the *Iliad* that 'he has learned to be brave' (*esthlos*, *Iliad* 6.444), remarks, "By declaring that *andreia* is a thing to be learned (*mathêma*) . . . the poet encourages us to learn what is good, and to pay attention to our teachers" (*prosekhein tois didaskousin*, *Moralia* 31A). Some teachers of rhetoric who also pursued careers as epideictic orators, a group often called sophists, performed the duty of exemplar outside the school as well as in it.<sup>4</sup> In Greek-speaking areas under Roman imperial occupation from the first century CE until well into the Christian period, these men 'taught' the city in mellifluous speeches designed to entertain, to inform, and to display the sophist's command of the arts of manliness as they emerged in the harsh light of performance. Those sophists who did not teach on a formal basis, but who received the title from their practice of epideictic and deliberative speech-making, found themselves the objects of similar scrutiny from a public long accustomed to reading oratorical performance as an index of moral character, a habit traceable in Greek oratory back to fifth- and fourth-century Athens.

Pursuit of public approval goes some way toward explaining the recurrence of manliness as a theme in surviving speeches of the imperial period. Aelius Aristides declares during the reign of Marcus Aurelius: "the rhetor, the philosopher, and all those involved in liberal education must not delight the masses in the same way that these servile men, these dancers, pantomimes, and showmen, do" (*Oration* 34.55). In Dio Chrysostom's first Kingship oration, an encomium for the emperor Trajan, the philosopher-sophist proclaims it his intention and his duty to make men manly (*andreious*) with his speech, just as Alexander the Great's favorite musician had done (*Oration* 1.1–4). While these statements bespeak the educator's moral

<sup>3</sup> Grammarians had some role to play here, but in part due to the available evidence from the imperial period, I will limit myself to discussing rhetoric. Morgan 1998, 120–44 analyzes the virtues inculcated in grammatical drills on Egyptian papyri, where the focus is not *andreia*, but prosperity and wealth.

<sup>4</sup> Stanton 1973 and now, in a more extensive and critical discussion, Brunt 1994 define the word 'sophist' and traces the history of its use. I will use the word for convenience's sake, but should acknowledge the regularity with which it is used to belittle its target, even into the second century.

responsibilities, at least as Aristides and Dio like to describe them, they also reveal the degree to which the professions of teacher, courtier, actor, and entertainer overlapped in imperial society, making it necessary for the teacher to assert his status as a unique and superior exemplary type.

The responsibility for fostering manliness might seem to fall naturally into the formal pedagogical domain of rhetoricians and sophists. Yet a variety of factors complicated the situation. The 'teacher' as a figure broadly conceived occupied a complex and conflicting position in imperial Greek society, that of training youths in a virtue whose contours did not (necessarily) shape his own intellectually oriented life. Or to speak more accurately, those contours were *conceived* not to do so. The imperial teacher lived surrounded by deeply rooted cultural associations between eloquence and trickery, scholarship and passivity, ignorance and strength. He occupied an anomalous place in his community, putatively possessing the attributes of a man prepared for life in the public sphere, but reserving them for private and indirect use, living a sedentary life indoors, at a distance from the normative hierarchies of power in the marketplace or the courts.<sup>5</sup> His very role as a trainer of youth poses a conundrum: if education transforms children from wild, willful and undisciplined animals into receptive tools of the social order, where does *andreia* fit into the equation? How could teachers promise to make their pupils elegant *pepaideumenoí* while simultaneously making them active and courageous manly men?<sup>6</sup>

By the Roman period, most teachers were members of a different class, in the strongest sense of the word, from the aristocratic models recommended in pedagogical texts from Aristotle and Plutarch. Contemporary sketches of teachers in Philostratus and Lucian show that it was not possible for them all to lay claim to the role of exemplar with conviction or plausibility. In any age, the teacher's claim

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<sup>5</sup> There were exceptions to the rule here, especially among the most famous sophists, who took on a quasi-political role. However, they could and did not take that role for granted, for precisely the reasons I outline here: see Aelius Aristides' speeches on concord, especially 23.1–5.

<sup>6</sup> On another note, teachers must strike a balance between molding their students' morals and brutalizing them: one anonymous Greek author, whose immensely influential essay on education was preserved in Plutarch, argues against corporal punishment, because it gainsays the aim of education to refine and civilize the young (*Mor.* 8F; Quintilian 1.3.14–17).



to moral authority is made problematic by the fact that authority is a sociopolitical phenomenon, while the teacher's claim rests on the attainment of specialized knowledge, an entity notoriously difficult to define in socially sensible terms. Andrew Ross writes with insight about modern intellectuals' struggle to win popular esteem in a society where practical knowledge, self-determination and self-reliance entail disrespect for expertise that does not arise from direct, 'hands-on' experience.<sup>7</sup> In imperial Greece, not only provincial grammarians, but Roman citizens of property and good family who became eminent teachers of philosophy or rhetoric, like Dio and Aristides, were aware that the symbolic capital they achieved derived not from great deeds in war or even politics, the traditional arenas of *andreia*, but from the intangibles of wit, memory, knowledge and charisma.

In this essay, keeping in mind the pioneering work of Daniel Boyarin on positive representations of non-phallic manhood in talmudic scholarship, and Brent Shaw on the re-evaluation of traditionally feminine virtues in early Christian ethics, I will explore in greater depth the relations between *andreia* and *paideia* in the speeches and writings of Greek imperial orators and in biographical works about them. What distinguishes their negotiations of these relations, as I will attempt to draw them out, is the way they weave together certain negative stereotypes about teachers' femininity and passivity into a subtly new conception of *andreia*, one that favors diplomacy and endurance over active risk and daring. The specific enactments of the shift that I will be discussing are only one part of the polyphony of ethical practices that inevitably marks any historical moment, and the scope of my texts compels me to resist the temptation to theorize about a grand revolution in virtue theory going on at this time.<sup>8</sup> Still, these writings deserve careful attention, both because they illuminate some of the paradoxes inherent in *andreia* itself, and because they display a self-aware manipulation of those paradoxes—an important angle to be explored in any discussion of the pedagogy of manliness, the authority and appeal of which remains powerful today.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Ross 1989, 1–13 and *passim*.

<sup>8</sup> Contrast Shaw 1996 and Boyarin 1995, whose broad scope places them in a much better position to argue for such a revolution.

<sup>9</sup> Joanna Russ has assembled testimonials about ideals of manly courage in the modern US Army (1998, 381–410).

2. *Paradoxes in the relations of paideia and andreia*

It is impossible to detect a period of Greek cultural development during which education, *paideia*, was not an important marker of elite identity. Even Homer, whom Greek poets and orators liked to represent as ‘everyman’s poet’, could and did offer an arena for asserting social distinctions through superiority of literary knowledge, and for winning symbolic capital in intra-elite competition.<sup>10</sup> *Paideia* was evidence of the propertied man’s possession of leisure time and, more importantly, as Aristotle writes in the *Politics*, his good judgment of how to spend that time (1334a30). The literature and oratory of the Greek-speaking part of the Roman empire in the first and second centuries attest to the enduring presence of *paideia* at the center of political and social life, and what we know of its format is easily summarized. Boys who were able to continue their education beyond the basics offered by a *grammatistes* or *grammatikos* studied with a *rhetor* (though grammar was far from being a merely ‘primary’ subject in the modern sense).<sup>11</sup> Depending on the size of the town and the social status of teacher and pupils, as I have already said, this *rhetor* might also have been a *sophistês*, a performer of epideictic oratory in a variety of civic and religious venues.<sup>12</sup> To signal the imperial era’s strong sense of successorship to the classical Greek sophistic tradition, and to underline the significance of the men who best embodied it, the third-century biographer Philostratus gave it the name ‘Second Sophistic’ (*deutera sophistikê*, *Lives* 480–1).

Most of the evidence for imperial *paideia*—or more accurately, representations of *paideia*—is drawn from the sophists’ speeches, which were performed regularly throughout the Greek-speaking parts of the empire, at civic festivals, temple dedications, official greetings offered to emperors or imperial officials upon their entrance into a city, and under many other circumstances about which we know very little.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Ford 1999, 233.

<sup>11</sup> A point very effectively made by Atherton 1998.

<sup>12</sup> To the fundamental social studies of the sophists by Bowersock 1969 and Bowie 1982 must be added Schmitz 1996; and as a corrective to exaggerations regarding their social and intellectual status, see Brunt 1994.

<sup>13</sup> Precisely under what circumstances Aristides would give such speeches as his ‘birthday’ commemorations (30) or Dio his ‘lectures’ on literary criticism (e.g. *Or.* 9, 18) it is impossible to say.

We are able to identify the most popular themes of sophistic oratory: episodes from Greek history up to the death of Alexander and the decline of Athenian democracy, Homeric myth, ethics, natural philosophy and literary criticism.<sup>14</sup> When the sophists addressed current political events, which they often did in panegyric, or in unsettled circumstances when urban factions or rival Greek cities were given public 'lessons' in concord (*homonoia*), they liked to illustrate the problems of the present with plentiful allusions to the history of the classical past. In all these speeches, their characterization of themselves as conduits of cultural knowledge underline their implied function as teachers of the polis.

Sophistic classical erudition attracted an especially high level of social recognition in the first and second centuries CE, giving rise to the period's reputation as a cultural renaissance. At the same time, representations of the teacher of rhetoric in literature and oratory from the period question his legitimate possession of manly virtue. There are many parallels to this phenomenon in the modern world: those from Islamic culture are, perhaps, the most illuminating, because it deeply values rhetorical eloquence and religious and philosophical learning, much like imperial Greece. The *Cairo* novels written by Naguib Mahfouz in the 1950s, for example, describe a Muslim family riven by conflicting intensities of desire and contempt for education. When the family's youngest son chooses to enter teachers' college, his father, a successful city merchant who loves classical music and reveres the local learned sheikh, begs the youth to put aside his 'infatuation with a life of humiliation' and to prepare for an honorable life in law or politics. "How can you reject all of this", he asks, "and become . . . a teacher?" Mahfouz' skillful characterization suggests that the roots of the merchant's anxiety lie in modern Egyptian concerns about manliness. Al-Sayyid Ahmad fears his son's decision will force him to live at a remove from the 'real' civic, military and economic activity of the city, literally stripping him of his ability to live a manly life.<sup>15</sup> Andrew Ross's warnings about the problematic intangibility of the intellectual's contribution to society are again apropos.

<sup>14</sup> Russell 1983 and Swain 1996, 65–89 are fundamental discussions.

<sup>15</sup> Scholars in Mahfouz' novels routinely fail to win the women they love (*Palace of Desire*, 1957, trans. 1991, 55).

What kind of exemplar of *andreia* was the imperial teacher of grammar or rhetoric? The physical and emotional weakness that Aristotle and the medical tradition treat as characteristically feminine is a prominent theme in sympathetic as well as satirical representations of teachers.<sup>16</sup> In his collected biographies of the sophists, Philostratus describes a certain Heracleides falling prey to stage fright while performing *ex tempore* before Septimius Severus. "Now if this were to happen to a forensic (*agoraios*) orator", Philostratus remarks, "he would be criticized, for as a tribe those men are rash and self-confident (*itamoi kai thraseis*). But how can a sophist, who spends the best part of the day teaching little boys, fight off nerves?" (*Lives* 614). Rival teaching professions such as athletics could point to their direct involvement in the training of *andreia* with ease, as the sophists were aware (Dio, *Orations* 28 and 29). By contrast, putting the body through the oratorical motions proper to an *andreios* man in front of an audience of students—"acting *andreios*", as teachers were paid to do—is not, in Philostratus' view, proof of the teacher's possession of the real thing. His comment shows that grammarians, rhetoricians and philosophers had to develop a defense of the perceptible discrepancy between manly virtue as traditionally conceived and the skills teachers actually taught.

Another angle emerges in a short ethopoetic sketch by Dio Chrysostom (*Oration* 58), one of many speeches in which he addresses the relations of *andreia* and *paideia*. In it the young Achilles complains about learning archery, in his view, a demeaning and cowardly skill. The shrewd responses of his teacher Chiron have an epigrammatic flavor archery may not let the enemy get sufficiently near, Chiron admits, but it doesn't let him get far away either (1). To Achilles' earnest praise of hand-to-hand combat as the most manly type of battle, he asks, "Perhaps you think that women are more manly (*andrioterai*), then, because they battle at the closest of quarters, piling on top of one another?" But Chiron's sophistic verbal cleverness succeeds only in underscoring Achilles' anxiety over his fitness as a moral exemplar, and he is ultimately unable to shake his student's conviction that his teaching lacks *andreia* and is unfit for a king (2–3).

<sup>16</sup> On the medical material, see Carson 1990 and Hanson 1990. Sluiter 1988 examines a broad collection of invectives against teachers' morals: her discussions of pedantry, violence, sloth, and cunning are instructive.

He cuts the argument short with the harsh prediction that Achilles' death will occur

not at the hands of a noble man, as you expect; but no, while you effortlessly slaughter men just like you, men who are brave and stupid (*tous andreious kai anoêtous*), you will be killed by a man of intelligence and military skill. (6)

To set up *andreia* in unfavorable opposition to the cunning of *mêtis* or the wisdom of *sophia* or *phronêsis*, as Dio does here, is not new. Aristophanes uses this logic in his characterization of the Weak and Strong Arguments in the *Clouds*, as does Thucydides in Pericles' funeral oration, which attacks the Spartans' robust but intellectually impoverished version of *andreia*. Demosthenes contends that the excessively *andreios* orator lacks subtlety and persuasive effect (*Proemium* 45). And within a generation of Dio Chrysostom's own lifetime, Lucian attributes the aggression of an illiterate poseur to his manly lack of shame (*anaischuntos ei kai andreios*, *Against the Ignorant* 3) and in a cutting satirical piece, jokes that the Celts' crude version of the god Heracles is the true god of eloquence (*Heracles*).

By re-conceiving Achilles' courage as the blundering of a fool, the Achilles–Chiron dialogue links *andreia* together with stupidity and then invokes that link as proof of the virtue's limitations. If it turns the rhetorical tables on the Homeric warrior ideal, however, it leaves the teacher's claim to teaching *andreia* essentially empty. Chiron has the last laugh; but it is Achilles' accusation that echoes most loudly in the speeches of Dio and his contemporaries, who return again and again to the challenge of convincing their audiences that the teacher of rhetoric may also be a man of *andreia*—and as such, worthy of high status and social, as well as intellectual, authority.

Many facets of social and sexual ideology, sometimes inconsistent or in apparent conflict with one another, make this a difficult task. Though literacy and scholarship in antiquity largely remained the provinces of men, the refinement and elegance that are imagined to accompany them are subject to representation as feminine or feminized aspects of personal ethos. And in many ancient hands, the link between *andreia* and ignorance, particularly ignorance of literature and other cultural signifiers of elite taste, is a valorized and even central aspect of the social logic of manliness. In Lucian's *Dream*, a short piece in which the sophist pretends to explain his choice of career, two women appear to him in his sleep, one representing

sculpture, the other *paideia*. 'Sculpture' is filthy, vulgar, and uses bad grammar—in a word, she is manly (*andrôdês*, 6–8)—and Lucian runs eagerly to the side of the graceful 'Education'. But even as he advises his audience to follow in his footsteps, he satirizes his own portrayal of the educated man with references to stereotypical effeminates (16–18). In the essay *The Rhetorician*, in many ways a longer version of the *Dream*, Lucian describes a youth facing two paths leading to sophistic fame: the first is guarded by a strong man with hard muscles and a manly (*andrôdês*) walk who will force him to read Demosthenes and speak perfect Attic (8–9), while the second is supervised by a clever and handsome man (*pansophon*, *pankalon*) with long oiled hair, weak body, and soft voice, whom the narrator compares to famous prostitutes (10ff.). His decision is limited to the crude (*agroikon*) quality of manly speech (*to arrenôpon*) or the softness of an elegant effeminate (*habrou kai erasmiau*). Here is a vivid illustration of the paradox of class and virtue attending the relation of *andreia* and *paideia*: the two pairs of qualities are set apart from one another without any prospect of resolution.

Dio Chrysostom and Aelius Aristides use the same imagery. Dio is familiar, he tells an audience in Tarsus, with crowds that denounce straight-speaking orators as rude and unpolished (*agrimon*, 33.15) and applaud elegance for its own sake, "precious language from a precious man" (33.3, 13).<sup>17</sup> *Paideia* creates a conundrum of class that was usually articulated in terms of gender: an obvious snarl in *paideia*'s contribution to the inculcation of masculine virtue.

The function of sophistic *paideia* and the culture surrounding it in the imperial period was "precisely to define an elite over against the ordinary run of mankind".<sup>18</sup> Now the creation of a culture of exclusivity that rested on an 'initiation' into the liberal arts, as the fourth century orator Libanius describes *paideia* (*Epistle* 285.2), brings a class inflection to that culture's understanding of elite virtue, which rests on notions of natural, as well as merely political, superiority. Does a man shaped by a class-exclusive *paideia* necessarily observe the same

<sup>17</sup> Aristides, *Oration* 34 attacks effeminate sophists who attract huge audiences with their seductive movements and immoderate, sing-song style; contrast his eulogy of the teacher Alexander (*Oration* 32).

<sup>18</sup> Matthews 1989, 78: compare the democratic inflections of writing on education in the Athenian context.

rules of *andreia* as an uneducated man, or does defining himself as a elite man against the common run of men entail conceiving a different version of manly virtue?<sup>19</sup> To phrase the question more narrowly, is it possible to conceive of a 'learned' *andreia*, in the disyllabic sense of the adjective, or do learning and the cultural refinements associated with it force a shift in the definition of the virtue?

By nature, *paideia* is a transformative process. It has unmistakable physical effects, fashioning ungainly bodies and loud, coarse speech into elegant articulations of limbs, facial expressions and gracefully modulated voices. Even as it instills *andreia*, that is, *paideia* enacts a certain polishing and refinement that distances the pupil from the raw strength of natural masculinity and the crude conduct of the *okhlos*, slaves and louts. So Plutarch warns his readers to watch carefully over their sons' education, because it is impossible to say whether literature will exhort young men to behave with courage or transform them into effetes (Plutarch, *Mor.* 14E–37B).<sup>20</sup> Contemporary writings offer no explicit solution to the problem, but they all agree that the problem exists.

The moment we begin to speak of different kinds of *andreia*, of course, we enter treacherous ground, because of *andreia*'s unique connection to the biological male body. I have already said that, following Aristotle and Plato, most Greek texts on education written under the Roman empire in the first and second century CE treat *andreia* as something to be learned, instilled, and encouraged by example. This does not mean, however, that they suppose everyone to be capable of learning it. At the very least, imperial writers implicitly agree with Aristotle's claim that men naturally possess more and greater courage, the fundamental constituent of *andreia* (*Nicomachean Ethics* 3.6.1–2).<sup>21</sup> In his essay on female virtues, for instance, Plutarch's

<sup>19</sup> Texts from this period do not claim that *andreia* is exclusively a virtue of the elite: on the contrary, rustics and those living a poor and simple life are much more likely to be praised as *andreios*, as in Dio Chrysostom's paradigmatic Euboean oration (*Or.* 7).

<sup>20</sup> Dio Chrysostom also discusses poetry as the site of instilling *andreia* and its opposite in the so-called Kingship Orations, where the sophist is the musician's counterpart (1.1–5) and Philip and Alexander debate the merits of Hesiod, Homer, and other poets as training for kings (2.2–31). See also Quintilian, *Oratorical Training* 2.3.12, and Hermogenes, *Rhetorical Exercises* 7.37–8.

<sup>21</sup> See *History of Animals* 9.1 (which also links femaleness with intelligence): "the female is softer in disposition, is more mischievous, less simple, more impulsive, and

righteous women are modest and self-restrained, and *andreia* remains the exclusive domain of men.

The link I am drawing here between the quality of *andreia* and the possession of biologically male attributes is of course historical and historicist, not essentialist. And in this regard, recent work in cultural studies led by Judith Butler must be acknowledged, which has argued that marks of gender that we are accustomed to treat as authoritative *because* they are biological have their own fallibility.<sup>22</sup> Modifications of bodily practices and even the body itself, including castration, circumcision and ascetic practices of self-denial or self-punishment, offer powerful alternatives to hegemonic conceptions of biology, and they are likely to contribute to changes in configurations of gender over time.<sup>23</sup> Still, granting the now familiar view that imperial Romans and Greeks conceived masculinity and femininity as sets of behaviors that took on a specific shape as a result of upbringing and environment, it is important to stress that the shape and look of the body, especially its primary and secondary sex characteristics, crucially delimit the index of behavioral possibilities available to the individual agent. There is a gap between the body and its gender identity, but the gap takes a certain shape from bodily matter. If we consider *andreia* a consummate or quintessential aspect of the phallus, that Lacanian 'signifier of signifiers' of power and authority, we must remember that in antiquity, the relation between the phallus and male genitals is not arbitrary, but politically and socially motivated: *contra* Lacan, the two are necessarily inseparable.<sup>24</sup> A man who had some but not all physical features of maleness, like the self-castrated priests described in Lucian's *On the Syrian Goddess*, or the

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more attentive to the nurture of the young; the male, on the other hand, is more spirited, more savage, more simple, and less cunning"; and other passages cited in the fine essay of Deslauriers 1998, 154–6, which argues persuasively that Aristotle is committed to viewing the difference between male and female bodies as nonessential, and so his claim of women's natural weakness and inferiority is unsupported by philosophical argument.

<sup>22</sup> Butler 1993, esp. 27–92.

<sup>23</sup> Circumcision is a good example of a bodily modification that involves ideological revisioning (Boyarin 1995).

<sup>24</sup> "In Greek antiquity, the phallus is not represented by an organ but as a [family] insignia": Lacan, quoted in Wilden 1981, 187. I am not quarreling with Lacan's insight into the historically variable identity of the phallic signifier, but his specific claims about western antiquity. Grosz 1990, 122–6 helpfully introduces the Lacanian treatment of the phallus.



sophist Favorinus, who lacked visible testicles, faced special difficulties in persuading his community of his rightful access to the privileges accorded by biologically unambiguous maleness. Favorinus' critics made a special point of linking his effeminate habits with his bodily defect, which they took to have unmanned him in a specifically biological, and significant, way. The obstacle to Favorinus' practice of legitimate philosophy, Lucian says in the satire *Demonax*, is nothing more than what he lacks: 'balls' (*orkheis*, 12).

Greek and Roman parents wishing to conceive a virtuous son could take an active role in guaranteeing prominent biological signs of maleness in their offspring. Physicians advised them to avoid rich food and drink before sex, so that the resulting vigorous male embryo would be prepared for a virtuous life from the very moment of conception.<sup>25</sup> Once born into the world, the male body was shaped into a manly one, first by the nurse, who shaped his limbs with cloth bindings and massage, then by the *paidagōgos*, who taught him morals along with the alphabet, and finally, in his adolescence, by the grammarian and the rhetorician, whose schooling steeped the boy in proverbs, anecdotes, and exercises in argumentation that brought his understanding of manly virtue into line with the literary tradition and contemporary ideology. As medical experts prescribed the biological reproduction of male infants with advice on diet and exercise, so experts in *paideia* ordained the reproduction of manly youths, through the iterative toil of the soft wax tablet and the oratorical declamation.

This implies another paradox, this one not of nature and class but of nature and nurture. *Andreia* is conceived to be biologically latent in youths and men, and its cultural authority is deeply imbricated in the claims of men to biological, hence natural, superiority. Todd Haynes has pointed out that the authority of manliness (as opposed to womanliness) rests precisely in its co-optation of naturalness, "the standard against which the world of differences is compulsively measured".<sup>26</sup> At the same time, it is the object of training. That is, manly virtue is more than a simple potentiality in male bodies, but it rarely, if ever, fulfills itself *sua sponte*: to come into its putatively 'natural' existence, it requires the artificial assistance of education.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Rousselle 1988, 5–23.

<sup>26</sup> Cited in Berger 1994, 79.

<sup>27</sup> Greek rhetoricians maintain a loud silence on the issue, as Gleason 1995,

Ancient society privileged what it liked to call natural authority. Our sources in Greek rhetoric and political theory are clear on this point, from Aristotle's habitual reference to nature (*phusis*) and natural law as the basis for political power to Dio's equation of the king with the naturally superior man in the first and the fourth Kingship orations. It is equally clear that education is a cultural artifact—in fact, as ancient authors often say, *paideia* is Greek culture's highest achievement—and thus it stands in opposition to nature, the wild, the unrefined ([Plut.] *Moralia* 5C–E; Diod. Sic. 12.13.1–3). Consequently, a kind of zero-sum game operates in representations of teachers, whereby the expert in *paideia* yields the authority granted him solely by nature—the manly virtue latent in all biological men—in exchange for an authority based on culture, on the intangibles of knowledge contained in books. Natural virtue is also an intangible, of course, but it cannot be easily commodified or transmitted in the same way that cultural knowledge can be. From a critical or satirical perspective, the rhetorician's expertise in the highest refinements of culture seems to annul his authority as an exemplar of a virtue like *andreia*, which exists in a special (if paradoxical) relation to nature. The figures of hard and soft rhetoric described in Lucian's *Dream* and *The Rhetorician* translate into visual terms the resulting impossibility of mapping *paideia* neatly onto a normal, or normative, path of manly behavior. Lucian parodies the manly strength of the hard *andreios* rhetorician as savagely as the weakness of the soft, *malakos* one: in his representation, the rhetoricians' corruption lies in their capacity to deform both categories of gender.

Because rhetoricians act as the human instrument in refining men who rest their claims to elite identity on an internally conflicted valorization and disavowal of refined *paideia*, their own qualities of refinement are subject to be treated as the scapegoat of cultural anxiety over identity (trans)formation. Experts in culture, they threaten

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121–2 notes: physiognomical writings and near-contemporary Roman texts suggest how it was broadly treated. A passage from Athenaeus shows what Greek rhetoricians were careful *not* to say about their male students (*Dinner of the Sophists* 13.568a). It describes a group of successful prostitutes, who set up their own houses to train very young women. They remodel them (*anaplattousi*) in a kind of parody of the education of young men, whose teachers redress their defects: they are all 'improved', made into something they are not in order to bring out their natural feminine attractions; but they make no effort to hide the traces of improvement—a crucial difference in the gendered discourse of education.

to throw social and political claims based on nature into disarray, and so they literally embody the dangerous supplement described by Derrida in his well-known essay on Rousseau: "It is indeed culture or cultivation that must supplement a deficient Nature, a deficiency that cannot by definition be anything but an accident and a deviation from Nature".<sup>28</sup> As supplements to the structures of power that sustained Greek imperial society, bearers of the burden of the nature/culture *paideia/andria* paradox, rhetoricians aroused in their observers both intrigue and alarm, fascination and repulsion—even when the observers themselves were part of the pedagogy/oratory network.<sup>29</sup>

The overdetermination of the teacher's unmanliness helps explain why Greek rhetoricians analyzed oratorical styles in terms of gender, why a sophist's speech could be called not only indolent (*hup-tios*) but womanly (*mioxothêlus*), as Philiscus of Thessaly's was, when Caracalla removed his immunity from public liturgies, normally the teacher's prerogative—itself also a sign of his detachment from the normal society of men (Phil. *Lives* 623). The more refined the sophist, the more intensively his manly virtue comes under assault. Philostratus links the highly individuated, elegant style of the sophist and consul Herodes Atticus with his extravagant emotional outbursts, weakness of character, and financial extravagance (558, 559, 561), and reports criticism of the eloquent Polemon's arrogance, greed and lack of self-restraint (532, 535–7). He tells of Antoninus Pius' attack on the physical signs of Alexander Peloplaton's refinement, his elegantly arranged coiffure and dress, clean teeth and fingernails, and perfume (571). The Peripatetic Aristocles of Pergamon's choice of a sophistic career, as Philostratus tells it, leads him to develop fastidiousness of taste and immoderate indulgence of pleasures, particularly theater and dancing (567–8).<sup>30</sup> Aelius Aristides draws on the same field of associations in order to contrast himself with sophists whose behavior proclaims them weak effeminates (*Or.* 34). Similarly Dio, in an ironic defense of his own sincerity and truthfulness, explains his inability to practice the typical sophist's eloquent deceitfulness as the result

<sup>28</sup> Derrida 1992, 84.

<sup>29</sup> They also exploited that alarm for political reasons, as I have argued elsewhere in Connolly 2001.

<sup>30</sup> See also the biographies of Scopelian (*Lives* 520, 536) and Hadrian (586).

of his *lack* of *andreia* (*Or.* 12.13). Lucian's critical views of the rhetorician have already been aired.

In a deep sense, the teacher needed to train youths in the habits of manly virtue is a living reminder of the unsettling inadequacy of nature alone as its source; hence the reversal in so many texts from antiquity to modernity, by which teachers' knowledge of ways and means of manliness casts them as unmanly men. Of course, simultaneously and equally unsettling, the ancient Graeco-Roman teacher is also a reminder of the superfluity of culture in a world that often privileged brute strength over anything else. This brings us away from the broad paradoxes of class, nature, and nurture and back to the historical context at hand. In imperial Graeco-Roman society, where *paideia* is a constitutive sign and instrument of social power, rhetoricians and sophists literally hold the key to the common culture that both enables and assuages elite struggles for political ascendance. As Peter Brown has written, the ideals associated with *paideia* provided the basis for elites to deal with the "grimmer aspects" of their politics and society.<sup>31</sup> In a very real sense, the polish and refinement of the educated man, the *pepaideumenos*, was a "fragile speck of order in a violent and discordant world"—a world, we might say, of *andreia* unchecked. Thus experts in *paideia* were entrusted with two tasks at once: training youths in the behavior proper to *andreia* and restraining its own native brutishness.

### 3. *Dio Chrysostom's invention of a manly teacher*

All these issues come into better focus in the work of Dio Chrysostom, especially the classic *speculum principis* speeches called the Kingship orations, which set out to teach the emperor Trajan the ways and means of the best king by the lights of contemporary Stoicism and Cynicism. Dio's skillful negotiation of the role of teacher in these speeches reveals one way a sophist could turn the prejudices against him into a virtue: the invention of a manly didactic voice whose *andreia* rests on the conventional courage, honesty, self-restraint, and, less predictably, eloquence, cultural refinement, and an astonishing ability to endure.

<sup>31</sup> Brown 1992, 48.

The fourth Kingship speech vividly recreates an imaginary dialogue between the Cynic philosopher Diogenes of Sinope and the young Alexander the Great. Its fluent but direct Attic idiom and liberal references to the culture of classical Greece is typical of Dio's style, as is the rhetorical maneuver by which Dio's knowledge of the classical past is invoked as proof of his intellectual authority in the present.<sup>32</sup> From the start, Dio exchanges the role of the courtly imperial *laudator* for that of the aggressively plain-spoken Cynic philosopher, a rhetorical strategy that serves a number of obvious ends: it is a neat and tactful instrument of self-praise, and philosophically speaking, it functions as a programmatic statement of interest (crudely stated, Cynic ethics over Academic logic, Stoic grammar, and the sciences).

Most importantly, it goes a long way toward solving the ethical problem of sophistic encomium, a commonly performed genre but one based in subservience, flattery, and other unmanly qualities.<sup>33</sup> Since deferential encomiasts risk publicly forfeiting the spirit and ingenuity (*thumos*) proper to the *andreios* man (Arist. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1115a), performing in the voice of a strong protreptic persona like Diogenes effectively recoups the speaker's own manly attributes. As 'Diogenes', Dio can courageously denounce flatterers, speak the honest truth, and pre-empt the reactions of an emperor who may not always welcome what he has to say. What we have already established about the negative associations between teachers and manliness, however, shows that Dio's transformation of praise into protreptic is a more complicated tactic than we may at first see.

In the course of the speech, Dio overhauls education from the ground up. He begins with a twofold division:

Most men call the human sort *paideia*, meaning 'something to do with children (*paidian*)', apparently, and they think that the man who knows the most literature, whether Persian or Greek or Syrian or Phoenician,

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<sup>32</sup> So Lucian professes Old Comedy and Menippean satire as his models of comic *parrhêsia*; Aelius Aristides makes Thucydides' indictment of Sparta and Athens into the moral high ground from which he can preach concord to the rival cities of Asia Minor (*Or.* 33, 34); Favorinus quotes Homer, Herodotus, Simonides and even Orpheus to justify his attack on the fickle citizenry of Corinth ([Dio] *Or.* 37).

<sup>33</sup> Discussions of encomiastic anxiety: Pliny, *Pan.* 1; Dio *Or.* 3.13ff.; Plutarch, *How to tell a flatterer from a friend*; Aelius Aristides *Or.* 35; Lucian, *Essays in portraiture*.

and who is familiar with the greatest number of books, is the wisest and most learned man (*pepaideumenon*) . . . (4.30)

Trajan, it is worth mentioning, was not a distinguished *littérateur*. "I don't understand what you are saying", he told Dio, as the two surveyed a Roman triumphal procession from the imperial chariot, "but I love you as I love myself" (Philostratus, *Lives* 488). In context, Dio's ridicule of erudition is the tactic of a canny panegyricist alert to his addressee's shortcomings. His dismissal of the most common misconception of *paideia* is equally canny, distancing the 'good' *paideia* that he will next describe from those most notorious reminders of the artifice and material cost involved in education: great numbers of books (compare Lucian, *Against the Ignorant Man*). His next point goes further, explicitly redefining *paideia* as a kind of natural *andreia*:

. . . but the other sort of education they call at times *paideia*, and then at other times manly courage (*andreia*) and magnanimity (*megalophrosunê*). Thus men of antiquity called well-educated men (*tous tês agathês paideias epitunkhanontes*) and manly souls (*psuchas andreious*) 'the sons of Zeus', since they were educated (*pepaideumenous*) just as that famous Heracles was. And so any man good by nature who has that education easily becomes expert in the other also, after hearing only a few short lessons. (4.30f.)

If Trajan expected Dio to draw a simple distinction here, praising the divine virtues of *andreia* and *megalophrosunê* at the expense of human learning, what he hears is an ontological jumble of all three terms. Dio begins by using the word *paideia* as the label for limited human education, but he uses it again to describe the divine type, first as a literal synonym ("sometimes they call it *paideia*, and then at other times *andreia* . . ."), and then again in tandem with *andreia* as the main attributes of the so-called sons of Zeus. This is an innovative (if unrigorous) approach to the nature/culture paradox. Dio here articulates a kind of *paideia* that doubles back to nature via culture: his *andreios* man turns out also to be the most learned man, who achieves human *paideia* "after only a few short lessons". The strategy overrides the incompatibility of learning and manliness laid out by Lucian in *The Rhetorician* and *The Dream*, and elsewhere by Dio himself; *paideia* is no longer a supplement filling a human lack, but an aspect of nature, even of divinity.

And from then on no one can rob this man of [both types of education], neither time nor men nor a sophist, not even a man who

wished to burn them out with fire; but if he were burned, as they say Heracles burned himself, yet his beliefs (*dogmata*) would remain in his soul . . . (4.32)

In the end, the virtuous *pepaideumenos* attains an education that 'not even a sophist' can take away, because it is—or has become—part of his nature.

In many of Dio's Cynic speeches, Diogenes embodies the natural authority of masculinity as Aristotle describes it in the *Politics* (1.1), where men are distinguished from women, children, and slaves by their exclusive possession and use of the 'authoritative' part of the soul. Most of the anecdotes Dio tells about Diogenes' life feature a self-reliant authority so extreme as to verge on intemperance, such as the tale of Diogenes' bold command to Alexander the Great, whose shadow fell over the philosopher as he lay in the sun: 'Get out of the way; you're blocking my light' (4.14). The king is shocked by Diogenes' manliness and fearlessness (*to andreion kai to adees*, 4.76). With such a persona Dio is able to give the Roman emperor blunt lessons in the difficult art of learning how to command:

'Don't you know', Diogenes said, 'that to carry arms is the sign of a man who is afraid? But no one who is afraid could ever become a king, no more than a slave could'. Hearing this, Alexander nearly hurled his spear. But Diogenes kept saying these things to exhort (*protrepôn*) the king to trust in good deeds and in justice rather than arms'. (4.64–5)

Part of the significance of Dio's choice of Diogenes for the larger issue of teaching manliness rests in the issue of social class. We have already seen that *andreia* is associated with the brute strength of rustics and other groups low on the social scale; here we should recall the material fact that Greek *grammatikoi* and *rhêtores* were themselves often born to a lower social status than the clientele they served.<sup>34</sup> The teacher's social standing necessarily existed in a certain degree of tension with his ideal role as a model of virtuous manliness, particularly in elite settings, and particularly with regard to *andreia*, that most active and autonomous of virtues. Traces of this tension are evident in Philostratus' apologies for the less socially exalted members of his sophistic pantheon: in his *Lives* he claims that Dionysius

<sup>34</sup> Some teachers, of course, mingled on a daily basis with the children of the great, and in a few cases obtained high standing via these indirect means. On the grammarian's social class, see Kaster 1986, 99–134, 201–30.

of Miletus' birth, whether good (*epiphanestaton*) or merely free (*eleutheron*) should signify nothing in the face of the man's achievements (522); and he defends Apollonius of Naucratis from the charge of having sold his rhetorical arts to a poor family in Macedonia (600).<sup>35</sup>

The extremist quality of Diogenes' manliness in *Or.* 4 and other Cynic speeches transforms what was a problematic aspect of the teacher's social reality into a virtue, in the process reversing the overdetermined connection between teachers and effeminacy that we have already seen. In fact Diogenes' manly character manifests itself most clearly precisely in its disregard for class and other marks of social difference. Diogenes'—or rather Dio's—teacherly *andreia* transcends the issues of property and noble birth because it speaks contempt for class in a voice that combines the crude strength of the uneducated man with sophistic tact. The partiality of sophists to reenact Athenian speeches that take up the issue of class and faction, even in indirect ways, may be similarly explained as a way the sophist could work loose from class associations. While these speeches seek explicitly to apply classical history to contemporary political circumstances, they also recast the elegant sophist as a forceful statesman calling for democratic action, whose exhortations to every member of the polis counterbalance his elite appearance (e.g. Aristides, *Orations* 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15; Phil. *Lives* 519, 522, 527, 528, 538, 541, 542).

There is more. The central place of rhetoric in ancient education made rhetoricians vulnerable to a peculiarly intricate and powerful ethical critique, summed up in the famous charge made in Plato's *Gorgias*, that rhetoric is a kind of flattery and a cosmetic concealment of inner corruption (463b1, 465b2). Just as the refined elegance taught by the rhetorician may be turned against him, so the very content of his learning invited charges of effeminate theatricality and deceit. Why? Epideictic oratory is the most troublesome and problematic of all rhetorical genres. It is a practice of display, very closely related to theatrical performance, and thus it provides easy opportunities for the dramatic, actor-like performances that ancient writers of rhetorical handbooks, and orators themselves, most strongly

<sup>35</sup> In an attack against his old teacher, a carpenter's son, Herodes is reported to have misquoted Hesiod *Works and Days* 25: "And the potter envies the potter, and the carpenter—the orator" (καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ ῥήτορι τέκτων, *Lives* 544).



attack as inappropriate and unmanly. Cicero refers to epideictic only a few times in his rhetorical treatises, specifying in the *Orator* that its natural habitat is the gymnasium and the school of the stylish *Graeculi*, and correspondingly it is unfit for the real-life struggles of the forum and the political assembly (42). The elder Seneca records half a dozen anecdotes of Augustan declaimers, men who made their reputations giving epideictic performances in the Roman schools, breaking down when forced to speak in what he calls 'real' settings. Declaimers lack forensic orators' 'fighting edge' (*pugnatorius mucro*, *Controversiae* 2 pref. 2; cf. 3 pref. 16–17).

This is the attitude exploited not only in Lucian's satires *The Rhetorician* and *On the False Critic* (*Pseudologistês*) but in authors like Galen, for whom sophistic argumentation stands for fallacy and garrulity.<sup>36</sup> Marcus Aurelius observes in his *Meditations*: 'No one could ever say of my father that he was a sophist or a glib slave or a pedant' (1.16.2). Aurelius thanks the gods that he escaped the study of rhetoric, history, logic, and natural science (1.17.4), and instead learned his lessons in manly virtue from men of action and authority. In a move that we have already encountered, Dio Chrysostom himself appropriates that criticism in his attacks on the melodramatic effeminacy of his rival educationalists. One Cynic speech aims at its Athenian audience a Socratic harangue against music masters, athletic trainers, grammarians, and rhetoricians, none of whom teach their students to practice temperance (*sôphrosunê*), manly virtue (*andreia*), or justice (*dikaïosunê*, 13.17, 32). In the fourth Kingship oration, he describes talkative sophists as no better than charlatans (4.33) or eunuchs (4.35).

In its adoption of a voice whose rough directness almost parodies ideals of manliness (a possibility that should never be overlooked), Dio's theatrical ventriloquization of Diogenes turns the criticism of epideictic against itself. The audience is subtly but unmistakably reminded that without the ethopoetic techniques of oratory that only the trained speaker can employ, an educational system based in *exempla* must fail: sophistic re-enactments of manly men provide literally necessary sustenance to the virtue of the schoolroom and the city. Dio is functioning like a sophist, after all, even if he calls himself a philosopher and attacks sophistic techniques: he is fully aware of his capabilities and makes ambitious claims for the power of his unusual

<sup>36</sup> Galen's attacks on the sophists are collected in von Staden 1995, 66 n. 52.

kind of epideictic (e.g. *Oration* 1.4, 12.1–16; Philostratus, *Lives* 488). In the first Kingship oration, Dio praises the speech (*logos*) of wise men and invokes the gods associated with eloquent and charming speech to help him communicate their ideas:

It is only the *logos* of the thoughtful and the wise, such as were most men of earlier times, that can prove a ready and perfect leader and helper of a man who will listen to persuasion and who has a good nature, and can properly exhort and lead him toward every virtue . . . but we must call upon Persuasion (*Peithō*), the Muses, and Apollo. (1.8, 10)

At the climax of the speech, Dio retells Xenophon's tale of Heracles' initiation into adult life.<sup>37</sup> His young Heracles has had a simple education (*pepaideumenos haplōs*), uncorrupted by the influence of sophists and other untrustworthy types (60–1), and like Lucian's boy in *The Rhetorician*, he faces a choice between the paths to Virtue and Vice (1.67–8). Despite the wide and easy slope of the path to Virtue, reflecting its naturally metaphysical 'rightness', Heracles' decision to follow it inaugurates a life of difficult labors, including the overthrow of tyrants, the defense of just kings, and the general succor of humanity, which Dio proceeds to describe (84). Heracles' choice offers a model to Trajan, of course, as Dio notes in conclusion (84); it also figures Dio's own choice, as a wandering philosopher-orator, to endure the harsh labors of exile and poverty.

Other speeches that describe this choice at great length (e.g. 8, 9, 11, 13, 72), make the ascetic practices of Dio's body the basis for the authenticity and legitimacy of his epideictic persona, because they underwrite his possession of a Diogenes-like *andreia*. He is not 'making up' a story out of nothing (so he says) but bringing his powers of eloquence to bear on his own bodily experience: this is what crucially distinguishes him from his garrulous and effeminate sophistic rivals. The sufferings of exile lead him to apply his philosophical knowledge in the sophistic arena (*Oration* 12.11), just as his rough appearance and endurance of poverty and privation help to authorize his comments on his audience's morals (e.g. *Orations* 13.11–15,

<sup>37</sup> This is a retelling of Prodicus via Socrates via Xenophon (*Memorabilia* 2.1.21; cf. Cicero, *On Duties* 1.32), but Dio says he heard the tale from an old woman—an ironic distancing that draws attention to the ancient and aphoristic nature of the story, and perhaps bespeaks the impossibility of telling new tales about *andreia* at this point in time.

33.14, 34.16, 35.12, 72.2,16). In the eighth and ninth orations, Dio recounts Diogenes' experience at the Isthmian games, where he struggles with "the toughest contestants, those who are the hardest to defeat, whom none of the Greeks can look in the eye" (8.12). These terrible rivals, hunger, cold, thirst, the lash, burning, exile, and loss of reputation, which the fearless Diogenes easily conquers, are labors comparable to those of Heracles (*ponous*, 8.12–13, 16). The Cynics considered Heracles their special divinity, and Dio makes the connection between Diogenes and Heracles explicit with his wry observation that the Isthmian spectators ignored Diogenes in his struggle with these contestants, just as no one paid any heed to Heracles as he struggled and suffered long ago (*Heraklea ponounta*, 27, repeated in 28).

Diogenes' manly fight for virtue, centuries in the past, is necessarily a silent one—like those fought by the other moral *exempla* of "earlier times" to whom Dio refers in the first Kingship speech. In giving them literal voice, Dio fights their ancient moral battles over again in the public arena of the imperial age, and in the process, seamlessly integrates his bodily mimesis of Cynic *ponos* into sophistic epideictic theater. Dio also articulates a clear ethical role for epideictic in civic discourse: just as Heracles' *ponoi* cleanse the world of monstrous corruption and danger, a process he describes at the end of the Isthmian speech (8.29–36), so Dio's epideictic representation of *ponoi* cleanses himself and his audience of vice. Dio/Diogenes himself becomes the ideal Isthmian athlete, and in fact hoists that figure above the realm of athletics into a metaphysical contest for goodness. "The noble man considers his labors to be his greatest antagonists, and with them he competes night and day, not for parsley, like goats, or wild olive or pine, but for happiness and virtue throughout his whole life" (8.15).

Diogenes' exaggerated Socratic lifestyle—his endurance of poverty without complaint, living without money or luxury and beholden to no one—is not in fact an accurate reflection of Dio Chrysostom's own career, which, though marked by one period of exile and a degree of self-imposed privation, was spent in the company of emperors and on his own sizable Prusan estate. Consequently his dramatic epideictic accounts of his own life as a life of Cynic/Heracleian *ponoi* must be interpreted as parables intended precisely to stake a claim on a manliness that might otherwise have been denied to the ora-

torical performer Dio Chrysostom Cocceianus.<sup>38</sup> It should be clear by now that the pressure of uncertainty brought to bear on the *andreia* of the sophistic *pepaideumenos*, what we might call the gender trouble of sophistic elegance, is the generating force behind Dio's intricate and self-defensive play of self-representation.<sup>39</sup>

In this context, it is doubly significant that, at the climax of Dio's redescription of *paideia* as a kind of *andreia* in the fourth Kingship oration, he refers to Heracles' painful death: "but if he were burned, as they say Heracles burned himself, yet his beliefs would remain in his soul" (*Oration* 4.29). First, just as the reference to the divinity underscores the sincerity of Dio's claims on moral authority, so Dio's epideictic unexpectedly legitimizes and refines the quintessentially *andreios* Heracles, making him the founder of human culture. This is a project taken up in other speeches in which Dio praises Heracles' role in civilizing the world, especially the Isthmian oration (8.27–35). There, among other things, Dio claims that Heracles performed his labors to enforce the morals of the world (31–3). His representation of the god symbolizing the crudest kind of physical strength as the civilizer and moral arbiter of Greek and barbarian society brings together the hitherto distinct terms of manliness and culture, expressing an ideal kind of *andreia* that acts in the service of civilization and right thinking: "for he believed that he ought to fight and struggle no less against opinion (*doxan*) as against wild beasts and the wicked criminals among men" (35; and see 31.16).<sup>40</sup>

Second, Heracles' endurance of *ponoi* and at the end of his human life, a painful death, captures in a single image the efforts of Dio and other sophists to link their oratory to the experiences of their bodies: specifically, the danger, risk, and pain they have endured in their lives. In the earliest theoretical accounts of *andreia*, the endurance of pain is an important element. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which identifies *andreia* as first of all the virtues, Aristotle concludes: "In fact men are sometimes called *andreioi* for enduring pain. So *andreia* itself

<sup>38</sup> Holford-Strevens 1988, 105 refers to the "Stoico-Cynic imitatio Herculis" in regard to Lucian's *Peregrinus*.

<sup>39</sup> Jones 1978 takes a different view of what I am treating as Dio's 'playacting' as a philosopher (by which I do not mean to imply that the role was not a serious one); Whitmarsh 1998 adopts a more suggestive and fruitful stance.

<sup>40</sup> Dio then describes Diogenes, who has been 'telling' this story, defecating on the ground, apparently to remind his audience of his anti-conventional beliefs (36).

is attended by pain (*dio kai epilupon hē andreia*). And it is justly praised in that regard, because it is harder to endure pain than it is to abstain from pleasure" (1117b). Lending an element of Heraclean endurance to sophistic practice helps to ameliorate the troubled relations of *paideia* and *andreia*; and after a brief discussion of sophistic epideictic after Dio Chrysostom, I will conclude with the sophists' co-optation of that element in their oratory.

#### 4. *The endurance of sophistic elegance*

Most sophists did not straddle the roles of sophist and philosopher in precisely Dio's fashion: but like him, they negotiated the tensions between *andreia* and *paideia* by situating *andreia* at the center of their performances, underlining the role played by the epideictic voice in teaching manly virtue to the city, and likening their profession to endurance of agonizing labors. The sophists made *andreia* part of their repertoire in their re-enactments of courageous speeches given in Athens during the resistance to Persia, the Peloponnesian war, and the struggle with Philip and Alexander, along with heroic moments in Greek epic, such as the embassy to Achilles, which describes his feats in war (Aelius Aristides, *Oration* 16) and Odysseus' recapture of his palace in Ithaca (Phil. *Lives* 488).<sup>41</sup> Upon seeing a gladiator sweating in terrified anticipation of the arena, Polemon remarked, "He looks like he's about to declaim" (Philostratus *Lives* 541). His comment, ostensibly about stage-fright, bespeaks the regularity with which the sophists re-enacted brave deaths in their own version of the arena. Philostratus records an emotional reaction from the audience to a speech given by the sophist Hermocrates, who, when he reached his peroration, shouted dramatically, "At least I can kill myself!" (*Lives* 621). Dionysius of Miletus passionately begs the dead to mourn Philip's victory at Chaeronea (*Lives* 522), and Hermogenes and Aphthonius outline the proper mode of lament, using Achilles and Hecuba as models (*Rhetorical Exercises* 2.15, 45).

<sup>41</sup> In his 'Sicilian' orations, dealing with the fate of the Sicilian expedition after the death of Lamachus, Aristides offers two contrasting arguments for and against sending reinforcements to the island: manly courage is an important theme (*Orations* 5.8–9, 6.56). Aristides re-enacts other Athenian themes in *Orations* 7–15; see also the references above on p. 302.

Two representative speeches by Polemon give voice to the agonized suffering of two classical Athenian fathers, fighting over the right to give the funeral oration over the dead of Marathon.<sup>42</sup> Their contest hinges on the comparative heroism of their dead sons, and Polemon speaks for each father in turn. One son lost his hands in his daring effort to hold back the Persian ships; the other was hit by so many arrows and spears his body stands upright even in death.

My own son Cynegirus, after rushing past the front line of battle, attacked the beach itself, and fighting almost naked he attacked the sea, being the first human being to engage in a naval battle from land. He terrified many ships, and laying a mighty hand against the keel of one ship, he held it tight. For a long time the ship was held there by the hand of Cynegirus as if by a rope. When this hand was cut off, he flung his other hand upon the ship, and when this hand too was cut off, what remained of him was simply a victory monument. (A8–10; Reader 1996, 102ff.)

O common target of all Asia! O you who in death stripped the king's army of its arms and who possessed most of the barbarian's arrows as spoils of war! O revered votive offer of war! O noble image of Ares! O only one putting on the robe of war! O figure of freedom! O one not allowing Greece to lie down! O one more extraordinary than nature! (B51–2; Reader 1996, 168ff.)

Epideictic performance, as I argued earlier, was vulnerable to a specific kind of cultural critique because of its existence outside the practical spheres of forensic and deliberative speechmaking, and its natural grounds for theatricality and excess. Dio Chrysostom had employed a strong moralistic voice and references to his personal experience to buttress his manly authority and virtue and to distinguish himself from his less commanding rivals. In these two speeches, because Polemon is re-enacting a scene from the classical past, Dio's tactic is not available to him. His epideictic theater's claim to *andreia* lies rather in the extremity of his act. Scholars of the period have viewed the classical themes of sophistic oratory largely in socio-political terms, interpreting them as the product of nostalgia for the long-lost Athenian Empire, combined, perhaps, with resistance to Roman cultural imperialism.<sup>43</sup> Dramatic speeches about manly virtue

<sup>42</sup> Reader 1996 is an excellent edition with comprehensive notes; this translation is adapted from his text.

<sup>43</sup> Swain 1996, 87–100.

emerge also as an important opportunity for the sophists to justify their status as models of *andreia* in the face of contemporary prejudices about *paideia* and *andreia*. As a sophist like Polemon courageously reanimates the torments of the past, his body is contorted into agony by the very real actorly pressures of the sophistic arena. The historical event of *andreia* being narrated and the agonistic intensity of the epideictic performance overlap, the one blurring into the other.

Realistically speaking, in the elite Greek world in which the sophists lived, participation in a genuine battle of Marathon, let alone a real choice of Heracles, was unlikely if not impossible. Yet that world seems to have fostered the construction of a notional field of violence in which *andreia* could be won and proven. In the sophists' hands, then, the inspiration, form, content, and context of their speeches become experiences of *ponos*. They treat the world of epideictic competition as an ongoing agonistic struggle, punctuated by student battles and dramatic one-on-one confrontations. As Demosthenes was supposed to have said when he heard of Aeschines' death, in what became a popular maxim even when the democratic context of oratory had been utterly transformed: "he died on the point of my *logos*". The effective sophist fought 'like a lion' in his speeches (Phil. *Lives* 536), while other, less principled sophists, plotted against their rivals (*Lives* 566).<sup>44</sup> Even the most problematic areas of the profession—elegant and refined personal style, and expertise in acting—could be represented as the products of physical endurance. The ubiquitous emphasis on the rigid control of voice and body throughout the sophists' speeches and the rhetorical treatises—an emphasis we tend to take very seriously in our understanding of the ancient pedagogy of manliness—may itself be viewed as a product of the rhetoricians' desire to make something manly of their teachings.

Endurance is certainly central to Aelius Aristides' conception of his profession. In the twenty-eighth oration, Aristides defends his highly ornate style by comparing himself to a series of bodies deformed by unmanageable physical forces: the possessed Pythian oracle, a professional soldier, the ritual dancers of Mars, the swollen Nile, and the flying arrows of Apollo (108–12). Aristides is a hero, whose acts in battle deserve Homeric praise (28.15–18): "You have read that passage of Homer", he says, "where 'he raged as when spear-shak-

<sup>44</sup> Many references to sophistic quarrels are collected in Anderson 1993, 35–9.

ing Ares or destructive fire rages on the mountains, with foam around his lips'" (106). The oratorical performance is an act of courage in the face of violence and death: orating is like being struck by lightning, he says, or being set on fire by divine inspiration (28.113). "The heat, like a drug, escorts and guides the speech like a ship, and it has no room for that which is contrary to it. Whenever it leaves, the words ebb away and a numbing chill prevails, and such a rhetor must plunge down, grown cold through dullness, like an eagle lowering its wings" (115).<sup>45</sup> His use of fire as a motif for oratorical inspiration recalls Dio's argument in the eighth oration that Heracles did not burn himself to death in his effort to escape the pain of Deianeira's poisoned robe, but set himself on fire by divine inspiration, unwilling to face old age and weakness. Given this characterization, and Aristides' long experience with painful illness, it is not surprising that he claims a special relationship with Heracles (40.22).

Heracles' powers of endurance, and perhaps his tendency to cross the boundaries of gender propriety in Greek myth, make him an effective exemplar of manliness for the gender-troubled sophists to appropriate. And it seems just possible that Heracles' labors were a *topos* of sorts in representations of the sophists' daily lives. Herodes Atticus discovered a gigantic young man from central Greece, whose strength and pure archaic Attic encouraged Herodes to name him Heracles. Heracleides of Lycia, the victim of stage-fright, wrote a treatise called *Ponos*, Labor; one day as he was carrying his book around, another sophist ridiculed him by crossing out the p on the top page—making the title *Onos*, or Ass—a joke with possible resonances with Heracles that also returns to the conventional connection between endurance and stubborn foolishness. Most suggestive of all in this context is Lucian's satire *Heracles*, which represents the hero as the true god of eloquence—a 'fact' (he says) the Celts recognized long ago.

Suffering voices are difficult to ignore. In Elaine Scarry's compelling work on pain, she points out that pain's power is its apparent dissolution of the categorical boundaries separating body from voice, and person from speech—the dissolution, that is, of the very

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<sup>45</sup> In the *Sacred Tales*, Aristides constructs pain as an identity-constitutive experience: Perkins 1995, 173–99.



possibility of deceitfulness and trickery. Speaking persuasively in the guise of a brave and long-enduring man cuts the link between *paideia* and effeminacy and rewrites as legitimate, if not quite natural, the *paideia* that enabled the performance in the first place. The voice that is the product of painful experience effaces the nature of education as supplement, fusing the supplements of training and discipline into a natural whole: the *paideia*'s sophistic elegance turns out to be the product not of a cosmetic, but of a distilling process. Pain also lends authority to the voice that speaks it: and thinking through pain, as Seneca and Epictetus suggest, generates a sentient authority over it. In this sense, the sophists' version of *andreia* is a rational and rationalizing one, because it converts intense experiences into formal oratory. If it is a problem inherent in *andreia* that it can lead to crude ignorance and shamelessness, then sophistic *paideia* improves on untrained *andreia*, because it represses the crude reactions of native manliness.<sup>46</sup>

A speech by Aelius Aristides on political concord argues that the constant exercise of declamation makes the speaker useful to his community, even in times of war.

I believe that from my continual exercise and practice in oratory, something useful accrues, especially for such contests [he refers here to the threat of barbarian invasions]. We are not always declaiming so that we may never say anything of use; but whoever has the ability and courage to say what is necessary, he is the one who proves that his declamation has not been performed in vain or without purpose. (*Oration* 23.4)

To restrain one's speech in order to flatter or deceive, he says next, would be an act of cowardice (*anandria*, 23.7). What the epideictic orator is able to contribute to the delicate political situation are the best ideas framed with good will (*eunoias*) and courage (*andreias*, 23.80): the highly disciplined and yet subtly emotive nature of his eloquence is capable of mitigating power struggles without recourse to dishonesty or violence. In a series of speeches that describe the ruin caused by earthquakes in Smyrna and Rhodes, Aristides develops the notion that the sophist's role is to give voice to unspeakable things, espe-

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<sup>46</sup> There is an interesting connection between the selflessness that is a central aspect of manly courage and a broader intellectual carelessness, which (for example) Dio exploits in the Achilles/Chiron dialogue (above, p. 293f.).

cially events that arouse great painful emotion, and exhort his audience to endure (*Orations* 18–21; esp. 18.1, 19.17; also 25.34–7). The refined control of sophistic oratory is shown to be superior—more courageous, in fact—than crude outbursts of passion. In the light of the path we have wound in this essay, I hope to have shown the real intensity of the cultural pressures out of which Aristides' bold assertion is born.

For the sophists, contorted into agony by the disciplines of elegant refinement, their performances of ancient struggles, and even their critical descriptions of oratory itself, the body is the field of combat. Caught in a cultural paradox whereby oratorical perfection is judged by elegance and elegance is weak and effeminate, the sophists invent a alternative grammar of bodily practice in which elegance is the product of the severest self-control and eloquence is necessary for manliness to survive. To draw a term from rhetorical discourse, the sophists 'redescribed' their practices as *andreia* just as they redescribed themselves as classical Attic *rhêtores* in the tradition of Pericles or Demosthenes. They engaged in a kind of notional cat-achresis, a violent renaming, of their profession and its ethical value. Ironically, in order to accomplish this, the sophists maintain a clear investment in cultural associations between rhetoric and effeminacy; for in a sense, the power of that connection is a necessary element of their version of *andreia*. In that sense, their negotiations of prejudice remain essentially conservative.

I have tried here to ask a few basic questions about the sophists' choice of theme and self-representation, questions that tend not to emerge, I think, until the texts are interpreted in the light of the sophists' socio-sexual identity. Only when the questions are posed in the way this collection encourages, by focusing on the puzzling spaces where ancient institutions and practices seem to grow out of conflict and paradox, does the real and complicated nature of ancient values begin to emerge. In final conclusion, I will simply mention two implications of my discussion for the later history of *andreia* and *paideia*. First, sophistic texts re-evaluate the gendered aspects of the refinements of education. This resonates with Brent Shaw's argument that Fourth Maccabees, compiled in the first century CE, and other, Christian writings roughly contemporaneous with later sophists, show a progressive "loosening of rigid gender categories from their anchoring in the social hierarchies of the polis" by which endurance (*hupomonê*, *patientia*) gradually overtakes more active virtues in the

sphere of manly action.<sup>47</sup> Second, as *andreia* undergoes a certain paideutic refinement, it departs the traditional community of civic practice, war, and constitutes itself increasingly as a virtue of self-discipline and restraint rather than daring courage. If the sophists succeed, in part, in renaming their activity as *andreia*, their manliness bespeaks later, Christian struggles where the body is the battlefield, and virtue is its own reward.

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## CHAPTER FIFTEEN

### PLUTARCH'S MANLY WOMEN

Jeremy McInerney

#### 1. *Introduction*

In the third volume of his *Histoire de la Sexualité*, Foucault offers a reading of Plutarch's *Amatorius* in which he argues that it represents "the first shape of an important change in the old erotics" and presages the coming of a new, unitary conception of love.<sup>1</sup> For Foucault the *Amatorius* marks the move away from the earlier dualistic approach that polarized physical and spiritual love. In the Classical construction of *erôs*, physical love is associated with heterosexuality, while spiritual love, on display in powerful and enduring friendships, is expressed in the temperate love of boys. Now, according to Foucault, there begins the move towards symmetry: an understanding of *erôs* in which the shared respect of husband and wife is marked by conjugal affection and a degree of mutuality largely absent from the older erotics. Foucault notes that in Plutarch's view it was entirely appropriate for married women to enjoy strong sexual feelings towards their husbands. In the *Amatorius*, for example, the character Plutarch offers a resounding defense of the widow Ismenodora who is in love with the ephebe Bacchon. The dialogue is interrupted by the news that Ismenodora has kidnapped Bacchon, and the rather elegant interplay of action and philosophy is brought to its climax with the happy news that the wedding will proceed and the interlocutors must adjourn. Pisias, who was Bacchon's lover and was formerly opposed to the wedding, is actually leading the procession, and the dialogue closes with Plutarch saying that they should all go and have a

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<sup>1</sup> Foucault 1988, 197 and 228–32. Earlier versions of this paper were delivered at the University of Sydney and Macquarie University. I wish to thank both audiences, and especially Kathryn Welch and Tom Hillard, for helpful comments that improved the focus of this paper. My thanks also go to an anonymous reader who made detailed suggestions that were very helpful.

laugh at the old pederast's expense. Although the dialogue is steeped in Platonic theory throughout, the endorsement of Ismenodora and the unequivocal praise of conjugal, heterosexual love do indeed mark the *Amatorius* as a fresh contribution to the Greek discourse on sexuality.<sup>2</sup>

Plutarch's approach to sexual relations is part of a broader trend towards seeing an equivalence between the sexes. The Greek novels, David Konstan has shown, often feature heroes and heroines of similar age, class and outlook, a feature rooted in the novels' derivation from the plots and concerns of New Comedy.<sup>3</sup> Closer to Plutarch's own time, the Roman emphasis on the *mulier univira* prefigured the trajectory taken up by early Christianity which would articulate an ideal of partners sharing, in Simon Goldhill's phrase, "equal fervour and religious duty".<sup>4</sup> Patristic writings explored gender relations, if inconsistently, taking their cue from Paul's observation that "in Christ there is no male nor female" (Gal. 3.28), and offering Perpetua and Blandina heroic models regardless of their sex.<sup>5</sup> One final influence was Stoicism's endorsement of the notion of symmetry, particularly in the claims that both men and women were capable of virtue and that both equally warranted training in philosophy.<sup>6</sup>

But as with any broad assertions of sweeping change it is desirable to add nuance to the picture where possible. One can approach Plutarch's thinking on gender from another angle by examining his treatment of 'the virtuous woman'. This is the subject of Plutarch's *Mulierum Virtutes*, in which the Second Sophistic author gives special attention to female bravery. In the introduction to the *Mulierum Virtutes* (242F) Plutarch asserts that women's virtues (*aretai*) are one and the same (*eis to mian einai*) as those of men, and among these virtues he specifies bravery, wisdom and justice. Here we seem to be on the same ground as in the *Amatorius*: there is a symmetry, even an equivalence between the sexes. But Plutarch's argument raises a problem. It is one thing to acknowledge that, in general, men and women

<sup>2</sup> For a discussion of various assessments of the originality of the *Amatorius*, see Brenk 2000, 51–2.

<sup>3</sup> Konstan 1994, 14–59 and 141–50, although Konstan notes that it is courtesans and not citizen women who feel passion equivalent to that of their male counterparts.

<sup>4</sup> Goldhill 1995, 132–3.

<sup>5</sup> Moriarty 1998, 2.

<sup>6</sup> Goldhill 1995, 137.

possess the same virtues, but when these are particularized the implications of the claim become more unsettling. Since *andreia* is a part of virtue, and since *andreia* is the essence of manliness, the assertion that women's virtues are the same as men's implicitly contains within it the tricky proposition that women may possess and display the one virtue that most thoroughly makes a man a man: *andreia*.<sup>7</sup> What is at stake is not merely a question of semantics. If bravery is the same as manliness, then it is no small matter to assert that women's bravery is the same as men's.

Accordingly, the assertion that women's virtues are the same as men's contains within it an implicit approval of the manly woman, a much more radical proposition than the simple notion that men and women are equal. One glimpses the potentially destabilizing effect of this in a contemporary Christian text, *The Passion of St Perpetua*, when, dreaming of her approaching martyrdom, Perpetua describes the scene as follows:

We had hardly reached the amphitheater, breathless, when he took me into the middle of the arena . . . And I was stripped naked, and became masculine (*facta sum masculus*). And my supporters began to rub me with oil, as they do for a wrestling match; and on the other side I saw the Egyptian rolling himself in the dust . . . And we joined combat and fists began to fly . . . and he fell upon his face and I trod upon his head . . . And triumphantly I began to walk towards the Gate of the Living. (*Pas. S. Perpet.* 10)

For Perpetua, martyrdom involves a transfiguration in which she is made masculine.<sup>8</sup> This may be appropriate for someone whose beliefs threaten the established order of Roman society, but Plutarch's milieu was a Greek elite that had long since made its peace with Rome. To avoid the problem of the masculine woman, Plutarch side-steps a close analysis of Virtue or virtues, instead asserting that all virtues are in essence the same. Despite its respectable Socratic lineage, this is a highly reductive approach, better suited to a philosophical dialogue than to a compilation of *exempla*. A collection of stories with

<sup>7</sup> For an (overly) cautious discussion of the significance of *andreia*'s etymological roots, see Moriarty 1998, 5–6.

<sup>8</sup> The bibliography relating to this passage alone is considerable. For a discussion of the passage and a summary of earlier work see Moriarty 1998, 9–10, following the earlier treatment by Shaw 1983. For men, too, impending martyrdom affirmed their *andreia*. "Be strong, Polycarp, and play the man", the saint is exhorted by an anonymous voice as he enters the arena (*The Martyrdom of Polycarp* 9).



a cast of many characters and a variety of situations is likely to provide many different instances and types of virtue, as is the case, for example, in the *Vitae*. As if recognizing that his choice of genre is likely to undercut his philosophical stance Plutarch concedes that contingent circumstances differ so that virtues will take on various colors or be expressed differently according to the character of the individual, the customs of the society or other variables. Thus, Ajax and Achilles are both brave but in different ways. But rather than explore these differences, especially any differences between men and women, Plutarch declares emphatically, "Let us not assert different kinds of bravery, wisdom and justice . . ." (243D). This frees Plutarch from the need to define more closely the virtues under discussion: any instance of a virtue becomes an example of Virtue, not because this has been demonstrated dialectically, but because it has been asserted by Plutarch.

This blurring of all distinctions between virtues is reflected in the vignettes recounted in the *Mulierum Virtutes*. Plutarch rarely explicitly states which virtue is illustrated by any given episode. The reader is usually left to infer whether a particular story illustrates justice or moderation or bravery. Plutarch's problem—how to approve the brave woman without also approving the manly woman—is thus circumvented by stripping the episodes of explicit commentary. When no specific virtue is ever identified the women's actions are simply, self-evidently, and generically virtuous. And even when their actions appear to be praiseworthy the narration frequently undercuts the praise of women by making their actions out to be morally ambiguous.

On its own, this failure to identify which virtues are operative in the various stories might seem warranted by Plutarch's contention that all virtues are the same but a better explanation is that the philosophical introduction and the main body of the work simply do not fit with each other.<sup>9</sup> In the introduction, for example, Plutarch proposes to prove that men's and women's virtues are identical by comparing the magnificence (*megalopragmosunê*) of Semiramis and that of Sesostris, the intelligence (*sunesis*) of Tanaquil and that of Servius, the high-mindedness (*phronêma*) of Porcia and that of Brutus. However,

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<sup>9</sup> Duff 2000 analyses at length the disparities between the *sunkrisis* and its narrative in the *Vitae*.

no such *sunkriseis* subsequently appear. There are no *virorum virtutes* to act as a counterpoint to the deeds of virtuous women. The *Vitae*, of course, are constructed around exactly this type of one-for-one parallel, in order to make the point that Greek and Roman men exhibited exactly the same virtues and vices, that they were, in fact, identical, but the *Mulierum Virtutes* announces such a comparison only to drop it.<sup>10</sup> The effect of this curious failure is to call attention, whether Plutarch realized it or not, to the abrupt disjunction between the introduction, with its rhetorical balance, its philosophical language and its faintly radical posture, and the rest of the work, with its highly conventional narratives culled from a wide variety of Greek and Roman sources. We are promised comparisons of men and women illustrating the sameness of their virtues, but what we get is a series of vignettes dealing with the bravery and justice of women, either individually or in groups. In fact, a closer reading of the *Mulierum Virtutes* reveals that lurking behind the novel figure of the brave and virtuous woman is a highly traditional, and restrictive, understanding of womanly virtue. In short, the narrative of the *Mulierum Virtutes* finally undercuts the proposition stated in the introduction that men's and women's virtues are identical.

## 2. *Manly women*

The manly woman, the *gunê andreia*, is not an invention of the Second Sophistic and derives from a longstanding debate over female courage and virtue. Socrates, according to Aristotle, maintained that the temperance, courage and justice of men and women were the same.<sup>11</sup> The same claim can be traced back to Antisthenes in the fourth century (Diog. Laert. 6.1.12), but it was not an idea to which the mainstream of Greek thinking was sympathetic. Aristotle explicitly

<sup>10</sup> Plutarch's *sunkriseis* have been well studied. For the most recent treatments see Boulogne 2000, and Duff 2000. Rosenmeyer 1992, 209 discusses comparison as an organizing principle in Plutarch's biographical works and refers to the introduction of the *Mulierum Virtutes*, commenting, "One may wonder whether . . . Plutarch has given the problem of comparing all the thought it deserves. The argumentative discourse indicates that he is aware of the difficulties. But the problem recedes in the face of his assurance". As we shall see, that assurance may mask a deeper anxiety.

<sup>11</sup> Aristotle, *Politics* 1260a21–2. For a discussion of the debate on women's virtues before Plutarch see Stadter 1965, 3–5.

rejected Socrates' position, asserting that males possessed a superior courage (*arkhikê andreia*) and women an inferior sort (*hupêretikê*). In the *Politics* (1277b20) Aristotle also used female bravery as a yardstick against which to measure male courage, stating that a man would seem a coward if he were only as courageous as a manly woman. Similar thinking, expressed more evocatively, underlies the way Herodotus employs the figure of Artemisia to emphasize the fundamental wrongness of the Persian attack on the Greeks. That there was something essentially wrong in the attempt of the Persians to yoke Europe to Asia was best summed up by the exasperation of Xerxes witnessing the performance of his fleet before Salamis, where Artemisia's Carian forces outshone the rest of his contingents, causing the Great King to leap from his seat and cry out, "My men have become women and my women men".<sup>12</sup> The confusion of gender and sex roles suggests the deeper threat facing the Greeks and also hints at why the expedition must fail: it is unnatural. Barbarians must not and cannot dominate Greeks, anymore than women can excel men. Where they do, they represent a deep threat to order.

Similar anxieties over the bending of gender lines found constant expression in the Greek fascination with Amazons. Both as analogues of Persians and bogeymen in their own right, non-Greek Amazons gendered the Greek anxiety over the threat to order. Nothing could better demonstrate why the order of things had to include the social seclusion of women, and why the best that could be said of a woman was that there was nothing to say about her, than to imagine what would happen if these restrictions were not in place: these warrior women who had invaded Attica had to be beaten by Theseus. In the Athenian imaginary, there was no figure half as scary as a woman who walked, talked and fought like a man.<sup>13</sup>

The threat embodied by the manly woman rendered good service to those branches of Greek culture that reinforced social norms. In the theater, for example, a character such as Clytaemnestra, with her manly deliberations (Aesch., *Ag.* 11), is utterly monstrous. No matter what the ethical complications and the moral conundrums may be that face such a character, avenging a daughter betrayed

<sup>12</sup> Hdt 8.88; see Harrell in this volume.

<sup>13</sup> Lys. *Epitaph.* 2.6–8; Isoc. *Paneg.* 4.68–70; Plut. *Theseus* 27. On Amazons see Boardman 1982, 13, Tyrrell 1984, 9–22, Hall 1989, 215, and Blok 1995.

and the exploitation of her *oikos*, she crosses the line once she begins to act like a man. The line between *oikos* and state was finely and unevenly drawn in the classical period, and gave rise to many contradictions and inconsistencies that were rehearsed and explored on the stage but nothing can excuse, from the point of view of the male citizen audience, the awful actions of a manly woman like Clytaemnestra. There is really no successful resolution for a woman caught between obligations to household and state, even if she is as noble as Antigone. She either goes mad or kills herself or is executed. And just as women on stage so often embody the contradictions of competing loyalties, so too the wholly virtuous woman is caught in a bind. The glory of women becomes synonymous with a good death, so that, as Nicole Loraux has demonstrated, "wives and young girls, if they are going to win the elusive *kleos gunaikôn*, must strive for *andreia*".<sup>14</sup> Hence the paradox of womanly *andreia* as exhibited by Alcestis: her death is noble, selfless and bold, but being so manly it results in the feminizing of Admetus.<sup>15</sup>

Medical writers also explored the innate contradiction of the manly woman in their discussions of conception and sex differentiation. Although Aristotle is well known for having expressed a view of women that saw them as essentially passive participants in these processes, as early as Alcmaeon and Parmenides there were Greek thinkers who posited that the womb was a potential battleground between male and female seed.<sup>16</sup> The fullest expression of this theory is to be found in a treatise in the Hippocratic Corpus in which the explicit claim is made that "both the man and the woman have male and female sperm".<sup>17</sup> Only when there was no battle between the seeds was there a happy outcome, the mingling of male seed from both man and woman creating a manly boy, or the mixing of female seed from both father and mother leading to a feminine girl. The other combinations were more or less grotesque, as Ann Ellis

<sup>14</sup> Loraux 1987, 63.

<sup>15</sup> Loraux 1987, 29.

<sup>16</sup> Arist. *GA* 4.3 769a15–23. For Alcmaeon, Parmenides and the anti-Aristotelian tradition see Lonie 1981, 125–6.

<sup>17</sup> Hipp., *De genitura* 7. Galen also composed a celebrated passage on this question, concluding that similarities between parents and children were evidence that different sperms prevailed in different parts of the body; see Galen, *De sem.* 2.5. For a fuller discussion of theories of sex differentiation in the Hippocratic Corpus see Manuli 1980, 405–6 and Lonie 1981, 125–6.

Hanson points out, with the manly girl a product of the father's female seed defeating the mother's male producing seed.<sup>18</sup> It was a victory of the male, but not of the masculine. Even though the father's seed won the battle, the product of the victory was a female with masculine characteristics, and hence an inappropriate vessel for masculinity.

Greek culture, therefore, admitted the existence of the manly woman, but tended to see this as an aberration or threat. Despite this (or perhaps because of it), the figure of the woman who performs outside the narrowly circumscribed world of women remained fascinating. In the early Hellenistic period Charon of Carthage wrote a four-volume compilation entitled *Biographies of Famous Women*.<sup>19</sup> A steady trickle of works detailing the accomplishments of women continued during the Second Sophistic. Book 5, for example, of the compilation of Sopatros of Apamea included a section on the origins and careers of those who won glory in the world of the Greek theater, whether the performers were male or female.<sup>20</sup> Apollonius the Stoic produced a work entitled *Women Who Were Philosophers or Otherwise Accomplished Something Noteworthy*, while Artemon of Magnesia composed an *Account of Deeds Accomplished by the Virtue of Women*.<sup>21</sup> One cannot assume that the tone of all these works, known to us only by their titles, was uniformly favorable, since authors of the same period were fascinated by paradox and *adoxia*, the praise of unpraiseworthy things, as in the case of Favorinus' *In Praise of Thersites*. One vignette, however, from this genre is preserved and is noteworthy. In Favorinus' speech *In Praise of Fortune*, we encounter the figure of Demonassa the Cypriot lawgiver. Her laws and the penalties they prescribe lead to the execution of her own children. Later, upon seeing a cow mourning for its calf and being driven mad by what Maud Gleason calls "the tragic paradox of her own maternity", she

<sup>18</sup> Hansen 1992, 43.

<sup>19</sup> Charon of Carthage, *Bioi endoxôn gunaikôn* (= *FHG* IV 360)

<sup>20</sup> Sopatros, *Excerpts* 5 (= Phot. *Bibl.* 161). Stadter 1965, 7–8 refers to the anonymous work used by Sopatros as *Women Lifted up to Great Fame and Brilliant Reputation* but the context and wording of the citation makes it clear that the biographies were all of performers.

<sup>21</sup> Apollonius Stoicus, *hosai gunaikes ephilosophêsan ê allôs ti epidoxon diepraxanto* (= Phot. *Bibl.* 161); Artemon of Magnesia, *tôn kat' aretên gunaiki pepragnateumenôn diêgêmata* (= Phot. *Bibl.* 161). See Stadter 1965, 7–8 and Wicker 1978, 109.

jumps into a vat of boiling metal and is turned into a statue.<sup>22</sup> One has to wonder whether some of the works about famous women were not paradoxological, with more emphasis on the *para* than the *doxa*.

It is most explicitly in the work of Musonius the Stoic that we find a radical reevaluation of the manly woman. In his tract, *Whether Sons and Daughters should receive the same Education*, Musonius writes explicitly,

Someone may say that *andreia* only applies to men. But this is not so! For a woman too, or at least the best woman, must act in a manly fashion and must cleanse herself of cowardice, so that she may not be overcome by affliction or fear. Otherwise how could a woman remain chaste, if someone by threat or force could make her the victim of some outrage.<sup>23</sup>

The benchmark here is a woman's chastity, so that the apparent novelty of the argument is somewhat undercut by its conventional concerns. Even so, if Musonius were interested in nothing more than a traditional conception of *aidôs* it was hardly necessary to make the further claim that women could possess *andreia*. After all, a manly woman such as Clytaemnestra demonstrated that female *andreia* was, at the very least, problematic. By extending the customary notions of *aidôs* to include *andreia* Musonius was breaking new ground, or at least giving philosophical legitimacy to attitudes that were still novel. What is perhaps most unusual here is not his belief in female courage but the advocacy that follows from it: because girls, no less than boys, have an innate capacity for *andreia* it should be recognized and nurtured by education. It was precisely the philosophical proposition underlying Musonius' claim that fascinated Plutarch and is reflected in Plutarch's assertion that the virtues of men and women are identical. This, however, is in the introduction to the *Mulierum Virtutes*. The episodes recounted in the body of Plutarch's work tell a very different story.

<sup>22</sup> Gleason 1995, 13.

<sup>23</sup> Musonius, *Diatribē* 4 (Hense).

### 3. Mulierum Virtutes

The first and perhaps overwhelming feature of the work is that the pivotal moment of many stories depends on the woman's body. In fact, the virtue of women is inseparable from their bodies and the range of behaviors, taboos and restrictions that are focused on the body, summed up in the notion of shame (*aidôs*). So deeply ingrained is this thinking that some stories are reduced to little more than shorthand. In the case of Lucretia, for example, Plutarch offers only the barest details. Her virtue was one of the causes of Tarquinius' downfall, says Plutarch (250A). After being raped by one of Tarquinius' sons she reported the matter to friends and family, and killed herself, setting in train the events that would eventually lead to the last king's downfall. The notion of *aidôs* operating here is utterly conventional and deeply ingrained, and its ubiquity in stories supposedly concerned with bravery and wisdom helps to explain why the stories in the *Mulierum Virtutes* tend to fall into three categories: those that revolve around obscenity, suggested either by the display of the female genitals or by verbal abuse (or both); stories that relate to concealment; and stories that hinge on physical exploitation. Whatever the work's philosophical stance, the narrative will return again and again to women's bodies.

#### 3.1 *Virtue and Obscenity*

In the first category, involving obscenity, women instil vigor in their men and protect the fertility of their countryside. For example, Plutarch recounts the story of Cyrus' men fleeing from battle only to be confronted by their women who hike up their skirts and cry, "Where are you off to, you most miserable of men? You sure can't flee and crawl back here (*entautha*), from where you came!" (246A–B). Similarly, in the story of the Lycian Women (247F–248D), the curse of Bellerophon who has invoked a terrible tidal wave to inundate Lycia is undone when the Lycian women pull up their garments and go out to meet him, forcing him to retreat out of shame (*hup' aiskhunês*). The tidal wave, too, rolls back to the sea.

Both these stories are, in one sense, about the men's virtue, not the women's. In the story of the Persian Women, the virtue of the women may be said to reside in their boldness, but the outcome depends on the men reacting modestly and honorably to this chal-

lenge to their manhood. In the Lycian episode, it is Bellerophon's sense of modesty that causes him to turn back, and the episode is typically unclear about specifying the virtue of the women.<sup>24</sup> In one version of the story, according to Plutarch, the men accomplished nothing when they asked Bellerophon to desist, but when the women crowded around him they met with respect (*aidous tukhein*) and put an end to his anger. The respect referred to is Bellerophon's.

Plutarch does not explain how these stories of genital exposure demonstrate the virtue of women because, in terms of their appeal to the Greeks, the stories have nothing to do with affirming virtue. Rather, the stories resonate with associations to highly traditional and well-established cultic practice. At the Haloa and Thesmophoria festivals in Athens and the Stenia festival on Andros women ritually abused men and held up models of their genitals.<sup>25</sup> These were instances of *aiskhrologia*, well documented also at Syracuse, Aegina and Epidauros. The *gephurismos* associated with the *pompê* to Eleusis similarly included women abusing the participants in the sacred procession. The best-known example is the Orphic story preserved in Clement of Alexandria, according to which Baubo cheered up the mourning Demeter by exposing herself to the goddess, a story reminiscent of Iambe's jests mentioned in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter.<sup>26</sup> The connections here between obscenity and fertility are unmistakable.<sup>27</sup> Jeffrey Henderson explains the nexus of cult, abuse and obscenity thus: "The efficacy of obscenity in such activities is sometimes sympathetic, in that naming of sexual organs and acts aids fertility, or apotropaic, in that evil powers do not like obscenity".<sup>28</sup> Plutarch, or his sources, is clearly close to this apotropaic sense in his story of the Lycian Women averting the curse of sterility, and the Persian episode, set in the early days of their *arkhê*—the victory is over the Medes, not the Greeks—sanctions sympathetically the growth of

<sup>24</sup> For a discussion of this episode and its variants see Blok 1995, 319–22.

<sup>25</sup> Henderson 1975, 15. The fact that the story of genital exposure is attributed to Persian women does not weaken its association with Greek cult. The Persian story appears to originate with Ctesias; see Stadter 1965, 53–6. Eventually it was given a Spartan setting; see *Apophth. Lac.* 241b. Its significance lies not in its origin but in the way it would have been understood by its audience.

<sup>26</sup> Clem. Al. *Protr.* 2.20.1; *Hymn. Hom. Cer.* 200–5.

<sup>27</sup> Deubner 1966, 54; Brumfield 1981, 81 and most recently McClure 1999, 47–52 and 215–18.

<sup>28</sup> Henderson 1975, 13.



their power, which, in the tradition of Thucydides, is presented as organic. These episodes seem startling with their focus on self-exposure but turn out to be conventional, resonating with associations from traditional Greek cults concerned with fertility and evil. They have little to do with affirming any female virtue and are really drawn from stories and practices that illustrate the male dread of female sexuality.<sup>29</sup>

Stories concerned with verbal abuse work in a similar way, as women goad their men into action by transgressing the customary gender role that favors female silence and compliance.<sup>30</sup> One example is the first story of the Chian Women (244E–245B), in which, outraged by their men's readiness to lay down their arms, the women revile them. The men are taught boldness by their women and are saved (*houtoi men oun tharrein didakhthentes hupo tôn gunaikôn houtôs esôthêsan*). This pattern is more fully developed in the story of Xenokrite (261E–262D). Aristodemus has established himself as tyrant of Cumae and is forcing the men of the city to toil away digging a ditch. As he passes in review one woman steps out of his way and modestly covers her face. When the menfolk ask her jokingly why she avoided only Aristodemus she replies "Because among the Cumaeans Aristodemus is the only man". On the one hand her physical avoidance of the tyrant's proximity and her gesture of concealment are interpreted by the men as signs of her *aidôs*, but on the other she is still permitted a sharp tongue to spur on her gutless menfolk. Plutarch writes, "This utterance pricked all of them and shamed them (*parôxunen aiskhunei*) into struggling for their freedom" (262C). This particular vignette is interesting for the way in which it splits the figure of the courageous woman in two. Plutarch praises the virtue of the two women who set Cumae free; the first is the anonymous woman armed with the *bon mot* mentioned above, while the other is Xenokrite. But all that she actually does is to get the conspirators into Aristodemus' palace. She is functionally more important for what she is, namely the prize in Aristodemus' bed. Her subjugation stands for the tyrant's exploitation. So here are the twin roles of womanly courage in action: the sexually desirable woman who is the object of the tyrant's unwanted attentions, and the anony-

<sup>29</sup> Horney 1932, 348–60 and Connell 1995, 11.

<sup>30</sup> On the silence of Athenian women, see McClure 1999, 19–24.

mous voice urging the men into action by affirming traditional mores. These women are little more than Body and Conscience. In one sense, the story splits bravery into active and passive components: the women elicit reactions, but it is the men who perform actions.

A variation of these two fields of action is described in the story of the Women of Miletus (249B–D). During a spate of suicides by young women, occasioned perhaps by something in the air or from some divine origin, on the advice of a man of intelligence (*nous*), the Milesians pass a decree according to which any future suicides are to be carried naked through the agora to their burial. The suicides stop immediately. Although the vignette is short, in it Plutarch manages to blend a remarkable variety of elements. The Hippocratic notion of natural environment is hinted at; the religious explanation of divine affliction is also suggested, so that by exactly the halfway mark we have reached the turning point: the calamity seemed to be beyond human help, says Plutarch. And then immediately an intelligent man, a philosopher perhaps, makes a sensible suggestion based upon his keen understanding of human nature, in this case that those fearless of death may still fear shame. The episode explicitly praises the virtue of the Virgins who are most strongly motivated by a desire to avoid ill repute, but it is the wise man who finds the solution to the problem. The girls' virtue, as always in classical constructions of femininity, is written on their body. Their virtue is proved when their bodies are covered.

### 3.2 *Virtue and Concealment*

The second category involves stories of concealment, in which the woman's body is equated with some other element, such as the family's wealth or the men's weapons. In the story of Timoclea (259D–260D), she and her house are handed over to a Macedonian officer after the fall of Thebes. After dinner the officer summons Timoclea to sleep with him. This is not the end of his outrageous behavior, says Plutarch, because he then bullies her into revealing the whereabouts of the family treasure. Timoclea's response is revealing. She announces clearly that she would rather have died before this night so that her body might at least have escaped outrage, but she concedes that now she is under his power. She remarks that she will not deprive him of what is his (*ouk aposterêsô se tôn sôn*), for she has become whatever he wishes her to be, an expression that elides the

distinction between her body and her property. She then goes on to tease him with a story of the household's wealth that she has secreted in a dry well outside. The Macedonian is seduced into fetching up the treasure immediately, and while he is in the well Timoclea and her servants kill him by piling rocks on top of him. She is later found out but forgiven by Alexander. Her virtue, her body and the family's property are thus safeguarded.

In the cases of the Women of Melos (246D–247A), and the Women of Salmantica (248E–249B) the role of the women is to hide weapons within their garments, just as their bodies are concealed by their robes. In both cases the women are agents necessary for the men's victory, in the one case enabling them to slay their perfidious hosts, the Carians, and in the other helping them to fight their way to freedom and eventually to win the restoration of their city. Plutarch's language is revealing. In the case of the Melian Women, at the critical moment, "all at once, the women (*men*) opened their robes, while the men (*de*) seized their swords, attacked the barbarians and slew the whole lot of them" (246F). The words draw attention to the women not just concealing the weapons and smuggling them into the banquet, but also opening their garments. It is a critical moment of transgression for both the men and the women: the former are violating *xenia* while the latter are violating *aidôs*. In both cases their actions are justified by the threat to their existence, but the responses, or more properly the fields of action available to each, are quite different: the men take decisive action against their foes while the women are cast in a supporting role in which their decency is compromised in order to facilitate the deeds of their menfolk.

It is surely not coincidental that the story is set at the time of the founding of Cryassus by Melian colonists. Like many ktistic stories this episode is compelling because it reflects the belief that the foundation of a Greek colony was a special moment that required a dispensation from the usual *nomoi* of a civilized community. This pattern is remarkably consistent in many colonial narratives, involving rape, oath-breaking and even murder.<sup>31</sup> Colonial narratives, in fact, are often constructed as if the colonial foundation were a *rite de passage* in which norms are temporarily overturned so that they, and the new society painfully coming into existence, can be reestablished all

<sup>31</sup> Dougherty 1993, 31–44.

the more securely. The community is reassuring itself that there is an inverse relationship between their wild, law-breaking origins and their current law-abiding state. It may be for this reason that so many of the Greek vignettes in the *Mulierum Virtutes* derive from ktistic traditions. These include the stories of the Trojan Women (243E–244A), who are really the first Roman Women, the Chian Women (244E–245C) from the foundation story of Leuconia, the Women of Melos (246D–247A), from the founding of Cryassus, the so-called Etruscan Women (247A–F), actually the foundation story of Lyctus on Crete, the story of Pieria (253F–254B) from the stories of Miletus and its colony Myos, and the story of Lampsace (255A–E), the eponym of Lampsacus. It is in these charged episodes that we most often see women as individuals or groups acting purposefully. It is the Trojan Women, for example, who make the decision to put an end to the wandering of the Trojan survivors by literally burning their boats once they have reached Italy. The Chian Women object to the wimpiness of their men folk, abusing them as cowards (*ekakizon autous*) for abandoning their arms and quitting the city, while Lampsace secretly warns the Greeks of the plot against them. It is as if the crisis of founding a polis authorizes actions which are at odds with normative behavior and permit temporarily a suspension of the usual restrictions on women.

The implications of this for Plutarch's work is that his general proposition that women's virtue is the same as men's often relies for proof on stories that only allow women to act in exceptional circumstances. In some respects this may overlap with broader notions of *andreia*, which emphasize its operation in moments of crisis, but there is still an important difference between men's and women's *andreia* in action. The paradigm of male courage calls for a straightforward response to a threat, whether it be to personal honor or the safety of the community. If the man acts courageously he averts the threat and enhances his own reputation. The moral economy is uncomplicated: danger + courage = honor. But in the case of women's actions the results are more often ambiguous. Polycrite (254B–F) slips a message into a cake baked for her brothers telling them how they can attack her lover's forces, leading to the lover's defeat and capture. Caphene (246D–247A), betrays her Carian relations to aid her lover and the Greeks, and Lampsace (255A–E) betrays her friends and relatives to help the Phocaeans colonists. In these stories the women embody divided loyalties, as if complicated moral dilemmas

are more easily handled by displacing them from the male onto the female. These stories draw on the tradition of Greek drama that so often puts heroines into impossible situations, where the restoration of order is finally made possible by the elimination of the female.

Furthermore, not only are women's loyalties divided, but also their bravery is often presented as ambiguous. This becomes almost a reflex on Plutarch's part, as if to concede a simple act of bravery were too much for him. Thus, the story of Valeria and Cloelia (250A–F) tells of the escape of a group of young Roman women from Lars Porsena. The episode culminates in the gift of a horse from Porsena to Cloelia, commemorated in an equestrian statue, for her display of strength (*rhômê*) and daring (*tolma*) beyond that of a woman (*hôs kreittona gunaikos*). Much of the narrative, however, undercuts the praise of the heroines. In fact, the escape of the maidens is misguided because they are not captives. They are serving as hostages to guarantee the terms of the alliance between Porsena and the Romans. He has shown his good faith by rejecting his alliance with Tarquinius and giving up preparations for war against Rome. It is under these conditions that the women impulsively make their escape. As a result, when they get home their menfolk, while admiring their *aretê* and *tolma*, are horrified by their return because they, the men, will appear to be inferior to Porsena in matters of good faith (*en pistei kheirones*). The women's complete disregard for the dictates of honor stands in stark contrast to the behavior of such Roman heroes as Regulus, who argued against peace with Carthage even though this meant returning to his death.<sup>32</sup> The women are commanded to return to Porsena's camp, so that their actions are basically nullified. Indeed, it is telling that Plutarch twice refers to their daring, *tolma*, a quality that is often qualified as 'reckless' (*alogistos*), rather than their bravery (*andreia*), a term not applied to their exploits. They are ambushed on the way back, and although Valeria manages to escape and raise the alarm, it is Aruns, Porsena's son, who rescues the rest of the Roman women. So, while we get the conventional praise of the *aretê* of these women, with at least an implied acknowledgment of bravery, the narration actually undercuts this and presents us with women who court danger, compromise their men's

<sup>32</sup> Zonar. 8.15. See also Plut. *Pyrr.* 20 and App. *Sam.* 10 on the return of prisoners bound by oath. My thanks to Tom Hillard for these references.

honor and need to be rescued. The best that can be said is that the bravery of Plutarch's women is never straightforward.

At times, in fact, the tension between the rather trite praise of women's virtues and the actual details of the *exemplum* almost makes a mockery of the central proposition that women possess the same virtue as men. Consider the extraordinary case of Aretaphila of Cyrene (255E–257E). The vignette begins with Plutarch praising Aretaphila for her *aretê* and her accomplishments (*praxis*). She is distinguished by her good sense (*to phronein*) and her political skill (*politikês deinotêtos*). But the record of her actions tells a different story altogether: she plots to poison her husband, the tyrant Nicocrates, lies when confronted, engineers the seduction of Leander, the tyrant's brother, by dangling her daughter in front of him, is rumored to have poisoned Leander, secretly provokes a war with Cyrene's African neighbors, bullies the tyrant into a defenseless parley with the African chief and hands Leander over to Anabous after alternately egging him on (*etharrunen*) and abusing him (*ekakize*). Even the description of the climactic moment when Aretaphila grabs Leander and physically drags him over to Anabous emphasizes the recklessness of her actions (*itamôs panu kai tetharrêkotôs*). The story ends with Aretaphila retiring demurely to the women's quarters and taking up her work at the loom, but this pat ending cannot hide the fact that the virtue displayed by Aretaphila is worlds away from the straightforward, vigorous manly courage of those who use weapons to exact justice.

Women's weapons undercut the proposition that their virtues are fundamentally the same as men's. Secrecy, trickery, lies, abuse, concealment and the occasional burst of impulsive action: these are the spheres in which female virtue operate, as is also illustrated in the story of Eryxo, widow of the king of Cyrene (260E–261D). When the tyrant Laarchus tries to legitimize his hold on power by marrying her she tricks him into a secret assignation at which he is cut down by her brothers. Although she is explicitly praised for her self-control (*sôphrosunê*) and bravery (*andreia*), the record of her actions qualifies the reader's response to female bravery in a way that distinguishes it from the open *andreia* of men.

### 3.3 *Virtue and Sexual Exploitation*

Plutarch's understanding of female virtue, then, when the philosophical frame is stripped away, is rooted in conventional notions of

*aidôs*. So far we have seen this play out in stories employing the tropes of self-exposure or concealment. The third category of story includes those vignettes dealing with sexual exploitation. These are especially significant because within the *Mulierum Virtutes* the sexual exploitation of *women* comes to stand for violations of social order. This authorizes a specific field of action in which women may display their virtues of courage and resourcefulness so long as it serves the greater and more important goal of restoring stability. For example, in the second part of the episode dealing with the Women of Chios (244E–245C), they take hold of a terrible and wild spirit (*deinon d'hai gunaikes kai agrion thumon labousai*—the words suggest that their virtue is an external quality rather than innate), mount the walls and supply their men with arms and encouragement to defeat Philip V. The stimulus for all this is Philip's appeal to the slaves within the city to desert with the promise of freedom and sex with their masters' women. The women's spirited actions are permissible because of the overwhelming threat posed by Philip's proposition. In fact, they are commensurate with that threat.

But if crises call for extreme measures they do not set precedents for daily business. That is well illustrated by the story of the Women of Argos (245C–F). This episode begins with a similar threat to the very existence of the community when Cleomenes defeats the Argives in battle and marches on the city. Once again a semi-divine spirit (*hormê kai tolma daimonios*) operates from without on the women, leading them to man the battlements and defend their country. After their victory the women find that Argos is short of men, so they marry the best of their perioecic neighbors. The women are somewhat contemptuous of these men, whom they regard as beneath them (*hôs kheironas*), leading the Argives to pass a law saying that "Married women having a beard must occupy the same bed with their husbands" (245F). The curious reference to bearded women is an allusion to the masculinity displayed by women who have fought in battle and chosen their own husbands. Not coincidentally, the military success of these manly women was commemorated at a religious festival, but the *Hubristika* was a festival of transvestism. Here as in other such cults, the transvestism did not threaten the normal order of social affairs as much as it reinforced it by offering a temporary respite from it.<sup>33</sup> The festival was an exceptional moment,

<sup>33</sup> Tyrrell 1984, 68. For a modern version of the same festival, the Yinaikokratia held in Monklissia, see Storace 1996, 234–7.

when women might briefly assume the role of men, the very role that they had played during the siege of Argos. But the festival turns the inversion of gender roles into a game, while the law restates the proper order: women may not enjoy independence.

### 3.4 *Male and Female Virtue*

Most of the stories, therefore, demonstrate a disjunction between the philosophical claims asserted in the introduction and trotted out towards the end of each vignette, and the lessons conveyed within the narrative. The stories really seem to prove that women's virtue is utterly different from men's: it is more likely to spur others to action than itself to act. It is more likely to arise in, and be confined to, moments of exceptional crisis. It is almost inseparable from traditional notions of shame and can rarely be divorced from the range of men's anxieties about women's bodies. The differences between male and female virtue are best summed up in two episodes. In the story of the Women of Amphissa, (249E–F) Plutarch tells how a band of Thyiades, maenads, lose their way towards the end of their frenzied wanderings around Mt. Parnassus. They arrive one night at Amphissa, where, "exhausted and still not returned to their senses, they threw themselves down here and there in the agora, and fell asleep" (249E). The women of Amphissa discover them and are afraid that they will come to harm and so they form a silent, human barrier around the sleeping women. Next morning, when the Thyiades awake, the women of Amphissa individually take care of them, feed them and finally, with their husbands' consent, they lead them safely to the border. As in the charged stories dealing with colonial foundations, the episode at Amphissa deals with the threat of social disruption. Since they are bacchantes, the Thyiades embody the female threat to civilization, which is why their activities are normally assigned to the wilds of Parnassus or Cithaeron. The agora, on the other hand, is civic space and therefore a male domain. The presence of bacchantes in the middle of the agora, therefore, suggests an inversion of, or at least a threat to established order. At the time of this episode Amphissa is supposed to have been under occupation by the forces of the Phocian tyrants, so that the juxtaposition of male and female is even more sharply drawn: the bacchantes are an implicit threat to the male order and they themselves are explicitly threatened by the Phocian mercenaries. Each of these factors increases the tension, which is only resolved by the Amphissan women interceding



on behalf of the Thyiades. The actions are the opposite of everything Bacchic. They stand in silence around the sleeping bacchantes; they minister to them like servants, and they only escort them to the border once they have won permission from their husbands.<sup>34</sup> The story contrasts the excellence of these silent and subservient women with the latent violence of the Thyiades.

The virtues residing in silence and subservience are also on display in the story of Micca, Megisto and the Women of Elis (250F–253F). The elements of the story are familiar: the city has been seized by a tyrant—we are back in the world of social disorder; lovely young Micca becomes the obsession of one of the tyrant's mercenaries—once again, a woman's body serves as the focus of a man's lack of *sôphrosunê*; Micca is stripped naked and remains silent while beaten to death by the mercenary—her courage consists of silent suffering. The story now focuses on the tyrant Aristotimus, who drives many Elians into exile, imprisons the women and beats the priestesses of Dionysus who have come in silence as suppliants to him. As opposition to the tyrant builds, the story moves towards its climax, the interview between the furious tyrant and the level-headed Megisto. At first he attempts to frighten the women by threats (*phobôi* . . . *êpeilei*) but the imprisoned women refuse to answer and silently agree not to be frightened, nor to give in to the threats (*siôpêi* . . . *anthomologoumenai to mê dedienai mêd' ekpeplêkhthai tèn apeilên*). Then Megisto, who has the position of leadership (*hêgemonikên taxin*) by virtue of her husband and her *aretê*, and who notably does not give up her seat, tells the tyrant that if he were sensible (*phronimos*) he would stop talking to the women and deal with the men directly. "And don't expect that they'll be tricked the way we were", she continues, "and don't expect us to help you trick them". The confrontation is between two figures measured against the standard of self-respecting manhood: the manly woman and the intemperate tyrant. Neither can quite measure up: the woman has only moral strength to assert against the tyrant, and the tyrant has already had to rely on trickery. This has often been exactly what women had available to them, but now it is the tyrant's weapon. In effect, the tyrant and the tyrannized end up swapping gender identities in the story. When Aristotimus rushes at Megisto in a rage his associate

<sup>34</sup> McInerney 1997, 270–2.

Cylon pulls him away saying that such an action would be undignified (*agennes*) and womanish (*gunaikôdes*) and not the work of a ruler (*ouk andros hêgemonikou*). Aristotimus is overthrown shortly thereafter by the returning exiles. After being faced down by the manly woman, the womanish ruler is living on borrowed time.

### 3.5 *Virtue and Order*

Now it may seem churlish to keep insisting that the virtues of women are different from the virtues of men, and a defender of Plutarch might well say these stories amply prove that Plutarch was right when he asserted that, contingent circumstances aside, male and female virtue are the same. But behind this assertion lies a much more conservative and conventional picture of women. Female virtue is repeatedly connected to notions of *aidôs*, and when they take action their deeds are likely to be morally ambiguous, relying on abuse, deceit and trickery. They are most manly when they are used as a counterpoint to highlight the failings of the bully or the tyrant. Most importantly, the mixture of *aidôs*, *tolma* and *andreia* that constitutes their *aretê* is most often activated by a threat to social order. Read in one way these stories have very little to do with ethical questions about the nature of women's virtues at all. The stories are much more about that other abiding interest of Greek thinkers: good order. This is the theme that links so many of the stories—the threat of slaves let loose on free women, the threat posed by uncontrolled tyrants, the threat of attacks by perfidious barbarians, the threat of bacchantes in the market place, even the threat posed by irrational teenagers—they all share one trait: women can play a role as agents when there is a threat to *eutaxia*. The one time that Plutarch uses this specific word is instructive. It is in the story of the Women of Keios (249D–E) another vignette about *parthenoi*. But unlike the Milesian girls whose dangerous behavior can only be beaten by their natural *aidôs*, the Cean maidens are models of exemplary behavior. These good girls played all day together at the public shrines where they could be seen by all their suitors. At night they attended their menfolk, fathers and brothers, and so modest were they that there was no adultery or seduction for over 700 years. In one sense there is no story in this episode since there is no threat and nothing happens. Nevertheless the girls are models of *aretê*. Despite Plutarch's assertion that all virtues are one and the same, clearly they are not.

*Aretê* can be demonstrated by simple good behavior, while *andreia* would require test of the girl's courage. It is precisely because the story does not fit with the rest of the work that it is most revealing: it confirms that Plutarch was most interested in the question of social harmony.

This theme is taken up in one of the best-known episodes in the *Mulierum Virtutes*, the story of the Women of Phocis (244B–E).<sup>35</sup> Shortly before the Persian Wars the men of Phocis decide to take up arms against their Thessalian overlords and win their independence once and for all. In desperation they resolve to place all their women and children on a pyre and to set fire to it if they lose the battle. They decide to seek the consent of the women who hold their own assembly and confirm the men's decision. The men fight victoriously and the women are spared, but what wins Plutarch's approval is the women's complete loyalty to their men, their like-mindedness. Indeed, despite their desperation, so completely united are the Phocians in their resolve that even the children hold their own assembly and ratify the men's decision! Ideally women can affirm social harmony. Indeed, in the story of Pieria (253F–254B) the heroine lets her lover know that if he wants her he has to settle the war between her people, the Myosians, and his, the Milesians. Establish peace and harmony and you get the girl.

This discourse on women's virtues is therefore shot through with conventional tropes and motifs, and informed by very traditional concerns regarding shame. In fact, the only stories that seem to offer a genuinely novel vision of women are ones drawn from outside the Greek realm. Three stories late in the work (257E–259D) are set among the Galatians and here we meet women planning, acting and instigating. In one the widow of Sinatus avenges her husband by marrying his killer and poisoning him; in another the infertile Stratonice convinces her husband to father royal heirs by a surrogate, while in the third, Chiomara is captured and raped, but avenges her disgrace by engineering the beheading of her captor. But two observations seem pertinent here: the first is that from the time of Herodotus and Hecataeus, ethnography permitted Greek writers to explore alternative social systems but did not automatically authorize those alternatives. Furthermore, it is notable that each of these stories revolves

<sup>35</sup> See also Paus. 10.1.7 and Ellinger 1993.

around the woman as partner, as equal to her husband. These women complement their husbands in avenging their deaths or in securing them heirs. The last vignette, which is repeated in condensed version in the *Amatorius*, ends with Chiomara's husband claiming that a woman's loyalty is a good thing, to which Chiomara replies, "Yes, but it is even better that only one man should live who has been intimate with me", a gruesome, if amusing, twist on the usual claim made by a *femina unius viri*.

#### 4. Conclusion: the Purpose of Mulierum Virtutes

Plutarch's thinking, therefore, is a fascinating blend of utterly conventional stories in which women abuse, cajole, mediate, and conspire, on the one hand, and, on the other anecdotes in which women really emerge as worthy partners of men. Not all the stories support the claim that women's virtues are the same as men's, no matter what Plutarch says in the introduction, and this calls for some explanation. It is insufficient merely to assert that the *Mulierum Virtutes* is poorly composed. Rather, there is a tension here between two opposites: on the one hand, a disparate body of material—a wide variety of stories available to Plutarch from his deep familiarity with Greek literature and history—entirely infused with traditional notions of female propriety, and, on the other, Plutarch's own, quite new understanding of conjugal relations, from which he extrapolated the beginnings of a new way of seeing women.

The inconsistency between Plutarch's claims and the conventional stories he actually provides compels us to ask what the forces and anxieties were that prompted his rethinking of female virtue even as he reasserted traditional roles. The key to understanding this lies in recognizing that the sphere of influence and action identified by Plutarch as appropriate for women—the areas in which their *aretê* and *andreia* operated, in other words—was essentially a reflection of a masculine conception of order extending from the household to the state. In other words, it is not gender *per se*, but order which is at the heart of Plutarch's concerns. Accordingly, Plutarch's interest in the virtues of women is part of a broader set of anxieties relating to power, status and ethnic identity that characterizes Greek culture during the Second Sophistic. Just as in an earlier age Amazons, the quintessential manly women, had served as a convenient way of

framing Greek thinking about the otherness of Persians and barbarians and had helped sharpen the sense of what it was to be Greek, so too Plutarch's interest in cataloguing and affirming the virtues of women was at the same time part of his larger program of identifying (and perhaps shaping) the desired order of things in a Hellenized Roman empire. For a Greek writer in the Roman Empire such as Plutarch, the question of woman's virtue and manliness cannot help but be inflected by the underlying question of Greek culture's relationship to Rome, in the same way that the *Vitae* deal ostensibly with men's virtues but also assert the sameness of Greek and Roman statesmanship.

All men's writing about women shares a concern with power, and power is very much an issue at stake in the world of the Second Sophistic. In the early Empire, any writing about power relations—kings and philosophers, statesmen and the community, masters and slaves, Greeks and barbarians, men and women, is going to be written by Greeks under the sway of Rome. Simon Swain has demonstrated the way that Second Sophistic writers rendered the two cultures equivalent and to a certain extent interchangeable: Greeks were equivalent in statesmanship, and the Romans' counterparts in civilization.<sup>36</sup> One thinks, for example, of Aelius Aristides, using Greek encomium to celebrate the power of Rome. This twinning of the two cultures no doubt eased anxieties about the real impotence of the Greeks in the face of Rome's *imperium*. Such is the program that underlies the *Vitae* and the same basic conception of partnership also operates in Plutarch's thinking about women. What concerns him is a power relationship in which weaker impacts favorably upon stronger, in which the weaker partner can inspire the stronger and has within it the potential to match the stronger. That is the position he allows women in relation to men and it is the relationship he desires for Greece with Rome. At the same time, by dwelling on traditional themes of chastity and fidelity, Plutarch is also participating in a discourse in which a concern for bodily boundaries mirrors a concern for social boundaries.<sup>37</sup> The necessary and carefully delineated role within a clear sphere of conduct conceded to women is the same as the position claimed for Greek intellectuals, priests, local elites and

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<sup>36</sup> Swain 1996, 136–8.

<sup>37</sup> Perkins 1995, 46–7.

philosophers in relation to their Roman masters. Plutarch is, to use Jacques Boulogne's phrase, "un médiateur transculturel".<sup>38</sup>

The true antecedent, then, to the *Mulierum Virtutes* is not the body of complex and contradictory literature about women. Rather, it is the Hellenistic legacy to which Plutarch was heir: namely the belief that reciprocity was the key to all social relations, linking the weak and the strong in a relationship with clear boundaries and mutual rights. That is the model on which the radical concession to women is made. Plutarch's women, therefore, are manly and virtuous not only because of his generosity of spirit and the novelty of his intellect, but because it mattered so much to his own place in the world.

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# I INDEX OF GREEK TERMS

ἄβρός	295	ἄσκησις	263; 272ff.; 276; 307
ἄβροσύνη	93	ἀτολμία	31 n. 19
ἀγῆνωρ	39f.	ἀτολμος	31 n. 19; 47; 226
ἄδεές, τό	304	αὐταρκεία	147
αἰδώς	33; 53; 327; 328; 329; 330; 332; 336; 339	ἀφοβόσπλαγχνος	18; 44f.
ἄκυρος	196f.; 209f.	γυναικώδης	339
ἄλεξίκακος	16; 17	δειλία/ίη	28; 96 n. 3; 127 n. 2; 131; 173
ἄλκη	25; 33; 36; 39 n. 42; 65	δειλός	54
ἄλκιμος	78; 79	δαινόν	107ff.; 221
ἄλόγιστος	28; 31; 51; 334	ἐγκωμιάζω	10
ἀναίδεια	10	ἐπαινέω	11
ἄναλκις	79	εὐανδρία	273
ἀνανδρ(ε)ία	9; 13 n. 22; 98; 127 n. 2; 131; 133; 138; 314	εὐψυχία	96 n. 3; 127 n. 1; 128; 220 n. 11
ἄνανδρον, (τό)	28; 30; 86	ἡγορέα	60; 73
ἀνδραγαθία	55 + n. 76; 56; 132	ἡγορέη	35 n. 31; 36; 39 n. 43; 60 + n. 1; 72 n. 33
ἀνδρεία	passim	θαρραλεότης	219 + n. 11
ἀνδρεία πολιτική	50; 53f. + n. 70	θαρρέω	330; 335
ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος	28; 30; 31 + n. 19; 32 n. 21; 56	θαρρύνω	335
ἀνδρηίη	41 n. 48	θάρσος	25; 39 n. 42; 110 n. 23
ἀνδρίζεσθαι	218; 220	θηλυδρίης	89
ἀνδρικός	11; 115 n. 1	θράσος	53
ἀνδρότης	34	θρασύς	16; 105 n. 18; 138 + n. 34; 293
ἀνδρώτης	295	θῶμα	77; 78 n. 5; 80; 89
ἀνήνωρ	35	καιρός	135 n. 22
ἀνῆρ	25; 33; 34; 36; 38; 42f.; 53; 55; 67; 121; 173	κακία	13 n. 22; 173
ἀνήρ-compounds	25; 33; 34; 38 39 n. 43; 60	κακίζω	333; 335
ἀνορέα	14	κάλλος – καλός	35; 42; 59ff.; 62; 65ff.; 69f.; 73; 276; cf. 295
ἄξιωμα	48; 53f.; 55	καρτερέω	52; 106
ἀρετή	n. 76; 68; 70; 73; 128; 132; 135; 213; 235f.; 240; 241ff.; 247ff.; 249 + nn.; 254 + n. 59; n. 60; 255 + n. 61, 62; 320; 334; 335; 338; 341	καρτερία	213; 219 n. 11; 225 n. 23
ἄρρενωπόν, τό	295	κάρτος	36
		κινδυνεύω	47; 106
		κίνδυνος	47; 54; 131 n. 11; 134 n. 19; 189
		κλέος	14; 41f. + n. 49; 59; 69; 70ff.; 73; 270
		κλέος γυναικῶν	325
		κοῦροι (αἰχμηταί)	22; 59f.; 64 n. 15;



	269		222ff. + nn.; 225;
λήμα	80		226; 263 + n. 2;
μαλακός	87; 89; 90; 299		264; 276; 306;
μάχιμος	88 n. 37		335; 338
μεγαλοφροσύνη	303	τιμή	48 + n. 62; 54;
μεγαλοψυχία	219 n. 11; 222		276
	n. 15; 228f. +	τόλμα	31 n. 19; 32; 51;
	n. 27; 236 n. 4;		121 n. 19; 213;
	258		334; 336; 339
μένος	25; 34	τόλμα ἀλόγιστος	28; 31; 51
μιξόθηλυσ	300	τόλμα ἄφρων	51, 106
πολεμέω	16	ὑποκορίζομαι	10; 11
πόνος	see φιλοπονία	ὑπομονή	315
προπολεμέω	50	ὑπτίος	300
πρόφασις	11	φιλ-	30; 31 n. 18
σθένος	36	φιλοπονία	96 n. 3; 220
σωφροσύνη	9; 117 + n. 6;		n. 11; 227; 273;
	118; 121; 137; 138		cf. 308f.; cf. 312;
	+ n. 33; 140		313
	n. 39; 141; 170	φόβος	53
	n. 8; 219; 221;	χάρις	71f.; 72 n. 33

## II INDEX OF LATIN TERMS

<i>fortitudo</i>	237; 241 n. 16	<i>vir</i>	241 + n. 15
<i>Honos</i>	252; 254; 255 + n. 63	<i>virtus</i>	21; 167; 168; 235ff.; 241ff.;
<i>patientia</i>	315		253ff.

### III INDEX LOCORUM

- AESCHINES, 1.18: 158 n. 78; 1.28–30: **123** + n. 25; 1.97: 151; 1.99: 155; 1.101: 155 n. 63; 1.124: **155**; 1.145.1–12: 228; 1.154: 155 n. 63; 1.185: 123 n. 26; 2.79: 132 n. 15; 2.106–7: 130 n. 10; 2.137: 133 n. 17; 2.169: 131 n. 12; 2.176–7: 132 n. 13, 134 n. 20; 3.81: 127 n. 2; 3.163: 135 n. 22; 3.175: 127 n. 2
- AESCHYLUS, *Agamemnon* 11: 170 n. 8, 324; 351: 42 n. 51, 170 n. 8; 1112: 172 n. 15; 1183: 172 n. 15
- , *Fr.* 106 Radt: 38 n. 39; 124 Radt: 38 n. 39
- , *Prometheus Bound* 833: 172 n. 15
- , *Seven Against Thebes* 49–51: 39 n. 43; 52–3: **38**, 45 n. 55; 76: 39 n. 42; 124–6: 39; 184: 39 n. 42; 215: 39 n. 42; 270: 39 n. 42; 498: 39 n. 42; 569: 39 n. 42; 589: 258; 878: 39 n. 42
- ANAXANDRIDES, *Fr.* 2: 249 n. 46
- ANDOCIDES, 1.38: 152 n. 43, 155; 1.107–9: 128 n. 4, n. 5; 2.4: 130 n. 10; 2.17–8: 130 n. 10, 131 n. 12; 3.1: 132 n. 13; 3.12: 132 n. 15
- ANON. *Fr.* 327 (*TGF* II): 249 n. 46; 346 (*TGF* II): 249 n. 46
- ANTIPHANES, *Fr.* 210 (K.-A.): 158 n. 79, 249 n. 46; 212 (Kock): 242 n. 20, 249 n. 46
- ANTIPHON (55), *Fr.* 2 (*TGF* I): 249 n. 46
- APOLLONIDAS (152), *Fr.* 2 (*TGF* I): 249 n. 46
- APOLLONIUS STOICUS, *Women Who Were Philosophers*: 326
- APPIANUS, *Gall.* 18.2: 257 n. 69
- , *Pun.* 13: 239 n. 11
- , *Sam.* 10: 334 n. 32; 12.1–2: 244 n. 28
- ARCHILOCHUS, *Fr.* 114: **66f.**, 69 n. 26
- ARISTIDES, *Or.* 1.281: 135 n. 22; 5–10: 305; 5.8–9: 310 n. 41; 6.56: 310 n. 41; 7–15: 310 n. 41; 15: 305; 16: 310; 18–21: 315; 23: **314**; 23.1–5: 289 n. 5; 25.34–7: 315; 28.15–18: **312f.**; 28.106–15: **312f.**; 30: 291 n. 13; 32: 295 n. 17; 33: 302 n. 32; 34: 295 n. 17, 300, 302 n. 32; 34.55: **288f.**; 35: 302 n. 33; 40.22: 313
- ARISTOPHANES OF BYZANTIUM, *Lexeis* or *Glossai*: 27 n. 5
- ARISTOPHANES, *Acharnians*: 32–6: 147 n. 13; 88: 122 n. 20; 118: 122 n. 21; 377–840: 121 n. 19; 633–64: 121 n. 18; 646: 121 n. 19
- , *Birds* 91: 115 n. 1; 289–90: 122 n. 20; 831: 122 n. 21; 1337: 124; 1349: 115 n. 1; 1473–81: 122 n. 20
- , *Clouds* 14–16: 118 n. 10; 69–70: 118 n. 10; 119–20: 118 n. 10; 353: 122 n. 20; 355: 122 n. 21; 400: 122 n. 20; 510: 158 n. 82; 511: 115 n. 1; 673–80: 122 n. 20; 911: 124; 972: 117; 985–6: 117; 991: 117; 1002: 117; 1003f.: 117; 1007–23: 117; 1043–57: 118; 1052: 115 n. 1; 1058–82: 118; 1327: 124
- , *Ecclesiazusae* 26: 115 n. 1; 75: 115 n. 1; 129: 122 + n. 22; 275: 115 n. 1; 519: 115 n. 1; 679: 115 n. 1; 1281–7: 122 n. 22
- , *Fragments* 129: 122 n. 22; 407: 122 n. 21
- , *Frogs* 48: 122 n. 21; 57: 122 n. 21; 274: 124; 372ff.: **18f.**, 115 n. 1, 158 n. 82; 422: 122 n. 21; 473: 45 n. 54; 489ff.: **17f.**, 44, 115 n. 1; 494–6: **44f.**, 45 n. 54, 115 n. 1; 602: 115 n. 1; 773: 124; 844: 45 n. 54; 1006: 45 n. 54; 1016–17: 38 n. 40; 1024: 45, 115 n. 1; 1064ff.: 45
- , *Knights* 81: 115 n. 1; 82: 115 n. 1; 178–9: 116, 119f.; 196: 172 n. 15; 268: 115 n. 1; 329: 119; 379: 115 n. 1; 437: 117; 451: 115 n. 1; 453: 115 n. 1; 510–11: 121 n. 18, 121 n. 19; 599: 115 n. 1; 1235–6: 120; 1238–9: 120; 1241–2: 120 + n. 14; 1245–7: 120 n. 15; 1255: 120; 1281–7: 122 n. 22; 1293: 122

- n. 20; 1372: 122 n. 20; 1374: 122 n. 21; 1398–1400: 120 n. 15
- , *Lysistrata* 14–41: 123 n. 24; 489–95: 157 n. 76; 549: 44, 115 n. 1; 559: 115 n. 1; 621–2: 122 n. 21; 1092: 122 n. 21; 1108: 44, 115 n. 1
- , *Peace*: 147 n. 13; 11: 123 n. 24; 446: 122 n. 20; 478: 115 n. 1; 498: 115 n. 1; 515: 115 n. 1; 673–9: 122 n. 20; 732: 115 n. 1; 759–61: **16**; 767–74: **17**; 883–5: 122 n. 22; 1295ff.: 122 n. 20; 1307: 115 n. 1
- , *Ploutos* 153–9: 117
- , *Thesmophoriazusae* 101–265: 122; 154: 115 n. 1; 235: 122 n. 21; 415–20: 155 n. 64; 574–654: 122 n. 21; 656: 115 n. 1; 839–45: 115 n. 1, 153 n. 52; 1204: 115 n. 1
- , *Wasps* 19–20: 122 n. 20; 153: 115 n. 1; 450: 115 n. 1; 822–3: 122 n. 20; 1015–1047: **15f.**, 121 n. 18; 1029–43: 121 n. 19; 1187: 122 n. 21; 1200: 115 n. 1
- ARISTOTELES, *Analytica Posteriora* 97b15–20: 228
- , *Ath. Pol.* 45.3–4: 209; 49.4: 148 n. 24; 68.3–4: 209; 68.11: 209
- , *De anima* 433a18–20: 199 n. 14; 433a21: 199 n. 14; 433b10–11: 199 n. 14
- , *Eudemian Ethics* 1218b32: 220 n. 12; 1228a26–30a37: **53f.**; 1229a–1230a: 129 n. 7; 1229b3–14: 54; 1241b18–24: **200**
- , *GA* 769a15–23: 325 n. 16; 772b27: 209; 778a1: 209
- , *HA* 9.1: 296f. n. 21
- , *MA* 698b7: 209
- , *Metaphysica* 1072b13–14: 202 n. 18; 1074b1–14: 208
- , *Nicomachean Ethics* 1098b26: 220 n. 12; 1099a31: 220 n. 12; 1101a6ff.: 255 n. 61; 1101b10ff.: 188, **204ff.**, 207; 1101b24: 204 n. 20, 205 n. 22; 1101b30–1: 205; 1102b28–33: 198; 1106a15: 242 n. 18; 1106b36–1107a2: **197f.**; 1114a23–30: 205 n. 21; 1115a6–1117b23: 129 n. 7, **188ff.**; 1115a: 296, 302; 1115a27–33: 54; 1115b4: 220; 1115b24–1117a27: 127 n. 2; 1116a18–20: 54; 1116a20–9: 54, 127 n. 1; 1116b3–23: 54; 1117b6–10: 229 n. 28, 309f.; 1124b6–8: 229 n. 28; 1126a6–8: 136 n. 30; 1129b29: 237 n. 5; 1137a26ff.: **206f.**; 1140b20–30: 197; 1144b17–21: 198; 1144b30–2: 198; 1145a22–7: 207, 254 n. 60; 1151b15: 209; 1160b32–3: 210; 1161a22–3: 210; 1178a9–1178b32: 188; 1178a19–22: **203**; 1178b3–5: **203f.**; 1178b7ff.: **202f.**, **204ff.**, 207, 254 n. 60; 1179b23–8: **201**
- , *Oeconomica* 1343a25–b2: 147 n. 14; 1343b3–13: 146 n. 3; 1344a23–9: 147 n. 9
- , *Politica* 1252: 153 n. 51, 304; 1253b1ff.: **192ff.**; 1253b18–23: 192; 1254a8–11: **200**; 1254a14–17: 200; 1255b9–11: 200 n. 16; 1255b16–22: 193; 1256b10–22: 147 n. 14; 1257b1–5: 148 n. 16; 1258a19–b8: 147 n. 14, 148 n. 16; 1258b25–7: 148 n. 21; 1258b33–9: 148 n. 21; 1259b1–10: **209f.**; 1259b18ff.: 188; 1259b21–36: **193ff.**, 197; 1259b36–8: **194**; 1259b40–1260a2: 193 n. 9, 197; 1260a4–7: **195**; 1260a8–14: **196**, **209f.**; 1260a14–20: 193; 1260a20–4: 138 n. 33, 197, 323 n. 11; 1260a31–3: 199; 1260a41–b2: 148 n. 21; 1260b3–7: 199; 1264b4–6: 157 n. 75; 1277a14–16: 193; 1277a32–b7: 148 n. 21; 1277a36–7: 148 n. 21; 1277b18–25: **201**; 1277b20–1: 46 n. 56, 324; 1277b25–9: 197, 198; 1277b33–1278a13: 148 n. 21; 1284a15: 241 n. 16; 1289b26–34: 148 n. 19; 1291a33–4: 154 n. 57; 1291b14–30: 148 n. 19; 1316b3–5: 148 n. 22; 1332b3–5: **200f.**; 1334a30: **291**; 1337b18–22: 148 n. 21; 1338b9–14: 127; 1341b8–18: 148 n. 21; 1343a17: 287
- , *Poetica* 1454a22–4: **46 n. 56**
- , *Rhetorica* 1366b11: 53; 1367a30–32: 146 n. 5; 1367a33: 147 n. 11; 1376b12: 209; 1376b27: 209; 1381a21–4: 147 n. 14
- ARTEMON OF MAGNESIA, *Account of Deeds Accomplished by the Virtue of Women*: 326
- ATHENAEUS, *Deipnosophistae* 13.568a: 299 n. 27; 201d: 255 n. 62; 272c: 158 n. 80; 512b4–6: 148 n. 23; 540f–541a: 70 n. 29

AUGUSTINUS, *De civitate dei* 4.21: 255  
n. 63

BACCHYLIDES 5: 70 n. 30; 9.27–31: 70;  
13.175–81: 70

CAESAR, *De Bello Africano* 72–4: 241  
n. 14

—, *De Bello Civili* 3.59.1–3: **237** +  
n. 6; 3.60.1–2: **238**

CALLIMACHUS, *Hymns* 1.94–6: 254 n. 60

CARCINUS (70) fr. 4 (*TGF* I) 249 n. 46

CATO, *De agricultura* 1.2: **242**

CEG 4: 61 n. 5; 6: 61 n. 5; 13: 61  
n. 5; 18: 60; 19: **59ff.**, **73**; 27: **64**;  
28: 60; 43: 61 n. 6; 45: 61 n. 6;  
51: 60; 68: 61; 82: 61 n. 5; 117: 61  
n. 6; 119: 61 n. 4; 136: 61 n. 5;  
150: 60; 154: 61 n. 6; 161: 60; 163:  
61 n. 6; 171: 61 n. 6; 175: 61 n. 4

CHARON OF CARTHAGE, *Biographies of  
Famous Women*: 326

CICERO, *Academica Priora* 1 praef. 1:  
257 n. 69

—, *Ad Att.* 2.1.8: 257 n. 69; 10.8.9:  
241 n. 16; 11.17.5: 241 n. 16;  
16.15.5: 101 n. 13

—, *Ad Fam.* 14.1.1: 241 n. 16

—, *Brutus* 18: 257 n. 69; 261: 238 n. 7

—, *De amicitia* 21: **238**

—, *De divinatione* II 79: 167

—, *De fato* 28–30: 225

—, *De imperio Gn. Pompeii* 64: 238 n. 8

—, *De legibus* 1.45: 241

—, *De natura deorum* 2.30–9: 254  
n. 60; 2.79–80: 254 n. 60; 2.153:  
254 n. 60; 3.87: 248 n. 40

—, *De officiis* 1.32: 307 n. 37; 3.13:  
238 n. 8; 3.25: 227

—, *De oratore* 2.4: 256 n. 65; 2.268:  
248 n. 41; 3.136: 238 n. 8; 3.155:  
243 n. 25

—, *In Verrem* 2.37–59: 247 n. 38;  
4.4–5: 256 n. 65; 13.94: 156 n. 65

—, *Orator* 42: 306

—, *Phil.* 13.30: 257 n. 69

—, *Pro Caelio* 13: 156 n. 67

—, *Pro Murena* 30: 238 n. 8

—, *Pro Plancio* 12: 241 n. 15

—, *Pro Sestio* 60: 257 n. 69; 76: 241  
n. 15; 93: 241 n. 15

—, *Tusculanae Disputationes* 2.43: 241  
n. 15; 5.56: 252 n. 54

CICERO (QUINTUS), *Commentariolum petiti-  
onis* 9: 256 n. 67

CIG<sup>2</sup> II 2786: 255 n. 62

CIL I<sup>2</sup> 195 n. 18: 252 n. 56; 725: 236  
n. 2; 743: 236 n. 2

CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS, *Protrepticus*  
2.20.1: 329 n. 26

COM. FRAGM. 126, 163, 190, 195, 412,  
1286 (Kock): 249 n. 46

DEMOSTHENES 1.6: 135 n. 25; 1.7–8:

135 n. 22; 1.15: 135 n. 22; 1.16:

130 n. 10; 1.19–20: 134 n. 21; 1.24:

135 n. 22, n. 25; 2.12–13: 134

n. 21, 135 n. 25; 2.22–7: 128 n. 5,

134 n. 21, 135 n. 23, 135 n. 25;

3.3: 135 n. 22; 3.4–5: 135 n. 25;

3.21–2: 130 n. 10; 3.20: 134 n. 21,

135 n. 24; 3.24–8: 132, 135 n. 24;

3.30: 135 n. 26; 3.32: 130 n. 10;

3.33–5: 134 n. 21, 135 n. 26; 4.9:

135 n. 23; 4.12: 135 n. 22; 4.36–7:

135 n. 22, 135 n. 25; 4.42: 136

n. 27; 4.44: 135 n. 25; 5.24–5: 132

n. 13, 134; 6.1–4: 135 n. 23;

6.8–11: 135 n. 24; 6.32–3: 135

n. 24; 8.21: 135 n. 23; 8.23: 135

n. 23; 8.36: 135 n. 23; 8.49: 135

n. 24; 8.52: 132 n. 13; 8.53: 135

n. 23; 8.56–7: 132 n. 13; 8.69–71:

130 n. 10; 9.35: 136 n. 27; 9.36–53:

135 n. 26; 9.38: 135 n. 22; 9.67:

135 n. 26, 136 n. 27; 9.73–4: 135

n. 24; 10.3: 135 n. 23; 10.24: 135

n. 24; 10.46: 135 n. 24; 10.55: 132

n. 13; 10.70: **130ff.** + n. 11; 10.73:

135 n. 24; 11.22: 136 n. 27; 13.4–5:

134 n. 21, 135 n. 23; 13.21–31: 135

n. 26; 13.25–7: 132, 133; 13.33–5:

135 n. 24, n. 25, n. 26; 14.8: **133f.**

+ n. 18, n.19; 14.9: 135; 14.14–15:

135 n. 23; 14.28: 134 n. 20; 15.28:

128 n. 4, 128 n. 5, 133 n. 17, 135

n. 26, 136 n. 27; 15.30: 135 n. 26;

18.97: 128 n. 5; 18.215: 128 n. 4;

18.219–20: 130 n. 10; 19.6: 135

n. 22; 19.8: 135 n. 22; 19.15–16:

130 n. 10; 19.88: 132 n. 13; 19.92:

132 n. 13; 19.95: 132 n. 13; 19.146:

132 n. 15; 19.183: 135 n. 22;

19.218–9: 133 n. 17, 136 n. 27;

19.269: 133; 19.336: 132 n. 13;

20.102: 154 n. 60; 21: **136ff.** +

**nn.**; 21.133: 130; 21.151: 154 n. 57;

21.153: 154 n. 57; 21.160–6: 130,

**131**; 21.172: 127 n. 2; 21.208: 154

- n. 27; 22: 123 n. 24; 22.58: 123  
 n. 26; 24.3: 130 n. 10; 24.167: 136  
 n. 30; 27: 151, 156 n. 70; 27.5:  
 155 n. 62; 27.9: 155 n. 65;  
 27.20–1: 152 n. 43; 27.53: 153  
 n. 52; 27.55: 153 n. 52; 28.12: 152  
 n. 43; 28.47–8: 153 n. 52; 32: 151;  
 32.4: 151 n. 39; 32.9: 151 n. 39;  
 33.7: 149 n. 29; 34.5–31: **151**;  
 34.37: 151; 36.4–6: 150, 156 n. 67;  
 36.8: 153 n. 53; 36.11: 150; 36.14:  
 150 n. 33, **153 n. 52, 157**; 36.18:  
**157**; 36.28–30: **156f.**; 36.37: 150;  
 36.43: 150 + n. 33; 36.46, 48: 150  
 n. 33; 36.57: 156 n. 67; 37: 155;  
 39.6: 154 n. 55; 39.35: 154 n. 55;  
 41: 153 n. 52; 44.49: 154 n. 60;  
 44.67: 154 n. 60; 45.28: 153 n. 53;  
 45.31–2: 150; 45.64: 149 n. 29;  
 45.71: 155 n. 65; 45.72: 156 n. 67;  
 46.14: 154 n. 60; 48.14–5: 150;  
 49.22: 155 n. 66; 49.31: 150 n. 36;  
 49.51: 149 n. 31; 50.1: 133 n. 17,  
 134; 50.59: 130 n. 10; 52.8: 155  
 n. 66; 52.14: 155 n. 66; 53.21: 152  
 n. 43; 57.45: 146 n. 6; 59.22: 156  
 n. 71; 59.31: 152 n. 43; 59.45–6:  
 158 n. 79; 60: 127 n. 1, 128 +  
 n. 3, 129 n. 6, 132 n. 15, 255  
 n. 61; 61.8: 128 n. 4, 138 n. 33;  
 61.9: 255 n. 61; 61.13: 138 n. 33;  
 61.19: 128 n. 3; 61.21–3: 128 n. 4,  
 130 n. 8; 61.24: 127 n. 1; 61.26–7:  
 128 n. 4; 61.32: 255 n. 61;  
 61.37–9: 128 n. 4; Pr. 45: 294  
 [DEMOSTHENES] 50.21: 128 n. 3; n. 5  
 DINARCHUS 1.79: 127 n. 1  
 DIO CHRYSOSTOMUS, *Or.* 1–4: **301f.**;  
 1.1–5: **288f.** 296 n. 20, **307**; 1.8:  
**307**; 1.10: **307**; 1.60–1: **307**;  
 1.67–8: **307**; 1.84: 307; 2.2–31:  
 296 n. 20; 3.13f.: 302 n. 33; 4.14:  
 304; 4.29: **309**; 4.30: **302f.**; 4.32:  
**303f.**; 4.33: 306; 4.35: 306; 4.64–5:  
 304; 4.76: 304; 7: 296 n. 19;  
 12.1–16: 307; 8: 307; 8.12–16:  
**308**; 8.27–36: **308f.**; 9: 291 n. 13,  
 307; 11: 307; 12.11: 307; 12.13:  
**300f.**; 13: 307; 13.11–15: 307;  
 13.17: 306; 13.32: 306; 18: 291  
 n. 13; 28: 293; 28.5: **276** + n. 42;  
 29: 293; 31.16: 309; 33: 295; 33.14:  
 308; 34.16: 308; 35.12: 308; 58:  
**293**; 72: 307; 72.2: 308; 72.16: 308  
 [DIO CHRYSOSTOMUS], *Or.* 37: 302 n. 32  
 DIODORUS SICULUS 12.13.1–3: 299;  
 23.9.1: 245 n. 30  
 DIOGENES LAERTIUS 6.1.12: 323; 7.36:  
 227; 7.121: 226 n. 24; 7.170: 228;  
 7.174: 226; 7.202; 217  
 DIOGENES SINOPENSIS (88) fr. 3  
 (TGF I): 249 n. 46  
 DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS 19.9.4:  
 244 n. 27  
 DONATUS, *In Ter. Phormio* 329.3: 247  
 n. 38  
 ENNIUS, *Annales* 516 (Skutsch): 243 n. 22  
 —, *Hectoris Lytra* sc. 188–89 Vahlen: 237  
 EPICETUS, *Discourses* 1.2.1: 222;  
 1.6.28–32: **229f.**; 1.6.32–4: **227ff.**  
 EURIPIDES, *Electra* 839–43: 43; 844–7:  
**43f.**; 947–51: **42f.**, 47 n. 58  
 —, *Fragments* 660 Mette: 157 n. 74;  
 745 N.: 135 n. 22; 787–8 N.: 118  
 n. 13  
 —, *Ion* 533: 172 n. 15  
 —, *Iphigenia in Aulis* 373: 38 n. 38  
 —, *Orestes* 917–22: 147 n. 13  
 —, *Suppliants* 508–10: 127 n. 2; 881–7:  
 147 n. 13  
 FAVORINUS, *In praise of Fortune*: 326  
 —, *In praise of Thersites*: 326  
 FHG IV 360: 326 n. 19  
 FRONTO, *Strat.* 3.6.4: 244 n. 28  
 GALEN, *De sem.* 2.5: 325 n. 17  
 —, *PHP* 7.586: 217  
 —, *An Exhortation to Study the Arts*: 280  
 n. 51; 9: 281 n. 56  
 —, *De methodo medendi* 12.815,  
 1–8 k.: 104 n. 17  
 —, *The Exercise with the Small Ball*: 280  
 n. 51  
 —, *To Thrasybulus: Is Healthiness a Part*  
*of Medicine or of Gymnastics*: 280 n. 51  
 GELLIUS, *Noctes Atticae* 1.6: **251ff.**;  
 1.6.8: **253**; 2.26.7: 236 n. 3; 4.5.5:  
 250 n. 48; 4.8: 248 n. 41; 10.3.14:  
 253 n. 58  
 HARPOCRATION, s.v. *notheia* 155 n. 62  
 HERACLIDES PONTICUS (ap. Athenaeus  
 512b4–6): 148 n. 23  
 HERMOGENES, *Progymnasmata* 7.37–8: 296  
 n. 20  
 HERODIANUS, III 8: 274 n. 39

- HERODOTUS, *Histories* 1.17.1: 77 n. 3; 1.29.5: 160 n. 88; 1.47: 171; 1.79.3: **78**; 1.87: 61, 132 n. 13; 1.123.1: 79; 1.144: 91; 1.155.4: **79**; 1.171: 84 n. 21, 85, 86 n. 31; 1.173: 82; 1.205: 83 n. 20; 1.214: 80 n. 10; 2.102.4–5: **79**; 3.80.26: 56 n. 78; 3.83.3: 56 n. 78; 3.106: 242 n. 18; 3.142.15: 56 n. 78; 4.93: 79; 4.142: 86; 4.198: 242 n. 19; 5.37.8: 56 n. 78; 7.5: 242 n. 19; 7.93: 85; 7.98: 86; 7.99: 41 n. 48, **80ff.**; 7.102: 81; 7.103.4: 81; 7.140ff.: **181ff.**; 7.145: 89; 7.153: **89ff.**; 7.156.3: 92; 8.3.1: 132 n. 13; 8.87: 86 + n. 32; 8.88: 86, 324 n. 12; 8.104: 85 n. 28; 8.144: 242 n. 9; 9.37.2f.: **78** + n. 5; 9.122: 87, 88 n. 39, 90
- HESIOD, *Theogony* 641: 35 n. 31  
—, *Works and Days* 25: 305 n. 35
- HESYCHIUS OF ALEXANDRIA, *Alphabetical Collection of All Words*: 27 n. 5
- HIPPOCRATES, *Airs Waters Places* 95 n. 3; 12–24: **87f.**; 12: 87, 90; 16: 46 n. 57, 88 n. 37, 88 n. 39, 90, 95 n. 3; 23: 88 n. 37, 96 n. 3; 24: 88 n. 37  
—, *De arte* 1.15–17: **99**; 3.5–8: **99**; 4: **100**; 5–7: 100; 5.9–11: 100 n. 11; 8: **101ff.**, 112; *fin.*: 106f. n. 19  
—, *De articulis* 78: 99 n. 9  
—, *De diaeta* 1.28: 95 n. 3  
—, *De genitura* 7: 325 n. 17  
—, *Epidemics* 1.11: 95 n. 1  
—, *Prognostic* 1.1: **110ff.**
- HIPPONAX 84.16–7: 120 n. 14
- HOMER, *Iliad* 2.1ff.: **179ff.**; 2.50–2: 179; 2.80–2: 179; 2.84: 180; 2.144: 180; 2.155–65: 180; 2.185–7: 180; 2.276: 34; 2.536: 38 n. 40; 2.651: 34; 2.671–5: 66 n. 19; 2.833: 34; 3.8: 38 n. 40; 3.17–18: 65; 3.23: 65; 3.27: 65; 3.39ff.: **65f.**; 3.189: 34 n. 26; 4.176: 35 n. 28; 5.529: 33 n. 24; 5.787: 67; 5.801: 66; 6.112: 33 n. 24; 6.156: **35**, 66, 73; 6.186: 34 n. 26; 6.444: 288; 6.475: 34; 7.87–91: **41f.**; 7.228: 34; 7.288: 69 n. 26; 8.170–1: **176f.**; 8.174: 33 n. 24; 8.226: 35f.; 8.228: 67; 9.334: 65 n. 18; 9.498: 254 n. 60; 9.699: 34; 11.9: 36 n. 33; 11.287: 33 n. 24; 11.508: 38 n. 40; 12.205–9: **175ff.**; 12.228–9: **176**; 12.237–43: **176f.**; 12.484: 61; 13.258: 35 n. 28; 14.509: 34; 15.487: 33 n. 24; 15.561: 53; 15.661: 53; 15.665–6: 33; 15.734: 33 n. 24; 16.270: 33 n. 24; 16.857: 34; 17.185: 33 n. 24; 17.279–80: 66; 17.321: 36 n. 34; 17.328–30: 36; 18.317: 34; 20.411: 241 n. 16; 22.71–6: **67**; 22.100: 53; 22.369ff.: 66; 23.276: 242 n. 18; 24.6: 34; 24.41–42: 34; **39**; 24.724: 34  
—, *Odyssee* 1.106: 34; 1.250: 35 n. 29; 1.272–3: 170; 1.297: 170; 2.266: 35 n. 28; 2.324: 35 n. 28; 2.331: 35 n. 28; 4.622: 34 n. 26; 4.766: 35 n. 28; 4.769: 35 n. 28; 6.5: 35; 6.130–2: 38 n. 40; 6.235: 72 n. 33; 6.237: 72 n. 33; 8.159ff.: 66; 9.200: 34; 10.284–91: 35; 10.301: **35**; 10.341: **35**; 11.550–1: 66, 73 n. 34; 13.19: 34 n. 26; 17.482: 35 n. 28; 17.581: 35 n. 28; 18.67–9: 66 n. 20; 18.251: 242 n. 20; 19.124: 242 n. 20; 20.375: 35 n. 28; 21.361: 35 n. 28; 21.401: 35 n. 28; 23.31: 35 n. 28; 23.46–8: 38 n. 40; 23.162: 72 n. 33
- HOMERIC HYMN TO DEMETER 200–5: 329 n. 26
- HORATIUS, *Carmina* 3.24.22–3: 241 n. 16  
—, *Satires* 1.3.40ff.: 11 n. 20; 2.3.60–1: 250 n. 48
- HYPERIDES, *Against Athenogenes*: 151 + n. 42, **159f.** + **nn.**; 6.17–19: 129 n. 6; 6.19: 128 n. 3, 148 n. 17, 158 n. 82; 6.37–8: 132 n. 15; 6.40: 132; *Fr.* A 4 (Burt): 127 + n. 2
- I.v.E. 6, l. 15: 273 n. 36  
I.v.O. 54: 264 n. 4, n. 7; 55: **263ff.** + n. 1, 2
- IBYCUS 151: **68ff.**  
*IG* I<sup>3</sup> 421–30: 151 n. 41  
*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1388.61–2: 147 n. 8; 1492.137: 147 n. 8  
*IG* II–III, 1006, ll. 59–60: 273 n. 36  
*IG* IV.1, 618: 273 n. 38  
*IG* V 1, 660: 273 n. 38  
*IGR* III, 500 (V.): 268 n. 25  
*IK* 24.1, 657: 264 n. 5  
ISAEUS 3.1: 154 n. 60; 3.6: 154 n. 60; 3.9: 154 n. 60; 3.29: 154 n. 60;

- 3.45–51: 155 n. 62; 5.39: 146 n. 6;  
6.5: 130 n. 8; 6.25: 154 n. 55;  
7.32: 154 n. 57; 7.42: 154 n. 57;  
8.35: 152 n. 43; 10.10: 158 n. 78;  
fr. 8: 154 n. 55
- ISOCRATES, 4.68–70: 324 n. 12; 4.91:  
255 n. 61; 4.108: 242 n. 19; 4.197:  
237 n. 5; 6.1: 128 n. 5; 6.5: 130  
n. 8; 6.13: 133 n. 17; 7.74: 129  
n. 6; 8.5–8: 132 n. 13; 8.19–20:  
132 n. 13; 8.21: 158 n. 80; 8.36:  
132 n. 13; 8.44: 134 n. 21; 8.47–8:  
130 n. 9, 134 n. 21; 8.128: 154  
n. 57; 11.10: 155 n. 61; 11.14: 242  
n. 19; 12.30–2: 133 n. 16; 12.178:  
47 n. 60; 12.197: 236 n. 4; 12.198:  
127 n. 1; 12.242: **132f.** + n. 16;  
14.48: 146 n. 5; 16.29–30: 131  
n. 12; 17: **150 n. 35**; 17.2: 156  
n. 67; 17.11–12: 150; 17.31–2: 149  
n. 29; 17.43: 149 n. 29; 18.60–1:  
130 n. 10; 20.8: 140
- IUVENALIS, *Satires* 1.165–7: **19**
- LIBANIUS, *Ep.* 285.2: 295
- LIVIVS 22.10: 248 n. 40; 24.3.1: 244  
n. 28; 26.40.13: 245 n. 30;  
26.47.1–3: 244 n. 27; 27.16–7: 245  
n. 30; 28.11.9: 245 n. 30; 29.27:  
239 n. 11
- LUCIANUS, *Demonax* 12: 298  
—, *Essays in Portraiture*: 302 n. 33  
—, *On the Syrian Goddess*: 297ff.  
—, *Pseudologists*: 306  
—, *Against the Ignorant* 3: 294, 303  
—, *Dream* 6–8, 16–18: **294f.**, 299, 303  
—, *Heracles*: 294  
—, *The Rhetorician*: 3–6f.; 8–9, 10ff.:  
295, 299, 303
- LUCILIUS fr. 532–3 Marx: **242**
- LUCRETIVS 5.858: 241 n. 16; 5.863:  
241 n. 14, n. 16; 5.966: 241 n. 16
- LYCURGUS, 1.43: 128 n. 5, 130 n. 10;  
1.48: 255 n. 61; 1.49: 132; 1.70:  
129 n. 6; 1.76: 132 n. 15; 1.83:  
129 n. 6; 1.104: 158 n. 82; 1.105:  
129 n. 6; 1.108: 128 n. 3, 148  
n. 17
- LYSIAS, 1: 153 n. 51; 1.49: 118 n. 12;  
2.4–6: 127 n. 1, 128; 2.6–8: 324  
n. 12; 2.7–9: 127 n. 1, 129 n. 6;  
2.11–14: 127 n. 1, 128 n. 4, n. 5,  
129 n. 6; 2.23: 128 n. 3; 2.55: 128  
n. 4, 129 n. 6; 2.76–80: 132; 10.27:  
128 n. 5, 130 n. 10; 14.7–15: 130 +  
n. 8; 16.3: 128 n. 5; 16.13: 128  
n. 5, 130 + n. 10, 132 n. 15; 16.15:  
130 n. 10; 16.17: 128 n. 4; 19.37:  
154 n. 55; 19.39: 155 n. 62; 20.25:  
130; 24: 148 n. 24, **149**; 24.11: 139  
n. 37; 27.9–10: 154 n. 57; 31.7: 128  
n. 5; 31.31: 132 n. 15; 32: 153 n.  
51, **158f.**; 34.11: 133 n. 17
- M. AURELIUS, *Medit.* 1.16.2: 306;  
1.17.4: 306
- MENANDER, *Fr.* (Körte-Thierfelder)  
179c: 249 n. 46; 333–4: 157; 338:  
147 n. 13, 249 n. 46; 402–3: 157;  
493: 249 n. 46  
—, *Georgos* 46, 57: 147 n. 9  
—, *Perikeiromenē* 497: 158 n. 79  
—, *Dyscolus* 729–39: 155 n. 62  
—, *Epitrepontes* 378–80: 151 n. 40  
—, *Samia* 234–6: 155 n. 64
- MUSONIUS, *Diatrobe* 4 (Hense): **327** +  
n. 23
- NEPOS, *Eum.* 1.1: 255 n. 61  
—, *Lys.* 1.1: 255 n. 61
- NEW TESTAMENT, *Gal.* 3.28: 320
- ORF 8.4.58: 253 n. 58; 18.4: **253**
- ORIBASIVS 6.10.16: 281 n. 55
- OROSIVS IV 7.6: 245 n. 30
- OVIDIVS, *Fasti* 3.535: 250 n. 48;  
4.347–8: 253 n. 56
- PASSIO S. POLYCARPI 9: 321 n. 8
- PASSIO SS. PERPETVAE ET FELICITATIS  
10: **321**
- PAUSANIAS 6.3.12: 244 n. 28; 6.9.1: 62  
n. 8
- PEREGRATES, *Fr.* 142 (K.-A.) 146 n. 7
- PHILEMON, *Fr.* 71 (Kock) 249 n. 46
- PHILITAS OF COS, *Glosses* 27 n. 5
- PHILO, *Allegories of the Laws* 1.68: 217
- PHILOSTRATUS, *Gym.*: **283** + n. 61  
—, *Vita Soph.* 1.25.11: 255 n. 62;  
480–81: 291; 488: 303, 307, 310;  
519: 305; 520: 300 n. 30; 522: 305,  
310; 527: 305; 528: 305; 532: **300**;  
535–7: **300** + n. 30, 312; 538: 305;  
541: 305, 310; 542: 305; 544: 305  
n. 35; 558: **300**; 559: **300**; 561:  
**300**; 566: 312; 567–8: 300; 571:  
**300**; 586: 300 n. 30; 600: 305; 614:  
**293**; 621: 310; 623: **300**



- PHOTIUS, *Bibliotheca* 161: 326 n. 20  
 PINDARUS, *Fragment* 249a: 70 n. 30  
 —, *Isthmian Odes* 4.11: 60 n. 1, 72 n. 33; 4.50: 72 n. 33; 4.53: 66 n. 21, 72 n. 33; 4.72: 72 n. 33; 7.22: 71 n. 31  
 —, *Nemean Odes* 3.19: 71 n. 31; 3.20: 39 n. 43; 4.79ff.: 74; 5.1ff.: 74  
 —, *Olympian Odes* 1.30ff.: 71 n. 32; 6: **71f.**; 6.76: 71f.; 8.19: 71 n. 31; 8.67: 39 n. 43; 9.65–6: 71 n. 31; 9.94: 71 n. 31; 10.93–105: **71**  
 —, *Pythian Odes* 4.158: 61; 8.36: 62 n. 8; 8.40: 172 n. 15; 9.97–100: 71 n. 31; 10.54–9: 72  
 PLATO, *Alcibiades I* 122d: 242 n. 19  
 —, *Apology* 28c–d: 228  
 —, *Charmides* 222 n. 16; 159b2ff.: 6 n. 12; 164e: 172 n. 15  
 —, *Cratylus* 26 n. 5; 177–88: 27 n. 5  
 —, *Critias* 110c: 242 n. 19; 117b–c: 242 n. 19  
 —, *Crito* 44b–46b: 13 n. 22  
 —, *Euthydemus* 5d8ff.: 6 n. 12  
 —, *Gorgias* 463b1: 305; 465b2: 305; 483a: 136 n. 30  
 —, *Laches* 287 n. 1; 179c–d: 51; 190e4: **5f.**, 51, **105**, 215; 191b–c: 54 n. 73; 191c–d: 51; 191c7ff.: 6 n. 11; 191d–e: 219; 191d3f.: 8; 192c–d: 106, 215; 192e2–3: 225 n. 23; 193a3: **105f.**; 193b–e: **51f.**, 106; 194af.: **52**; 194d: 107; 195a–b: 107; 195d7: **109**; 196a2: 109; 196dff.: 109, **215f.**; 196c: 127 n. 2; 197a–c: 105 n. 18, 110 n. 23, 127 n. 2; 198d5ff.: 109; 199c–e: 107 n. 20  
 —, *Laws* 631b–d: 254 n. 60; 633d: 222 n. 16; 643d: 242 n. 18; 709b–c: 255 n. 61; 772b: 242 n. 18; 837c5: 123 n. 26; 889d: 147 n. 13  
 —, *Phaedrus* 244a–245c: 167 n. 2; 264e–266d: 167 n. 2  
 —, *Protagoras* 329c: 237 n. 5; 347c: 148 n. 18; 349b–51b: 110 n. 23  
 —, *Republic* I–II: 236 n. 4; 352–6: 242 n. 18; 371c: 148 n. 18; 429a–430c: **50**, 54; 451dff.: 157 n. 75; 474d6: 10; 474d7ff.: **10f.**; 493a9ff.: **11f.**; 560c9ff.: **9f.**; 560d–e: 138 + n. 33; 560d8ff.: **9f.**; 560e: 51 n. 68  
 —, *Statesman* 289e: 148 n. 18  
 —, *Symposium* 181d4: 123 n. 26; 188a7: 123 n. 26; 192d: 172 n. 15  
 —, *Theaetetus* 151d: 220  
 —, *Timaeus* 25c–26c: 255 n. 61; 71–2: 167 n. 2, 172 n. 15  
 PLAUTUS, *Amphitruo* 41–5: **239** + n. 10; 212: 241 n. 15; 925: 241 n. 16  
 —, *Asinaria* 547: 241 n. 14; 556–7: 241 n. 15  
 —, *Aulularia* 760: 246  
 —, *Miles Gloriosus* 728: 242 n. 20; 1154: 243 n. 22  
 —, *Mostellaria* 173: 242 n. 20  
 —, *Persa* 549–60: 248f. n. 44  
 —, *Poenulus* 800: 246  
 —, *Pseudolus* 581–2: **239**; 585–7: 240  
 —, *Rudens* 43: 243  
 —, *Stichus* 123–5: 248 n. 44  
 —, *Trinummus* 413: 246  
 —, *Truculentus* 79: 248 n. 43; 493–6: **240**  
 PLINIUS, *Ep. Tra.* 118–19: 272 n. 32  
 —, *Pan.* 1: 302 n. 33  
 PLUTARCHUS, *Amatorius* **319f.**  
 —, *Apophthegmata Lac.* 241B: 329 n. 25  
 —, *Cato maior* 10.4: 257 n. 69  
 —, *Cato minor* 8–11: 257 n. 69; 51.1–5: 257 n. 68; 67–72: 257 n. 69  
 —, *De audiendis poetis* 14E–37B: 296; 31A: **288**  
 —, *De communibus notitiis* 1061A: 223 n. 18; 1070E–F: 215 n. 3; 1076B: 230  
 —, *De defectu oraculorum* 167  
 —, *De E.* 167  
 —, *De fortitudine Romanorum* 318E, 322D: **251** + n. 50  
 —, *De liberis educandis* 3B: **287**; 5C–E: 299; 8F: 289 n. 6  
 —, *De Pythiae oraculis*: 167  
 —, *De sanitate tuenda*: 130A–B: 280 n. 53  
 —, *De Stoicorum repugnantis* 1034B: 226 n. 24; 1039A: 223 n. 18; 1040A: 215 n. 3; 1043C: 218 n. 8; 1046E–F: 217, **224**; 1052C–D: 215 n. 3  
 —, *De virtute morali* 440E–441D: 218  
 —, *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend*: 302 n. 33  
 —, *Marius* 26–9: 252 n. 54; 26.3–5: **252f.** + n. 55; 26.5–6: **253**, 254; 27.10: 252 n. 54  
 —, *Mulierum Virtutes* **320ff.**; **328ff.**; 242F: 320; 243D: **322**; 243E–244A: 333; 244B–E: **340**; 244E–245B: **330**,

- 333, **336**; 245C–F: **336**; 246A–B: **328f.**; 246D–247A: **332**, 333;  
247A–F: 333; 247F–248D: **328ff.**;  
248E–249B: **332f.**; 249B–D: **331**;  
249D–E: **339f.**; 249E–F: **337f.**;  
250A: **328**; 250A–F: **334**;  
250F–253F: **338f.**; 253F–254B: 333,  
**340**; 254B–F: 333; 255A–E: **333**;  
255E–257E: **335**; 257E–259D: **340**;  
259D–260D: **331f.**; 260E–261D:  
**335**; 261E–262D: **330f.**;  
—, *Pyrrhus* 20: 334 n. 32  
—, *Theseus* 27: 324 n. 12  
POLLUX 4.7: 155 n. 65; 4.22: 155  
n. 65; 7.155: 155 n. 65; 7.159: 155  
n. 65; 7.170: 155 n. 65  
POLYBIUS 9.39.2: 244 n. 27; 10.11.7:  
239 n. 11; 10.17.6–16: 244 n. 27;  
10.17.9–10: 245 n. 30; 29.21: 255  
n. 61  
Q. CAECILIUS METELLUS NUMIDICUS,  
*De ducendis uxoribus* = ORF 18 =  
Gellius *NA* 1.6: **251ff.**  
QUINTILIANUS 1.3.14–17: 289 n. 6;  
2.3.12: 296 n. 20; 8.6.34: 241  
n. 17, 243 n. 25; 12.10.34: 241  
n. 17  
ROUECHÉ 1993, no. 72: 273 n. 38,  
**275f.** + n. 41; 74, 75: 278 n. 50;  
89: 273 n. 38, 282 n. 59  
SALLUSTIUS, *Catilina* 10.3: **257**; 54.2–4:  
256 n. 67; 54.4: **256f.**; 54.4–6: 257  
n. 70; 54.6: 257 n. 69  
—, *Iugurtha* 63.2: 257 n. 68; 63.6: 257  
n. 68; 83.1: 257 n. 70  
SAPPHO, *Fragment* 50: 68  
SCHOLIAST ad Arist. *NE* 1116b19: 54  
n. 72  
SCHOLION ad Ar. *Birds* 1655–6: 155  
n. 62  
SCHOLION ad Dem. 21.133 (469a  
Dilts): 139 n. 37  
SCHOLION ad Hom. *Il.* 21.194: 70  
n. 30  
SCHOLION ad Pindar *Ol.* 6.76: 72  
SEG 12.100 ll. 67–71: 153 n. 54;  
26.72, ll. 49–55: 147 n. 8;  
44.1156–82: 282 n. 57, n. 58  
SENECA, *Controversiae* 2 pref. 2: 306; 3  
pref. 16–17: 306; 7.1.17: 236 n. 3  
SENECA, *De ira* 2.4.1: 221 n. 14  
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, *Adv. Physicos* 152–77:  
254 n. 60  
SIG<sup>8</sup> 45: 85 n. 26; 46: 85 n. 26; 1073  
II: 264 n. 4, n. 7  
SIMONIDES 20.5: 61 n. 3; *Fr.* 579.7: 39  
n. 43  
[SIMONIDES] 30 Page: **62**, 73 n. 34  
SOPATROS, *Exc.* 5: 326 n. 20  
SOPHOCLES, *Electra* 839–43: 43; 844–7:  
**43f.**; 949: 47 n. 58; 975–85: **40f.**  
—, *Oedipus Tyrannus*: **172ff.**; 33: 172;  
76: 173; 135: 173; 245: 173; 274:  
173; 312: 173; 314: 173; 331: 173;  
337: 174; 344–5: 174; 524: 174;  
536: 173; 800–14: 174; 873: 173;  
880–1: 174; 1433: 173  
—, *Trachiniae* 12–13: 41 n. 47  
STATIUS SILVAE 1.2.172: 250 n. 48  
STELE 6.21, 31–46 (Pritchett, Amyx &  
Pippin) 151 n. 41  
STOBAEUS, *Ecl.* 2.59.9: 217; 2.59.10–11:  
219 n. 11; 2.61.12–62.2: 219 n. 11;  
2.62–3: 226; 2.63.7: 216; 2.63.8–10:  
217; 2.63.10–25: 217; 2.82.20–1:  
223 n. 20; 2.94.6–10: 226 n. 24;  
2.111.3–8: 226 n. 24;  
5.906.18–907.5: 230  
SUETONIUS, *Div. Iulius* 24.3: 257 n. 68  
—, *Galba* 13: 250 n. 48  
SUIDAS, s.v. *epiklêros* 155 n. 62; s.vv.  
Ἡρόδοτος, Πανύασσις, Πίγρης 84  
n. 22  
SVF 2.604: 215 n. 3; 3.262: 217;  
3.243: 218 + n. 9; 3.263: 217;  
3.313: 215 n. 3; 3.455: 215 n. 3;  
3.510: 230; 3.698: 226 n. 24  
SYLL.<sup>3</sup> 985: 255 n. 62  
TELES, *Fr.* 4b (Hense): 152 n. 43  
TERENTIUS, *Phormio* 127, 329, 608: 247  
n. 38  
THEOCRITUS 17.135ff.: 254 n. 60  
THEOGNIS 98, 117, 124: 63 n. 10; 147:  
237 n. 5; 312: 63 n. 10  
THEOPHRASTUS, *Characters* 30.15–17: 152  
n. 43  
THUCYDIDES 1.21: 48 n. 62; 1.40: 255  
n. 61; 1.71: 31 n. 19; 1.80.5: 134  
n. 20; 1.84.3: 127 n. 1; 2.35–46: 31  
n. 19, 32 n. 21; 2.36: 48; 2.37: 48  
+ n. 61; 2.39.4: **47f.**; 2.40: 48; 2.41:  
48; 2.42: 48, 49; 2.47.4: 110 n. 22;  
2.61.1: 132 n. 13; 2.64: 32 n. 21;  
2.87: 32 n. 21, 255 n. 61; 2.89: 31

- n. 19, 32 n. 21; 3.82: 10, **27ff.**, 30  
 n. 17, 31 n. 18, n. 19, **37**, 46, 49  
 + n. 65, 51, 56 + n. 78, 91 n. 46,  
 138 n. 33, 257 n. 68; 3.83: 31  
 n. 19; 3.84: 31 n. 19; 4.59.2: 132  
 n. 13; 4.62.2: 132 n. 13; 4.78.3: 56  
 n. 78; 4.120.3: 32 n. 21; 4.126.5f.:  
 32 n. 21, 127 n. 1; 5.9.9: 32 n. 21;  
 5.72.2: 32 n. 21; 6.4.3: 92 n. 47;  
 6.59.1: 31 n. 19, 49 n. 65; 6.69.1:  
 32 n. 21; 6.72: 32 n. 21; 7.21.3: 31  
 n. 19; 8.96.5: 31 n. 19  
 TYRTAEUS 10: 61, **67f.**, 72; 12.37–42:  
 72
- VARRO ap. Aug. CD 4.24, fr. 189:  
**255**  
 —, *De lingua latina* 6.93: 252 n. 52  
 VELLEIUS PATERCULUS 2.35.2: 257  
 n. 69  
 VERGIlius, *Aeneid* 5.344: 73 n. 34
- XENOPHON, *Agesilaus* 2.21.7: 30 n. 16  
 —, *Cyropaedia* 8.3.49.1: 30 n. 16  
 —, *Hellenica* 6.2.23: 148 n. 19  
 —, *Memorabilia* 2.1.21: 307 n. 37;  
 2.1.30: 123 n. 26; 2.8: **147**; 3.5.4:  
 45 n. 55; 3.11: 158 n. 79  
 —, *Oeconomicus* 1.1: 155 n. 65; 1.5: 153  
 n. 51; 1.16–7: 147 n. 10; 5.1: 147  
 n. 13; 6.4: 153 n. 51; 7.23–5: 127f.,  
 146 n. 2; 7.30: 146 n. 2; 7.35–43:  
 157 n. 73; 9: 155 n. 64; 9.14–17:  
 157 n. 73; 12.3: 147 n. 10  
 —, *Symposium* 2.11–12: 127 n. 1; 3.4:  
 237 n. 5  
 —, *De vectigalibus* 2.1.7: 158 n. 80;  
 4.14–15, 19, 23: 152 n. 43; 5.5–13:  
 132 n. 13  
 [XENOPHON], *Ath.Pol.* 1.10–1: 150  
 n. 23, 152 n. 43; 1.13: 154 n. 57;  
 1.17: 152 n. 43
- ZENODOTUS (215) Fr. 1 (*TGF* I): 249  
 n. 46  
 ZONARAS 8.6: 244 n. 28; 8.15: 334 n. 32

## IV GENERAL INDEX

*abstinence from action*: see *passivity*

*Achilles* 7; 228 + n. 26; 229; 293f.;  
310; 314 n. 46; 322

*Amazons* 324

*andreia* passim; see also *courage*,  
*manliness*, and *masculinity*

—, action-based 204f.; 213

—, and *Achilles* 7; 228 + n. 26;  
229; 293f.; 310; 314 n. 46; 322

—, and athletics 21; 263ff.; 283; 293

—, and barbarians 20; 38 n. 39; 79

—, and beauty 35; 43; 59f.

—, and biological gender 296ff.; 325

—, and business sense 159f.

—, and children 110; 193ff.; 304;  
340

—, and danger 2; 8f.; 78; 127; 128  
+ nn.; 333

—, and death in battle 61f.; 189

—, and dialectic 52

—, and divination 21; 167ff.; 169ff.

—, and doctors 95ff.; 107f.; 108 n. 21

—, and economy 21; 145f.

—, and endurance 105f.; 113; 221f.;  
224f.; 229; 312; 313

—, and ethnicity 77; 79; 81; 82ff.;  
86f.; 90

—, and geography 77; 81; 85; 86f.; 90

—, and gods 21; 187ff.; 202ff.

—, and *Heracles* 7; 16; 17f.; 22; 115  
n. 1; 227f.; 229; 230f.; 232; 287;  
294; 303; 307ff.; 312; 313

—, and heroes 14; 22; 33; 34; 53;  
54; 97 n. 5; 214; 224ff.; 229 + n.  
28; 230; 232

—, and hoplites 14; 22

—, and ignorance 294f.; 314

—, and loss 2; 223f.; 229

—, and motivation 131

—, and motor cycles 23

—, and the noble 187f.

—, and *paideia* 5f.; 50ff.; 116ff.; 127;  
283ff.; 287ff.; 291ff.; 295f.

—, and performance 22; 78; 92;  
131; 306; 310; 316

—, and philosophers 22, 50ff.; 187ff.;  
213ff.

—, and poetry 296 n. 20

—, and politics 77; 81; 82

—, and prognosis 104ff.

—, and rhetorically constructed

  battlefield 95ff.; 96 n. 4; 97 n. 5;

  98 n. 7; 99 + n. 8; 102f.; 112; 139;  
173; 315

—, and slaves 21; 187ff.; 192ff.;  
194f.; 304

—, and social class 296 + n. 19; 304f.

—, and traditional morality 119;

  122f.; 272 n. 34

—, and tyrannicides 22

—, and vacation 222f.

—, and visual appearance 20; 44; 59;  
73; 274; 278; 287 + n. 2

—, and wealth 148

—, and women 20; 21; 41f.; 46; 77;  
80; 86ff.; 90; 110; 115 n. 1; 128;

  152ff.; 187ff.; 192ff.; 196ff.; 241  
  n. 16; 293; 296f.; 304; 319ff.; 323ff.

—, as a mean 53; 187 n. 1; 188 +  
n. 2

—, as physical attribute 34; 35; 36;  
45; 46; 56; 236; 267; 312

—, Athenian 47ff.; 129

—, circumstances/opportunities for  
195; 202; 218; 219f.

—, comic poets' 13ff.; 115; 121 +  
n. 18

—, comic use of 13ff.; 44ff.; 115ff.

—, competitive nature of 1 + n. 1;  
128f.; 130f.

—, flexible rhetoric of 141; 315

—, martial context 2; 6; 8; 14; 16;  
18; 20; 21; 26; 34; 54; 78; 79; 80;

  91; 95; 115 n. 1; 122; 124; 219

—, morally neutral 1 n. 1; 41 n. 48;  
cf. 248 n. 42

—, natural vs. cultural 127; 297ff.; 303  
305; 306

—, political virtue 47ff.; 50; 54; 56;  
115 n. 1; 116 n. 5; 129; 226

—, prototypical military association 8;  
14; 16; 18; 20; 21; 26; 34; 54; 78;

  79; 80; 115 n. 1; 122; 219

—, semantic history of: ch. 2

—, Spartan 47ff.; 54 n. 73

- , value assigned by community 8;  
15; 41; 98; 129; 213; 224ff.; 226;  
276; 288
- assembly*, as arena for *andreia* 169f.;  
174; 178; 183; 184ff.
- athletes* 21; 71; 263ff.; 283; 293
- beards* 22; 122 + n. 21; 336
- beauty* 35; 43; 59ff.
- , and athletes 71
- , and valor 65; 66ff.; 70
- best example* 6f; 18
- body*, as battlefield 95ff.
- cardinal virtues* 55 n. 75; 216
- children* 110; 193ff.; 304; 340
- comedy* 13ff.; 44ff.; 115ff.; 121 + n. 18
- courage*, see *andreia*
- , and not leaving one's post 3; 6;  
33; 105; 215
- , and gender 33 + n. 23; 79; 86;  
128
- , and opportunities 134f.; 135 n. 22;  
213; 223f.; 230f.
- , and self-defense 136ff.
- , as behavior/performative aspect  
22, 78; 92; 131; 306; 310; 316
- , civil 120; 128; 130
- cowardice* 1f. + n. 1; 13; 69; 97; 103;  
122f.; 129; 131; 133; 136 + n. 27;  
138; 139; 141; 159; 218; 221; 226;  
314; 327
- death* 61f.; 188ff.
- definition*, history of 26
- dialectic*, as an act of *andreia* 52
- divination*, as test of *andreia* 21; 167ff.;  
169ff.
- education* 5f.; 50ff.; 116ff.; 127; 283ff.;  
287ff.; 291ff.; 295f.
- , physical 118f.
- , rhetorical 118f.
- effeminacy* 79; 86 + n. 33; 89f.; 116;  
122 + n. 21; 290; 293; 294f.; 295  
n. 17; 298; 305; 307; 314; 315; 325f.
- emasculation* 44
- etymology* 26
- evaluative language*, performative use of  
2; 9; 10ff.
- , rhetoric of 12; 55; 129ff.; 141;  
173; 315
- fanaticism* 12
- fides*, morally neutral 248 n. 42
- freedom* 81; 82; 132
- , of speech 1
- gods*, and *andreia* 21; 187ff.; 202ff.
- , and *aretê* 254 n. 60
- Heracles* 7; 16; 17f.; 22; 115 n. 1;  
227f.; 229; 230f.; 232; 287; 294;  
303; 307ff.; 312; 313
- historical semantics* 26
- (Homeric) hero* 14; 22; 33; 34; 53; 54;  
97 n. 5; 214; 224ff.; 229 + n. 28;  
230; 232
- hoplites* 14, 22
- manliness*, see *andreia*
- , and civic success 118 + n. 13;  
122
- , and commerce 147
- , and debate 184ff.
- , and sex 119; 122; 123; 124
- , enactment of 78; 92; 131; 306;  
310; 316
- masculinity*, see *andreia*
- , as performance 22; 78; 92; 131;  
306; 310; 316
- , aberrant/excessive 40; 104; 139
- , and athletics 21; 263ff.; 283; 293
- , and *paideia* 5f.; 50ff.; 116ff.; 127;  
283ff.; 287ff.; 291ff.; 295f.
- , and public approval 8; 15; 129;  
224ff.; 226; 288
- medicine* 95ff.
- , as performance 98; 103 n. 16
- oratorical performance*, as act of courage  
313
- paideia* 5f.; 50ff.; 116ff.; 127; 283ff.;  
287ff.; 291ff.; 295f.
- passivity* 22; 135 + n. 23; 138; 141;  
225; 290
- peace* 132ff.; 191
- performative use of evaluative language* 2; 9;  
10ff.
- prototype theory* 6f.
- Rough Riders* 2f.
- semantics* ch. 2; 26
- semantic borrowing* 240ff.; 243; 249
- slaves* 21; 187ff.; 192ff.; 194f.; 304
- , as defective men 146
- sociolinguistics* 21; 235ff.; 243ff.

- Socrates*, as hero 227ff.  
*spin-doctoring* 13  
*unmanliness*, see *effeminacy*  
*value terms* 3; 4; 9; 20  
*virtue*, and beauty 62f.  
 —, and women 241 n. 16  
 —, ethical/martial 236ff.; 247ff.; 254;  
 255; 256  
 —, of things 242  
 —, political debate over 251ff.  
 —, cardinal 55 n. 75; 216  
*war*, and freedom 81  
*warfare*, poetry as 19  
*women*, see *andreia* and women  
 —, and banking 156  
 —, and bodies 328ff.  
 —, and deliberation 208ff.  
 —, and power 157  
 —, manly 321; 323ff.

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